GRINKORN v. SEELEY

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.

CPLR 5015 (a) allows a court to vacate a default entered against a party "upon such terms as may be just" if the default was "excusable" (CPLR 5015 [a] [1]). In order to establish that a default is excusable, a party must show both a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious cause of action or defense ( see Zeltser v. Sacerdote, 24 AD3d 541, 542; Kumar v. Yonkers Contr. Co., Inc., 14 AD3d 493, 494). Here, the plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable excuse for his default. His vague affidavit did not establish that the default was attributable to law office failure; indeed, the record makes clear that his default was the direct consequence of his discharging his attorney after the court ordered the parties to begin jury selection ( see P K Marble v. Pearce, 168 AD2d 439, 439). Moreover, contrary to the plaintiff's contention, CPLR 321 (c) does not provide a party with an automatic 30-day stay upon an attorney's mere request to withdraw from a case ( see Zacher v. Oakdale Islandia Ltd. Partnership, 271 AD2d 441).

Under these circumstances, it is irrelevant whether or not the plaintiff's claim may have had merit.