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U.S. v. ELIAS, (Idaho, 1999)

United States District Court, D. Idaho.
Oct 12, 1999
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

B. LYNN WINMILL, Chief Judge, United States District Court.

INTRODUCTION

The Court has before it Elias's motion for disclosure and the Government's motion to reconsider. The Court will deny both motions, and explains its reasoning on each issue raised below.

1. Voir Dire

Elias's motion for disclosure seeks, among other things, a criminal background check of jury foreperson Boyd Greenlee. Elias asserted that during voir dire, Greenlee failed to reveal that he had been convicted of a DUI. The Court ordered that a criminal background check be provided to the Court in camera. That background check has been done, and reveals only a single item, a DUI conviction on November 9, 1983, almost 16 years prior to the voir dire in this case.

Greenlee did not reveal this DUI during voir dire. Elias seeks to interview Greenlee or hold some type of hearing where Elias can explore Greenlee's failure to reveal his DUI during voir dire. The Court finds that Elias is not entitled to such a hearing.

During voir dire, the Court initially asked the panel whether any of them had "ever been arrested on a felony or serious misdemeanor charge?" See Transcript at 595. Shortly thereafter, the Court expressed "[t]he concern . . . that if you have had some involvement . . . with the criminal justice system, that you may feel that maybe the case wasn't handled properly and that it created an attitude or belief on your part that might tend to make it difficult for you to be fair and impartial in this case." Id. at 596-97. After listening to some juror responses, the Court then explained that it was asking two questions: The first question was whether the jurors had ever been convicted of a "felony or serious misdemeanor;" the second question was whether the "conviction . . . might affect your impartiality." Id. at 597.

After some colloquy with jurors, and in response to a question from a juror, the Court expanded on its definition of the convictions that were relevant by stating, "[w]ell, felony or serious misdemeanor like a DUI or anything." Id. at 598. In response, four jurors revealed that they had been convicted of DUIs. Three of those jurors also identified the age of their convictions: Two jurors had convictions about 10 years old, and a third had one about 6 years ago. The fourth juror was not asked and did not identify when his conviction occurred. The four jurors were then asked a follow-up question as to whether they could be fair, and each answered yes. Greenlee did not volunteer any response either to the first question regarding past convictions or to the second question regarding his ability to be impartial.

Given Greenlee' s failure to respond, the issue becomes whether this Court should hold another evidentiary hearing, this time to determine the reasons behind Greenlee's failure to reveal his 16-year-old DUI during voir dire. The Court recognizes that when resolving allegations of juror misconduct, "it is preferable that a hearing be held." Hard v. Burlington Northern R.R., 812 F.2d 482, 485 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, the Court has discretion whether to hold a hearing, and "is to be guided by the content of the allegations, the seriousness of the alleged misconduct or bias, and the credibility of the source in determining whether a hearing must be held." Id.

The Court has already held one evidentiary hearing to investigate Greenlee's statements concerning what another juror told him about a contact with Elias.

To determine the weight and seriousness of the allegations against Greenlee, the Court must to some degree look at the merits of the claim. If the claim clearly has no substantive merit or effect, it is much less likely that a hearing is necessary.

"An honest yet mistaken answer to a voir dire question rarely amounts to a constitutional violation; even an intentionally dishonest answer is not fatal, so long as the falsehood does not bespeak a lack of impartiality." Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973, (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 575 (1998). Accordingly, a juror's failure to disclose information will not warrant a new trial unless the juror's lack of candor impaired the right to an impartial jury. See McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 549 (1984). Such a rule comports with the well-established principle that "a [defendant] is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one, for there are no perfect trials." Id. at 553. Errors that do not affect the essential fairness of the trial are to be ignored. Id. Elias must show "that [Greenlee] failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause." McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556.

In applying the second prong to this case, it is important that the four jurors who had DUI convictions were not challenged for cause because each testified that he could still be fair. This shows that Greenlee's 16-year-old DUI was, by itself, not enough to raise a challenge for cause so long as Greenlee could be fair. The real concern is that Greenlee's failure to reveal the DUI prevented a follow-up question concerning whether Greenlee could be fair despite the DUI. In other words, did Greenlee hide his DUI conviction in an attempt to hide his bias?

A hearing would certainly help answer this question. But if that was the standard for granting hearings, a hearing would be automatically held whenever a juror failed to reveal something at voir dire. In every such case, the juror might have kept silent in an effort to hide bias, and a hearing could reveal if that was in fact the juror's motivation. This would be especially true when the unrevealed item was a criminal conviction. Nevertheless, there is no rule in this Circuit providing an automatic right to a hearing whenever a juror fails to reveal any past criminal conviction during voir dire. Hard gives the district court discretion, depending on all the circumstances. There is no exception in Hard that removes the issue from the district court's discretion simply because the matter not revealed was a criminal conviction.

Given that this Court has discretion, the issue under Hard becomes whether the conviction is serious enough that the Court should exercise its discretion to hold a hearing and interview Greenlee concerning his motivations for failing to reveal the conviction. The Court thinks not, for three reasons: The conviction (1) was a single misdemeanor, (2) committed almost 16 years prior to the voir dire in this case, and (3) was entirely a state court matter having nothing whatsoever to do with the U.S. Attorney or federal court.

It is hard to imagine a more remote and irrelevant offense. If these circumstances warrant a hearing, then any failure to reveal a criminal conviction will trigger a hearing — this Court will be stripped of its discretion, Hard will be overruled, and, in a twist on an old adage, the rule will swallow all exceptions.

These exceptional circumstances are by definition rare. Certainly a hearing will be required in the vast majority of cases where a juror fails to reveal criminal convictions. That is why Hard directs that "it is preferable that a hearing be held." Hard, 812 F.2d 482, 485. However, in a small minority of cases, the conviction is so remote and irrelevant that a hearing is unnecessary. That is why Hard did not make hearings mandatory but left some discretion with the district court. This case falls within that small minority of cases, and hence no hearing will be set to explore Greenlee's motivations for failing to reveal his DUI conviction.

2. Juror Greenlee's Contacts With Government Agents

Elias also seeks to interview Greenlee concerning his contacts with Government agents. In his briefing, Elias makes his argument as follows:

It is the defense's understanding that the Government attorneys and agents were staying at [the same hotel as Greenlee]. Despite the fact that there are at least five other hotels within 300 yards of [that hotel], Greenlee chose the same hotel the Government had previously chosen to reside during the trial. This alone raise at least the appearance of impropriety.
When asked by the Court at the July 2, 1999, hearing if he had any contacts with the case agents or attorneys, Greenlee did not mention that he had stayed at the same hotel as the Government agents and attorneys, nor did he acknowledge any contact with them. However, juror Burkhardt testified that "Boyd [Greenlee], I know he said that he had either seen them [the government attorneys] or bumped into them at his hotel. I don't know what went on."
Finally, the defense has reason to believe that not all of the circumstances regarding the Government's post-trial interview of Greenlee has been disclosed. Greenlee stated that he "was hoping somebody would call him" when the Government called. No questions were asked regarding this matter at the July 2, 1999, hearing.
See Defendant's Brief at 3.

These arguments raise nothing of substance requiring follow-up at a hearing. The fact that Greenlee stayed at the same hotel means nothing. The vast majority of all parties to federal court litigation in Pocatello stay in one of those five hotels, so it is not much of a statistical anomaly — and hence not suspicious — that Greenlee and the Government chose the same hotel. Greenlee may have seen or "bumped into" Government attorneys but there is no evidence that he talked to them or had any improper contact with them. The fact that Greenlee was hoping someone would call also signifies nothing. For all these reasons, the Court will not permit Elias to interview Greenlee on his contacts with Government agents or attorneys.

3. Government's Motion to Reconsider

First, the Court will note that its September 14, 1999, order inadvertently set sentencing in Boise, and the Court will amend that Order to provide that the sentencing will take place in Pocatello. Second, the Court declines the Government's request to move the sentencing date up.

Third, the Court was not, in its earlier opinion, making any findings on credibility issues or presaging how it would rule in the future. Outside of the change in the location of the sentencing, the motion to reconsider is denied.

4. Further Motions

The Court finds that no further hearing is necessary on any issue. If any of the parties desire to file further motions, the deadlines for the filing of those motions will be governed by the dates set in the Order portion of this decision.

ORDER

In accordance with the Memorandum Decision above,

NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that the motion for disclosure (docket no. 185) and motion to reconsider (docket no. 196) are hereby DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that sentencing shall take place in the Federal Courthouse in Pocatello, Idaho.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that any further motions with supporting briefs and any supporting documents must be filed on or before October 20, 1999. Any response to those motions must be filed on or before November 1, 1999. Any final reply briefs shall be filed on or before November 5, 1999. The Court shall hear oral argument on any motion on November 9, 1999, at 9:00 am in the Federal Courthouse in Pocatello, Idaho.