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CLINE v. RELIANCE

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Aug 15, 2007
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs Clifford and Maxine Hardin, joined initially by other plaintiffs who later withdrew, brought suit in Ohio state court alleging various state-law securities fraud claims against Reliance Trust Company. The plaintiffs sought to recover retirement savings lost in a Ponzi scheme involving the sale and leaseback of pay telephones. Reliance served as the custodian of the Hardins' self-directed Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), which held the payphone investments. Reliance removed the case to federal district court, where both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to Reliance, holding that the plaintiffs' 2004 lawsuit was barred by Ohio's two-year statute of limitations on securities fraud claims.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs' securities fraud claims against Reliance Trust Company were barred by Ohio's two-year statute of limitations.
  2. Whether the plaintiffs were placed on inquiry or actual notice of Reliance's participation in the alleged fraudulent scheme, thereby triggering the statute of limitations.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The Hardins argued that although they knew of Reliance's overt role in the payphone scheme before July 27, 2002, they were unaware of its covert role in the sale of unregistered securities.
  • They contended that the two-year statute of limitations did not apply because they were never put on inquiry notice that would trigger the limitations period.
  • The alleged fraud involved Reliance's participation with National Communications Marketing, Inc., sales agent Delbert Cogar, and ETS Payphones, Inc. in perpetrating the Ponzi scheme.

Appellee's Position

  • This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 562-63 (6th Cir. 2005) The statute of limitations for securities-fraud claims begins when a plaintiff should have discovered the facts underlying the alleged fraud by exercising reasonable diligence. The court applied this principle to determine that the Hardins were on notice of the fraud well before filing suit, triggering the limitations period.
In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1326 (3d Cir. 2002) The limitations period starts when the plaintiff should have discovered the general fraudulent scheme, not necessarily all details. The court relied on this to reject the Hardins' argument that lack of knowledge of all details prevented the statute of limitations from running.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court found no error in the district court's grant of summary judgment for Reliance. It reasoned that the Hardins were put on inquiry notice of Reliance's involvement in the sale of payphones—and thus potential liability under Ohio Rev. Code § 1707.43—from the date they opened their IRAs with Reliance on April 5, 2000. This date marked their participation in a single business transaction involving funding IRAs, purchasing payphones, and leasing them back to ETS, establishing Reliance's role as a "participant" in the sale of unregistered securities. Further, the Hardins received actual notice of the Ponzi scheme in December 2000 via an attorney's letter, over three years before filing suit. Applying established precedent, the court concluded that the statute of limitations began running at that time, barring the claims. The court declined to issue a detailed opinion repeating the district court's thorough analysis, finding it unnecessary.

Holding and Implications

AFFIRMED the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Reliance Trust Company.

The direct effect of this decision is that the plaintiffs' securities fraud claims are barred by Ohio's two-year statute of limitations because they had inquiry and actual notice of the alleged fraud well before filing suit. No new precedent was established; the ruling reinforces the application of existing statutes and case law regarding the commencement of the limitations period in securities fraud cases.

Show all summary ...

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs Clifford and Maxine Hardin, along with other plaintiffs who have since withdrawn from the case, originally brought this action in Ohio state court, alleging various state-law claims of securities fraud against Reliance Trust Company. The Hardins seek to recover the retirement savings that they lost in a Ponzi scheme involving the sale and leaseback of pay telephones. Reliance acted as the custodian of the Hardins' self-directed Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), which held the investment in the payphones. After Reliance removed the case to federal district court, both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Reliance, concluding that the plaintiffs' 2004 lawsuit was barred by Ohio's two-year statute of limitations on claims of securities fraud.

After carefully considering the record on appeal, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, and having had the benefit of oral argument, we find no error in the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Reliance. The district court thoroughly explained in a well-written opinion why the two-year statute of limitations operates to bar the claims asserted by the Hardins. A detailed opinion by us covering the same ground would therefore be unduly duplicative.

On appeal, however, the Hardins emphasize that although they were aware of Reliance's "overt" role in the payphone scheme prior to July 27, 2002, they were unaware of its "covert" role as a participant in the sale of unregistered securities. They therefore contend that the two-year statute of limitations is inapplicable because they were never put on inquiry notice as required to trigger the statute. The claimed fraud is that Reliance participated with National Communications Marketing, Inc. (the seller of the payphones), sales agent Delbert Cogar, and ETS Payphones, Inc. (the company that leased the phones from the Hardins), in perpetrating this Ponzi scheme on the Hardins.

But the Hardins were put on notice of Reliance's involvement in the alleged scheme on April 5, 2000, the date they opened their IRAs with the company. As part of a single business transaction, the Hardins contemporaneously funded self-directed IRAs through Reliance, purchased payphones through their new IRA accounts, and leased the payphones back to ETS. The Hardins were thus on notice of Reliance's "participation" in the payphone sale from the very beginning for purposes of potential liability under Ohio Rev. Code § 1707.43 (providing that every "participant" in the sale of unregistered securities is jointly and severally liable to the defrauded purchaser).

Moreover, the Hardins were put on actual notice of the Ponzi scheme perpetrated by ETS when they received Attorney Joel Goodman's letter in December of 2000, more than three and a half years before they filed suit. See Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 562-63 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the limitations period for securities-fraud claims begins to run "when a plaintiff should have discovered, by exercising reasonable diligence, the facts underlying the alleged fraud"); In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1326 (3d Cir. 2002) ("Plaintiffs need not know all of the details or narrow aspects of the alleged fraud to trigger the limitations period; instead, the period begins to run from the time at which plaintiff should have discovered the general fraudulent scheme.") (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). The Hardins are thus barred by Ohio's two-year statute of limitations because they knew that Reliance was a participant — whether overt or covert — in the general fraudulent scheme long before the statute had run on their claims.

For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.