JAQUISH v. WESTERN WASHINGTON UNIV., 48313-7-I (Wash.App. 6-3-2002)

APPELWICK, J.

Rodney Jaquish filed a wrongful termination complaint against Western Washington University, alleging the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under chapter 49.32 RCW. The trial court dismissed his complaint on summary judgment and he appeals. Chapter 49.32 RCW does not apply to Jaquish as a public employee. Therefore, he may not bring a cause of action based upon its policy. Accordingly, we affirm.

From 1986 to 1998, Rodney Jaquish was employed by Western Washington University (WWU) in its police department. In that capacity, he was a member of a Union. On March 19, 1998, WWU sent Jaquish a letter informing him that his employment at WWU was terminated. That letter advised Jaquish he was entitled to appeal his termination to the Personnel Appeals Board. Jaquish filed an appeal with the Personnel Appeals Board. But after learning that his appellate hearing would be held at WWU a place that was unacceptable to him for emotional reasons he sought dismissal of the appeal. On September 1, 2000, Jaquish filed a complaint against WWU in Whatcom County Superior Court alleging that WWU, inter alia, discriminated against him based on his union activities. Specifically, he alleged that WWU violated provisions of chapter 49.32 RCW ("Injunctions in Labor Disputes") and committed the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The public policy he alleges was violated is Washington's declaration of policy set forth in chapter 49.32 RCW that workers should be free to associate, self-organize, and designate representatives to negotiate the terms and conditions of employment free from employer interference. Jaquish sought damages for emotional distress and lost wages.

On January 11, 2001, WWU moved for summary judgment dismissal of Jaquish's claims. WWU argued that chapter 49.32 RCW does not apply to Jaquish because he was a public employee. It further maintained that Jaquish's sole statutory remedy for unfair labor practices was under the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining chapter 41.56 RCW. The trial court determined that chapter 49.32 RCW "does not apply to public employees[.]" It therefore dismissed Jaquish's complaint with prejudice. The trial court, however, informed Jaquish that the dismissal order did not prevent him from seeking a remedy against WWU from the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) under chapter 41.56 RCW, pursuing an appeal of his termination with the Personnel Appeals Board, or seeking a remedy through arbitration. Jaquish acknowledges those remedies as available, but appeals the denial of remedies under chapter 49.32 RCW.

Jaquish, a public employee, acknowledges that there is no precedent in Washington for a public employee bringing a cause of action under chapter 49.32 RCW. He nonetheless contends that he is entitled to bring a cause of action relying upon the policy set forth in that chapter.

When reviewing summary judgment orders, this court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court. Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 66, 958 P.2d 301 (1998). Likewise, interpretation of a statute is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. State v. Bright, 129 Wn.2d 257, 265, 916 P.2d 922 (1996). "Employment relationships in Washington generally are terminable at will by either party." McClintick v. Timber Prods. Mfrs., Inc., 105 Wn. App. 914, 920, 21 P.3d 328 (2001). There is, however, a narrow exception to the employment-at-will doctrine that allows a terminated employee to bring a cause of action for wrongful discharge `where the discharge contravenes a `clear mandate of public policy." Roberts v. Dudley, 140 Wn.2d 58, 63, 993 P.2d 901 (2000).

The clear mandate of public policy at issue in this case is set forth in chapter 49.32 RCW. That chapter is titled, "Injunctions in Labor Disputes." Chapter 49.32 RCW. The section enunciating its policy was enacted in 1933 and has not been modified. RCW 49.32.020; Laws of 1933, Ex. Sess., ch. 7 sec. 2. It states as follows:

RCW 49.32.020. Policy enunciated.

In the interpretation of this chapter and in determining the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the state of Washington, as such jurisdiction and authority are herein defined and limited, the public policy of the state of Washington is hereby declared as follows:

WHEREAS, Under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protections; therefore, the following definitions of, and limitations upon, the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the state of Washington are hereby enacted.

In Port of Seattle v. Int'l Longshoremen's Warehousemen's Union, 52 Wn.2d 317, 324 P.2d 1099 (1958), Port of Seattle unions and union members appealed a restraining order enjoining them from striking and picketing the Port's operations. Port of Seattle, 52 Wn.2d at 317. Our Supreme Court noted that the appellants did not rely upon chapter 49.32 RCW for the following obvious reason:

Appellants do not specifically rely on [chapter 49.32 RCW] for the obvious reason that it is a well-established rule of statutory construction that general legislation is inapplicable to the state or its political subdivisions, unless the statute expressly applies to them, or unless they must be included by necessary implication.

Indeed, chapter 49.32 RCW contains no language to indicate that it expressly applies to public employees. Thus, Jaquish may only bring a cause of action under chapter 49.32 RCW if public employees must be included under that chapter by necessary implication. As Jaquish correctly points out, there is nothing in that chapter that excludes public employees. We, however, decline to infer from statutory silence that the Legislature intended to create an exception to the well-established rule that the statute is inapplicable to the State. Port of Seattle, 52 Wn.2d at 321.

"Although federal authority is not controlling in interpreting state statutes, it can be persuasive where the texts of both federal and state laws are similar." Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 125 Wn.2d 745, 755, 888 P.2d 147 (1995). Our Supreme Court has observed that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1573 is "the federal analogue" of chapter 49.32 RCW. Bravo, 125 Wn.2d at 754. In United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 272-75, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947), the United States Supreme Court concluded that 29 U.S.C. § 157 does not apply to the Government. Thus, the persuasive authority cited does not support Jaquish's contention that public employees must be included by necessary implication.

In sum, chapter 49.32 RCW does not expressly apply to public employees. Further, no arguments raised in this case convince us that public employees must be included under chapter 49.32 RCW by necessary implication. Consequently, chapter 49.32 RCW does not apply to public employees. Public employees therefore may not bring a cause of action relying upon its policy. The trial court properly dismissed the complaint filed by Jaquish, a public employee, that relied upon chapter 49.32 RCW. Accordingly, we affirm.

COX and ELLINGTON, JJ., concur.