MASONER v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, (C.D.Cal. 2004)

EDWARD RAFEEDIE, Senior District Judge

The Court has received, received, read and considered the papers filed in connection with the Respondents' Application for Stay of the Court's January 24, 2004 Order and February 3, 2004 Order pending appeal. The Court has come to the following CONCLUSIONS:

When a state appeals a federal court decision to grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner, the habeas petitioner shall be released from custody unless a stay is ordered by the court rendering the decision, the court of appeals, or the Supreme Court. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770 (1987).

State fails to demonstrate that it has a high likelihood of success on appeal. The mandatory language of P.C. 3041(b) imposes an affirmative obligation to grant parole, creating a legally cognizable liberty interest in parole and a presumption that parole release will be granted if certain conditions are met.McQuillon v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901-902 (9th Cir. 2002);Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2003). The deprivation of this right is permissible only when the Board of Prison Terms (BPT) can provide evidence from the record supporting its decision. In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal.4th 616 (Sup.Ct. 2002). Biggs 334 F.3d at 919 concludes that although a commitment offense can provide some evidence to justify the initial denial of a parole date, subsequent denials in the face of exemplary behavior and overwhelming evidence of rehabilitation raises serious questions involving an inmate's liberty interest in parole. Indeed, the Court holds that in the case of Petitioner Masoner, the BPT's refusals to grant a parole date and repeated failure to provide post-commitment support for its decisions have violated Masoner's liberty interest and due process rights. In addition, in light of Masoner's sterling record, the BPT's decisions also qualify as an unreasonable application of facts, as do state court decisions upholding the BPT.

State provides no support for its claim that it would be irreparably injured absent a stay. State has access to the Court of Appeals, which has authority to repair any harm inflicted by this Court, and is specifically able to issue a stay of judgment pending appeal.

State also contends that it would suffer irreparable harm absent a stay because the order requires compliance with logistically impossible time constraints, as it requires the BPT to determine whether Masoner's record contains post-conviction evidence suggesting that he is a threat to public safety, and if none is found, how his parole date should be calculated. However, the previous order issued by the court clearly stated that Masoner's spotless record demonstrates that no post-conviction factors exist to justify the BPT's decisions. As such, the sole duty imposed upon the BPT by the previous order is setting a date for Masoner's release within 30 days of the order.

No evidence is provided to support the claim that Masoner's continued incarceration is in the interest of the public. Although the gravity of the commitment offense and other pre-conviction factors alone may be sufficient to justify the denial of a parole date at a prisoner's initial hearing, subsequent BPT decisions to deny a parole date must be supported by some post-conviction evidence that the release of an inmate is against the interest of public safety.

Issuance of a stay would irreparably harm Petitioner. The time already served by Masoner is in gross excess of the established guidelines for his commitment offense. His continued incarceration is a clear violation of his due process rights. As such, any further incarceration simply serves to exacerbate the harm done to Masoner by the BPT's failure to abide by P.C. 3041(b) and Biggs. The fact that Masoner may be vindicated by the Court of Appeals and even the United States Supreme Court and ultimately released with no appeals pending does not serve to mitigate the harm done by his continued and unnecessary incarceration.

Therefore, the Court hereby DENIES Respondents' Application For Stay of Order, and Application For Stay of Order Pending Appeal.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve, by United States mail or by telefax or by email, copies of this Order on all counsel of record in this matter and on Petitioner.