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CRONE v. APFEL, (N.D.Iowa 1999)
JOHN A. JARVEY, United States District Court Magistrate Judge.
This matter comes before the court pursuant to briefs on the merits of this application for Social Security Disability benefits. By order dated June 18, 1999, the matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for the issuance of a report and recommendation. It is recommended that the court find in favor of the plaintiff, and against the defendant, and remand for an award of benefits.
Plaintiff Thomas Crone applied for Disability Insurance Benefits on May 9, 1995, alleging an inability to work since January 15, 1995. Plaintiff's application was denied September 9, 1996. The plaintiff filed a Request for Review of Administrative Law Judge Decision, urging reversal of the decision. On May 18, 1998, the Appeals Council declined to review the plaintiff's claim.
Administrative Law Judge Thomas M. Donahue found that the plaintiff was not disabled in a decision dated September 9, 1996. The decision was affirmed when the Appeals Council declined to review the claim. Despite the plaintiff's alleged impairments, including chronic pain in his neck, shoulders, back, arms and legs; carpel tunnel surgery on his right hand in September 1994; and heart problems which required triple bypass surgery in November 1995, Judge Donahue found that the plaintiff retained the functional capacity to perform and was not disabled.
FACTS
The plaintiff, Thomas Crone, of Tama, Iowa, is 52 years old, married with seven children, five of them still living at home. He has a 12th grade education, and has earned a modest yet steady income from 1962 through 1994, with an unexplained absence of earnings in 1986. Plaintiff had worked as a laborer for a variety of employers since 1980. In August 1994, plaintiff was employed in a Donaldson and Company factory assembling mufflers. His yearly income was more than $15,000 in the three years prior to his injury. In 1992, he earned $15,756; in 1993, he earned $25,833; and in 1994, he earned $21,559. The factory work required lifting and repetitive twisting and bending. On August 23, 1994, plaintiff injured himself on the job, and was put on "light duty" (no crawling, stooping, bending, climbing or lifting more than 15 to 20 pounds) until January 15, 1995, when he quit and filed for disability.
Since he quit work, the plaintiff said he does morning stretching exercises, takes a walk, prepares breakfast (usually cereal) and lunch sandwiches for his children, does some household chores, such as dishes and laundry. (Tr. 51) He is unable to do heavy cleaning, like vacuuming, and he drives two or three times each week for about two miles. (Tr. 51) At home, he picks a little bit in the garden (Tr. 43), but he must take sit-down breaks or naps in between all these activities. (Tr. 43). The plaintiff is able to care for his own personal needs, and takes a variety of pain medications, from over-the-counter pain pills to prescription muscle relaxers, which he said often make him drowsy. (Tr. 52).
For nearly two years, the plaintiff complained to physicians of chronic pain in his neck, back, arms, legs and chest. He consulted with a variety of medical doctors, including an Iowa orthopedic surgeon, two Mayo Clinic doctors in the Orthopedic Evaluation Center, a Grinnell hand surgeon, an occupational therapist, cardiologist, cardiac surgeon, and a physical therapist. Also, he had a Cedar Rapids neurosurgeon as the primary treating physician for his back pain.
On September 7, 1994, the plaintiff had a x-ray of his dorsal and cervical spine which showed dorsal spondylosis and scoliosis. (Tr. 187) On September 15, 1994, the plaintiff underwent an EMG by Marvin M. Hurd, M.D., of Des Moines, which showed evidence of carpel tunnel syndrome. (Tr. 152) On September 20, 1994, W.H. Bower, M.D., in Grinnell, Iowa, preformed surgery on plaintiff's right hand to alleviate pain from carpel tunnel syndrome. (Tr. 153). Daniel J. McGuire, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon from Grinnell, saw the plaintiff in mid-October 1994. Dr. McGuire could not conclude whether the plaintiff's pain was or was not work related, but he suggested the plaintiff may benefit from being on some anti-inflammatories. (Tr. 156) On October 24, 1994, Dr. McGuire wrote, "No doubt, he had some type of job where he was lifting things over something and that could irritate the muscles about the shoulder joint, could irritate the AC joints and could irritate the muscles of the neck. He has some underlying factors that make him a little bit more susceptible to these types of problems. He is an abuser of tobacco products. He has some underlying spondylosis. Obviously, we cannot ignore aging and conditioning, so there is a whole host of things going on." (Tr. 156) Dr. McGuire said many of the plaintiff's aches and pains were in the soft, muscle tissue and would not likely be helped by surgery. (Tr. 157) While the doctor suggested that the plaintiff may be "asked to work while he has aches and pains," (Tr. 157), Dr. McGuire also concluded, "It may be necessary to modify the job somewhat for a period of time." (Tr. 157).
On December 5, 1994, the plaintiff saw Rodney E. Johnson, M.D., at the Iowa Institute of Orthopaedics. The doctor suggested that the plaintiff consider carpel tunnel surgery of the left hand, and that he become involved in an aerobic conditioning program. "At this point in time, I think that he should be restricted from frequent bending and twisting at the waist, push/pull with the upper arms, reaching above shoulder level or repetitive gripping and manipulating of his hands," Dr. Johnson concluded. (Tr. 203).
The plaintiff was evaluated in early 1995 by Lawrence Rettenmaier, M.D., a specialist in rheumatology and internal medicine at the Mercy Arthritis Center in Clive, Iowa, who was "frustrated by his lack of improvement." (Tr. 170). Dr. Rettenmaier's impression was that the plaintiff had "probable chronic pain syndrome/fibromyalgia." (Tr. 170) On December 21, 1994, the doctor wrote, "He certainly has numerous tender points and wide-spread pain." (Tr. 170-171) During a follow-up visit on January 17, 1995, Dr. Rettenmaier assured the plaintiff that there was no evidence of inflammatory arthritis or connective tissue disease, but noted the plaintiff had "numerous tender points about the neck, shoulder girdle, midback and low back." (Tr. 167) He prescribed medication and exercise. Meanwhile, the plaintiff saw David L. Ferguson, M.D., of Grinnell Regional Medical Center in January 1995 mainly because of his elevated blood sugar levels, but he complained about being sore and stiff. On January 24, 1995, the plaintiff told Dr. Ferguson that he is not able to do anything at work, and that he did not feel he could do any lifting. (Tr. 186). "He broke down in tears today and said he needed somebody to tell him what to do," the doctor wrote. (Tr. 186). "I doubt if he is going to be able to return to work," Dr. Ferguson concluded, and recommended that the plaintiff be evaluated at the Mayo Clinic. (Tr. 186).
The plaintiff was evaluated at the Mayo Clinic Orthopedic Center January 30, 1995, and February 1, 1995 by John H. Beaumier, M.D., who concluded that the plaintiff had chronic cervical, dorsal and lumbar strain; spondylolsis involving the fifth lumbar vertebra; possible chronic pain syndrome; and median nerve entrapment involving both wrist areas. (Tr. 175) "I think we are dealing with a lot of chronic pain here," the doctor concluded. (Tr. 176). Also at the Mayo Clinic, the plaintiff was evaluated by James R. Gregoire, M.D., who evaluated the plaintiff's pain medication and suggested that the plaintiff potentially would be a candidate for pain management (Tr. 177) and water aerobics. (Tr. 178).
On March 1, 1995, the plaintiff was seen by Timothy Loth, M.D., a Cedar Rapids, Iowa, hand surgeon, who said the plaintiff's main complaints of back pain radiating into the arms, down the hands with intermittent hand tingling did not fit with carpal tunnel syndrome. (Tr. 190). Dr. Loth recommended a conservative approach — no surgery and pain management treatment. (Tr. 190).
Between February 28, 1995, and April 4, 1995, the plaintiff saw occupational therapist Lisa Christiansen who discussed with the plaintiff the possibility of returning to work at light duty. (Tr. 191) Also, the therapist suggested that the plaintiff return to work with a 15-pound lifting restriction and gradually increase his hours. (Tr. 191). Ms. Christiansen encouraged the plaintiff by telling him that his "recovery is slow but that he should anticipate more recovery." (Tr. 191). However, the therapist noted that the plaintiff had a "very poor understanding of controlling his low back pain and utilizing the techniques that he learned in Pain Treatment." (Tr. 191).
On April 5, 1995, the plaintiff saw James R. LaMorgese, M.D., a Cedar Rapids, Iowa, neurosurgeon who had been the doctor the plaintiff has turned to most often for help with his back pain. Dr. LaMorgese noted that the plaintiff had completed the Pain Treatment Center Program. "The patient continues to have a lot of underlying pain symptoms for which he was originally seen by us," LaMorgese wrote. (Tr. 219). The doctor suggested that the plaintiff could work, "but at relatively sedentary levels." (Tr. 219). "I feel that he should be able to stand and sit at his job as needed. I would recommend that he do no more lifting than 15 to 20 pounds on an occasional basis. I do not feel that he can do any frequent bending, pulling, lifting, stooping, crawling, or climbing." (Tr. 219). Finally, the doctor said the plaintiff had reached "maximal medical improvement" and that the program had nothing further to offer the plaintiff. (Tr. 219). During a recheck on June 16, 1995, and more complaints by the plaintiff of back pain and leg numbness, Dr. LaMorgese said, `I basically feel that there is no major problem at this point." (Tr. 218)
Then, on November 10, 1995, the plaintiff had chest pains and was admitted to Mercy Medical Center in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, by Ersin Atay, M.D. (Tr. 223). Another cardiologist, Todd Langager, M.D., diagnosed the plaintiff with arteriosclerotic heart disease and scheduled the plaintiff for surgery. On November 15, 1995, in St. Luke's Hospital in Cedar Rapids, the plaintiff underwent a triple coronary bypass by Wilson W. Strong, Jr., M.D. There were no complications and the plaintiff was discharged on November 20, 1995. In February 1996, the plaintiff was evaluated by physical therapist, Rick Peterson, of Des Moines, who described the plaintiff as 21 percent whole person impaired. (Tr. 239).
More than a year after Dr. LaMorgese suggested that the plaintiff work at "relatively sedentary levels," sitting and standing as needed and lifting no more than 15 to 20 pounds infrequently, the doctor reassessed the plaintiff on May 7, 1996. "The patient continues to be plagued with significant pain with activity," Dr. LaMorgese wrote. (Tr. 267). "He can only exercise for 10 to 15 minutes without having a lot of increased pain in the neck, shoulders, low back and hip regions." (Tr. 267). Finally, the doctor said the plaintiff "will not have any further improvement as far as I can determine." (Tr. 267). "I feel that his condition is permanent. I do feel that he has a disability related to his cervical and lumbar spondylosis. I do not feel this patient can be gainfully employed at this point in time." (Tr. 267).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Scope of Review -Substantial Evidence
In order for the court to affirm the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) findings of fact, those findings must be supported by substantial evidence appearing on the record as a whole. See Lochner v. Sullivan, 968 F.2d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 1992); Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1184 (8th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Cruse, 867 F.2d at 1184; Taylor v. Bowen, 805 F.2d 329, 331 (8th Cir. 1986). The court must take into account evidence which fairly detracts from the ALJ's findings. Cruse, 867 F.2d at 1184; Hall v. Bowen, 830 F.2d 906, 911 (8th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence requires "something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's findings from being supported by substantial evidence." Cruse, 867 F.2d at 1184 (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966). The court must consider the weight of the evidence appearing in the record and apply a balancing test to contradictory evidence. Gunnels v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1121, 1124 (8th Cir. 1989); Gavin v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1195, 1199 (8th Cir. 1987).
Determination of Disability
Determining whether or not a claimant is disabled is evaluated by a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a-f). First, if a claimant is working and the work constitutes substantial gainful activity, they will not be found disabled regardless of their medical condition, age, education, or work experience. Id. Second, a claimant must have an impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits their physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. Id. Third, if the impairment(s) meets the duration requirement or is listed in Appendix 1, or equals a listed impairment(s), the claimant will be found disabled regardless of age, education, and work experience. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, App. 1, Subpt. P. Fourth, the impairment must prevent the claimant from doing their past relevant work. Fifth, the impairment must prevent the claimant from doing any other work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
To establish a disability claim, the claimant bears the initial burden of proof to show that [s]he is unable to perform his past relevant work." Frankl v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 935, 937 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Reed v. Sullivan, 988 F.2d 812, 815 (8th Cir. 1993)). If the claimant meets this burden, the burden of proof then shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the claimant retains the physical RFC to perform a significant number of other jobs in the national economy that are consistent with the claimant's impairments and vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience. Id.
It is undisputed that the plaintiff has not been gainfully employed since January 15, 1995. The record shows that the plaintiff, by doctors orders, has had a series of restrictions on activities such as lifting and bending; these restrictions have limited the plaintiff's ability to do basic work functions. It is undisputed that the claimant is unable to perform any of the functions of the job in the auto muffler factory that he left on January 15, 1995, or any of the past relevant work as a laborer. Also, it is undisputed that the plaintiff does not have any acquired work skills which are transferable to the skilled or semi-skilled work functions of other work. The ALJ determined that there were jobs in significant numbers in the national economy which the plaintiff could perform. Examples of such jobs included: parking cashier, office helper, locker room attendant, and production assembler. However, the plaintiff's treating physician has determined that the plaintiff is disabled and unable to work. Nevertheless, the ALJ found that the plaintiff's impairment is not a "disability" as defined in the Social Security Act and denied his claim for benefits.
Subjective Complaints of Pain
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly discounted his subjective complaints of severe, disabling pain. When evaluating an applicant's claim of pain or other subjective impairment, the adjudicator may not disregard a claimant's subjective complaints solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them. The adjudicator must give full consideration to all of the evidence presented relating to subjective complaints, including the claimant's prior work record, and observations by third parties and treating and examining physicians relating to such matters as: (1) the applicant's daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency and intensity of pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication; and (5) functional restrictions. Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1321-22 (8th Cir. 1984); Baker v. Secretary of Department Health and Human Services, 955 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1992).
The ALJ "is not free to accept or reject the claimant's subjective complaints solely on the basis of personal observations." Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322 (emphasis in original). Subjective complaints may be discounted if inconsistencies exist in the evidence as a whole. Hinchey v. Shalala, 29 F.3d 428, 432 (8th Cir. 1994); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993). When deciding whether subjective complaints are credible, the ALJ must discuss the five factors, as well as any inconsistent medical evidence, and show that all the evidence was evaluated. Herbert, 783 F.2d at 130. The ALJ must say more than that the testimony on pain is not credible, the ALJ's credibility findings must be explicit. Rainey v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 1279, 1281 (8th Cir. 1987).
In rejecting the plaintiff's claim, the ALJ did not give full weight to the plaintiff's consistent claim of debilitating pain. In two years, the plaintiff saw nine doctors, complaining of the same pain in his back, neck, shoulders, arms and legs. He underwent surgery on his right hand for carpel tunnel syndrome relief. He was evaluated by a physical therapist and an occupational therapist. He completed a course in pain management. In reading the reports and evaluations provided to the ALJ by each doctor, the diagnosis remains constant: the plaintiff is found to have pain in the neck, shoulders, back, arms and legs. Despite the fact that the doctors may not agree on the source of the pain the plaintiff experiences, the doctors consistently reject surgery for more conservative treatment, such as stretching exercises and water aerobics, agreeing that even surgery may not alleviate the plaintiff's pain. The doctors consistently place the plaintiff on work restrictions — light duty with no heavy lifting, no twisting, no bending, no crawling, no stooping, no climbing, sitting, sitting, standing and resting as needed. The doctors consistently tell the plaintiff to try to find ways to manage his pain though clinic programs, suggesting that, indeed, the doctors believe that the plaintiff is in enough pain that he needs to find ways to cope. The ALJ did not give appropriate credibility to the plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain.
Transferable Job Skills
The ALJ agreed with the vocational therapist who stated that the plaintiff, a laborer, had no transferable skills. The vocational expert suggested that the plaintiff could work as a parking cashier, office helper, locker room attendant, or production assembler. If the plaintiff were limited to only very infrequent lifting or bending, then the plaintiff would not be able to perform the job of production assembler. (TR. 28). There are, according to the vocational expert, 600 jobs in the state of Iowa for a parking cashier. (Tr. 28). Of those 600 jobs, many of them require the worker to be stationed where they are exposed to the weather, not completely protected from the extreme cold of an Iowa winter. According to cardiologist Wilson W. Strong, Jr., M.D., the plaintiff should "avoid exposure to extremes of cold because of the known deleterious affect with coronary artery disease." (Tr. 143). Based on the heart specialist's recommendation, even if the plaintiff were able to work, many jobs as a parking cashier would not be viable for the plaintiff, therefore not as plentiful as the vocational expert indicated.
Testimony of Treating Physician
A treating physician's opinion is generally entitled to substantial weight, although it is not conclusive and must be supported by medically acceptable clinical or diagnostic data. Kelley v. Callahan, 153 F.3d 583, 589 (8th Cir. 1998). However, when the physician's opinion amounts only to a conclusory statement, it is not entitled to greater weight than any other physician's opinion. Metz v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir. 1995). The social Security Administration is encouraged to give more weight to the opinion of a specialist about medical issues relating to his or her area of specialty than to the opinion of a source who is not a specialist. Kelley, supra; Metz, supra. The opinion of a consulting physician who examines a claimant once or not at all does not generally constitute substantial evidence. Kelley, supra. Finally, a treating physician's opinion is entitled to controlling weight only when it is well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. Frankl v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 935,938 n. 1 (8th Cir. 1995).
James R. LaMorgese, M.D., a Cedar Rapids, Iowa, neurosurgeon was the plaintiff's primary treating physician. Dr. LaMorgese initially concluded in April 1995, that the plaintiff could work in "relatively sedentary levels," sitting and standing as needed, and lifting no more than 15 to 20 pounds infrequently. Then, more than a year later, in May 1996, Dr. LaMorgese acknowledged that the plaintiff was "plagued" with significant pain and that the plaintiff would not have any further improvement. Finally, Dr. LaMorgese declared the plaintiff's condition permanent and disabling. "I do not feel this patient can be gainfully employed," he said. While the defendant calls Dr. LaMorgese's diagnoses "inconsistent," that characterization is unfair to the physician who analyzed the plaintiff's pain and recovery efforts for a year. During that time, the doctor revised his medical opinion to coincide with the unchanged condition of the plaintiff.
It appears in this case that the treating physician, like the other doctors consulted, was not willing to hastily describe the plaintiff as disabled. Dr. LaMorgese, like the others, initially took a deliberately conservative route, monitoring the plaintiff's progress — or lack thereof — and recommending muscle relaxers, exercise and rest. However, when the plaintiff's symptoms did not abate after therapy, rest and completion of a pain treatment program, the treating physician — a neurosurgeon, recognized as a specialist in his field — declared the plaintiff disabled and unable to work. In rejecting the plaintiff's claim for Social Security disability, the ALJ did not acknowledge the doctor's opinion regarding disability and did nothing to discredit the opinion. In fact, the ALJ has the burden to discredit the treating physician and must demonstrate that his diagnosis of disability for the plaintiff is inconsistent with other medical opinions. Here, Dr. LaMorgese's diagnosis was consistent with other well-supported medical opinions.
Upon the foregoing,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that, unless any party files objections to the Report and Recommendation in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b) within ten (10) days of the service of a copy of this report and recommendation, the court find in favor of the plaintiff and remand for an award of benefits retroactive to May 1996. September, 1999.
Objections must specify the parts of the report and recommendation to which objections are made. Objections also must specify the parts of the record, including exhibits and transcript lines, which form the basis for such objections. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. Failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356 (8th Cir. 1990).
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