IN THE MATTER OF ROUGHT v. PALIDAR

It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: "[I]t is well settled that the standard to be applied in determining issues of visitation is the best interest[s] of the child" ( Matter of Mix v. Gray, 265 A.D.2d 692, 693). The visitation schedule fashioned by Family Court "permits the desirable end of more meaningful interaction between the child and his father" ( Matter of Effner v. Scott, 194 A.D.2d 890, 891) and recognizes that "the best interests of the child lie in being nurtured by both parents" ( Edgerly v. Moore, 232 A.D.2d 214, 215). We discern no basis for disturbing the court's broad discretion in fashioning a visitation schedule ( see Effner, 194 A.D.2d at 891-892). We reject the contention of respondent and the Law Guardian that the court improperly altered its original decision prior to an order having been submitted or entered on that decision. "`Until then, the court had inherent power, sua sponte or at the behest of one of the parties, to reconsider . . . its earlier decision'" ( Saccone v. Elm Hill Plaza, 5 A.D.3d 1028 [Mar. 19, 2004], quoting Levinger v. General Motors Corp., 122 A.D.2d 419, 420; see Scritchfield v. Perry, 245 A.D.2d 1054). We conclude that the court properly exercised that power in altering its original decision and fixing a more definite visitation schedule.