CITY OF SPOKANE v. SALMON, 22534-8-III (Wash.App. 2-1-2005)

KATO, C.J.

The trial court dismissed Kevin Salmon's appeal of an administrative order of forfeiture. Claiming the court erred by determining substantial compliance did not apply to the content requirements of a petition for review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), chapter 34.05 RCW,

Mr. Salmon appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. Mr. Salmon appeared at a forfeiture hearing to contest the police seizure of his vehicle under Washington's drug forfeiture law. RCW 69.50.505. The hearing officer entered an order of forfeiture including notice to Mr. Salmon of his right to appeal pursuant to chapter 34.05 RCW.

Subsequently, counsel for Mr. Salmon filed a one-page `Notice of Appeal to Superior Court,' attaching and incorporating the hearing officer's order. Clerk's Papers at 2. The form used by Mr. Salmon was supposedly provided by the Spokane County Superior Court and represented as being the form for filing appeals from administrative orders. The City of Spokane then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of compliance with RCW 34.05.546 (pertaining to petitions for judicial review). After a hearing on the motion, the court held substantial compliance with RCW 34.05.546 was insufficient to invoke the court's appellate jurisdiction under the APA in a drug forfeiture action. The court determined Mr. Salmon did not actually comply with the statute because much of the information required in a petition for review was attached to, rather than listed in, the body of the petition. The City of Spokane's motion to dismiss was granted and this appeal follows.

Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review. Crosby v. Spokane County, 137 Wn.2d 296, 301, 971 P.2d 32 (1999). Courts may determine their own jurisdiction, for it is the judiciary's province to interpret the law. See Griffith v. City of Bellevue, 130 Wn.2d 189, 196, 922 P.2d 83 (1996). `The overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that jurisdiction is conferred upon the appellate court only in the manner provided by statute or court rule.' In re Estate of Yand, 23 Wn.2d 831, 835, 162 P.2d 434 (1945). No jurisdiction is conferred when there is a failure to comply with the rule for perfecting an appeal. Id.

The superior court acts in its limited appellate capacity upon reviewing an administrative decision. Fay v. N.W. Airlines, Inc., 115 Wn.2d 194, 197, 796 P.2d 412 (1990). All statutory procedural requirements must be met before the superior court's appellate jurisdiction is properly invoked. Id. But "a procedural requirement should not be jurisdictional unless the legislature intended it as an essential element in a statutorily mandated scheme for pursuing substantive rights, and a failure to conform to the statute literally may be deemed to be an unimportant variation not affecting the jurisdiction of the court." Griffith, 130 Wn.2d at 197-98 (quoting 21 C.J.S. Courts sec. 54 (1990) (footnote omitted)) (emphasis added).

Substantial compliance is defined as "actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of [a] statute." City of Seattle v. Pub. Relations Comm'n, 116 Wn.2d 923, 928, 809 P.2d 1377 (1991) (quoting In re Application of Santore, 28 Wn. App. 319, 327, 623 P.2d 702, review denied, 95 Wn.2d 1019 (1981)). In cases where procedural requirements of a statute were not strictly followed, courts have found substantial compliance only if there was actual compliance or an adequate substitute. Id.; Crosby, 137 Wn.2d at 303; see also Hernandez v. Dep't of Labor Indus., 107 Wn. App. 190, 196, 26 P.3d 977 (2001).

The doctrine of substantial compliance with respect to appeals has been a part of Washington law since territorial days. `The Code of 1881, for example, directed that `An appeal or writ of error shall not be dismissed for any informality or defect in the notice or service thereof.'' Black v. Dep't of Labor Indus., 131 Wn.2d 547, 552, 933 P.2d 1025 (1997) (quoting Code of 1881 sec. 466). Substantial compliance is available because modern procedural rules prefer proceeding to a hearing on the merits. Thus, substantial compliance with procedural rules, other than those constituting the most basic steps, is sufficient in the appellate context. Id. at 552-53. A motion to dismiss based on a procedural technicality is precisely the sort of injustice the doctrine of substantial compliance was meant to avoid. Black v. Dep't of Labor Indus., 81 Wn. App. 722, 729, 915 P.2d 1170 (1996), aff'd, 131 Wn.2d 547, 933 P.2d 1025 (1997).

The parties cite Skagit Surveyors Eng'rs, LLC v. Friends of Skagit County, 135 Wn.2d 542, 556-57, 958 P.2d 962 (1998), for the proposition that all statutory procedural requirements must be satisfied before a superior court's appellate jurisdiction is invoked. The Skagit court, however, provides even further guidance. Skagit involved an appeal from a decision of a growth management hearings board governed by the APA. First, the court granted a motion to dismiss as to one party for a failure of service, an element essential to perfect jurisdiction. The court held that substantial compliance with the service requirements of the APA is not sufficient to invoke the appellate jurisdiction of the superior court when the language of the statute is clear. Skagit, 135 Wn.2d at 556.

Second, the court considered a motion to dismiss a petition for review where all of the parties to the proceeding below were named in the order attached to and incorporated in the petition. The Skagit court was asked to interpret the procedural provision of RCW 34.05.546(5) as a jurisdictional requirement. Citing a lack of support for this interpretation, the court determined the failure to name the parties in the body of the petition `is not a defect that deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction.' Id. at 557. Thus, Skagit declined to hold strict compliance with RCW 34.05.546 is a jurisdictional requirement. The motion to dismiss was denied because the petition substantially complied with the statute. Id.

The City of Spokane argues Mr. Salmon is seeking to substitute a totally new procedure that would allow substantial compliance for purposes of invoking appellate jurisdiction of the superior court. While it is true Washington courts have not addressed the doctrine of substantial compliance with regard to the jurisdictional prerequisites of the APA, Skagit makes clear that RCW 34.05.546 is a procedural provision, not a jurisdictional requirement.

In addition to the jurisdictional requirement of service, chapter 34.05 RCW mandates that judicial review under the APA `shall be instituted by paying the fee required under RCW 36.18.020 and filing a petition in the superior court.' RCW 34.05.514(1). The City does not challenge Mr. Salmon's compliance with these essential elements of jurisdiction. The superior court's jurisdiction was thus invoked.

RCW 34.05.546 enumerates what the petition for review must include. Mr. Salmon's counsel concedes his petition was procedurally faulty in this regard. Therefore, we must decide whether there was compliance with respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute. The legislature `intends that the courts should interpret provisions of this chapter consistently with decisions of other courts interpreting similar provisions of other states, the federal government, and model acts.' RCW 34.05.001. Comment to Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1981), sec. 5-109, provides: `The detail contained in this section may serve as a guide to unrepresented persons who wish to seek judicial review. It may also facilitate the judicial task, by requiring petitions to contain the specified material.' Model State Admin. Procedures Act sec. 5-109, cmt., 15 U.L.A. 134 (2000). Furthermore, RCW 34.05.001 states: `The legislature intends, by enacting this 1988 Administrative Procedure Act, to clarify the existing law of administrative procedure, to achieve greater consistency with other states and the federal government in administrative procedure, and to provide greater public and legislative access to administrative decision making.'

Although Mr. Salmon's counsel did not strictly comply with the directions for appeal as indicated on the hearing officer's order, there can still be substantial compliance `so long as there has been `actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of [a] statute.'' In re Det. of A.S., 138 Wn.2d 898, 914-15 n. 6, 982 P.2d 1156 (1999) (quoting Crosby, 137 Wn.2d at 301) (enlarging the scope of the substantial compliance principle beyond writ of certiorari cases).

The superior court recognized the `Notice of Appeal' filed by Mr. Salmon comported with the procedural requirements of RCW 34.05.546 in substance, if not in form. The court granted the motion to dismiss solely because part of the required content of a petition as enumerated in RCW 34.05.546 was found in the order attached to the petition rather than in its body. The appeal was not dismissed for lack of any material facilitating the judicial task or because the City was not sufficiently apprised of the appeal. The City even conceded at oral argument before the superior court that there was no misunderstanding about the identification of the agency action at issue. Report of Proceedings at 6. Mr. Salmon substantially complied with the directives of the statute.

The order of dismissal is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.

SWEENEY, J. and SCHULTHEIS, J., concur.