JEROLMAN v. JEROLMAN, No. FA 03-0478690S (Jul. 18, 2007)

STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI, J.

Both parties have moved to modify the parenting orders incorporated by agreement into the judgment dissolving their marriage on June 30, 2005. Those orders provide for joint legal custody of their minor child, Noah (born on April 3, 2000), "primary physical custody" and final decision-making with the mother, parenting time by the father on alternating weekends from Friday to Monday, two weekday nights one week, and one weekday night the next week. The plaintiff has now moved to end the father's overnight access on weekdays and Sundays during the school year. The defendant has moved to modify the custodial orders so that the parties would be designated as having "shared physical custody" and that final decision-making would be assigned to the mother on medical issues and to the father on educational issues and extracurricular activities. He also seeks another court update in a year. For the forgoing reasons, the plaintiff's motion is denied, and the father's motion is granted in part.

The parties appeared with counsel on two days in February and June of this year for hearing on these motions, at which time each party testified, as did the following:

Dr. Charles Preston Wiles, M.D., who conducted a court-ordered evaluation of the parties to assist them and the court in establishing parenting orders in the child's best interest and wrote a report on his evaluation;

Ms. Melissa Yetso, a licensed clinical social worker who is Noah's therapist; and

Attorney Margot Burkle, the court-appointed CT Page 13575 guardian ad litem.

During the pendente lite stage of the dissolution, the former guardian ad litem requested a psychological evaluation of the parties to assist the GAL in formulating recommendations for the parenting orders. The court granted the motion and appointed Dr. Wiles, who, as a psychiatrist not a psychologist, performed a psychiatric evaluation of the parties. The court also ordered a family relations custody study, which was completed on June 14, 2005, and introduced into evidence without an objection in the hearing before this court. When Dr. Wiles had not completed his evaluation by the time of the dissolution hearing on June 30, 2005, the parties agreed to abide by the family relations recommendations until he completed his study. Their written separation agreement provided as follows:

The Family Relations recommendations shall be the parenting plan effective immediately and shall continue in effect until Dr. Preston Wiles reviews the family relations study and, if he approves said study, it shall be incorporated herein by reference.

Apparently recognizing that this language could be construed as creating parenting orders that were not yet permanent yet realizing the obligation of a court dissolving a marriage to enter final custody orders, the court, Munro, J., informed the parties that she would adopt the family relations recommendations as the final custodial orders and that if Dr. Wiles' report recommended something different a motion for modification could be filed.

Dr. Wiles completed his evaluation, on which he prepared a written report dated June 16, 2006. In that report and in his testimony before this court in February 2007, he recommended that the physical custody orders be termed "shared physical custody," rather than primary residence with the mother, that the order of joint legal custody should continue but assign final decision-making to the mother on medical issues and to the father on educational issues. In his report he also recommended an update on these in another year, and although initially repeating that recommendation at hearing he later testified that he no longer believed a follow-up was appropriate. The defendant's motion for modification asks that the court implement his recommendations and also to adopt the guardian ad litem's recommendation that final decision-making be given to one of the parents on extracurricular activities by assigning that responsibility to the father. CT Page 13576

The defendant argues that the court cannot rely on Dr. Wiles' CT Page 13585 report or his testimony because each is based on outdated information. In support of that position, she cites the case of O'Neill v. O'Neill, 13 Conn.App. 300, 303, 536 A.2d 978, cert. denied, 207 Conn. 806, 540 A.2d 374 (1988), where the court concluded that trial court had failed to consider child's present best interest when it determined custody by relying on a outdated custody study thirteen months old. Between the date of the dissolution on June 30, 2005, and April 2006, Dr. Wiles had twelve meetings with one or the other parent. Three of those sessions also included Noah. There is no doubt that this court, if it grants any changes in the parenting orders, must do so based on a determination of Noah's present best interest. The problem in O'Bryan was that the trial court relied primarily on historical information about the parties, not their present capacity or fitness as parents. In the present case, on the other hand, this court has extensive information about the parents' present ability to take care of Noah and meet his needs from the parties themselves, the child's therapist (who has met with them as well as with Noah), and from the guardian ad litem. Dr. Wiles' report and his testimony provide necessary background information about the parties' relationship, their interactions, their psychiatric profiles, and their parenting. The court finds that Dr. Wiles' observations about the parties and Noah are remarkably consistent both with the family relations report finished a year before Dr. Wiles completed his study and with the court's own observations, findings, and conclusions. His report shows that the parties have great difficulty communicating effectively or working together collaboratively and that the conflict between them has caused stress and harm to their child. His conclusions about the dynamics of the relationship between the parties are the same as what this court has observed: Ms. Jerolman is "somewhat defensive," "not open to . . . further ways of communicating with Mr. Jerolman regarding Noah," has "great discomfort with the idea of shared parenting" and "[has resorted] to police and DCF reports when there did not appear to be a realistic basis to do so" (Dr. Wiles' report, at 12 and 13); "the lack of disclosure to [Mr. Jerolman] create[s] a vicious cycle whereby he becomes more upset, more insistent, and then . . . upset exchanges occur between him and Ms. Jerolman," id., at 13; and "both parents have repeatedly put Noah in the middle of their conflict." Id. In this proceeding, this court will base its findings and conclusions on its assessment of the parents' present abilities to parent Noah and meet his needs and the minor child's present best interest.

A third recommendation, that the mother have final decision-making on medical issues, is no change from the present order.

The plaintiff, on the other hand, objects to any change in the custodial orders. She also asks to cut back the defendant's visitation because she maintains that "such liberal visitation with Defendant-father during the school year has proven detrimental to Noah." (Pl.'s Amended Motion for Modification of Visitation.) Her basic claim is that the defendant has been "negligent in his diligence to tend to" Noah's educational and medical needs. ( Id., at 2.) Her motion seeking to end the midweek overnights and alternate Sunday overnight asserts that such a change is necessary so that "the child's homework and school assignments are properly completed in a timely manner and Noah's medication is administered each morning at the appropriate time." Id.

The court thus has the following issues to decide:

Whether to reallocate final decision-making on educational matters from the mother to the father, as recommended by Dr. Wiles;

Whether to reduce the child's overnights with his father, as requested by the mother's motion for modification;

Whether to modify the designation of physical custody from "primary physical custody . . . with the mother," as recommended by the family relations counselor and ordered by judgment of dissolution, to "shared physical custody," as recommended by Dr. Wiles; and

Whether to order an updated assessment in another year, as recommended by Dr. Wiles in his written report.

In considering these questions, the court has considered all the evidence offered in light of the court's findings and conclusions regarding the best interest of the minor child. The best interest determination is necessarily case-specific and depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular child and family situation. The court has fully considered the conclusions and opinions of the family relations report, the court-appointed psychiatrist, and the guardian ad CT Page 13577 litem. Yet while a court may take into consideration the opinions of a family relations counselor, Yontef v. Yontef, 185 Conn. 275, 281, 440 A.2d 899 (1981), a court-appointed evaluator, Ford v. Ford, 68 Conn.App. 173, (2002), and guardian ad litem, Janik v. Janik, 61 Conn.App. 181, 763 A.2d 65 (2000), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 940, 768 A.2d 949 (2001), the court is not bound by the testimony of any witness as to individual best interest factors or to their opinion as to the ultimate issue presented. In making its decision here, this court has considered the law regarding best interest, the specific facts of this case, the testimony and credibility of the various witnesses here, and the court's assessment and evaluation of the best interest of the minor child.

Section 46b-56(c) of the General Statutes provides as follows: "In CT Page 13586 making or modifying any order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors: (1) The temperament and developmental needs of the child; (2) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child; (3) any relevant and material information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the child; (4) the wishes of the child's parents as to custody; (5) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child's siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child; (6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders; (7) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents' dispute; (8) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child; (9) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments; (10) the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child's family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household; (11) the stability of the child's existing or proposed residences, or both; (12) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child; (13) the child's cultural background; (14) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child; (15) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in section (16) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b-69h. The court is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers."

The mother's motion for modification and Dr. Wiles' recommendation to shift final decision-making on educational matters involve similar factual considerations and require an understanding of the background of the current orders adopting the recommendation contained in the family relations report of "joint legal custody with Mrs. Jerolman having final decision-making authority." The family relations counselor who conducted the family study found that Noah was "quite attached to both of his parents and quite comfortable in both homes." After cataloguing numerous examples of conflict between the parents and its effects on Noah, examples of which are included in the margin, the family relations report stated that "both parents have considerable difficulty shielding Noah from the inter-parental conflict." The report concluded, however, that "despite each parent's deficiencies as a sole care-giver, coupled with the potential for the inter-parental conflict to continue to play out in a manner even more danger to Noah as one parent is seen as empowered and the other weakened," it was best for Noah "to be substantially in the care of one parent instead of being exposed to the inordinate amount of conflict that will undoubtedly arise through an entirely equal sharing of decision-making or residential responsibilities."

The family relations report included the following:

[The child's therapist] opined that both parents continue to present as very angry with each other and have anger management issues, including considerable difficulty not expressing anger regarding the other parent in front of Noah.

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During Dr. Wiles' evaluation in the year after the family relations report, he saw the same corrosive conflict between the parents and the risk of ensuing harm to Noah. He had read the family relations report written a year earlier and agreed with its observations and its warning that "Noah is likely to bear the brunt of any ill effects of . . . inter-parental combat, and serious psychological, emotional and developmental concerns could arise." In Dr. Wiles' opinion, "the entrenched and acrimonious relationship between the parents" (report, at 13) was threatening Noah's well-being and having "significant effects on Noah and his concept and relationship of each parent." Id., 14. He also observed the effects of a year in which Ms. Jerolman had exercised the power of final decision-making. On various occasions she had shown CT Page 13578 "confusion" and "misunderstanding" of the father's access schedule in such a way as to limit Noah's access to his father. Id., 13. She unilaterally changed Noah's school despite knowing that Dr. Wiles recommended against her doing so because he believed the school had been an important source of stability for Noah amidst the conflict between his parents and instability in his mother's life. She filed a restraining order and made complaints to the Department of Children and Families regarding a mild abrasion on the child's back incurred while visiting with his father despite the fact that both the child's pediatrician and Dr. Wiles told her, after viewing the abrasion, that it was minor; Dr. Wiles saw this as an example of her "resorting to police and DCF reports when there did not appear to be a realistic basis to do so." Id., 13. He concluded that her "continued reliance on filing police reports and motions for restraining orders is having a destructive impact on Noah and his relationship with his parents." Id., 14. At hearing before this court, Dr. Wiles explained why he had come to these conclusions and the court finds both his testimony and his report credible.

This court heard much testimony from both parents and the other witnesses about Noah's educational and medical needs. He has now just completed first grade in school. During his kindergarten year, he attended the Mary T. Murphy elementary school in Branford, where he showed learning, socialization, and behavioral problems. Dr. Wiles met with Noah three times near the beginning of kindergarten and wrote in his report that "Noah . . . presented as a kindergartner showing mild developmental speech and behavioral immaturity at the time of his evaluation." Id., 12. Based on reports of the child's academic and behavioral problems during his kindergarten year, Dr. Wiles wrote in June 2006 that "Noah should be evaluated for learning issues at school and emotional/behavioral issues by a mental health professional," id., 8, and he recommended counseling for the child. Noah had met with Melissa Yetso, a licensed clinical social worker, between June 2004 and February 2005 to help Noah deal with issues regarding his parents' divorce, and he began seeing her again in November 2006. Yetso diagnosed Noah as having attention deficit disorder, and Noah's pediatrician then prescribed Ritalin for the child.

In Dr. Wiles' June 2006 report, he strongly recommended that Noah remain at the Murphy School. He saw that Noah had been subject to several serious changes in his life in the past three years. Not only had his parents separated and become divorced, but between January 2005 and June 2006 his mother had lived with two other men, Gary Downs from January to July 2005 and then with Frank Church. Noah had moved from the family home in Branford to Downs' Branford condominium and then to CT Page 13579 Church's Branford condominium. Since, as he credibly testified at the hearing before this court, moving or changes in a parent's romantic partner or the child's adult care giver can be significant disruptions in a child's life, in June 2006 Dr. Wiles believed that the Murphy School offered Noah some stability: "School has been . . . an important constant and stabilizing place for Noah this year." Id., 13. Despite that recommendation, however, Ms. Jerolman, exercising her right of final decision-making under the dissolution judgment, enrolled Noah in the John B. Sliney School in Branford for first grade, where, by all reports, Noah did much better educationally and behaviorally in school after going on the Ritalin.

During the hearing before this court Ms. Jerolman claimed that Mr. Jerolman did not always make sure that Noah did his homework. Mr. Jerolman, on the other hand, testified that he did. In the category for "complete's homework on time," Noah's report card stated that Noah was "developing appropriately." The school principal told the guardian ad litem that Noah was doing well in school and his homework was getting done and was not an issue. Ms. Jerolman also claimed that Mr. Jerolman did not always give Noah his ADD medication, but Mr. Jerolman testified that Noah's pediatrician told him that giving the medication was discretionary, based on Noah's present needs. The GAL also spoke to the pediatrician, who confirmed what Mr. Jerolman had said and told her that the medication was not one that needed to be given constantly. Based on this testimony, and the court's own evaluation of the credibility of each of the parties, the court does not find it proven that the defendant has neglected Noah's homework or his educational or medical needs.

In his written report, Dr. Wiles recommended that the defendant be given final decision-making on educational matters since the defendant was the one who appeared more aware that Noah's need for stability would be best served by keeping him in the same school. When Dr. Wiles testified in February of this year, he said that the lack of communication, distrust and enmity between the parties made it difficult for them to resolve issues together. He explained that his June 2006 report recommended that the father have final decision-making on educational matters out of concern that continuing instability in the mother's life or in her romantic relationships might affect Noah's school in the future and he was then aware of the mother's plan to change Noah's school despite Dr. Wiles' belief that to do so was detrimental to the child's best interest.

A year has now passed, however. Although there has been additional instability in the mother's life — she has left Mr. Driver and is again CT Page 13580 residing with Mr. Downs, and during this interval Noah has lived in two motels as well as at both Driver's and Down' homes, none of these events affected Noah's educational placement. Ms. Jerolman has shown a strong interest and focus on Noah's academic progress, is involved in Noah's school, and has limited her work hours to be able to help out there. The court finds no factual basis for giving the father final decision-making on all educational matters.

On the other hand, the plaintiff has several times taken actions that had the effect of excluding the defendant from Noah's education. She listed herself on school enrollment forms as having "full" rather than joint custody, listed her significant other as Noah's guardian, and failed to list the defendant as having any legal rights or interest in Noah. She has at times not sent homework with Noah to the father's house. In view of these acts and the totality of the evidence, the court finds borne out, at least on the educational front, the prediction of the family relations officer, that awarding one parent decision-making authority could lead to the exclusion of the other parent. The court finds it in Noah's best interest that neither party have final decision-making on educational matters, except that, in view of the mother's poor choice to enroll Noah at the Sliney School, made in full awareness of the recommendation of Dr. Wiles that Noah should remain at Murphy School, the defendant should have final decision-making on any change in Noah's educational placement. The assumption of the order giving the mother final decision-making was that she, as the one who had always been Noah's primary care giver, was more attuned to Noah's best interest, should the parents be unable to agree about a major decision. But the evidence recounted above, along with her decision to remove Noah from the Murphy School, even while knowing that Dr. Wiles believed that the previous school was an important source of stability for her child, shows that she sometimes places her own interests and concerns over those of Noah with regard to educational issues. The court finds that on educational issues, there should be no final decision-making assigned to either party, except for any changes in school for Noah, on which matter the father should make the final decisions.

The guardian ad litem testified that she believed the court should allocate final decision-making on Noah's activities, but the current orders already do so. The father's motion for modification asks that the court adopt Dr. Wiles' recommendations, among which are that the parties should share joint legal custody. Dr. Wiles does not specifically mention delegating final decision-making to either parent except for medical and educational matters. It might thus be inferred that Dr. Wiles was proposing no delegation of final decisions on other issues, and the guardian's recommendation to allocate such on Noah's activities CT Page 13581 is consistent with such an inference. However, none of the testimony or argument of the parties before this court specifically addressed changing the order allocating final decision-making except with regarding to medical issues, educational matters, and activities. Dr. Wiles testified that he agreed in general with the family relations report, which had concluded that the dysfunction between the parties necessitated allocating final decision-making if the parties could not agree. The evidence offered before this court does not provide a basis to find that the parties are able to cooperate and communicate, which are the ordinary prerequisites for an order of joint custody. The family relations officer concluded here, and Dr. Wiles concurred, that Noah's need to have both parents involved in his life warranted an order of joint custody, despite their inability to cooperate, tempered by an additional order assigning final decision-making. The evidence shows, however, that it remains necessary to assign final decision-making, except on certain educational issues, as explained above. The evidence does not provide a basis to change the party who can make other finals decisions.

The court reiterates, however, that the order here is not one of sole custody, which would give the party with sole custody the right to make all major decisions without input from the other party, but one of joint custody, which requires the parents to make an effort to communicate and consult with each other before making any major CT Page 13589 decisions. Only after such consultation does the current order, joint legal custody with the right of final decision-making assigned to one or the other parent, permit the party with final decision-making authority to make such a decision.

Although the court at this time is only changing final decision-making authority on educational matters, the court is concerned that the mother's unwillingness to co-parent, her tendency to withhold important information from the father, and her tendency to exaggerate will continue to interfere with the father's parenting. Although the court concurs that, based on the closeness of her relationship with Noah and her historical role as his primary caretaker, the original order giving her more time with Noah and final decision-making was probably the correct decision when made, that may not continue to be true. As the family relations counselor, Dr. Wiles, and the guardian ad litem all observed, Noah has and needs to have a strong relationship with both parents. One of the factors that the legislature has directed courts to consider in determining a child's best interest when making or modifying custodial orders, is "the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders" See General Statutes § 46b-56(c)(6). In the two years since being assigned final decision-making and given the majority of the parenting time, Ms. Jerolman has too often shown herself unwilling to facilitate and encourage Noah's relationship with his father; continuation of this conduct may well provide a basis for further modification of these orders in the future.

One issue not addressed in the evidence, and thus not in this decision, is Ms. Jerolman's claim to Dr. Wiles that Mr. Jerolman had been "physically and emotionally abusive to her and potentially to Noah, leading her to take a number of steps such as not communicating with him directly, refusing to give Mr. Jerolman contact information, and similar steps she has `had to take' in order to protect herself." (Dr. Wiles' report, at 3.) This court has recognized in the past that "[d]omestic violence in a couple's past can create an imbalance between the parties in which the abuser has all the power and the abused partner is unable, because of the history of violence and/or fear of its recurrence, to function as an equal. An order of joint custody requiring parties to consult and make decisions jointly would be highly problematic if a history of abuse created such an imbalance." Lounsbury v. Lounsbury, Superior Court, judicial district of New London (Regional Family Trial Docket at Middletown), docket number FA 99-0551913S (April 24, 2003). Ms. Jerolman told Dr. Wiles that "she `refused to be forced into co-parenting' situation with [Mr. Jerolman] and that she refused to give him information regarding where she was staying but would when she eventually moved. She stated that she has received harassing phone calls from Mr. Jerolman including threats to kill her. `I'm not going to communicate with a man who threatens me.'" (Wiles report, at 11. Despite these claims, Ms. Jerolman did not move to modify the custodial order for joint legal custody, to which she agreed at the time of the dissolution. As long as this order remains in effect, both parents are obligated to make reasonable efforts to consult with each other before making any final decisions, unless such consultation is otherwise precluded by a restraining, protective, or other court order.

The court also finds that Dr. Wiles' recommendation that the designation of the physical custody order be changed is in the minor child's best interest. Ms. Jerolman's conduct shows that she regards the CT Page 13582 orders giving her final decision-making and primary physical custody as giving her "full custody" to the exclusion of the father. Although Noah is very close to his mother, who has always been his primary caretaker, he also has a strong relationship with and attachment to his father. His relationship with both parents is very important to him and his well-being. This court finds credible the conclusions of Dr. Wiles and the guardian ad litem that Noah's best interest is served by having the custodial orders reflect and reinforce his relationship with both parents. It is important to Noah and his best interest that he knows both parents have a say in his life.

The father's parenting time exceeds what the child support guidelines commission termed "the normal visitation schedule," which it described as "typically consist[ing] of two overnights on alternate weekends; alternate holidays; some vacation time; and other visits of short duration, which may occasion an overnight stay during the week." Preamble to the Child Support and Arrearage Guidelines, Section (j)(4) (2005). The commission concluded that

a finding of shared physical custody should be made only where each parent exercises physical care and control of the child for periods substantially in excess of a normal visitation schedule . . . [A]n equal time-sharing is not required for such a finding.

Id. Although the views of the Commission are not binding in the present proceeding, which does not involve child support issues, the court finds them helpful. Here the father has close to equal parenting time, six out of every fourteen nights. Designating physical custody as shared, rather than as primarily with the mother, more accurately describes the present parental access schedule. Because the mother has perceived the present terminology as giving her the ability to exclude the father from certain aspects of Noah's life, and because Noah's best interest is served when both parents are involved in his life and in decision-making about him, the court finds it in Noah's best interest to change the terminology of the physical custody order so that it is described, more accurately, as "shared physical custody." Events since the judgment of dissolution show that the previous terminology was not then or now in Noah's best interest, but instead encouraged the mother to take unilateral action excluding the father from aspects of Noah's life, to Noah's detriment.

The defendant also asks the court to adopt Dr. Wiles' written recommendation for another evaluation or update in a year, but Dr. Wiles had rescinded that recommendation by the conclusion of his testimony; CT Page 13583 and the court does not find the recommendation to be in Noah's best interest. Although the parental conflict continues at a high level and the risk of harm to Noah remains a serious concern, the actual access schedule is, for the most part, working. Because of protective orders, the parties have been unable to engage in serious communication for much of the recent past. Both parents appear to be sincerely motivated to meet Noah's best interest. Before any further court intervention, it would probably be best to give the counseling ordered below an opportunity to lessen the conflict and improve their ability to cooperate.

Various professionals who have worked with the Jerolmans have described a dynamic between the parents that exacerbates the conflict between them. This court finds it in Noah's best interest that both parents participate together in counseling to address and remediate the conflict between them and help them become better able to communicate and cooperate on issues regarding Noah. Before this counseling begins, each parent should participate in individual parenting counseling to increase their awareness of Noah's needs and how to respond to those needs. Although these orders were not specifically sought by either party, the court has authority under General Statutes § 46b-56(i) to order the parents to engage in counseling when in the child's best interest. The court is fully aware that a protective order in a criminal proceeding currently prevents joint counseling, and that any such counseling could begin only if such restrictions were to end. Therefore, the court will retain jurisdiction over this file to enter orders implementing this finding when and if any orders from the criminal court preventing such joint counseling are no longer in place. The court orders the parties to notify the court when such restrictions have been lifted, and the clerk of court then to schedule the matter for a court hearing at which time the court will enter appropriate orders. The court also orders the parties to begin their own individual counseling immediately, and directs the clerk to schedule a status conference for the court to review their compliance with this order in sixty days.

General Statutes § 46b-56(i) provides as follows: "As part of a decision concerning custody or visitation, the court may order either parent or both of the parents and any child of such parents to participate in counseling and drug or alcohol screening, provided such participation is in the best interests of the child."

In conclusion, the court enters the following orders as in Noah's best interest:

1) The parties will share physical custody of the minor child, Noah, in accordance with the parental access schedule previously ordered by the court.

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2) The order of joint legal custody remains in effect. The plaintiff will continue to have final decision-making on all matters except educational matters, on which the father will have final decision-making with regard to school placement.

3) The parties will enter individual counseling as directed above. When no longer prevented from doing so by orders from criminal court, the parties will engage in joint counseling as described herein and approved by the court.

4) The parties are further ordered to sign releases authorizing their individual and joint counselors to disclose to the court the dates on which they have participated in such counseling and whether such counseling has, as one of its goals, the purposes ordered herein: for individual counseling — to increase the party's awareness of Noah's needs and how to respond to those needs; for joint counseling — to address and attempt to remediate the conflict between them so that can communicate and cooperate better on issues regarding Noah.

In summary, the mother's motion for modification of the father's parental access schedule is denied. The father's motion for modification of the custodial orders is granted in part and denied in part.

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