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GIARDINA v. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, (E.D.La. 2003)
KAREN WELLS ROBY, United States Magistrate Judge
On January 30, 2003, the defendant, Lockheed Martin Corporation ("Lockheed"), filed a Motion to Compel Discovery (doc. #36) seeking an order compelling the plaintiff, Felicia Giardina, to respond to several questions posed during her deposition. Giardina opposes the motion contending that the information sought is cumulative and irrelevant.
I. Background A. Plaintiff's Allegations
The plaintiff filed the instant suit pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. ยง 2000e, claiming that she was discriminated against during her employment with Lockheed. In January 1998, the plaintiff was hired by Lockheed as a welder in Lockheed's Michoud facility. Several months after being hired, the plaintiff complained to her supervisor about pictures of naked women that were taped on the tool boxes of several male welders. Because the pictures were not removed, the plaintiff again complained to her supervisors. She claims that as a result of these complaints, the male workers placed additional pictures on their toolboxes, spread rumors about her and harassed her.
In August of 1998, the plaintiff filed a written complaint in which she claimed that several of her co-workers, who witnessed her being harassed, were also being harassed. She claims that her supervisors leaked the contents of her complaint to her co-workers. She also claims that several of the co-workers she listed as witnesses in her complaint were transferred to other shifts and other departments.
In November 1998, the plaintiff filed a complaint with Lockheed claiming that she had been retaliated against, however, no action was taken. In her retaliation complaint, the plaintiff complained of several incidents, including co-workers making lewd comments, pornography being viewed on the internet and left on company computers, employees being told not to associate with her and co-workers being written-up for supporting her complaints.
Subsequently, in December 1998, the plaintiff was injured when she fell six feet from a piece of equipment. Upon receiving treatment for her injuries, she was informed by her treating physician that the on-site doctor for Lockheed attempted to negatively influence her medical treatment by stating that she was a "bad egg" who filed a Sexual Harassment Complaint against the company. The plaintiff claims that such harassment continued until she was terminated in 1999.
The plaintiff also claims that in October 1999, she was terminated for insubordination for allegedly not returning to work during her allotted break time. She claims that this alleged nondiscriminatory reason for discharge was a pretext for gender discrimination, sexual harassment and retaliation. She filed the instant suit on April 5, 2002 seeking to recover declaratory, injunctive and equitable relief, back pay, reinstatement and punitive damages. She also seeks compensatory damages for pain and suffering, emotional distress and mental anguish.
II. Instant Motion
According to the exhibits submitted by Lockheed in support of the instant motion, the plaintiff was treated for depression during March 1999 by Ms. Mary Ann Catalanotto of the Touro Infirmary. During a March 3, 1999 session with the plaintiff, Ms. Catalanotto noted that the plaintiff was motivated to enter therapy because of anxiety and depression related to work and the breakup of a relationship with her partner of two years. Ms. Catalanotto also noted that the plaintiff's closest relationship was with her partner with whom she was with for two years.
The plaintiff's deposition was taken on January 3, 2003. During the deposition, counsel for Lockheed requested that the plaintiff identify her partner. However, counsel for the plaintiff objected to the question contending that the identity of the plaintiff's partner is a "private issue." Counsel for the plaintiff then instructed the plaintiff not to answer the question.
Thereafter, Lockheed filed the instant motion requesting that the Court compel the plaintiff to identify her partner. Lockheed argues that it is entitled to discover the identity of the plaintiff's partner because such person had a close relationship with the plaintiff during the time the plaintiff claims to have been harassed. Lockheed also asserts that it is allowed to obtain the identity of the plaintiff's partner because the plaintiff has indicated that she intends to call family members as witnesses to support her claims of emotional distress. As such, Lockheed submits that it should be permitted to determine if there are any witnesses that may contradict that testimony.
Lockheed further states that because Ms. Catalanotto's notes suggest that the plaintiff's relationship with her partner may have contributed to her emotional distress, it is entitled to determine whether the emotional distress she suffered was related to work. Lockheed seeks to obtain this information by deposing the plaintiff's partner.
The plaintiff opposes the motion contending that because she sought therapy for depression some three months following the end of her relationship with her partner, any testimony the partner may provide is only marginally relevant. The plaintiff also suggests that if the Court allows the identity of her partner to remain undisclosed, she will agree not to call this witness for the issue of emotional distress damages. She asserts that because she will call family members and physicians to provide testimony as to this issue, any testimony provided by her partner will be cumulative.
The plaintiff further indicates that because her partner has not made her sexual orientation public, her partner's job and the custody of her partner's child will be placed at risk if her sexual orientation is disclosed. Finally, the plaintiff submits that Lockheed has refused the plaintiff's reasonable efforts to provide information. She contends that she has offered to produce her partner for deposition if her identity, residence and employer is not disclosed.
III. Analysis A. Identity of the Plaintiff's Partner
The discovery rules are accorded a broad and liberal treatment in order to affect their purpose of adequately informing litigants in civil trials. Hebert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979). In ascertaining whether information is discoverable, the court must focus on the claims and defenses involved in the action. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Seabulk Towing v. Oceanografia, 2002 WL 1837855, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 8, 2002). The determination of whether such information is discoverable because it is relevant to the claims or defenses depends upon the circumstances of the pending action. Seabulk, 2002 WL 1837855, at *3.
Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the scope of discovery includes any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action. The range of relevant matters is broad and may be related to "the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Id.
When the discovery sought appears relevant, the party resisting the discovery has the burden to establish the lack of relevance by demonstrating that the requested discovery (1) does not come within the broad scope of relevance as defined under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure. Beach v. City of Olathe, 2000 WL 960808, at *2 (D. Kan. July 6, 2000).
Applying this standard to the instant matter, the Court finds that the identity of the plaintiff s partner is relevant and discoverable. First, the Court notes that the plaintiff has failed to cite any authority to support the proposition that she may refuse to provide the identity of her partner on privacy grounds.
Also, the Court notes that the plaintiff claims to have suffered emotional distress as a result of the discrimination, harassment and retaliation she suffered while employed at Lockheed. During the time she was employed by Lockheed and shortly after her relationship with her partner ended, the plaintiff began treatment with Ms. Catalanotto. The plaintiff alleges that she submitted to such treatment as a result of the emotional distress suffered during her employment with Lockheed. However, the evidence suggests that the plaintiff may have also suffered emotional distress as a result of her personal relationships. In fact, Ms. Catalanotto's notes indicate that the plaintiff was "motivated to enter this therapy for the first time because of anxiety and depression related to work and the breakup of a relationship with her partner of two years."
Furthermore, the plaintiff has indicated that she intends to call several witness to support her claims of emotional distress. Lockheed is certainly entitled to discover the identity of any individuals that may be able to contradict such testimony. Additionally, Lockheed has asserted that it does not seek to question the plaintiff's partner about sexual matters or sexual orientation. Rather, it states that it will only pose questions regarding the plaintiff's employment and questions regarding the plaintiff's mental or emotional health during the relevant time period. Moreover, Lockheed has agreed to designate the identity of the plaintiff's partner as confidential pursuant to the Protective Order entered in this case.
These witnesses include her mother, Glenda May, and her aunts, Diana Latour and Maria Bayer.
Rec. Doc. No. 11.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the plaintiff shall reveal the identity of her partner pursuant to the terms agreed upon in the Protective Order.
B. Attorney's Fees
The plaintiff seeks to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs. Rule 37(a)(4)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that when a motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may enter any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and may, after affording an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a just manner. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4)(C). After a review of the circumstances, the Court finds that attorney's fees are warranted in the instant case.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Compel Discovery (doc. # 36) is GRANTED IN PART and CONTINUED IN PART as follows:
1) GRANTED as to the identity of the plaintiff's partner. The plaintiff shall provide the identity of her partner within 5 days this order.
2) CONTINUED as to the request for attorney's fees. If Lockheed seeks to recover attorney's fees incurred in bringing the instant motion, it is to submit the appropriate documentation in compliance with Local Rule 54.2 no later than June 4, 2003. A ruling on the attorney's fee issue is continued until June 11, 2003.
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