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IN RE GROOTE
S. TEEL JR., Bankruptcy Judge
James L. Marketos and the firm of Berliner, Corcoran Rowe, LLP have filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Conseil Alain Aboudaram, S.A. ("CAASA"), alleging that CAASA has not paid their fees. In turn, CAASA has filed an opposition to the motion, and the court will address that opposition even though it could be stricken because it was not signed by an attorney who is a member of the bar of the district court of which this court is a unit.
CAASA urges that the movants were required to serve their motion on CAASA pursuant to the procedures of the Hague Convention. The simple answer is that once CAASA filed a claim in this case (and, moreover, once it appeared in pursuit of or in defense of any proceeding in this case) it subjected itself to service in accordance with the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and the Local Bankruptcy Rules (and any of the District Court Local Rules incorporated by the Local Bankruptcy Rules), see Kline v. Ed. Zueblin, AG (In re American Export Group Int'l Services, Inc.), 167 B.R. 311 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1994). A prime example of this making sense is when a litigant's counsel seeks to withdraw from representing the litigant, and the motion was served in accordance with the rule regarding such a motion.
Beyond its argument regarding service of the motion, CAASA asserts that there is a dispute as to whether it owes the fees that the movants claim are owed them, and contends that there are several matters still pending as to which CAASA would be prejudiced by a withdrawal of the movants as its counsel. District Court Local Civil Rule 83.6(d) provides in relevant part that:
The court may deny an attorney's motion for leave to withdraw if the withdrawal would unduly delay trial of the case, or be unfairly prejudicial to any party, or otherwise not be in the interest of justice.
The rule does not require that the attorney show that it has a valid reason for wanting to withdraw: attorneys are not indentured servants. Plainly the movants do not wish to continue to represent CAASA, and that would not be altered even if, as CAASA contends, their claim for unpaid fees is in error. In any event, the court will not allow the issue of withdrawal to turn on likely time-consuming satellite litigation regarding CAASA's contention that fees are not owed.
Without implying that it views CAASA's dispute regarding the fees to be spurious, the court notes that whenever an attorney seeks to withdraw based on nonpayment of fees, there would be a danger that the client could raise a spurious dispute as to fees simply as a way to eke out further representation by counsel without fees being paid for such representation. That is a reason to adopt a prophylactic rule that the court will not delay the ruling on the motion to withdraw by being side-tracked into resolving whether the fees claimed are actually owed. It suffices that the law firm wishes to withdraw for whatever reason: such withdrawal should be permitted unless it ought to be denied for one of the reasons set forth in Rule 83.6(d).
The court thus addresses whether the motion should be denied for one of the reasons listed in Rule 83.6(d). No trial has been set on any of the pending proceedings. The court rejects CAASA's contention that it would be unfairly prejudiced: the pending proceedings are not so complicated that it would entail substantial expense to bring a new attorney up to speed, and the movants would be obligated to assist via turning over documents they have compiled that are pertinent to a new attorney's handling the litigation of those proceedings. The debtor has not contended that it would be prejudiced by the withdrawal of CAASA's counsel. Finally, CAASA has not pointed to any other reason why the withdrawal of counsel would not be in the interest of justice.
An order follows granting the motion. Because the court has directed the filing by December 22, 2006, of status reports as to pending matters, CAASA should cause replacement counsel to enter an appearance by December 18, 2006, so that the debtor's counsel will be able to consult with that new attorney prior to the deadline for the status reports.
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