CRAWFORD v. SEIDMAN

William M. Nickerson, United States District Judge

Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Paper No. 14. Also pending are a number of motions filed by Plaintiff including several motions for "judicial notice" of certain statutes and judicial opinions, Paper Nos. 20, 21, 22, 23, and 27, as well as a motion for partial summary judgment, Paper Nos. 29 and 30. Plaintiff's "judicial notice" pleadings are more in the nature of oppositions to Defendants' motion to dismiss and while considered by the Court as such, will be denied as motions per se. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted and Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment will be denied.

This action arises out of the alleged wrongful denial of Plaintiff's application for a license to practice medicine in the State of Maryland. Plaintiff presented this same dispute to this Court in much the same form several years ago. See Crawford v. Paris, 897 F. Supp. 928 (D.Md. 1995). As Judge Messitte provided a relatively comprehensive description of the factual and procedural background of Plaintiff's claims in his opinion dismissing Plaintiff's prior complaint, a full rehearsal of that background will not be repeated here. Very briefly, the relevant facts are as follows.

Some of the details of this action are also presented in an opinion of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, Crawford v. Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene, No. 1527 (July 10, 1991).

Plaintiff was once licensed to practice medicine in the State of North Carolina. In February 1982, the Medical Board of North Carolina requested that Plaintiff submit to a psychiatric examination as a condition of retaining that license. Rather than submit to such an examination, Plaintiff wrote to the Board on March 30, 1982, stating that he was "sadly choosing to surrender his license to practice medicine in the State of North Carolina." Plaintiff never physically surrendered the license to the North Carolina Board, however, a fact to which Plaintiff would later attach great significance.

In June 1986, Plaintiff applied for a medical license in the State of Maryland. In October 1986, the Maryland Board of Medical Examiners (the Board) informed Plaintiff that, based upon his previous surrender of his North Carolina license, the Board would deny his application pursuant to § 14-504(26) of the Health Occupation Article of the Maryland Code. Plaintiff challenged this decision on the ground that § 14-504(26) was not in effect at the time he allegedly surrendered his North Carolina license. He also informed the Board that he was still in "possession of an authentic and original license to practice medicine" in North Carolina.

This provision allowed for the denial of an application where the potential licensee had surrendered a license issued by another state. Section 14-504 has since been recodified at § 14-404 of the Health Occupation Article.

Shortly thereafter, the State conceded that § 14-504(26) was inapplicable to Plaintiff but informed him that the Board intended to deny his application on the basis of a finding of a "lack of good moral character" under § 14-504(1). This finding was based upon Plaintiff's representation regarding the status of his North Carolina license which the Board determined to be a misrepresentation. Plaintiff then went through several levels of appeal, leading to a July 10, 1991 opinion of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversing the Board's decision. The Court of Special Appeals held that Plaintiff had not intentionally deceived the Board regarding the surrender of his license and the court remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings. In remanding the action, the court noted:

On remand, we may not usurp the Board's administrative function by making a decision on the merits, i.e. by ordering the Board to give appellant a license. Consequently, the Board must reconsider whether appellant has met the requirements for licensure under section 14-305(b) and whether any of the specific circumstances enumerated in section 14-504 — other than section 14-504(1) — require the denial of appellant's application for licensure.

Crawford v. Board of Medical Examiners, slip op. at 19-20 (citations omitted).

On October 22, 1991, the Board of Physicians Quality Assurance (BPQA), the successor agency to the Board of Medical Examiners, requested that Plaintiff update his application so that it could be considered. At that point, the original application was more than five years old. Almost four years later, at the time that Judge Messitte issued his opinion in Crawford v. Paris, Plaintiff had yet to make a submission to the BPQA and, as a result, the BPQA had never acted on his application.

Judge Messitte dismissed Plaintiff's previous action on the ground of abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), finding that the proceedings before the BPQA were judicial in nature, served an important state interest, and provided Plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to present any federal claims he might have related to licensure. 897 F. Supp. at 931. Because no hearing had been held and thus, no final decision had been rendered by the BPQA, he found that any court challenge would be premature. In addition, Judge Messitte expressly found "the BPQA's request for current information . . . eminently reasonable and entirely consistent with the Court of Special Appeals remand. Id. at 931 n. 9. Plaintiff did not appeal this decision.

Judge Messitte also made clear that, even if Plaintiff were to provide the requested updated information and the BPQA were to reach a final decision adverse to Plaintiff, this Court would still abstain under Younger. Id.

As his rationale, Judge Messitte noted that "Maryland law provides that a physician who is licensed in Maryland must submit a renewal application at least every three years. Md. Health Occ. Code Ann. § 14-316. Periodic renewal allows the BPQA to collect current information including disciplinary actions taken by hospitals and other jurisdictions, changes of address and compliance with continuing medical education requirements." Id. at 931 n. 8.

Now, more than five years later, the situation remains exactly the same. Despite clear language to the contrary in the Court of Special Appeal's decision, Plaintiff takes the position that the BPQA was absolutely and unconditionally obligated to issue him a license upon remand from the Court of Special Appeals. Apparently, for that reason, Plaintiff has refused to supplement his original application, which is now almost fifteen years old. Plaintiff has, in fact, made it abundantly clear that he has not updated his application as required. He states, "[t]he 1986 application is the only application that Plaintiff has ever filed for a Maryland license. That application has never been amended so as to include any new facts." Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 10.

Defendants have proffered a variety of reasons as to why Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed. The Court, however, need look no further than Judge Messitte's reasoning. As this dispute is in precisely the same posture as it was when presented to Judge Messitte, the result must be the same. A separate order consistent with this Memorandum will issue.

ORDER

In accordance with the foregoing Memorandum and for the reasons stated therein, IT IS this ___ day of February, 2001 by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, ORDERED:

1. That Plaintiff's Motions for Judicial Notice, Paper Nos. 20, 21, 22, 23, 27 are DENIED;

2. That Plaintiff's Motion to Extend Time to File Response, Paper No. 25, is GRANTED;

3. That Plaintiff's motion for waiver of page limits, Paper No. 19, is GRANTED;

4. That Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Paper Nos. 29 and 30, is DENIED;

5. That Defendants' Motion to Deny Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, to Strike, Paper No. 31, is DENIED as Moot;

6. That Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Paper No. 14 is GRANTED:

7. That this case is hereby CLOSED;

8. That any and all prior rulings made by this Court disposing of any claims against any parties are incorporated by reference herein and this order shall be deemed to be a final judgment within the meaning of Fed.R.Civ.P. 58; and

9. That the Clerk of the Court shall mail or transmit copies of the foregoing Memorandum and this Order to Plaintiff and all counsel of record.