IN RE BOUCHER

LORRAINE WEIL, Bankruptcy Judge

WHEREAS, the above-referenced plaintiff (the "Plaintiff") seeks in this adversary proceeding a determination that a certain judgment debt owed by the above-referenced debtor (the "Debtor") to the Plaintiff is nondischargeable pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(2);

WHEREAS, to prevail in this action the Plaintiff relies entirely upon the collateral estoppel effect of the referenced judgment (rendered as a default judgment by the Superior Court of the State of Connecticut, the "Judgment");

WHEREAS, it appears that the Judgment was rendered on various alternative grounds: some grounds were based on fraud theories (and thus relevant for Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(2) purposes) and some grounds were based on theories that were not fraud based such as breach of contract (and thus irrelevant for Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(2) purposes); WHEREAS there is an issue (the "Issue") as to whether, under applicable (Connecticut) law, a default judgment rendered on alternative grounds (one a fraud ground and one a contract ground) would be given collateral estoppel effect on the issue of fraud. See Dowling v. Finley Associates, Inc., 248 Conn. 364, 370-379 (1999) (discussing, inter alia, Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. i (1982)). See also Gilmore v. Gilmore (In re Gilmore), No. 02-15992-7, 2004 WL 2044116, at *6 (Bankr. D. Kan. July 16, 2004) ("[T]he Plaintiff's [default] judgment should not be given preclusive effect here unless each of its two legal bases (that is, the one contained in Count I and the one contained in Count IV), standing alone, would satisfy the requirements of either § 523(a)(2), (4), or (6)."). But see Harmon v. Kobrin, 242 B.R. 183, 186-188 (E.D. Cal. 1999), rev'd, 250 F.3d 1240 (9^th Cir. 2001). Cf. Jackson v. R.G. Whipple, Inc., 225 Conn. 705, 718 (1993) ("Our decision . . . indicates that had there been a full and fair opportunity to litigate issues and such issues were necessary to a default judgment, that judgment should put to rest subsequent litigation of all issues necessary for the rendering of the default judgment." (emphasis added));

WHEREAS, the court desires to afford the parties an opportunity to brief the Issue;

NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that, on or before October 21, 2005, the respective parties may (but are not required to) file and serve a brief in respect of the Issue, provided, however, any such brief shall not exceed five (5) pages in length (exclusive of caption); and it is further ORDERED that the Clerk's Office shall serve a copy of this order upon counsel for the Plaintiff and upon the Debtor.