RENFRO v. INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY, (W.D.Mich. 2002)

WENDELL A. MILES, Senior Judge

In accordance with the court's Order granting the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, entered on August 8, 2002, in accordance with the Opinion entered on August 27, 2002, and in accordance with the Order on Unopposed Motion for Entry of Final Judgment on Claims of Planner Plaintiffs entered on today's date finding that there is no just reason for delay and that final judgment should be entered in favor of AEP and against the plaintiff planners, the claims of the following plaintiffs are hereby dismissed with prejudice: Kurt Renfro; Richard Peterson; Terry Abernathy; James B. Adkins; Evan Arms; Carter Browne; Leonard A. Caccioppo; James E. Cavitt; Ralph E. Davidson, Jr.; James Eggleston; Steven Fulton; Michael Harper; Roger Ingalsbe; Alan Johnson; Dale Koern; Edwin Phillips; James Pope; Lawrence Prenger; Bruce Radde; Gregory Reese; Conrad Reid; E. Brian Roush; John Mark Sanders; Joseph Staub; Guy Troxell; and Larry Wilkes.

ORDER ON UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT ON CLAIMS OF PLANNER PLAINTIFFS

The plaintiffs have filed this action against their employer, Indiana Michigan Power Company, d/b/a American Electric Power ("AEP"), alleging violations of the overtime pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. The case involves three distinct groups of employees at AEP's Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant: "planners," "technical writers," and "nuclear specialists." The court has issued an order granting a motion by AEP for partial summary judgment on claims made by the planner plaintiffs, and those plaintiffs' claims have therefore been dismissed. Although the action is not yet completed, the matter is currently before the court on an unopposed motion by AEP for entry of final judgment on the claims of the planner plaintiffs (docket no. 208).

Pursuant to a Scheduling Order entered in the case on July 2, 2001, the claims of the planner plaintiffs were severed from those of the remaining plaintiffs for purposes of trial. The court's ruling on summary judgment motions addressed only the claims of the planners and not those of the technical writers and nuclear specialists, which remain pending.

AEP urges the court to direct the entry of final judgment in AEP's favor on the claims of the planners, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). Rule 54(b) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

[W]hen multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties[.]

Rule 54(b) certification requires two findings: first, the district court must expressly direct the entry of final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties; and second, the district court must expressly determine that there is no just reason to delay appellate review. General Acquisition, Inc. v. Gencorp. Inc., 23 F.3d 1022, 1026 (6th Cir. 1994).

Here, the first requirement is clearly satisfied. The planners' claims against AEP are factually distinct and separable from those of the technical writers and nuclear specialists. See Soliday v. Miami County, Ohio, 55 F.3d 1158, 1163 (6th Cir. 1995) (Rule 54(b) certification was proper and appellate court had jurisdiction over partial appeal where claims against two defendants, who were not implicated in any remaining claim, were distinct and separable from the claims against the other defendants).

The second requirement for certification, determination of no just reason for delay, "requires the district court to balance the needs of the parties against the interests of efficient case management." General Acquisition, at 1027. Although there exists no precise test for making the determination, district courts have been instructed to consider the following nonexhaustive list of factors:

(1) the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (2) the possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the district court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; (4) the presence or absence of a claim or counterclaim which could result in set-off against the judgment sought to be made final; (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense and the like.

Id. (citations omitted).

Considering the factors which apply here, the court finds that there is no just reason to delay entry of final judgment as to the planners. As noted above, the planners' claims are distinct from those of the technical writers and nuclear specialists, being based on different facts. The need for review of the planners' claims will not be mooted by future developments on the remaining plaintiffs' claims, and the possibility that the reviewing court might be required to consider the same issues a second time seems remote. There are no counterclaims, and no issues of set-off. In addition, it is unknown when the claims of the remaining non-planner plaintiffs will be resolved, and there seems no good reason to require the planners to wait for an uncertain period of time before they may seek review on the issue of AEP's liability to them. All of these considerations lead the court to a finding of no just reason for delay for purposes of Rule 54(b).

A final judgment as to the claims of the plaintiff planners will be entered accordingly.

ORDER ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION REGARDING COLLECTIVE ACTION

This matter came before the court on Plaintiffs' Motion Regarding Collective Action (docket no. 146). In their motion, the plaintiff planners seek to have their claims tried as a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b).

On August 8, 2002, the court issued an order granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment in its favor on the claims of the planners. This ruling renders moot plaintiffs' motion, which seeks a ruling on how their claims will be tried.

The court therefore denies plaintiffs' motion as moot.