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DUNLAP v. WOODLAND

United States District Court, D. Idaho.
Jun 2, 2004
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER

LARRY BOYLE, Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff's Complaint was conditionally filed on May 7, 2004. The Court now reviews the Complaint to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and 1915A. The Court also reviews Plaintiff's other pending motions. Having reviewed the record, and otherwise being fully informed, the Court enters the following Order.

I. REVIEW OF COMPLAINT

A. Background

Plaintiff is a prisoner at the Idaho Maximum Security Institution (IMSI), who is under death sentence but whose death warrant is stayed. He alleges that the prison has not fairly implemented Idaho Code § 19-2705(11) as to his housing arrangements at the prison. That section provides:

when a person has been sentenced to death, but the death warrant has been stayed, the warden is not required to hold such person in solitary confinement or to restrict access to him until the stay of the death warrant is lifted or a new death warrant is issued by the sentencing court; provided however, no condemned person shall be housed in less than maximum security confinement, and provided further that nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the warden's discretion to house such person under conditions more restrictive if necessary to ensure public safety or the safe, secure and orderly operation of the facility.

I.C. § 19-2705(11). Plaintiff alleges that he was moved from his former solitary confinement cell to a different tier, but not into the general population, like other death-penalty inmates.

B. Standard of Law and Discussion

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff cannot bring a civil rights claim based solely upon Idaho Code § 19-2705, which is not a federal statute or part of the federal Constitution.

The Court will provide Plaintiff with an opportunity to amend his Complaint. It is unclear whether he has any factual allegations which would state either an Eighth Amendment claim or a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim. The Court provides the standards of law for these types of actions below.

1. Eighth Amendment

To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that he is incarcerated "under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm," or that he has been deprived of "the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities," Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal citation omitted). A plaintiff must also allege facts showing that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his needs. Deliberate indifference exists when an official knows of and disregards an unconstitutional condition or when the official is aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a risk of harm or violation exists, and actually draws the inference. Id. at 837,

2. Equal Protection

Plaintiff may wish to allege that prison officials are applying the state statute in a discriminatory manner; however, to eventually succeed on such a claim, he will have to show that he is not a greater security risk than other inmates under death sentence who are now in the general population. The Equal Protection Clause guarantees that "all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike" by governmental entities. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). However, "[t]he Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same." Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147, (1940).

If a plaintiff is not a member of a protected class, equal protection claims brought by a "`class of one'" are valid "where the plaintiff alleges that [he] has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment." Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Indeed, ""the purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents." Id.

Under a rational basis inquiry, in order to prevail on an equal protection claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he is being treated in a disparate manner, and that there is no rational basis for the disparate treatment. More v. Farrier, 984 F.2d 269, 271 (8th Cir. 1993). Stated another way, prison officials need show only a rational basis for dissimilar treatment in order to defeat the merits of Plaintiff's claim. Id. at 271, In an equal protection claim, state action is presumed constitutional and "will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). Where a case "does not rise to the level of invidious discrimination proscribed by the Equal Protection Clause . . ., the federal courts should deter to the judgment of the prison officials." More, 984 F.2d at 272.

3. General Guidelines for Amendment

If Plaintiff chooses to amend his § 1983 complaint, he must allege in specific terms the following; (1) the names of the persons who caused or personally participated in causing the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights; (2) the dates on which the conduct of each Defendant allegedly took place; (3) the specific conduct or action Plaintiff alleges is unconstitutional; and (4) the remedy sought. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Furthermore, Plaintiff's amended complaint must contain all of his allegations in a single pleading, and cannot rely upon or incorporate by reference prior pleadings. D. Idaho L. Civ. R. 15.1 ("Any amendment to a pleading, whether filed as a matter of course or upon a motion to amend, shall reproduce the entire pleading as amended"). Plaintiff shall set forth each different factual allegation in a separate numbered paragraph.

The amended complaint must be legibly written or typed in its entirety, and it should be clearly designated as the "First Amended Complaint." PLAINTIFF IS CAUTIONED IF HE FAILS TO FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT, THIS ACTION MAY BE DISMISSED. Alternatively, the court will permit Plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss his complaint by submitting a notice of voluntary dismissal.

C. Other Pending Motions

The Court will currently deem Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis moot. It will reconsider the Motion sua sponte (on its own) if it later determines that Plaintiff may proceed on an amended complaint.

Plaintiff has also filed a Motion requesting that the Court order the prison to give him back his video games, because confiscation of the games amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. Inmates have no constitutional right to a television, or by analogy, to video games. See James v. Milwaukee County, 956 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1992); Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 718, n. 8 (7th Cir. 1995); Gladson v. Rice, 862 F.2d 711, 713 (8th Cir. 1988); Montana v. Commissioners Court, 659 F.2d 19, 23 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The claims relating to the usage of radio and television were properly dismissed as frivolous. These claims do not pertain to federal constitutional rights"); Bagwell v. Brewington-Carr, 2000 WL 1239960 (D. Del. 2000); Manley v. Fordice, 945 F. Supp. 132, 136-37 (D. ("[T]here is simply no right to television while incarcerated. . . . [S]uch items are luxuries, and any allowance of them in prisons is merely an altruistic act on the part of the Department of Corrections.").

The Court in James v. Milwaukee aptly described why denial of television does not fit within the protection of the Eighth Amendment:

Relying on identical provisions in the English Bill of Rights of 1689 and the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, the Framers of the eighth amendment sought, as its words suggest, to prevent judges and legislators from imposing on citizens barbarous or "cruel and unusual" forms of punishment. See generally Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted; The Original Meaning, 57 Calif. L.Rev. 839 (1969). Consequently, the eighth amendment has long been thought to prohibit such inhumane punishment as torture, lingering death, In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 519 (1890), drawing and quartering, disembowelling, and burning at the stake. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878). Today . . . prison conditions involving the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, totally without penological justification, offend the constitution. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). However, not all prison conditions trigger eighth amendment scrutiny — only deprivations of basic human needs like food, medical care, sanitation, and physical safety. Id.; see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977); Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1988); cf. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520(1979).
956 F.2d at 698-99.

Further, the Supreme Court has cautioned the federal courts not to interfere with the day-to-day operations of the prisons, especially those things related to security, a task which is best left to prison officials who have particular experience in dealing with prisons and prisoners. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (First Amendment claims). Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Return of Video Games is denied.

II. ORDER

NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

A. Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Docket No. 1) is MOOT.
B. Plaintiff's Motion for Return of Video Games (Docket No. 6) is DENIED.
C. Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days after entry of this Order in which to file an amended complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal.