RANDALL v. SAFECO LIFE INSURANCE CO., (N.D.Tex. 2000)

A. JOE FISH, United States District Judge.

Before the court are the motions of the plaintiff Eric Christopher Randall ("Randall") to remand and of the defendant SAFECO Life Insurance Company ("SAFECO") to transfer venue. For the following reasons, the motion to remand is granted, while the motion to transfer venue is denied as moot.

Randall filed suit in the 134th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas on August 23, 1999. See Plaintiff's Original Petition and Request for Disclosure ("Petition"), attached as Exhibit 1 to Defendant's Amended Notice of Removal ("Notice"). In his original Petition, Randall alleges that he is the annuitant and the beneficiary under the SAFECO Life Insurance Company Annuity Contract No. AA512552 (the "Contract"). See Petition at 2; see also Contract, attached as Exhibit A to Petition. He also alleges that SAFECO has been wrongfully paying the benefits of this contract to a person other than himself, namely his father. Petition at 2. Randall seeks to recover the $52,000.00 in benefits that were allegedly wrongfully paid to his father from December 20, 1987 up through December 20, 1994. Petition at 2-3.

SAFECO was served with the suit on August 27, 1999. It timely filed its amended notice of removal with this court, alleging that diversity jurisdiction exists in this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Notice at 1-2. Randall has since moved to remand this case back to the court from which it was removed. See generally Plaintiff's Motion to Remand Removed Action and Supporting Brief ("Motion to Remand").

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) permits removal of "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction." Removal jurisdiction must be strictly construed, however, because it "implicates important federalism concerns." Frank v. Bear Stearns Company, 128 F.3d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Willy v. Coastal Corporation, 855 F.2d 1160, 1164 (5th Cir. 1988). Furthermore, "any doubts concerning removal must be resolved against removal and in favor of remanding the case back to state court." Cross v. Bankers Multiple Line insurance Company, 810 F. Supp. 748, 750 (N.D. Tex. 1992). The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party seeking removal. Frank, 128 F.3d at 921-22; Willy, 855 F.2d at 1164.

There are two principal bases upon which a district court may exercise removal jurisdiction: (1) the existence of a federal question and (2) complete diversity of citizenship among the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1332. This court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the instant case on the basis of a federal question because the case does not present any issues "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However, this court can properly exercise jurisdiction on the basis of diversity of citizenship provided that the plaintiff does not share citizenship with the defendant and the case involves an amount in controversy of at least $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a).

There is no dispute that complete diversity of citizenship exists. See Notice at 2. Randall argues, however, that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because SAFECO has not established that the amount in controversy is at least $75,000. See Motion to Remand at 1-2. SAFECO, in turn, argues that diversity jurisdiction exists since there is actually $87,000.00 at stake in this case. See generally Defendant SAFECO Life Insurance Company's Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand Removed Action and Supporting Brief ("Response").

"It has long been recognized that `unless the law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith.'" St. Paul Reinsurance Company, Ltd. v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Company v. Red Cab Company, 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938)); also De Aguilar v. Boeing Company, 47 F.3d 1404, 1408-09 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 865 (1995). Moreover, the right to remove is "to be determined according to the plaintiffs' pleading at the time of the petition for removal." Pullman Company v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537 (1939). See also Brown v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 901 F.2d 1250, 1254 (5th Cir. 1990) ("When a defendant seeks to remove a case, the question of whether jurisdiction exists is resolved by looking at the complaint at the time the petition for removal is filed."). At the time SAFECO removed this case, Randall claimed only $52,000.00 in benefits, the amount then due and payable.

As the amount in controversy in this case is only $52,000.00, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Therefore, Randall's motion to remand is GRANTED, and this case is REMANDED to the 134th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas. The clerk shall mail a certified copy of this memorandum order to the district clerk of Dallas County, Texas. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (c).

SO ORDERED.