BOYLE v. LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC., (N.D.Ill. 2000)

WAYNE R. ANDERSON, United States District Judge

Before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment brought by defendant Lucent Technologies. Plaintiff Victoria M. Boyle filed a one Count Complaint alleging that she was discharged in retaliation for her filing of an internal sexual harassment complaint and a complaint before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. For the following reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.

BACKGROUND

Boyle started working for the defendant in 1984. In 1990, she was declared a surplus employee and in danger of being discharged. In November of 1990, John Kulzer hired Boyle as a Tier 3 secretary in the department he supervised. Plaintiff worked for Kulzer until April of 1993. During that time, Kulzer prepared several performance evaluations for Boyle. In some of the evaluations he rated her performance as satisfactory and in others he rated her performance unsatisfactory. In March of 1993, Kulzer prepared an evaluation of unsatisfactory and gave plaintiff the option of resigning or being demoted to a Tier 2 secretary. Boyle chose to remain employed by the defendant. On March 1, 1993, Boyle began working for Len Gilchrist, another supervisor, as a Tier 2 secretary.

Boyle appealed her performance review. From 1984 to 1990 Boyle had never been written up for poor work performance. In the appeal process, plaintiff stated that the reason for the unsatisfactory evaluation was that Kulzer sexually harassed her. Both parties have stipulated that the facts which Boyle contends support her internal sexual harassment complaint are irrelevant to the instant lawsuit. Boyle attempted to file a charge with the EEOC, but was told that her claim was barred by the statute of limitations.

During the investigation of Boyle's sexual harassment claim, she attempted to deal directly with James M. Staulcup, defendant's in-house attorney. As a result, she was assigned to work at home. Boyle alleges that the assignment was retaliation for her complaint. After completing its investigation, defendant concluded that there was no basis for Boyle's claims. Plaintiffs former position with Len Gilchrist was no longer available. Furthermore, Boyle stated that she did not want to be returned to that position. Therefore, defendant began to search for other available positions.

Staulcup contacted Dominick Spagnuolo, head of human resources, and requested that Spagnuolo find a new position for Boyle. Spagnuolo had some knowledge of Boyle's allegations of sexual harassment. Staulcup asked Spagnuolo to refrain from disclosing Boyle's history to potential new supervisors. Spagnuolo discovered a Tier 2 opening under Lee Stecher. Spagnuolo contacted Stecher and asked Stecher to consider plaintiff for the position. Spagnuolo did not inform Stecher about Boyle's previous allegations of sexual harassment.

Stecher thought that Boyle was a friend or relative of someone in management. At the time Stecher received Spagnuolo's request, Lucent was downsizing its workforce, and Stecher thought that he was doing a favor for someone in management. Stecher was told not to ask about Boyle's personnel file or her background in the company. Stecher's secretary, Marilyn Twist, interviewed Boyle and recommended that she be hired. Stecher hired Boyle to be a Tier 2 secretary in his department. Boyle's benefits and salary remained the same.

Boyle's role was to assist other secretaries in the department. She was responsible for handling other secretaries' duties when they were absent. Stecher began to receive complaints about Boyle's performance soon after she staffed. Twist told Stecher that she felt Boyle was not capable of performing the tasks assigned to her. Stecher also received complaints from other department heads that plaintiff would not finish her assigned work. Another department head told Stecher that she would rather not have a secretary than have Boyle assigned to cover her secretary's desk in the future. Stecher also personally experienced some of Boyle's performance problems. She failed to turn in his long-distance reimbursement form, she had difficulty processing mail and expense vouchers, and she had trouble filing.

Boyle and Stecher met to discuss her work performance. Boyle asked Stecher about the department and about her job duties. Stecher gave her a video which explained the department and a list of job expectations. Stecher expressed concern that Boyle lacked job knowledge, initiative, and attention to detail. Stecher also informed Boyle that he arranged for further training. Stecher prepared a memorandum summarizing the meeting. Boyle disagrees with some of Stecher's criticisms but she admits that she picked up the wrong mail, failed to input correct data into the payroll system, and failed to update the payroll system.

Boyle and Stecher met a second time to discuss other problems with plaintiff's performance. Plaintiff admitted that some of the further criticisms were correct. Consistent with standard company practice Stecher sent a copy of his notes to Staulcup.

Stecher met with Boyle a third time to discuss her performance. Stecher criticized plaintiff for her failure to complete a project. Further, he noted that she failed to process the mail on a day in which she was covering for another secretary. Finally, Stecher complained about the quality of an assignment. At this meeting, Stecher informed Boyle that he was putting her on probation because her work was unsatisfactory.

After the probationary period, Stecher prepared a formal evaluation in which he stated that Boyle was more willing to take assignments during the probationary period. However, he noted that the quality of her work did not improve. Stecher stated that Boyle could only be assigned work which was "robotic in nature" with very detailed instructions and that she worked much slower than other clerks. After the probationary period, Stecher decided to discharge Boyle. He noted that Boyle did not have the essential talents or capabilities for employment in the clerical area. Boyle claims that Stecher's evaluation of her performance was not honest.

Stecher was the sole decision maker with respect to Boyle's termination. Consistent with company policy, he consulted with Spagnuolo before placing plaintiff on probation. When Stecher discharged Boyle he was not aware of her prior complaints of discrimination. Boyle testified that she saw two or three pieces of correspondence between Staulcup and Stecher describing her performance. The first was dated before she started working for Stecher and two others were dated after she had started. Boyle could not recall any reference, in the correspondence, to her filing of a sexual harassment claim. Boyle has provided no evidence that Stecher knew of her harassment claim against Kulzer.

Boyle filed a charge of discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. After several amendments, the complaint contained two allegations of retaliation: first, that defendant retaliated against Boyle when Stecher placed her on probation; and second, that defendant retaliated against Boyle when Stecher decided to terminate plaintiff. Boyle filed a one count Complaint before this Court. She alleges retaliatory discharge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment carries the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of evidence to support the position of the nonmoving party. Doe v. R.R. Donnelley Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1994). The nonmoving party must then set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine dispute about a material fact exists only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

In making this determination, the Court must draw every reasonable inference from the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and should not make credibility determinations or weigh evidence.Association Milk Producers, Inc. v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., 27 F.3d 268, 270 (7th Cir. 1994). The nonmoving party must support its contentions with admissible evidence and may not rest upon the mere allegations in the pleadings or conclusory statements in affidavits. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment against a party who fails to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. The production of only a scintilla of evidence will not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Employment discrimination cases, while often turning on factual questions, are nonetheless amenable to summary judgment when there is no genuine dispute of material fact or there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate the presence of the alleged motive to discriminate. Cliff v. Board of School Comm'rs, 42 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1994). With these standards in mind, we turn to the motion before us.

In her Complaint, plaintiff delineates several instances of alleged retaliation: first, the involuntary leave of absence from her job; second, her transfer to work under Stecher's supervision; third, another alleged involuntary leave of absence; and, fourth, Stecher's decision to place her on probation and his decision to discharge her.

Since Boyle has offered no direct evidence of discrimination, she must rely on the McDonnell Douglas indirect burden shifting method. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Under the application of McDonnell Douglas to a retaliation claim, Boyle must establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she engaged in statutorily protected expression, she suffered an adverse employment action, and there existed a causal connection between her protected expression and the adverse employment action. Sanchez v. Henderson, 188 F.3d 740, 745-46 (7th Cir. 1999), cert den. 120 S.Ct. 1201 (2000). Defendant admits that Boyle engaged in statutorily protected expression, but disputes all other portions of the prima facie case as they relate to Boyle's multiple claims. If Boyle is able to establish a prima facie case, the defendant has the burden of producing a valid non-retaliatory reason for the discharge. Id. at 746. The plaintiff must then rebut the employer's proffered reason by proving that it is mere pretext for discrimination. Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996).

I. Involuntary Leave of Absence

Although Boyle's Complaint alleges two involuntary leaves of absence, she admits that only one leave of absence occurred. Defendant claims that the transfer home during the investigation of Boyle's sexual harassment claim was not an adverse employment action because it was temporary and brought no change in plaintiffs compensation or benefits. We agree. A transfer involving no reduction in compensation and no more than a minor change in working conditions is clearly not an adverse employment action. Flaherty v. Gas Research Institute, 31 F.3d 451, 456-57 (7th Cir. 1994). However, working at home is a major change in working conditions. The critical factor, which is not in dispute, is that this transfer was temporarily implemented for the duration of the investigation of Boyle's claims of sexual harassment. Since the transfer was temporary, Boyle retained identical compensation, and defendant transferred her back to work after the close of the investigation, the transfer is not an adverse employment action. Thus, Boyle cannot state a prima facie case for this claim.

Furthermore, even if Boyle could establish her prima facie case, she has advanced no argument to rebut defendant's legitimate non-retaliatory justification. Defendant stated that Boyle was transferred because she continually attempted to directly contact Staulcup instead of communicating through her attorney. The desire to avoid that contact is a legitimate reason for the temporary transfer, and therefore, Boyle's temporary involuntary leave of absence does not support her retaliation claim.

II. Transfer to Work Under Stecher

Plaintiff claims that her transfer to work under Stecher was an adverse employment action. Plaintiff clearly cannot meet her burden in establishing a prima facie case on this claim. After her transfer, her salary and benefits remained unchanged. Furthermore, she continued to operate as a Tier 2 secretary, the same job she held before the transfer. Adding a new responsibility or requiring an employee to learn a new skill is not a materially adverse employment action. Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, Boyle's attorneys informed defendant that she did not want to return to her former position. Thus, Boyle's transfer does not support her retaliation claim.

III. Probation and Discharge

Boyle is closer to meeting her prima facie case on her probation and discharge claims. She engaged in protected expression and she clearly suffered an adverse employment action. However, Boyle has no evidence to show a causal connection between her protected expression and her probation and discharge. She argues that "the web of entangled relations between all the employee's involved in Boyle's charge of sexual harassment" can create the inference that her protected activity was likely the reason for the adverse action. Boyle is correct that circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to raise such an inference, but in order to show a causal connection she must have some evidence that Stecher knew of her sexual harassment claim or her IDHR charge. Damato v. Jack Phelen Chevrolet Geo, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 283, 288 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Boyle argues that the relationship between Stecher and Spanuolo and the letters that she saw should create an inference that Stecher knew of her sexual harassment claim. Stecher, however, testified that he had no knowledge of the claim. Furthermore, Spagnuolo testified that he purposely did not inform Stecher about the sexual harassment claim in order to give Boyle a fresh start. Finally, Boyle could not remember whether the letters contained references to her sexual harassment claim. The facts here are not sufficient to give rise to an inference that the adverse employment action was caused by Boyle's protected expression.

Plaintiff cites a Third Circuit case for her proposition that a pattern of antagonism can give rise to an inference of retaliation, Kachmar v. SunGard Data Systems, Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3rd Cir. 1997). InKachmar, the Third Circuit clearly focuses on the temporal proximity between the protected expression and the retaliation. Id. Plaintiff admits that such a proximity does not exist here. Plaintiff however, posits that defendant may have purposely waited to discharge her in order to avoid the inference or appearance of retaliation. Boyle's claims rest on total conjecture and does not evidence a pattern of antagonism. She admits that she made many of the errors that formed the basis for Stecher's decision to put her on probation and eventually discharge her. In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must present more than conjecture. Boyle must provide admissible evidence. She has no evidence that Stecher knew of her sexual harassment claim and she does not dispute the fact that it was he who made the decision to put her on probation and to discharge her.

Even if plaintiff were able to establish a causal connection, however, she has not shown Stecher's legitimate non-retaliatory reasons to be pretextual in nature. In answering Lucent's Statement of Material Facts, Boyle admits that many others in the department had problems with her work, that she failed to complete several projects, and that she produced low quality view graphs for Stecher. She also admits that Stecher had three meetings with her in which he clarified her job expectations, criticized her work, and arranged for more training in her position. Only after those efforts failed to improve her performance did Stecher place Boyle on probation. Boyle also admitted that during the probationary period she failed to complete a project for Stecher and the portions of the project she did complete contained misspellings. The record shows that Stecher had ample legitimate basis for both the probation and the discharge.

Boyle counters with her assessment that she felt her performance was satisfactory. Self serving statements by plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases are not sufficient to establish satisfactory performance. Gustovich v. AT T Communications, Inc., 972 F.2d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 1992) ("An employee's self-serving statements about his ability, however, are insufficient to contradict an employer's negative assessment of that ability"); Williams v. Williams Elec., Inc., 856 F.2d 920, 924 (7th Cir. 1988) (employee's self interested assessment of her own job abilities are insufficient to raise an issue of fact). It is Boyle's burden to show that she has satisfied her employer's legitimate expectations, and evidence that defendant was not satisfied requires a dismissal of the Title VII claim. Villa v. City of Chicago, 924 F.2d 629, 631 (7th Cir. 1991). Boyle's only evidence is the lack of earlier complaints. However, she does not disagree with any of the specific complaints that Stecher identified. It is not our job to grade plaintiffs performance and determine whether those shortcomings justified the dismissal. If Stecher legitimately believed that Boyle's performance was below legitimate expectations, there is no Title VII violation, Day v. Colt Construction Development Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1460 (7th Cir. 1994); Kralman v. Illinois Dep't of Veterans' Affairs, 23 F.3d 150, 156-57 (7th Cir. 1994), cert den. 513 U.S. 948 (1994). Lucent has provided ample evidence to show that Stecher was not satisfied with Boyle's performance. In the absence of any evidence suggesting that these criticisms were false or pretextual, they defeat Boyle's claim.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court grants Lucent's motion for summary judgment. Judgment is entered in favor of Lucent Technologies. This case is terminated.