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YITZHAKI v. SZTABEREK

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department.
Mar 6, 2007
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Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Miri Yitzhaki, entered into a contract to purchase residential rental property from the defendant, Janusz Sztaberek. The contract included a mortgage contingency clause requiring the plaintiff to secure a conventional first mortgage of $598,500 within 45 days and to provide the seller's attorney with a firm written mortgage commitment. Time was expressly made of the essence. If the plaintiff failed to secure the mortgage within the timeframe, the defendant could either cancel the contract or extend the time to obtain the mortgage commitment.

On March 1, 2005, the plaintiff requested an extension until March 21, 2005, to secure the mortgage, but the defendant's attorney did not respond due to inability to reach the defendant. By July 14, 2005, the plaintiff forwarded two mortgage commitments to the defendant: one for $500,000 as a first mortgage and another for $98,500 as a second mortgage.

The plaintiff then commenced this action seeking specific performance, alleging the defendant refused to schedule a closing. The defendant answered, denying any extension and claiming to have canceled the contract. The defendant also counterclaimed for $25,000 in damages, alleging the plaintiff failed to secure a firm mortgage commitment within the contractual timeframe.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment asserting the defendant neither canceled the contract nor extended the time to secure the mortgage commitment. The Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s motion directing specific performance, and the defendant appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendant validly canceled the contract by failing to respond to the plaintiff’s request for an extension and refusing to close title after the mortgage commitments were tendered.
  2. Whether the plaintiff complied with the mortgage contingency clause and was ready, willing, and able to perform under the contract.
  3. Whether the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance as a matter of law based on the facts and contractual provisions.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The defendant never validly canceled the contract nor extended the plaintiff’s time to secure a mortgage commitment.
  • The plaintiff tendered mortgage commitments within a reasonable time and was ready, willing, and able to perform.
  • The defendant’s refusal to close title constituted an anticipatory breach of contract.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The defendant contended that the mortgage commitments were untimely and did not comply with the mortgage contingency clause.
  • The defendant claimed to have elected to cancel the contract due to the plaintiff’s failure to secure a firm mortgage commitment within the contractual period.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Schatten v Briedis, 163 AD2d 379 Cancellation of contract must be timely; untimely cancellation after tender of mortgage commitments is invalid. The court held the defendant’s purported cancellation was untimely since it occurred after the plaintiff tendered mortgage commitments and sought to close title.
Huntington Min. Holdings v Cottontail Plaza, 60 NY2d 997 Refusal to close title constitutes an anticipatory breach, obviating the need for tender prior to commencing an action. The court found the defendant’s refusal to close title was an anticipatory breach relieving the plaintiff from further tender before suing.
Ober v Bey, 266 AD2d 441, 442 Compliance with mortgage contingency clause must be sufficient to show readiness, willingness, and ability to perform; minor noncompliance does not necessarily raise a triable issue. The court determined the defendant’s contentions about noncompliance did not create a triable issue about the plaintiff’s readiness, willingness, and ability to perform.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the mortgage contingency clause, emphasizing that time was of the essence and that the plaintiff was required to secure a mortgage commitment within 45 days or obtain an extension. The defendant neither canceled the contract within the required period nor extended the plaintiff’s time. The defendant’s cancellation attempt was untimely, occurring after the plaintiff tendered mortgage commitments and sought to close title, thus invalidating the cancellation.

The refusal of the defendant to close title was found to be an anticipatory breach, which relieved the plaintiff from the obligation to tender performance before initiating the lawsuit. The plaintiff demonstrated prima facie readiness, willingness, and ability to perform under the contract by tendering mortgage commitments, despite minor alleged deficiencies in meeting the mortgage contingency clause. The defendant’s arguments regarding noncompliance failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact.

Accordingly, the court concluded that the Supreme Court properly granted summary judgment directing specific performance.

Holding and Implications

The court affirmed the order granting summary judgment directing specific performance of the contract in favor of the plaintiff.

This decision directly enforces the contract between the parties, requiring the defendant to perform the sale as agreed. No new legal precedent was established; the ruling applies established principles regarding mortgage contingencies, anticipatory breach, and summary judgment standards.

Show all summary ...

Ordered, that on the court's own motion, the defendant's notice of appeal from a decision of the same court dated March 8, 2006, is deemed a premature notice of appeal from the order ( see CPLR 5520 [c]); and it is further,

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff entered into a contract to purchase certain residential rental property from the defendant. The contract contained a mortgage contingency clause which provided that the contract was "subject to the Purchaser, at his own cost and expense, securing a conventional first mortgage for 25/30 years, at the prevailing rate of interest in the sum of $598,500." The plaintiff had 45 days from receipt of a fully executed contract "to provide Seller's attorney with a proper firm written commitment," and the contract recited that time was of the essence. In the event the plaintiff was "unable to secure said mortgage by the aforementioned date" the defendant's options were to cancel the contract or to extend the plaintiff's time to obtain a mortgage commitment.

On March 1, 2005, the plaintiff asked for an extension of time, until March 21, 2005, to secure a mortgage commitment. The defendant's attorney acknowledged that he did not respond to this request because he was unable to reach the defendant.

On or about July 14, 2005, the plaintiff forwarded, to the defendant, two mortgage commitments from one lender, Power Express, to wit, (1) a commitment for a loan in the amount of $500,000 for a term of 30 years secured by a first mortgage on the subject property, and (2) a commitment for a loan in the amount of $98,500 for a term of 30 years secured by a second mortgage on the subject property.

The plaintiff commenced the instant action seeking specific performance of the contract on the ground that the defendant refused to schedule a closing of title. In his answer, the defendant claimed that he never extended the plaintiff's time to secure a mortgage commitment, and instead "elected to cancel said contract." The defendant counterclaimed for damages in the sum of $25,000, based upon the plaintiff's alleged "inaction . . . in being unable to secure a firm mortgage commitment with the time allotted by the Contract of Sale." The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the ground that the defendant never elected to cancel the contract or to extend the plaintiff's time to secure a mortgage. In opposition, the defendant contended that the mortgage commitments were untimely and did not comply with the terms of the mortgage contingency clause. The Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment directing specific performance of the contract. We affirm.

Despite the provisions of the mortgage contingency clause, the defendant neither cancelled the contract nor extended the plaintiff's time to secure a mortgage commitment. His purported cancellation, contained in his answer to the plaintiff's complaint, was untimely since the cancellation was made after the plaintiff tendered the mortgage commitments and sought to close title ( see Schatten v Briedis, 163 AD2d 379). The undisputed fact that the defendant refused to close title constituted an anticipatory breach of the contract obviating a need by the plaintiff to tender performance prior to commencement of the instant action ( see Huntington Min. Holdings v Cottontail Plaza, 60 NY2d 997).

The plaintiff established, prima facie, that he was ready, willing, and able to perform. The defendant's contentions that the plaintiff did not specifically comply with the mortgage contingency clause do not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff was ready, willing, and able to perform ( see Ober v Bey, 266 AD2d 441, 442).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment directing specific performance of the contract.