AUGUSTINE v. BARNHART

G. THOMAS PORTEOUS, JR., U.S. District Judge

Before this Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These motions came for hearing on an earlier date, and oral argument was waived. Having reviewed the motions, memoranda, exhibits, and applicable law, this Court sits ready to rule.

I. Background

The Plaintiff, Robert Augustine, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") denying Supplemental Social Security Income ("SSI") benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 1382c. The Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment reversing the decision of the Commissioner. The Commissioner has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment to uphold the final decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ").

The Plaintiff filed an application for Title XVI (SSI) benefits on November 17, 1997. (Tr. 12). This claim was denied on February 28, 1998, and plaintiff did not pursue this claim further. (Tr. 12, 44). Plaintiff re-applied for SSI on November 10, 1999, alleging that he became disabled on December 1, 1997. (Tr. 58-60). This application was denied both initially and on reconsideration. Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who issued a decision on November 21, 2000, finding plaintiff not to be disabled. (Tr. 20). Upon the Appeals Council's denial of plaintiffs request for review on July 20, 2001, the ALJ's determination became the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 5). Plaintiff now seeks judicial review' of the ALJ's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g).

After considering the hearing testimony and the other evidence of record, ALJ Stuart Wein issued a decision on August 30, 2000. finding that plaintiff had some mental impairments but did not meet or equal one of the Social Security Administration Listed Impairments. (Tr. 15). Based on the plaintiffs Residual Functional Capacity (RFC), the ALJ found that plaintiff could perform his past relevant work as a dishwasher. (Tr. 18). Thus, the ALJ found the plaintiff was not disabled at step four of the sequential evaluation process. After using an impartial Vocational Expert (VE), the ALJ determined that, in spite of his limitations, plaintiff could still perform his last relevant work, as a dishwasher, as well as perform a significant other number of jobs in the national economy. (Tr. 18). The ALJ found the plaintiff was not disabled at any time. (Tr. 19). The Plaintiff then filed this appeal claiming that the ALJ's decision is arbitrary, contrary to law, and unsupported by substantial evidence. The sole issue raised is whether the ALJ properly found that plaintiff is not disabled as defined in the Act.

The plaintiff Robert Augustine, was incarcerated for ten years, during which time he was examined for mental conditions by the attending physician. Without going into detail concerning every examination plaintiff has undergone, this Court notes that plaintiff has been examined by numerous physicians, and all but one were in agreement that plaintiff has no serious mental health problems. Dr. Wortham, the treating physician at the New Orleans Mental Health Hospital, was the one exception, finding that plaintiffs condition would worsen if he was placed in a stressful situation, especially that of a job. (Tr. 208-210).

The Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's reasons for finding that plaintiffs condition is not severe enough to be considered a disability under the Act are not supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in 1) failing to give proper weight to the treating physician's examination, 2) disregarding the Vocational Expert's testimony, and 3) failing to find the plaintiff credible despite corroborating evidence. (See plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5.) Plaintiff contends that "the ALJ disregarded the treating physician's medical opinion and substituted his own lay opinion." Id. p. 9.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Standard of Review

This Court's review of the Commissioner's denial of disability benefits is limited to determining (1) whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards to evaluate the evidence. Martinez v. Charter, 64 F.3d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1995); Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1993). A final decision of the Commissioner must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Milam v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 1284, 1287 (5th Cir. 1986). "Substantial evidence" is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and such that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support the conclusion.Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401(1971); Randall v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1992). In determining whether substantial evidence exists, the reviewing court cannot reweigh the evidence, try the issues de novo, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.Martinez, 64 F.3d at 173; Spellman, 1 F.3d at 60; Deters v. Secretary of Health, Educ. Welfare, 789 F.2d 1181, 1185 (5th Cir. 1986). A finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings exist to support the Commissioner's decision. Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1988). Conflicts in evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve, not the courts. Patton v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 590, 592 (5th Cir. 1983). However, despite its limited function, the court must scrutinize the record in its entirety, and may not simply "rubber-stamp" the decision of the ALJ. See Millet v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir. 1981).

B. Legal Standards for Disability Under the Act

Disability is defined under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act as the "inability to engage in substantial gainful activity because of a medically determinable impairment that has lasted, or is expected to last, for at least 12 consecutive months." 20 C.F.R. § 404. 1505, 416.905; 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A), 1382c (a)(3)(A). Gainful work activity is the kind of work usually done for pay or profit, whether or not the profit is realized. (Tr. 13).

To qualify for SSI, a claimant must be "disabled" as defined by the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D). In order to determine if the claimant is disabled, a five step evaluation must be performed pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The five step evaluation requires the following sequential analysis: 1) if claimant is performing substantial gainful work, he is not disabled; 2) if the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work, his impairments must be severe before he can found to be disabled; 3) if claimant is not performing substantial gainful work and has a severe impairment that has lasted or is expected to last at least 12 months, and his impairment meets a listed impairment contained in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4, the claimant is presumed disabled without further inquiry; 4) if the claimant's impairment does not prevent him form doing his past relevant work, he is not disabled; 5) even if the claimant's impairment prevents him from doing his past relevant work, if other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that accommodates his residual functional capacity and vocational factors, he is not disabled. (Tr. 13).

In the present case, the plaintiff had failed to show that his impairment prevents him from doing his past relevant work as a dishwasher, and thus he is not disabled. The VE's testimony as to the number of jobs in the economy that plaintiff could engage is irrelevant since plaintiff failed to fulfill step four of the sequential evaluation.

C. Substantial Evidence

The ALJ determined that Dr. Wortham's opinion was not supported by the full record, and, therefore, did not give controlling weight to his opinion. While plaintiff contends that the treating physician's opinion should be given greater weight than single consultative visits, the ALJ has considerable discretion and is free to reject the opinion of any physician if the evidence supports a contrary conclusion. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927 (d), (e); Greenspan v. Shalala. 38 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 1994); Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 364 (5th Cir. 1993);Moore v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir. 1990); Miliam v. Bowen, 782 F.2d 1284, 1287 (5th Cir. 1986). The ALJ may give less weight to a physician's opinion when the opinion is so brief and conclusory that it lacks strong persuasive weight, is not supported by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory techniques, or is otherwise unsupported by the evidence. Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 2001); Leggett v. Charter, 67 F.3d 558, 566 (5th Cir. 1995); Spellman, 1 F.3d at 364. The ALJ, after examining all the reports of all the physicians, held that Dr. Wortham's diagnosis was not supported by the medical evidence. Dr. Wortham's evaluation was so contrary to the examinations of all the other physicians so as to cause the ALJ to have to employ a balancing test to determine which diagnosis to consider the most binding. The district court may not try the issues de novo, reweigh the evidence, or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. In the instant case, the ALJ put forth a reasonable explanation of his findings, supported by substantial evidence. He noted that the plaintiffs personality disorder and low intellectual capacity are severe impairments, that plaintiffs claims of his disability are not totally credible, and that claimant can perform his past relevant work as a dishwasher. (Tr. 19). Therefore, his findings are conclusive.

The ALJ found that plaintiffs impairment did not prevent him from performing his past relevant work. (Tr. 18). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ disregarded the VE's testimony and thus committed error that prejudiced him. On the contrary, the ALJ used the VE to determine that the plaintiff was not disabled by determining that plaintiff was able to perform his past relevant work, and asking the VE if there was any work besides his past relevant work that plaintiff could engage in. The VE stated that there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy in which plaintiff could perform. (Tr. 18). Finally, the ALJ asked a third question of the VE concerning Dr. Wortham's diagnosis, but since the question incorporated assumptions rejected by the him, the ALJ was not bound by the VE's answer to that question.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to find him credible despite corroborating evidence. The ALJ's assessment of plaintiff's credibility must be based upon a consideration of all the evidence in the record, including: "Diagnosis, prognosis, and other medical opinions provided by treating or examining physicians or psychologists and other medical sources." Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-7p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34, 486 (1996). The ALJ made note of the fact that plaintiff's statements concerning his education are inconsistent throughout the record. (Tr. 18). The medical evidence does show that the plaintiff has an impairment. However, the evidence does not show that the impairment is disabling, as defined in the Regulations. When viewed against all the medical evidence, the ALJ did not find plaintiff s disability claim as credible. The ALJ followed SSR 96-7p and cited several medical diagnoses by examining and consulting physicians to show that plaintiffs impairment is not as disabling as he claims it to be. Judgment as to the credibility of testimony is the province of the ALJ, and in this case the ALJ put forth a reasonable explanation of his findings, supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, this Court should give deference to the ALJ's finding that plaintiffs claim of disabling impairment is not supported by substantial medical evidence.

III. Conclusion

This Court holds that the ALJ's finding that plaintiff was not disabled was supported by substantial evidence, and that Judge Wein applied the proper legal standards to evaluate the evidence in the record. Therefore, the ALJ's denial of SSI benefits is affirmed.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion of the Plaintiff, Robert Augustine, for Summary Judgment, be, and the same is hereby DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion of the Defendant, Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security, for Summary Judgment, be, and the same is hereby GRANTED