HUNT v. RUSHTON, (D.S.C. 2001)

PATRICK DUFFY, District Judge.

This matter is before the court upon Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on Hunt's petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This record includes a Report and Recommendation ("Report") of the United States Magistrate Joseph R. McCrorey made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B). The Motion is granted.

A party may object, in writing, to a magistrate judge's report within ten days after being served with a copy of that report. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). The Report was filed on August 23, 2001. Hunt filed timely objections on September 12, 2001. This court is charged with conducting a de novo review of any portion of a magistrate judge's report to which a specific objection is registered and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendations contained in that report. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1).

A review of the entire record indicates that the Report accurately summarizes this case and the applicable law pertinent to all of the issues before the court. Accordingly, the magistrate judge's report is adopted in whole and incorporated into this Order.

Hunt filed eight objections to the Report. Two objections are not objections at all and are either wholly consistent with the Magistrate's findings or unresponsive. Four of Hunt's objections are reiterations of his original petition and have been adequately addressed by the Magistrate's recommendation. A district court need not make a de novo review "when a party makes general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and recommendations." Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).

Hunt's seventh objection disputes the Magistrate's factual finding that Hunt's uncle was present during the initial interrogation. This factual objection is not material. as the Magistrate's reasoning does not depend on such a finding. The uncle's testimony was only relevant to a defense based on alleged police misconduct, a defense which the Magistrate properly ruled had been waived by Hunt's voluntary confession. See Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973).

Hunt's final objection rejects the Magistrate's inference that Hunt knew that a death sentence was unlikely. This objection is material to Hunt's more general allegation that his attorney, at the time of his guilty plea, failed to advise him of the likelihood of receiving the death penalty. Hunt states that while he was considering the plea bargain his attorney did not respond when Hunt's father said, "Boy, they are gonna fry you." (Obj. at 3). Even assuming, arguendo, the accuracy of Hunt's objection, his attorney did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1994). Hunt faced the possibility of the death penalty, even if that possibility had been somehow mitigated through the ensuing voir dire. It was neither necessary nor would it have been prudent for Hunt's attorney to have suggested otherwise. Accordingly Hunt's eighth and final objection is without merit. Therefore, none of Hunt's objections require any modification to the Magistrate's Report, and Hunt is not entitled to habeas corpus relief.

It is, therefore.

ORDERED, for the foregoing reasons the court adopts in full the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation as the Order of the court, and Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to all counts.