ITAMARI v. GIORDAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Contrary to the contention of the respondent, Emeric Csengeri, the Supreme Court was not bound by the doctrine of law of the case to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as it was asserted against him in his individual capacity. A prior order of the same court, dated March 29, 2001, did not address the precise question of whether Csengeri may be liable on an alter-ego theory, and therefore did not constitute the law of the case on the issue of piercing the corporate veil (see People v. Evans, 94 N.Y.2d 499, 502; Castle v. Gaseteria Oil Corp., 263 A.D.2d 523, 523-524; Gilligan v. Reers, 255 A.D.2d 486, 487).

However, contrary to the plaintiff's contention, he failed to adequately allege, in either the amended complaint or in opposition to the motion to dismiss, facts demonstrating that Csengeri exercised sufficient domination and control over the defendant Giordan Development Corporation to warrant piercing the corporate veil (see Matter of Morris v. New York State Dept. of Taxation Fin., 82 N.Y.2d 135, 141-142). Mere conclusory statements that a corporation is "dominated or controlled" by a shareholder are insufficient to sustain a cause of action against the shareholder in his individual capacity (see Abelman v. Shoratlantic Dev. Co., 153 A.D.2d 821, 823; Perez v. One Clark St. Hous. Corp., 108 A.D.2d 844, 845; Cusumano v. Iota Indus., 100 A.D.2d 892, 893). Accordingly, Csengeri may not be held liable to the plaintiff for the alleged obligations of Giordan Development Corporation (see Buehner v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 270 A.D.2d 299; W.H. Brownyard Corp. v. American Intl. Group, 237 A.D.2d 594; Finkel v. Blair Co., 213 A.D.2d 588).

O'BRIEN, J.P., KRAUSMAN, TOWNES and RIVERA, JJ., concur.