STATE v. SUTTON

PER CURIAM.

This matter is before the court upon the motion for rehearing of the State regarding our opinion in State v. Sutton, ante p. 185, ___ N.W.2d ___ (2007). While we overrule the motion for rehearing, we modify our opinion as follows:

In that portion of the opinion designated the "Analysis," we strike the following language from the opinion, id. at 193, ___ N.W.2d at ___:

[15] Intent is not an element of first degree sexual assault as defined by § 28-319, one of the offenses with which Sutton was charged. See State v. Sanchez, 257 Neb. 291, 597 N.W.2d 361 (1999). Intent, however, must be proved with respect to the second degree assault charge.

We replace the stricken language with the following:

[15] First degree sexual assault under § 28-319(1)(a) is a general intent crime. State v. Koperski, 254 Neb. 624, 578 N.W.2d 837 (1998). Intent must be proven with respect to the second degree assault charge.

We also withdraw the language of syllabus point 15, and we replace it with the following:

Sexual Assault: Intent. First degree sexual assault under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319(1)(a) (Reissue 1995) is a general intent crime.

The remainder of the opinion shall remain unmodified.

FORMER OPINION MODIFIED.

MOTION FOR REHEARING OVERRULED.