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STATE v. SANTIAGO, No. CR97-514778 (Jul. 25, 2000)
DEWEY, JUDGE.
In February, 2000, a jury found the defendant guilty of Manslaughter in the First Degree with a Firearm; Connecticut General Statutes 53a-55a; and Assault in the First Degree; Connecticut General Statutes 53a-59 (a)(1). On April 25, 2000, the defendant was sentenced to the custody of the commissioner of correction for a term of forty years for the manslaughter charge and twenty years for the assault charge, those sentences to run consecutively.
Connecticut General Statutes 53a-55a provides, in relevant part:
(a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm when he commits manslaughter in the first degree as provided in section 53a-55, and in the commission of such offense he uses, or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses a pistol, revolver, shotgun, machine gun, rifle or other firearm . . .
Connecticut General Statutes 53a-55 provides in relevant part:
(a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or a third person . . .
Connecticut General Statutes 53a-59 provides in relevant part:
(a) A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument . . .
Prior to trial, the State had filed a Notice of Sentence Enhancement which advised that pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes 53-202k the defendant was subject to a "mandatory sentence enhancement". Pursuant to that notice, the court ordered an additional five year period of incarceration, that sentence to run consecutive to the sentence already imposed.
Connecticut General Statutes 53-202k provides:
Any person who commits any class A, B or C felony and in the commission of such felony uses, or is armed with and threatens the use of, or displays, or represents by his words or conduct that he possesses any firearm, as defined in section 53a-3, except an assault weapon, as defined in section 53a-202a, shall be imprisoned for a term of five years, which shall not be suspended or reduced and shall be in addition and consecutive to any term of imprisonment imposed for conviction of such felony.
On June 26, 2000, the United States Supreme Court released its decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, ___ U.S. ___ (68 U.S.L.W. 4576, June 26, 2000). In that case, the issue before the Court was whether a trial court could increase a sentence on the basis of a hate crime law which allowed an "extended term" of imprisonment for selected substantive offenses if a defendant's actions were taken with a purpose to intimidate an individual because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.
The Supreme Court determined that the Fifth Amendment due process clause and the Sixth Amendment notice and jury trial guarantees compelled the conclusion that the imposition of punishment based upon a defendant's discriminatory purpose was more than the mere assessment of a higher degree of punishment for a particular felony. Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 4582. "Both in terms of absolute years behind bars, and because of the more severe stigma attached, the differential here is unquestionably of constitutional significance." Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 4584. After considering the historic foundations to the constitutional right to trial by jury, the Court rejected the legislative statutory designation, CT Page 9362 succinctly stating that a legislative body cannot use the label `sentence enhancement' to lower the State's burden of proof. Consequently, for the additional sentence to be applicable, it had to be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the present case, the effect of section 53-202k is identical to that of the New Jersey provision challenged in the Apprendi decision. As in the New Jersey case, the use of a firearm "goes precisely to what happened in the `commission of the offense.'" Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 4584 (citation omitted). Consequently, this court was without authority to impose the sentence enhancement allowed by section 53-202k.
Connecticut Practice Book Section 43-22 provides that the judicial authority can correct an illegal sentence. Pursuant to that authority, in light of the foregoing analysis, the sentence in the present case will be modified accordingly.
Dewey, J.
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