PARKMAN WESTON ASSOC. v. EBENEZER AFRICAN METH. EPIS., (C.D.Ill. 2003)

RONALD GUZMAN, District Judge

Pending is plaintiffs' motion to amend their second amended complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. ("Rule") 15(a), For the reasons set forth below, this motion is granted.

Plaintiffs Parkman Weston Associates, Ltd., an architectural firm and Illinois corporation, and Larry W. Parkman, architect and sole owner of Parkman Weston Associates, Ltd., have sued defendants for copyright infringement, breach of contract, and foreclosure of a mechanics lien. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on December 21, 2001. Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint on February 7, 2002, adding two defendants. Plaintiffs were granted leave to file a second amended complaint and did so on August 7, 2002, supplementing their pleadings with exhibits and raising the amount claimed under the contract. On October 16, 2002, plaintiffs filed this motion to amend the second amended complaint in order to correct an accumulated error in their damages amount. Defendants oppose the amendment.

Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the amendment of pleadings. Rule 15 contains a fairly liberal standard, allowing amendments "by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party . . . and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Whether to grant leave to amend a pleading is a decision that rests within the court's broad discretion. See Jones v. Hamelman, 869 F.2d 1023, 1026 (7th Cir. 1989). The goal of the federal rules is to resolve disputes on the merits in a single judicial proceeding if possible. Jupiter Aluminum Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 181 F.R.D. 605, 609 (N.D, Ill, 1998). To facilitate this goal, leave to amend should be allowed by the court absent undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, undue prejudice, repeated failures to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or futility of the amendment Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

Defendants' sole contention in opposition to plaintiffs' motion is that undue prejudice will result if this amendment is allowed. Defendants argue that the proposed amendment of the damage/lien amount will "destroy the certainty of every material averment of the affidavit that stands as its claims for mechanics lien," (Defs.' Mot, Opp'n Pls.' Mot. Leave Amend, at 3.) Defendants cite Marsh v. Mick, 159 Ill. App. 399, 407 (1st Dist. 1911), and Hyde Park Investment Co. v. Hyde Park State Bank, 257 Ill. App. 539, 545 (1st Dist. 1930), in support and opine that the misstatement of the Hen amount by plaintiffs would vitiate plaintiffs' lien claim. In both Marsh and Hyde Park, the lien amounts claimed were found to be so grossly exaggerated that they constituted fraud. Marsh and Hyde Park, therefore, are distinguishable from the present case because Marsh and Hyde Park both involved claims by a lienor that were fraudulently overstated rather than mistakenly understated. In the present case, the lien claims have been understated. The plaintiffs did not initially claim more than was due; they merely seek to amend their complaint to reflect what they honestly believe to be owed to them under the contract and the mechanics lien.

In light of these governing principles, this Court can find no reason to deny plaintiffs' motion. Although this will be the third amendment to the original complaint, the Court sees no evidence of bad faith or dilatory motive. It does not appear that plaintiffs are seeking to surprise or defraud defendants; they merely seek to adjust the amount of damages to reflect what is owed them on account of a prior error in defendants* favor. Most significant, perhaps, is that the amendment would not be futile. Plaintiffs only recently learned of the accounting error that was incorrectly credited to defendants; upon discovering such error, they immediately sought leave of court to amend the complaint to reflect the correction. Plaintiffs would have no reason to hide or delay correcting such an error, as this would be counterintuitive to their claim for damages. In Foman v. Davis, Justice Goldberg remarked in dicta that "[i]f the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits." 371 U.S. at 182. This Court finds that no harm or prejudice will result to defendants as a consequence of the Court's allowing the amendment.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants plaintiffs' motion to amend the second amended complaint [doc. no. 51-1].