WEST v. IRWIN

LONNY SUKO, Magistrate Judge

BEFORE THE COURT is Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment (Ct. Rec. 115) filed on February 28, 2006; and Defendants' Motion to Strike Evidence Submitted by Plaintiff (Ct. Rec. 159) filed on March 28, 2006. A hearing was held March 31, 2006 in Yakima, Washington. Karen Koehmstedt participated on behalf of the Plaintiff Mark Robert West; Lawrence Peterson participated on behalf of all named Defendants. The Court having considered the oral and written argument of counsel, enters this Order to memorialize the oral rulings of the Court which are incorporated herewith by reference. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Ct. Rec. 115, filed on February 28, 2006 is GRANTED. Plaintiff has not demonstrated any section 1983 liability. Plaintiff's claims for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985, § 1988 and the 4^th, 5^th, and 14^th Amendments are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. The Court finds that the plaintiff was not deprived of a right secured by the Constitution.

The Court concludes that a reasonable officer confronted with the facts and circumstances known to Deputies Sherman, Kouba, Roy, and Martin at the time of West's arrest would have determined that probable cause existed for the arrest. Although later alibi evidence cleared the plaintiff, the arresting officer(s) acted reasonably, in good faith, and did arrest the plaintiff who was the person named in the supporting paperwork submitted to Superior Court Judge Michael Leavitt, resulting in a facially valid warrant being issued.

No showing has been made from which the trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the arresting and investigating deputies conducted a reckless investigation. See Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1032 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[A] law enforcement officer is not required by the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence, whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite intent." (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Plaintiff has failed to show that the alleged constitutional injury resulted from the implementation or execution of a government policy or custom made by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy. In the absence of a constitutional violation by the Defendant deputies, Defendant Yakima County cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on the facts before the Court. Section 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979).

Finally, a state actor, such as a law enforcement officer, is entitled to qualified immunity in an action filed under § 1983 if his or her conduct during a criminal investigation either does not violate a federal constitutional right, or the constitutional right was not clearly established on the date of the alleged violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001).

2. Defendants' Motion to Strike Evidence, Ct. Rec. 159, filed on March 28, 2006 is DENIED without prejudice. The Court considered the evidence for purposes of Defendants' summary judgement motion only. The Court, however, recognizes that Defendants have grounds to renew their motion.

3. Remaining State Law Claims: All that remains in this case, having dismissed plaintiff's claims for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, are state law tort claims (false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process, conspiracy, negligent and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress, outrage, defamation, and negligence — plaintiff has withdraw his state law claims for assault and battery).

"[I]n the ususal case in which federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . points toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims." Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pacific Co., 976 F.2d 1303, 1309 (9th Cir. 1002) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S. Ct. 614, 619 (1988). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court "may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." The Court having dismissed plaintiff's federal claims, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims.

Plaintiff's state law claims are accordingly DISMISSED without prejudice.

The District Court Executive is directed to file this Order and provide copies to counsel.