Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

SHAMROCK RIDGE, LLC v. BLAISDELL, No. 4100844 (Feb. 1, 2005)

Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of New London at Norwich
Feb 1, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS/SUMMARY JUDGMENT (NO. 101.00-101.50)

DEVINE, JUDGE.

The defendants, Heidi Blaisdell and Blaisdell Photography, hereinafter referred to as "defendants," move contemporaneously to dismiss the instant action or, in the alternative, grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

Factual Background

Plaintiff Shamrock, LLC, hereinafter referred to as "plaintiff," was the owner of a commercial building located at 100 Main Street, Norwich, Connecticut. The plaintiff entered into a commercial lease with the defendants which was executed on January 1, 2002. The plaintiff commenced a lawsuit by writ, summons and complaint dated October 18, 2002 against the defendants. (Docket No. CV02-0126231-S, Judicial District of New London at Norwich.) The case traversed through a tortured path concerning discovery, resulting in the granting of a motion for a judgment of dismissal on January 27, 2004. Additional motions were filed concerning discovery from February 2004 through March 2004 with a revised motion to reopen filed by the plaintiff on March 11, 2004. On April 26, 2004, the trial court granted the plaintiff another chance to comply with discovery and make a former business manager, a New York resident, available for a deposition in the State of Connecticut.

While some of the discovery responses were filed by the plaintiff, information was still missing and interrogatories not answered. The prior business manager was not made available for a deposition as ordered by the court. On July 12, 2004, the trial court again found that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate good faith compliance in responding to the defendants' requests. The defendants' oral motion for judgment of dismissal was granted by the court. No appeal was taken from this decision. No motions CT Page 1846 to reopen judgment was filed by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendants by writ, summons and complaint dated October 29, 2004. The present case involves the same plaintiff, defendants, the same two counts as stated in the prior action, word for word, for additional prayer for declaratory relief not requested in the prior suit. The defendants contend that the present action should be dismissed and/or summary judgment granted.

Motion to Dismiss

The defendants contend that the present case should be dismissed based on two separate theories: (1) the prior pending suit doctrine; and/or (2) accidental failure of suit statute, Connecticut General Statutes § 52-592. The court concludes that the defendants' motion to dismiss must be denied in that the prior pending suit doctrine has no applicability. There is presently no prior action pending between the existing parties.

The defendant argues that the accidental failure of suit applies to the present controversy. Section 52-592 states as follows:

Accidental failure of suit; allowance of new action. (A) If any action, commenced within the time limited by law, has failed one or more times to be tried on its merits because of insufficient service or return of the writ due to unavoidable accident or the default or neglect of the officer to whom it was committed, or because the action has been dismissed for want of jurisdiction, or the action has been otherwise avoided or defeated by the death of a party or for any matter of form; or, if, in any such action after a verdict for the plaintiff, the judgment has been set aside, or if a judgment of nonsuit has been rendered or a judgment for the plaintiff reversed, the plaintiff, or, if the plaintiff is dead and the action by law survives, his executor or administrator, may commence a new action, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, for the same cause at any time within one year after the determination of the original action or after the reversal of the judgment.

CT Page 1847

The defendants cite case law in their brief for the proposition that the plaintiff's case should be dismissed for want of proof of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect.

The defendants' argument is again misplaced in that the plaintiff is not relying on § 52-592 as authority in instituting the present complaint. The parties stipulated at the short calendar hearing that the applicable statute of limitations had not run as of the date of the commencement of this action (C.G.S. § 52-516). The plaintiff has stated in its brief and argument that it is not seeking relief under the accidental failure of suit statute. The defendants' motion and argument to dismiss the case, therefore, have no merit.

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Practice Book § 17-49. Summary judgment "is appropriate only if a fair and reasonable person could conclude only one way." Miller v. United Technologies Corp., 233 Conn. 732, 751, 660 A.2d 810 (1995). "In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 256 Conn. 343, 351, 773 A.2d 906 (2001).

The movant has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Miller v. United Technologies Corp., supra, 233 Conn. 751-52. "[T]he party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 209, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000). "A material fact has been defined adequately and simply as a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hammer v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Co., 214 Conn. 573, 578, 573 A.2d 699 (1990). "`Issue of fact' encompasses not only evidentiary facts in issue but also questions as to how the trier would characterize such evidentiary facts and what inferences and conclusions it would draw from them." United Oil Co. v. Urban Redevelopment Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 379, 260 A.2d 596 (1969). When a party moves for summary judgment "and there [are] no contradictory affidavits, the court properly CT Page 1848 [decides] the motion by looking only to the sufficiency of the [movant's] affidavits and other proof," Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756, 795, 653 A.2d 122 (1995).

A defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted if it "raises at least one legally sufficient defense that would bar the plaintiff's claim and involves no triable issue of fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Serrano v. Burns, 248 Conn. 419, 424, 727 A.2d 1276 (1999). "Summary judgment may be granted where the claim is barred by the statute of limitations." Doty v. Mucci, 238 Conn. 800, 806, 679 A.2d 945 (1996). Summary judgment is appropriate on statute of limitations grounds when the "material facts concerning the statute of limitations [are] not in dispute . . ." Burns v. Hartford Hospital, 192 Conn. 451, 452, 472 A.2d 1257 (1984).

The defendants claim that summary judgment should be granted on the pleadings with judicial notice taken of the prior action, which was dismissed for failure to comply with the discovery requests, by defendants' oral motion on July 12, 2004. The defendants argue that summary judgment should be granted in that the plaintiff's prior action was dismissed for failure to comply with prior discovery orders. The plaintiff contends that it is entitled to a trial on the merits and has a legal right to commence a new action prior to the running of the statute of limitations.

It is clear from the record of the prior proceeding and present case that a controversy between the parties has not resulted in a judgment on the merits. Res judicata and collateral estoppel are inapplicable to the present controversy due to the fact that no trial on the merits was heard. Hughes v. Berner, 206 Conn. 491, 495-96 (1998); Aetna Casualty Surety Company v. Jones, 220 Conn. 285, 296 (1991). The defendant's reliance on §§ 52-592 and 52-512 do not provide a reason to grant summary judgment. As previously stated, the plaintiff is not seeking relief by way of a motion to reopen the prior disciplinary judgment within four months of its granting nor is the plaintiff commencing this new suit under the accidental failure of suit provisions of the Connecticut General Statutes. The plaintiff is seeking a trial on the merits with this new legal action commenced within the applicable statute of limitations.

The parties have not had a trial on the merits. Milgrim v. CT Page 1849 DeLuca, 195 Conn. 191 (1985). The judgment entered by the court in the prior action was entered pursuant to the provisions of § 14-3 of the Connecticut Practice Book which states in part as follows:

(a) If a party shall fail to prosecute an action with reasonable diligence, the judicial authority may, after hearing, on motion by any party to the action pursuant to § 11-1, or on its own motion, render a judgment dismissing the action with costs. At least two weeks' notice shall be required except in cases appearing on an assignment list for final adjudication. Judgment files shall not be drawn except where an appeal is taken or where any party so requests.

The defendants have failed to cite any authority for the proposition that a disciplinary judgment precludes the plaintiff from filing a subsequent lawsuit within the statute of limitations to have that case tried on the merits.

ORDER

It is hereby ordered that the defendants' motion to dismiss/summary judgment, Motion Number 101.00-101.50 is DENIED.

Devine, J. CT Page 1850