IN RE INDIA G

Ordered that the order of disposition is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof adjudicating the appellant a juvenile delinquent based upon the finding that she committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of menacing in the third degree and substituting therefor a provision dismissing that count of the petition; as so modified, the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements, and the fact-finding order is modified accordingly.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency ( see Matter of David H., 69 NY2d 792), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of attempted robbery in the first degree ( see Matter of Juan J., SI NY2d 739, 740-741 [1992]; cf. People v Allah, 71 NY2d 830, 832; People v Mejia, 297 AD2d 755), attempted robbery in the second degree (two counts) ( see Matter of Juan J., supra; Matter of Louis V., 288 AD2d 38; Matter of Marc H., 284 AD2d 211; cf. People v Allah, supra; People v Mc-Donald, 257 AD2d 695), attempted grand larceny in the fourth degree ( see Matter of Willie W, 32 AD3d 479; Matter of John F., 12 AD3d 509), and menacing in the second degree ( see Matter of Kadeem W., 5 NY3d 864; Matter of Juan J., supra; cf. People v Allah, supra).

However, as the presentment agency correctly concedes, the count of menacing in the third degree constituted a lesser included offense of the count of menacing in the second degree ( cf. CPL 1.20; 300.40 [3] [b]). Therefore, we dismiss that count of the petition.

The appellant's remaining contentions are without merit.