TAKEUCHI v. SILBERMAN

Jurisdiction is demonstrated by plaintiffs' affidavit of service showing delivery to a person of suitable age and discretion at, and a mailing to, a place that defendant, in his cross motion to dismiss, acknowledged was his place of business. Such admission renders it irrelevant that for reasons of health, defendant may not have actually been at his place of business for some four months prior to the claimed service, and that plaintiffs never attempted to ascertain whether he was "available to receive service" there. Unlike CPLR 308 (4), CPLR 308 (2) does not require preliminary diligent attempts at alternative methods of service. We also reject defendant's argument that the notes, which provide for payment of the principal amounts "without interest on October 1, 2001," evince an intention, contrary to CPLR 5001 (b), to defer the running of prejudgment interest until commencement of the action at the earliest ( see Matter of Aurecchione v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 98 NY2d 21, 26-27). Plaintiffs established a prima facie right to recovery with proof of defendant's execution of the notes and default in payment, and defendant failed to meet his resulting burden to come forward with evidence establishing a triable issue ( see Alard, L.L.C. v Weiss, 1 AD3d 131). Defendant's motion to renew was properly denied for failure to show a lack of reasonable justification for not having presented the purported new facts on the original motion (CPLR 2221 [e] [3]).