ELLIS v. FINNEY

DAVID HAMILTON, District Judge

"We should not be too ready to exercise oversight and put aside the judgment of prison administrators; it may be that a constitutional challenge to a disciplinary hearing such as [this] will rarely, if ever be successful." Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 499 (1985) (citation omitted). The challenge of petitioner Anthony Ellis ("Ellis") to a disciplinary proceeding identified as No. NCF 06-03-0122 does not present one of the rare challenges to which Ponte refers. Accordingly, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied. This conclusion rests on the following facts and circumstances:

1. Ellis was charged with violating prison rules at the New Castle Correctional Facility through his possession of a deadly weapon. After being supplied with a copy of the written charge and notified of his procedural rights, Ellis was found guilty at a hearing and was sanctioned. Contending that the proceeding was constitutionally infirm, Ellis now seeks a writ of habeas corpus.

2. A federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) only if it finds the applicant "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." Id. When a prison disciplinary proceeding results in a sanction which affects the expected duration of a prisoner's confinement, typically through the deprivation of earned good-time credits or the demotion in credit earning class, the state may not deprive inmates of good-time credits without following constitutionally adequate procedures to insure that the credits are not arbitrarily rescinded and habeas corpus is the proper remedy. Cochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 639 (7th Cir. 2004).

3. "Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).

a. In these circumstances, Ellis was entitled to the following process before being deprived of his liberty interests: (1) advance (at least 24 hours before hearing) written notice of the claimed violation; (2) the opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision-maker; (3) the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence (when consistent with institutional safety); and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357, 361 (7th Cir. 1992). In addition, there is a substantive component to the issue, which requires that the decision of a conduct board be supported by "some evidence." Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985).

b. Also, Indiana prisoners must pursue their available administrative remedies before filing a habeas petition. Eads v. Hanks, 280 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2002); Markham v. Clark, 978 F.2d 993, 995 (7th Cir. 1992). The failure to do so, whether pertaining to the remedy as a whole or to the inclusion in an administrative appeal each claim which is later asserted in a federal habeas petition, constitutes a procedural default. Ellis could overcome procedural default through a showing of cause and prejudice or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if the merits of his claim are not reached. Aliwoli v. Gilmore, 127 F.3d 632, 634 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)).

4. The pleadings and the expanded record in this action show that Ellis did not exhaust his available administrative remedies with respect to the disciplinary proceeding challenged here as to the claims he presents, that he has not attempted to show cause for and prejudice from this procedural default, and that in consequence the court is compelled to dismiss the action without reaching the merits of the petitioner's claims. See Eads v. Hanks, 280 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2002); Markham v. Clark, 978 F.2d 993, 995 (7th Cir. 1992).

5. Apart from the question of procedural waiver, moreover, using the protections recognized in Hill and Wolff as an analytical template, Ellis received all the process to which he was entitled.

a. The charge was clear and adequate notice was given. In addition, (1) Ellis was given the opportunity to appear before the conduct board and make a statement concerning the charge, (2) the conduct board and reviewing authority issued a sufficient statement of its findings, and (3) the conduct board and the reviewing authority issued a written reason for its decisions and for the sanctions which were imposed.

b. With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence, the evidence favorable to the conduct board's decision, see Willard v. Pearson, 823 F.2d 1141, 1150 (7th Cir. 1987) (a federal habeas corpus court must presume that the jury resolved all reasonable inferences in the State's favor), is the following: During the early morning of March 21, 2006, officers conducted a search of Ellis at the New Castle Correctional Facility, an Indiana prison. While doing so, a sharp metal object with tape on the end of it was found in Ellis' property box. These circumstances constitute at least "some evidence," and hence constitutionally sufficient evidence, that Ellis violated prison rules in the manner specified in the charge against him. Henderson v. United States Parole Comm'n, 13 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1993) (a federal habeas court "will overturn the . . . [conduct board's] decision only if no reasonable adjudicator could have found . . . [the petitioner] guilty of the offense on the basis of the evidence presented"). The fact that Ellis offered an exculpatory explanation for his possession of the deadly weapon did not compel a different decision. Hill, 472 U.S. at 457 ("The Federal Constitution does not require evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the one reached by the disciplinary board.").

6. "The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the government." Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558. There was no arbitrary action in any aspect of the charge, disciplinary proceedings or sanctions involved in the events identified in this action, and there was no constitutional infirmity in the proceedings which entitles Ellis to relief. Ellis committed unexplained and unexcused procedural default by not including his habeas claims in his administrative appeal. Apart from this, his claims that he was denied the protections afforded by Hill and Wolff are either refuted by the expanded record or based on assertions which do not entitle him to relief. Accordingly, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be denied and this action dismissed. Judgment consistent with this Entry shall now issue.

So ordered.