BULL v. SULLIVAN, No. CV 07 5001414 S (Sep. 19, 2007)

SAMUEL J. SFERRAZZA, JUDGE.

The plaintiff, Robin Bull, administratrix for the estate of her deceased son, Mark Bull, applies for a prejudgment remedy in the amount of $350,000 against one defendant, Kevin Sullivan, in this wrongful death action. On September 15, 2007, the court held an evidentiary hearing on this application.

The parties stipulated that, if any prejudgment remedy ought to issue at all, the amount requested is justified. They also agreed that the operator of the vehicle which struck and killed Mark Bull was Sean Sullivan. Sean is the son of Kevin Sullivan and is also a defendant in the underlying case.

The proposed, amended complaint contains two counts which pertain to Kevin Sullivan and form the legal bases for this application. The first count asserts that Kevin Sullivan is vicariously liable for the negligence of his son under the family car doctrine. The third count claims that Kevin Sullivan is directly liable for the wrongful death of the decedent based on his own negligence in failing to return registration plates to the Connecticut motor vehicle department, as required by General Statutes § 14-16, and in failing "to ensure that Sean Sullivan had purchased insurance" for the vehicle as mandated by General Statutes § 14-213b.

A prejudgment remedy hearing is limited to a determination of whether or not there is probable cause that a judgment in at least the amount sought in the application will be rendered in the applicant's favor. General Statutes § 52-278d. The hearing "is not a full-scale trial on the merits." Chen v. Bernadel, 101 Conn.App. 658, 661-62 (2007).

I Vicarious Liability

CT Page 15848 The existence of probable cause as to the first count under the family car doctrine hinges on whether Kevin Sullivan was the owner of the car driven by his son on the fateful day.

The family car doctrine is a common-law source of imputed liability whereby the owner of a car, maintained for the general use and convenience of the owner's family, is liable for the negligent acts of a family member who uses the vehicle within the authority conferred by the owner for family purposes. Cook v. Nye, 9 Conn.App. 221, 225 (1986). This common-law doctrine is aided by a rebuttable, statutory presumption created by General Statutes § 52-182, Mathiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 840 (2003).

The owner of a car may incur legal responsibility under this doctrine even though the owner never drives nor maintains the vehicle and its use is confined exclusively to one family member, Chen v. Bernadel, supra, 664-65; Cook v. Nye, supra, 227-28. However, the family member against whom the doctrine is to be applied must actually own the vehicle and intend it to be used for family purposes.

In the present case, the court finds that Kevin Sullivan assigned title of the car, a Ford Mustang, to his adult son around nine months before the fatal accident. The respondent conveyed title by signing the assignment section of the Certificate of Title form issued by the motor vehicle department. The plaintiff contends that the assignment of title was insufficient to convey ownership of the Mustang because Kevin Sullivan never also signed the transfer section on the registration certificate issued for this vehicle; and the registration certificate reflecting the change in ownership was never submitted to the motor vehicle department and the registration plates were never returned within twenty-four hours of transfer of title as mandated by § 14-16(a). The court disagrees that these omissions negate the relinquishment of ownership for purposes of family car doctrine analysis.

First, General Statutes § 14-179(a) indicates that a transfer of ownership interest in a motor vehicle may be accomplished by executing the assignment of title to the transferee "in the space provided therefore on the [title] certificate." The court has found that that assignment occurred in this case. While § 14-16 imposes obligations upon a transferor to return plates and the registration certificate within twenty-four hours after transfer of ownership, § 14-16 contains no provision nullifying a transfer of title effectuated under § 14-179(a). Subsection 14-16(h) does subject violators to criminal penalties, and subsection 14-16(g) bars the owner from registering other vehicles under CT Page 15849 certain circumstances, but that statute lacks any language vitiating a transfer of title accomplished by complying with § 14-179(a).

Secondly, and perhaps more fundamentally, the execution of the assignment of title section in January 2005 transferring title from father to adult son, undermines probable cause to believe that the father, at the time of the accident in October 2005, meant to keep the Mustang for family purposes beyond the date of attempted conveyance, perfected or not. In the Chen and Cook cases, supra, the Appellate Court upheld the proposition that retaining title to a vehicle, even though exclusively used by another family member, would permit invocation of the family car doctrine because the vehicle was owned by the title holder for family convenience. Of course, the title holder was free to sell or dispose of the vehicle even though the owner never used the car.

In the present case, Kevin Sullivan divested himself of title by transferring title to his son Sean in January 2005. Kevin Sullivan ceased insuring the Mustang, and Sean procured insurance in his name, although he unfortunately allowed that policy to lapse before the accident. Under these circumstances, the likelihood of a favorable judgment against Kevin Sullivan utilizing the family car doctrine to impose vicarious liability for Sean's negligence on the first count is slim.

II Direct Liability

As noted above, the third count of the proposed, amended complaint alleges that Kevin Sullivan's failure to ensure that the registration plates were removed from the Mustang and returned to the motor vehicle department and that his adult son procured liability insurance were negligent acts which proximately caused the fatal accident. The court finds that success at trial based on these allegations is improbable.

Proximate causation is an essential element of a cause of action based on negligence. Busko v. DeFilippo, 162 Conn. 462, 466 (1972). The failure to secure the defunct registration plates and to maintain liability insurance played no role in the running down of a pedestrian nine months later and could not be a substantial factor in producing the accident.

The plaintiff relies on the trial court's opinion of Barnett v. Rosenthal, 40 Conn.Sup. 149 (1984), to support her claim. However, that decision actually weakens the plaintiff's position. In that case, Judge CT Page 15850 Berdon denied a motion to strike a claim of negligence which contained an allegation of negligence in failure to return registration plates. The court observed that in deciding a motion to strike he did not resolve factual claims such as causation. Id., 151. But Judge Berdon stated, "[n]evertheless, it is also clear that merely leaving the license plate on or in the automobile would be insufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute negligence." Id., 150.

The fact that the Mustang bore illegal plates on the date of the accident was a condition rather than a cause of the accident. The fatal collision could have occurred in exactly the same manner and at the same time and location whether the plates were valid, expired, stolen, or absent altogether. Proximate causation cannot be premised on speculation or conjecture Weigold v. Patel, 81 Conn.App. 347, 355 (2004), cert. denied, 268 Conn. 918 (2004).

The fact that the car was uninsured is an even more tenuous claim of negligence. The vehicle was, in fact, insured by Sean Sullivan in January 2005. Sean allowed coverage to lapse. The court cannot conceive how the plaintiff could prevail on this claim of negligence, even assuming Kevin Sullivan had a duty to compel his adult son to keep the vehicle insured. Again, the lack of insurance is causally unrelated to the accident in October 2005.

Consequently, the court concludes that no probable cause exists to suppose that the plaintiff will prevail at trial against Kevin Sullivan, and the application for prejudgment remedy is denied.

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