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STATE v. WALLER, 46568-6-I (Wash.App. 8-13-2001)

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
Aug 13, 2001

PER CURIAM.

Anthony Waller appeals his conviction for first degree murder, his exceptional sentence, and his community placement sentence.

The evidence shows that Waller did not request an attorney before making custodial statements to police. The evidence also supports the trial court's decision to impose an exceptional sentence based on the aggravating factor of deliberate cruelty: Waller stabbed his victim over 40 times in the head and face with a screwdriver. We therefore affirm the judgment and exceptional sentence. We remand the community placement sentence, however, because it is ambiguous.

FACTS

On the evening of January 17, 1999, in Auburn, Washington, at about 10:30 p.m., the defendant Anthony Waller and three other young men, Michael Waller, Adam Okerson and Nick Kemper, left Michael's house in Kemper's Ford Bronco. After buying some beer, the four young men stopped in an industrial area near some warehouses. Anthony got out of the truck and, with a screwdriver, began breaking into vehicles and stealing things.

As the group was getting ready to leave, they spotted a man walking through the area some distance away. Anthony jumped out of the Bronco and started to chase the man. According to Okerson, Anthony said that he was worried about the guy getting the license plate number of the Bronco, and claimed that "he was going to go beat this guy's ass." Okerson observed Anthony hit the man in the back of the head with his fist and observed the man struggle to get away. Michael and Okerson then followed Anthony. They found him some distance away, kneeling over the man he had been chasing, and apparently punching him. The man was lying on his back and his face was covered with blood. Okerson and Michael called Anthony, who rose to return with them to the Bronco. At this point, Anthony said something like, "`This is what happens . . . when people fuck with me or see shit they're not supposed to.'" Okerson saw that Anthony had a screwdriver in his hand.

When the three men returned to the Bronco, Kemper drove away from the scene. As the Bronco turned to enter Highway 167, Anthony threw the screwdriver out of the window.

The group returned to Michael's house. As they were entering the house, Anthony warned Michael and Okerson not to say anything about the assault to anyone. Anthony entered the house to wash his hands, and then left with Kemper.

Some hours later, a passerby discovered the victim's body. Police officers identified the man as Thomas Moore, a homeless man who lived in a camp nearby. The victim suffered more than 40 stab wounds to the head, and through-and-through stab wounds to the left hand. The wounds to the hand were defensive, indicating that Moore initially attempted to ward off the blows. The majority of the wounds were localized around the eyes. The wounds were all consistent with being inflicted with a flathead screwdriver.

In late February 1999, the police investigation ultimately led police to numerous witnesses, including Okerson, Kemper and Michael Waller. With the assistance of the witnesses, police located the screwdriver that Anthony had thrown from the window of the Bronco, near an on-ramp of Highway 167. Blood was present on the screwdriver. DNA tests revealed that the genetic profile of the blood was the same as the victim's.

Police removed small chips of freshly broken glass from the victim's overalls. Police also recovered glass fragments from the passenger side floor mat where Anthony Waller was sitting in the Bronco after the car prowls. Two of the glass samples from the floor mat had the same refractive index as samples recovered from the overalls.

Anthony Waller had left town in late January, telling his fiancee that he had to leave because he had murdered somebody. Waller eventually surrendered to police in Honolulu, Hawaii on March 19, 1999.

Detectives Steven Kelly and Kathy Holt of the Kent Police Department flew to Hawaii and met with Waller on March 20, at around midnight. They advised Waller of his rights, and he indicated that he wanted to speak with the detectives, but wished to talk with his father first. The detectives returned the following day. Because Waller had not yet spoken to his father, the detectives allowed him to make that telephone call. After the call, Waller indicated that he was willing to talk with the detectives.

The detectives again advised Waller of his rights, which he waived.

Waller initially told the detectives, in a taped statement, that Michael Waller and Adam Okerson had attacked the victim, and that he had not participated in the attack. The detectives confronted Waller with the evidence they had so far obtained, and told him that they did not believe his story. Waller then started to cry and admitted to the killing. The detectives took a second tape-recorded statement from Waller, after again advising him of his rights and obtaining a waiver. Waller admitted that he was the sole attacker, but claimed that he was "really drunk" that night and had not meant to kill the man.

Waller was charged with premeditated murder in the first degree. Before trial, Waller filed a CrR 3.5 motion to suppress the statements that he had made to police. After a hearing, the trial court ruled that the statements were admissible.

On December 23, 1999, a jury found Waller guilty as charged. Waller's standard sentence range was 271 to 361 months. The trial court imposed an exceptional sentence of 432 months, finding that deliberate cruelty to the victim was an aggravating circumstance. The court also imposed a community placement sentence. Waller appeals.

ANALYSIS A. Request for Counsel

Waller argues that the trial court erred in admitting his custodial statements to police. He argues that he made an equivocal request for counsel, and that police therefore had a duty to clarify his request before proceeding to interrogate him.

Before a trial court will admit a defendant's custodial statements, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights prior to making the statement to police. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, (1966); State v. Braun, 82 Wn.2d 157, 160-61, 509 P.2d 742 (1973).

If an accused makes a request for counsel, interrogation must cease until an attorney is present, unless the accused initiates further communication. State v. Jones, 102 Wn. App. 89, 96, 6 P.3d 58 (2000), review denied, 142 Wn.2d 1018 (2001). Generally, the request for counsel must be unambiguous. State v. Copeland, 89 Wn. App. 492, 500, 949 P.2d 458 (1998). In Washington, if the accused makes an equivocal request for counsel, any further questioning must be strictly limited to clarifying the suspect's wishes. State v. Robtoy, 98 Wn.2d 30, 39, 653 P.2d 284 (1982); Jones, 102 Wn. App. at 96. The essence of an equivocal request is that without further clarification it is impossible to determine whether a request has been made. State v. Smith, 34 Wn. App. 405, 408, 661 P.2d 1001 (1983). Courts use an objective standard when reviewing this issue; the test is whether a reasonable police officer would know that the defendant's statement was a request for an attorney. State v. Aronhalt, 99 Wn. App. 302, 307, 994 P.2d 248 (2000).

Here, after the CrR 3.5 hearing, the trial court found that Waller never made a request for counsel. The court also found that police had properly advised Waller of his Miranda rights, and that Waller had waived those rights. A trial court's findings of fact following a CrR 3.5 hearing are verities on appeal if substantial evidence in the record supports them. State v. Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d 118, 131, 942 P.2d 363 (1997).

The trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. According to Detective Kelly, when the detectives first talked with Waller on March 19, 1999, after they had read him his rights, Waller "said he was unsure whether or not he should sign the waiver part of the form." "He said that he wanted to talk to his dad before talking with us," and that "his dad was going to look into getting a lawyer." Waller made no other statements about wanting a lawyer or being unwilling to speak to the detectives without a lawyer. The detectives did not interrogate Waller that evening, giving him a chance to call his father.

The detectives returned the next day. Waller again indicated that he wanted to talk to the detectives but wanted first to talk to his father. Waller called his father and spoke with him. Detective Kelly also spoke with Waller's father. According to Kelly, Waller's father told him, "that he had told Tony to talk with us and to tell us the truth." After that, Waller told the detectives that he wanted to talk with them now and tell them what happened. The detectives again advised Waller of his Miranda rights, which he again waived.

As the trial court found, the evidence at the CrR 3.5 hearing shows that Waller never requested an attorney, either equivocally or unequivocally. At most, the evidence shows that Waller's father might have been considering obtaining counsel for Waller. But according to the evidence, Waller's father ultimately encouraged Waller to speak to the detectives without an attorney. Waller made no other statements invoking his right to counsel. Thus, the State met its burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Waller was advised of and waived his Miranda rights before speaking to police.

B. Deliberate Cruelty

Waller argues that the trial court erred in imposing an exceptional sentence based on the aggravating factor of deliberate cruelty. He argues that the court's reasons for imposing the exceptional sentence are not supported by the record.

A sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the standard range if it finds "that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence." RCW 9.94A.120(2). The court may consider, as an aggravating circumstance, whether the defendant's conduct during the commission of a crime manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim. RCW 9.94A.390(2)(a). Deliberate cruelty is "gratuitous violence, or other conduct which inflicts physical, psychological or emotional pain as an end in itself." State v. Strauss, 54 Wn. App. 408, 418, 773 P.2d 898 (1989). Deliberate cruelty contemplates acts not usually associated with the commission of the particular crime. State v. Payne, 45 Wn. App. 528, 531, 726 P.2d 997 (1986).

Here, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the exceptional sentence. The issue is whether those findings and conclusions are supported by the record. We will uphold the findings and conclusions unless they are clearly erroneous. See State v. Ha'mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 840, 940 P.2d 633 (1997).

In imposing the exceptional sentence, the court found that Waller intentionally and deliberately inflicted more than 40 stab wounds about the victim's head and face with a screwdriver, and that the fatal wounds entered the vital portions of the victim's brains through the eyes. The court found that the "deliberate attack took place over a period of time and distance sufficiently long to inflict extreme fear, pain and suffering on the part of Mr. Moore prior to his death." The court found that Waller remarked at the end of the attack, "`This is what happens when somebody fucks with me,'" which "further evidenced his deliberate cruelty and intent to perpetrate gratuitous violence toward Mr. Moore." Based on these findings, the court concluded that the more than 40 stab wounds "represent deliberate cruelty inflicted by the defendant," which wounds "go far beyond the norm and represent gratuitous violence not normally associated with the commission of murder in the first degree."

The trial court's findings and conclusions are supported by the record. The record shows violence that went beyond the norm. Waller stood over the victim and stabbed him repeatedly with a screwdriver. The defenseless victim tried to ward off the blows. The victim suffered at least 40 separate stab wounds in the head, concentrated around the eyes. Waller used a significant amount of force: some of the injuries created skull fractures. There were at least seven separate penetrating stab wounds that went through the eyes into the brain. Many of the wounds that Waller inflicted could alone have been fatal.

The gratuitous infliction of multiple wounds to a murder victim may be grounds for an exceptional sentence based upon deliberate cruelty. See, e.g., State v. Buckner, 74 Wn. App. 889, 897, 876 P.2d 910 (1994) (15 separate stab wounds warrant finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Ross, 71 Wn. App. 556, 562-63, 861 P.2d 473 (1993) (over 100 separate stab wounds, cuts, and marks warrant finding of deliberate cruelty); State v. Campas, 59 Wn. App. 561, 566, 799 P.2d 744 (1990) (victim repeatedly bludgeoned and stabbed); State v. Harmon, 50 Wn. App. 755, 761, 750 P.2d 664 (1988) (64 stab wounds sufficient for deliberate cruelty).

The trial court also found that Waller's attack took place over a significant period of time and distance. Waller first chased the victim and hit him on the head, and then when the victim was lying down, repeatedly stabbed him. The infliction of the multiple wounds to the victim's head took more than moments. In sum, the record amply supports the trial court's finding that Waller committed the crime with deliberate cruelty.

C. Community Placement

Waller argues that his community placement sentence must be remanded, because the term of the sentence is ambiguous. The State agrees.

"Where a sentence is insufficiently specific about the period of community placement required by law, remand for amendment of the judgment and sentence to expressly provide for the correct period of community placement is the proper course." State v. Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d 118, 136, 942 P.2d 363 (1997).

Here, section 4.7 of the judgment and sentence states that "Community Placement is ordered . . . for the maximum period of time authorized by law." Appendix H was attached and incorporated into the community placement sentence. Appendix H states that the defendant "is sentenced . . . to community placement for three years." Section 4.7 of the judgment and sentence is inconsistent with appendix H, because the "maximum period of time authorized by law" is greater than three years. "[T]rial courts may impose an exceptional term of community placement that does not exceed the statutory maximum when community placement is authorized." State v. Guerin, 63 Wn. App. 117, 121, 816 P.2d 1249 (1991). The statutory maximum for the crime here is life. Thus, Waller's community placement term is not limited to the three-year term provided in appendix H. Under State v. Jones, 93 Wn. App. 14, 968 P.2d 2 (1998), we remand the case with instructions for the trial court to reconcile the conflicting terms in appendix H and the judgment and sentence forms, and to specify Waller's period of community placement in the judgment and sentence.

D. Pro Se Supplemental Brief

Waller raises several additional issues in his pro se supplemental brief. Only one of those issues is an arguably cognizable legal issue. Waller contends that his attorneys were ineffective for failing to raise a diminished capacity defense and to present expert testimony in that regard.

To sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Waller must show that: (1) "counsel's performance was deficient," and (2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The first prong requires a showing that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on considerations of all of the circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Waller argues that counsel's performance was deficient, because there was substantial evidence in the record to support the theory that Waller's alcohol intoxication may have produced a mental disorder that would bear upon his ability to form the requisite intent to commit the crime.

Although Waller shared some beer with his friends before committing the crime, the record does not demonstrate that he was not in full control of his faculties. Waller has not proved that a reasonable defense attorney would have hired an expert to evaluate a diminished capacity defense.

Waller is bound by the record at trial, and his attorneys are presumed to have acted competently. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995); State v. Piche, 71 Wn.2d 583, 430 P.2d 522 (1967). Waller has not met his heavy burden to demonstrate, from the trial record, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The judgment and exceptional sentence are affirmed. The community placement sentence is remanded with instructions for the trial court to clarify the period of community placement.