CHAROS v. CHAROS

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, to issue a new order which shall accurately reflect the provisions of the stipulation.

The preferred remedy when a party alleges that an order or judgment does not accurately incorporate the terms of a stipulation is by motion in the trial court for resettlement or vacatur of the order or judgment, rather than by appeal ( see CPLR 5019[a]; Herpe v. Herpe, 225 N.Y. 323, 327; Matter of Beatrice T., 286 A.D.2d 686, 687; Matter of Gesvantner v. Dominguez, 273 A.D.2d 383; Pizzuto v. Pizzuto, 162 A.D.2d 443). However, we have examined the stipulation and order appealed from and find that in certain respects the latter does not conform to the former ( see Matter of Gesvantner v. Dominguez, supra; Pizzuto v. Pizzuto, supra).

As the defendant Thomas Charos correctly notes, the second, third, seventh, and tenth decretal paragraphs of the order appealed from do not, as required by the terms of the December 18, 2001, stipulation, provide for the exchange of general releases. Therefore, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, to issue a new order which accurately reflects the terms of the stipulation ( see Matter of Gesvantner v. Dominguez, supra; Pizzuto v. Pizzuto, supra).

ALTMAN, J.P., GOLDSTEIN, ADAMS and MASTRO, JJ., concur.