- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
BRUNO v. A.E. HANDY ASSOCIATES
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from Bruno's amended complaint and demand for a jury trial against A. E. Handy Associates, Inc. for wrongful discharge allegedly resulting from Bruno's reporting to jury duty. During pretrial proceedings the trial court allowed the corporation's attorney to withdraw and ordered the corporation to retain new counsel within 30 days and later gave the corporation 20 days to file an answer. An answer was filed captioned "DEFENDANT, A. E. HANDY ASSOCIATES, INC., by undersigned President," which Bruno contended was improper because Alfred E. Handy had personally answered on behalf of the corporation. Bruno moved for a default under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(b). The trial court entered a simple default (an interlocutory default without award of damages). A. E. Handy Associates, Inc. moved to set aside the default, citing rule 1.540(b); the court treated the motion as seeking relief under rule 1.500(d) and granted it. Bruno appealed from the order setting aside the default.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an order setting aside a simple default (an interlocutory order) is appealable.
- Whether Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) applies to relief from a simple default entered under rule 1.500(b).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Bruno) Arguments
- Bruno moved for default judgment on the ground that Alfred E. Handy personally answered the complaint on behalf of the corporation, which Bruno alleged rendered the answer a legal nullity.
- Bruno proceeded under the framework of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(b) (failure to plead or otherwise defend).
Appellee's (A. E. Handy Associates, Inc.) Arguments
- The corporation filed a Motion to Set Aside Default asserting mistake and citing Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Tieche v. Florida Physicians Ins. Reciprocal, 431 So.2d 287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) | Distinguishing a "simple default" entered under rule 1.500(b) from a final default judgment; rule 1.540(b) does not apply to interlocutory orders setting aside simple defaults. | Used to explain that the order entered was a simple default (interlocutory) and that rule 1.540(b) does not apply to setting aside such defaults; supports non-appealability of the order setting aside the default. |
| Moreno Const., Inc. v. Theys Const. Co., 722 So.2d 976 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) | Permissible entry of an initial default against a corporation under rule 1.500(b) when a responsive pleading is not timely filed. | cited to show proper use of rule 1.500(b) to enter an initial default against a corporation. |
| Perry v. Sawyer, 454 So.2d 790 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) | Non-appealability of orders setting aside simple defaults. | cited to support that an order setting aside a simple default is a non-final interlocutory order and not appealable. |
| Lindamood v. Office of the State Attorney, Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida, 731 So.2d 829 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) | Principle of not elevating form over substance when assessing the nature of a motion or relief sought. | cited as an example where the court declined to treat the form of a motion as determinative when substance showed a different relief sought; used illustratively. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court determined Bruno's motion sought entry of a default under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(b). The trial court's subsequent "Order — Default Judgment" was in substance a simple default entered pursuant to rule 1.500(b) because it contained no award of damages or other affirmative relief. A. E. Handy Associates, Inc. moved to set aside the default citing rule 1.540(b), but the court observed that rule 1.540(b) applies only to final judgments, decrees, orders, or proceedings and does not apply to interlocutory orders setting aside simple defaults (citing Tieche). The trial court properly treated the motion as one under rule 1.500(d) and granted relief setting aside the simple default. Because the order setting aside the simple default was interlocutory and non-final, the appellate court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear Bruno's appeal.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: DISMISSED.
Implications: The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the order setting aside a simple default was a non-final interlocutory order. The direct effect is that the trial court's order setting aside the default stands and there is no final adjudication on the merits. The opinion does not announce a new precedent beyond applying existing authority concerning the non-appealability of interlocutory orders setting aside simple defaults.
PLEUS, J.
This case arose when Bruno filed an amended complaint and demand for a jury trial against A. E. Handy Associates, Inc. for damages for wrongful discharge. Bruno alleged that A. E. Handy Associates, Inc. wrongfully discharged him from his employment because he had reported to jury duty. During pretrial proceedings, the trial court entered an order allowing A. E. Handy Associates, Inc.'s attorney to withdraw. In its order, the court stated: "A. E. HANDY ASSOCIATES, INC., shall have 30 days from the date of this order to retain new counsel." The court later entered an order allowing A.E. Handy Associates, Inc., 20 days in which to file an answer to Bruno's amended complaint. "DEFENDANT, A. E. HANDY ASSOCIATES, INC., by undersigned President" filed an answer to Bruno's complaint. Bruno filed a motion for default judgment on the ground that Alfred E. Handy had personally answered the complaint as president of the corporation, which was alleged to be "a legal nullity." Although Bruno did not cite a rule, we conclude that Bruno filed his motion for default judgment pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.500(b) which provides as follows:
Rule 1.500. Defaults and Final Judgments Thereon
* * *
(b) By the Court. When a party against whom affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules or any applicable statute or any order of the court, the court may enter a default against such party; provided that if such party has filed or served any paper in the action, that party shall be served with notice of the application for default.
[Emphasis supplied]. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an "Order — Default Judgment" against A. E. Handy Associates, Inc. Although the order is captioned as a default judgment, in reality it was merely a "simple default" entered pursuant to rule 1.500(b), rather than a "default judgment." See Tieche v. Florida Physicians Ins. Reciprocal, 431 So.2d 287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). See also Moreno Const., Inc. v. Theys Const. Co., 722 So.2d 976 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (trial court properly entered initial default against corporation pursuant to rule 1.500(b) because responsive pleading was not timely filed). The interlocutory order contains no award of damages or other affirmative relief. A. E. Handy Associates, Inc. thereafter filed a Motion to Set Aside Default, erroneously citing Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), asserting mistake. Rule 1.540(b) permits the trial court to relieve a party from a "final judgment, decree, order, or proceeding" on several grounds. However, the rule is applicable only to final orders and " does not apply to an interlocutory order setting aside a simple default." Tieche, 431 So.2d at 288. The trial court, however, appears to have correctly treated the motion as one seeking to set aside a default under Rule 1.500(d) and entered the order granting the motion from which Bruno now seeks to appeal.
Rule 1.500 Defaults and Final Judgments Thereon
* * *
(d) Setting aside Default. The court may set aside a default, and if a final judgment consequent thereon has been entered, the court may set it aside in accordance with rule 1.540(b).
In this case, no final judgment was entered. Rather, the trial court entered a simple default and then an order granting a motion to set aside the default. Thus, the court merely changed its mind with regard to its earlier entry of an interlocutory order. An order setting aside a simple default [whether by the clerk of the court or the judge pursuant to rule 1.500] is not appealable because it is a non-final interlocutory order. See Tieche, 431 So.2d at 288. See also Perry v. Sawyer, 454 So.2d 790 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984). The judicial labor is not at an end because there has been no final adjudication on the merits. The fact that a party later argues that he or she is entitled to relief from a simple default under rule 1.540(b) "would not make it so." Tieche, 431 So.2d at 288. See, e.g., Lindamood v. Office of the State Attorney, Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida, 731 So.2d 829, 831 n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (court declined to elevate form over substance in case where motion was titled as a motion for temporary injunction but substance concerned temporary reinstatement under section 112.3187, Florida Statutes).
"Final judgments after default may be entered by the court at any time." Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.500(e).
Because Bruno is appealing a non-final interlocutory order, this Court lacks jurisdiction. Hence, the appeal is dismissed.
DISMISSED.
SHARP, W. and PALMER, JJ., concur.
Alert