MINNESOTA v. YEAZIZW, (D.Minn. 2002)

DONOVAN W. FRANK, United States District Judge

Introduction

The above-entitled matter is before the undersigned United States District Judge pursuant to Defendant's Notice of Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). This matter is a criminal proceeding instigated in Hennepin County Court on behalf of the City Attorney for Minneapolis, Minnesota. Defendant Yeazizw is charged with disorderly conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.72, subd. 1, obstructing legal process with force in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.50, subds. 1 and 2(2), and assault in the fourth degree in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2231. For the reasons set forth below, the Court remands the matter to the Hennepin County Court.

Background

This case arises out of certain events which transpired on September 22, 2001, in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The nature of those events is hotly disputed by the parties to this lawsuit and are, for the most part, irrelevant to the motion before the Court. For purposes of this motion, it is sufficient to note the following facts.

On September 22, 2001, Defendant Linda Chaplin, on off-duty Minneapolis police officer, was working as a security person at the Walgreens Drug Store at 200 West Lake Street, Minneapolis. Defendant Walgreens contacted Defendant Gopher Towing about towing a number of vehicles parked in the Walgreens parking lot but believed to belong to patrons of a nearby business establishment (which is known colloquially as the "Somali Mall"). While Chaplin looked on, a representative of Gopher Towing began placing "boots" on a number of vehicles in the Walgreens parking lot. One of those vehicles belonged to Plaintiff Yeazizw who was, in fact, a patron of the Somali Mall. When Yeazizw left the shopping mall and approached her vehicle, the accounts of events become more confused. Yeazizw asserts that she got in her vehicle and began driving away, despite the boot attached to her wheel. She further asserts that Chaplin approached her car, began yelling at her, made a number of racist remarks, and assaulted her through the window of the vehicle by pulling her hair, slapping at her, and spraying her with mace. Yeazizw further asserts that other officers arrived on the scene and also sprayed her with mace.

In contrast, the City asserts that Chaplin attempted to stop Yeazizw from driving away with the boot and from recklessly driving towards a small crowd of on-lookers. The City claims that Chaplin ordered Yeazizw to stop the vehicle but that Yeazizw became violent, hitting Chaplin. In short, the City asserts that Yeazizw was the physical aggressor in the altercation.

Ultimately, Yeazizw was taken into custody, booked, and tab charged with disorderly conduct, obstruction of legal process, and failure to obey a lawful order of police. She was released the following day.

Yeazizw was arraigned on October 4, 2001.

At a pretrial hearing, Yeazizw moved for a formal complaint. The state court concluded that, because Yeazizw is not a native English speaker and because no interpreter was present during the reading of the tab charges, Yeazizw was entitled to a written complaint. The written complaint, sworn on November 21, 2001, charged Yeazizw with attempted assault in the fourth degree, obstruction of legal process with force, disorder conduct, and failure to obey a lawful order of a police officer. Between November 21 and the present date, there have been a number of motion hearings related to the criminal complaint. In addition, there have been two scheduled trial dates, both of which have been continued at Yeazizw's request. The criminal trial is currently scheduled to commence on November 12, 2002.

Yeazizw removed the state court criminal proceeding on October 22, 2002.

Discussion

Section 1443 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides as follows:

Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:

(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof. . . .

"A notice of removal of a criminal prosecution shall be filed not later than thirty days after the arraignment in the State court, or at any time before trial, whichever is earlier," absent a showing of good cause for the delay. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1).

On its face, the notice of removal in this action is untimely in the extreme. Yeazizw was arraigned on October 4, 2001, making the deadline for filing a notice of removal November 3, 2001, but this notice was not filed until nearly a year beyond that date. Indeed, the matter was scheduled to go to trial two times in the interim between the arraignment and this notice. Yeazizw has offered absolutely no explanation for the extreme tardiness of the notice of removal, much less proffered good cause to justify an exception to the statutory time frame. For that reason alone, regardless of the merits of Yeazizw's application for removal, the Court would be legally compelled to remand the matter to the state court.

However, the Court notes that, timely or not, Yeazizw has not articulated adequate grounds for removal under the statute. Accordingly, the Court makes a further finding that remand is appropriate because the statutory basis for removal has not been met.

In her removal petition, Yeazizw asserts that she was improperly arrested and charged because she is African-American; that the State of Minnesota, by and through the Minneapolis City Attorney, has perpetuated this racial discrimination by pursuing the prosecution without adequately considering exculpatory evidence; and that the Minnesota court system is an inadequate forum in which to defend her rights because she has been denied the opportunity to raise certain constitutional issues.

The United States Supreme Court's decision in City of Greenwood, Miss. v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966), is dispositive of this issue. In City of Greenwood, certain civil rights activists had sought to remove their criminal prosecution for various state law offenses related to their activity in helping African-Americans register to vote. The criminal defendants seeking removal alleged that they were all arrested and charged either because they were themselves African-American or because they were engaged in helping African-American's assert their constitutional rights. They further alleged that they would be unable to obtain a fair trial in a Mississippi state court. The Supreme Court held:

It is not enough to support removal under § 1443(1) to allege or show that the defendant's federal equal civil rights have been illegally and corruptly denied by state administrative officials in advance of trial, that the charges against the defendant are false, or that the defendant is unable to obtain a fair trial in a particular state court. The motives of the officers bringing the charges may be corrupt, but that does not show that the state trial court will find the defendant guilty if he is innocent, or that in any other manner the defendant will be `denied or cannot enforce in the courts' of the State any right under a federal law providing for equal civil rights. The civil rights removal statute does not require and does not permit the judges of the federal courts to put their brethren of the state judiciary on trial. Under § 1443(1), the vindication of the defendant's federal rights is left to the state courts except in the rare situations where it can be clearly predicted by reason of the operation of a pervasive and explicit state or federal law that those rights will inevitably be denied by the very act of bringing the defendant to trial in the state court.

City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. at 827-28; see also Doe v. Berry, 967 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1992).

The Supreme Court distinguished the facts presented in City of Greenwood from the facts presented in State of Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966), in which the Court determined that removal was appropriate. In Rachel, the criminal defendants were charged with trespass for refusing to leave a public accommodation which was denying them service as a result of their race. As the Court noted, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 gave the Rachel defendants an absolute right to violate the otherwise neutral terms of the state criminal trespass statute. The Court pointed out that, in contrast, federal law did not confer on the City of Greenwood defendants a defense or immunity from prosecution for obstructing a public street or other similar offenses. Similarly, in the case at bar, there is no federal statutory or constitutional provision that confers an affirmative right to engage in assault, obstruction of legal process with force, or disorderly conduct.

Indeed, Yeazizw's argument for removal is that the police and City Attorney have selectively enforced these criminal statutes against Yeazizw because of her race, that the charges against her are false, and that she will not get a fair trial from a Hennepin County judge. These reasons for removal were explicitly rejected by the Court in City of Greenwood.

For the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Defendant Yeazizw's Petition for Removal (Doc. No. 1) is DENIED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Hennepin County District Court.