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PIERSON v. STATE OF IOWA, (N.D.Iowa 2002)
JOHN A. JARVEY, United States Magistrate Judge
This matter comes before the court pursuant to the respondent's April 20, 2001 motion for partial summary judgment (docket number 9). The parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The respondent is represented by Thomas William Andrews, Assistant Attorney General. The petitioner is represented by Rockne Cole. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants the motion for partial summary judgment.
In this case, the petitioner, Bennie Pierson, Jr., was convicted of second degree murder by the Iowa District Court. He appealed claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, among other arguments. His conviction was affirmed by the Iowa Court of Appeals. The petitioner instituted an action in state court for post-conviction relief again claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court questioned whether petitioner preserved error on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel but resolved that claim on the merits. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed and stated that the petitioner had failed to show sufficient reason for his failure to raise the claim on direct appeal. The petitioner subsequently filed this petition for habeas corpus in federal court. The respondent moves for partial summary judgment on several of the petitioner's claims in his petition for habeas corpus, arguing the following claims are procedurally defaulted: (1) the petitioner's claim that his counsel failed to properly investigate and prepare his case; and (2) the petitioner's claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to discover evidence which would have changed the outcome of the verdict. The petitioner resists the motion, arguing the default should be excused.
The petitioner originally also included the following grounds in support of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in his petition for habeas corpus: (1) trial counsel failed to object to leading and suggestive questions, failed to interview relevant witnesses, failed to return phone calls or meet with the petitioner, and failed to allow petitioner to obtain copies or review depositions and police reports; (2) trial counsel failed to properly prepare for trial and consult with the petitioner; (3) trial counsel failed to object to prosecutorial misconduct during the trial; and (4) the district court erred in denying the petitioner post-conviction relief after newly discovered evidence raised sufficient doubt as to the accuracy of the jury verdict and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to discover it. However, in the petitioner's partial resistance to respondent's partial motion for summary judgment, the petitioner states that he does not resist the respondent's motion to dismiss these claims.
Summary Judgment: The Standard
A motion for summary judgment may be granted only if, after examining all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court finds that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kegel v. Runnels, 793 F.2d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 1986). Once the movant has properly supported its motion, the nonmovant "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [its] pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). "To preclude the entry of summary judgment, the nonmovant must show that, on an element essential to [its] case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, there are genuine issues of material fact." Noll v. Petrovsky, 828 F.2d 461, 462 (8th Cir. 1987) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)). Although "direct proof is not required to create a jury question, . . . to avoid summary judgment, `the facts and circumstances relied upon must attain the dignity of substantial evidence and must not be such as merely to create a suspicion.'" Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting Impro Prod., Inc. v. Herrick, 715 F.2d 1267, 1272 (8th Cir. 1983)). In applying these standards, the court must give the nonmoving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Krause v. Perryman, 827 F.2d 346, 350 (8th Cir. 1987).
The United States Supreme Court has held the trial court must dispose of claims unsupported by fact and determine whether a genuine issue for trial exists, rather than "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter." Lockhart v. Cedar Rapids Comm. Sch. Dist., 963 F. Supp. 805, 815 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24; and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)). In this way, habeas cases are not unlike summary judgment proceedings. The petitioner must come forward with relevant evidence to support his petition. See Weeks v. Bowersox, 119 F.3d 1342, 1354-55 (8th Cir. 1997).
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
The petitioner was charged with murder in the first degree of Michael Heiderscheit, a long-time acquaintance of the petitioner. Following a jury trial, the petitioner was found guilty of second-degree murder. He was sentenced to a term of incarceration not to exceed fifty years.
Evidence presented at trial established that on the evening of September 15, 1994, the petitioner accompanied the victim to cash his paycheck. Shortly thereafter, the two began drinking at the victim's residence. Later that evening, they met some friends at a bar located in northwest Cedar Rapids. According to witness testimony, the petitioner left the bar at about 11:00 p.m. with the victim and returned alone about an hour later. Several witnesses stated that the petitioner went into the bathroom and made some incriminating statements about having hit someone and displayed a wallet with cash inside. Some witnesses also recalled seeing spots of blood on the petitioner's hands. At trial, the timing of the events of that night was a crucial issue for both the prosecution and the defense. At issue was whether the petitioner would have had time to leave the bar, drive to the murder scene, commit the murder, appear on a convenience store surveillance video, and return to the bar.
The petitioner's conviction was affirmed by the Iowa Court of Appeals. The petitioner raised three main issues in his direct appeal: (1) sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the denial of his motion to suppress statements; and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel for pre-trial preparation relating to the interviewing of witnesses, not returning phone calls or meeting with the petitioner and not allowing the petitioner to copy or review depositions and police reports, and failure at trial to make objections to three questions the petitioner classified as leading and suggestive. The court denied most of the petitioner's claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to state with sufficient specificity what conduct the petitioner deemed ineffective and how competent representation would probably have changed his outcome of the trial. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the district court regarding the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to pre-trial preparation. Other claims were rejected for failure to show that the conduct of counsel fell below the standard of normal competency.
The petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief. The petitioner raised two main issues in his post-conviction relief application: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel relating to evidence from a local Handimart surveillance tape which showed the petitioner present twice on the night of the murder, an alleged conspiracy to frame the petitioner, and failure to call a deputy sheriff at the motion to suppress statements hearing; and (2) newly discovered evidence: the convenience store surveillance tape. This surveillance tape showed the victim and the petitioner in the store together at 7:35 p.m. The tape later showed the petitioner there alone at 12:05 a.m. The court determined that the petitioner could not demonstrate cause for his failure to properly raise these claims on direct appeal. The court also addressed the merits of the claims and found the videotape from the convenience store on the night of the incident would have been beneficial to the petitioner, but it failed to reach the necessary level of prejudice needed to establish his claims. On October 13, 2000, the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's determination that the petitioner failed to show sufficient reason or cause for his failure to raise his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.
The petitioner seeks habeas relief in this court on several grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to obtain the Handimart surveillance tape. Because the timing of the events on the night in question was critical, the petitioner now contends that this videotape exculpates him and his trial counsel's assistance was ineffective because his counsel failed to obtain and use the video at trial.
Conclusions of Law
The United States Supreme Court stated in O'Sullivan v. Boerckel:
Before a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court. In other words, the state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition. The exhaustion doctrine. however, raises a recurring question: What state remedies must a habeas petitioner invoke to satisfy the federal exhaustion requirement?O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842-83 (1999). Similarly, subsection 2254(c) provides:
An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). Thus, there must be "an inquiry into what procedures are `available' under state law." O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 847. Determining what these procedures are "is an intrinsically federal issue that must be determined by the federal courts." Wyldes v. Hundley, 69 F.3d 247, 251 (8th Cir. 1995).
Iowa law provides for direct appeal of a criminal conviction as a matter of right. Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a) (1983). The petitioner in this case filed a timely appeal, raising only the three issues described above with the Iowa Court of Appeals. His conviction was affirmed and the three issues were found by the court to lack specificity or rise to the level of necessary incompetence.
Iowa law also provides a way for attacking a conviction in the form of an application for post-conviction relief. See id. § 822.2. A petitioner cannot raise grounds for relief in a post-conviction relief action that were not raised on direct appeal unless he can show cause and prejudice to excuse the failure to raise the claim. This is true even if the post-conviction relief claim is based on newly discovered evidence.Carroll v. State, 466 N.W.2d 269, 271 (Iowa Ct.App. 1990).
In this case, the petitioner timely filed his post-conviction relief action, raising the two claims discussed above. However, these claims could have been but were not raised by the petitioner on direct appeal. Therefore, the post-conviction relief court found that the petitioner could not demonstrate cause for his failure to raise these claims. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for habeas relief with this court.
"A federal court can consider the merits of a habeas petition only when the petitioner has `fairly presented' to the state courts the `substance' of his [or her] federal habeas corpus claim." Buckley v. Lockhart, 892 F.2d 715, 718 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing Martin v. Solem, 801 F.2d 324, 330 (8th Cir. 1986)). In other words, before seeking federal habeas corpus relief, the petitioner must both exhaust state remedies and preserve his claim for review according to state procedural rules.McDonald v. Bowersox, 101 F.3d 588, 598 (8th Cir. 1996). A state court decision denying post-conviction relief which rests upon adequate and independent procedural grounds will bar federal habeas corpus review.See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989). To overcome this bar, the petitioner must show cause for the procedural default and prejudice attributable thereto in order to obtain review of the defaulted constitutional claim. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986).
The petitioner alleges that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to obtain and show to the jury the videotape of the petitioner at the Handimart store on the night of the murder. The state contends that the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure to obtain the videotape is barred by procedural default and no cause is shown to excuse the default. Both parties concede that the petitioner failed to properly preserve his state claims and the claims are therefore barred.
Federal courts will enforce state rules of procedural default. Therefore, federal habeas corpus review of the petitioner's claim is precluded unless he can show cause for his default of state procedural rules and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977); Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1066 (8th Cir. 1988). The "cause" element of procedural default requires that the prisoner show "some objective factor external to the defense impeded [the prisoner's] efforts." Cornman v. Armontrout, 959 F.2d 727, 729 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488). Where the petitioner has access to information necessary to make his claim before the state court, the failure to develop the claim will not excuse procedural default. El-Talbech v. Hopkins, 997 F.2d 386, 389 (8th Cir. 1993).
The petitioner in this case recognizes his obligation to establish cause and prejudice. He therefore argues that cause is shown based on the fact that the assistance of his counsel was ineffective because his counsel failed to obtain the convenience store surveillance tape. Ineffective assistance of counsel may be cause for procedural default. However, the exhaustion doctrine "generally requires that a claim of ineffective assistance be presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be used to establish cause for procedural default."Murray, 477 U.S. at 489. Ineffectiveness of counsel will constitute cause only if it is an independent constitutional violation. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753-54. However, this claim must be properly submitted to the state court to allow the state court to review the merits of the claim. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 452 (2000). The court concludes that the petitioner cannot claim ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to obtain the videotape as cause for procedural default. First, he did not submit this claim for the state court to review on direct appeal. Second, he cannot establish that the absence of the videotape from the trial provides cause. Nowhere has the petitioner made more than a conclusory allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the failure to pursue the videotape. He is not able to demonstrate that his counsel's conduct was ineffective in the pertinent respect according to the requirements for proof of such a claim under Strickland v. Washington, specifically, "unprofessional conduct" and "prejudice."Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The petitioner has offered no "cause" justification to overcome procedural default of his claim.
Because the petitioner has not been able to show cause for failing to properly bring his ineffective assistance of counsel claim relating to the videotape before the state court, it is unnecessary to determine whether he suffered any prejudice.
The second way in which the petitioner attempts to avoid the bar of procedural default is by demonstrating that the state law regarding appellate counsel's duty to raise issues not in the record on direct appeal was not regularly followed or well established at the time of the petitioner's post-conviction relief hearing. However, this issue was resolved by the Eighth Circuit in May v. Iowa, in which the court held that the Iowa law requiring appellate counsel to raise issues not in the record on direct appeal was well established and regularly followed. May v. Iowa, 251 F.3d 713, 717 (8th Cir. 2001).
Finally, the petitioner seeks to excuse procedural default of his claim by arguing that the failure to consider his claim by the court will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The petitioner raises a claim of actual innocence. He makes his claim of actual innocence as a "gateway" through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred claim considered on the merits. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315 (1995) (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993)). According to the United States Supreme Court, the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception should remain "rare" and be applied only in "extraordinary" cases. Id. at 321. Such a claim requires the petitioner to first, support his allegations of constitutional error with new and reliable evidence that was not presented at trial, and second, the petitioner must prove that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.Wyldes, 69 F.3d at 254 (citing Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329).
The petitioner in this case does support his allegations with new evidence not presented at trial, specifically, the convenience store videotape. However, he cannot show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence. There was overwhelming evidence presented at trial to support the jury's verdict of guilty of second degree murder. In fact, the argument may be made that the tape would have been harmful to the petitioner if shown at trial because it would have undermined his defense of intoxication. In sum, the petitioner has not satisfied the necessary requisites to excuse the procedural default of his claim.
The court finds that the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his counsel's failure to obtain the videotape is procedurally defaulted and the petitioner has not established cause to excuse his failure to bring up this claim on direct appeal nor has he established a fundamental miscarriage of justice would occur if the court did not consider the claim. Partial summary judgment is appropriate in this case as to issues 12(A)(3) and 12(D)(2) of the petitioner's petition for habeas corpus. Accordingly, the court grants the respondent's motion as to these claims.
Upon the foregoing,
Respondent's April 20, 2001 motion for partial summary judgment (docket number 9) is granted.
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