IN RE COLLINS

ALBERT RADCLIFFE, Chief Bankruptcy Judge

Dear Messrs Collins Mills:

I have reviewed the above-referenced motion. It is titled "Letter of Appeal." However viewing the document as a whole, especially in light of its factual allegations and legal argument, I have not construed it as a notice of appeal under FRBP 8001(a). Rather I have construed it as a motion to reconsider the Order Approving Final Distribution entered on February 20, 2008. I have further construed it as an objection to (or request to vacate orders allowing) various claims discussed below.

The motion objects to pro rata disbursement to three creditors, Linda Collins, Kimberly Standmore, and L3 Communications. Mr. Collins does not object to the Liquidating Trustee's accounting of the claimants' pro rata distributive shares, but rather to the claims' underlying merits.

Taking the objections in turn, the general unsecured portion of Linda Collins' claim has previously been allowed in the amount of $167,775.07 by order entered February 20, 2008 approving a duly noticed settlement. This order is the law of the case. Even were I to reconsider that order, Mr. Collins' argument that the claim is based on a California Judgment instead of an Oregon one has no merit. It appears from the record that the judgment was registered in Klamath County, Oregon. Even if had not been, I am required to give full faith and credit to the judgments of other states.

Mr. Collins next objects to allowance of Kimberly Standmore's claim for $375,000.00 general unsecured, on the basis that it is a corporate debt of Sonora Manufacturing and not his personal liability. Once again, this claim was allowed as the result of an order entered approving a duly noticed settlement. Even more damaging to Mr. Collins' present argument is that he objected to that settlement, through counsel. A hearing was held on June 21, 2005 at which time the objection was overruled, resulting in an order entered July 1, 2005 approving the settlement. Mr. Collins states no valid grounds under FRBPs 9024 or 3008 to vacate the July 1, 2005 order. As such, his motion will be denied as to the Standmore claim.

Finally, Mr. Collins objects to the allowed amount of L3 Communications' general unsecured claim. Although not entirely clear, it appears that again Mr. Collins is arguing that the debt is a corporate, rather than personal liability. The Liquidating Trustee objected to this claim on the basis that it claimed post-petition interest or charges, recommending its allowance in the amount of $71,478.23 general unsecured. The objection was served on December 13, 2007. L3 Communications did not timely request a hearing and the claim was allowed based on the Trustee's recommendation, by self-executing order. Nevertheless, because the objection was not Mr. Collins', I am prepared to grant him a hearing on this objection. At the hearing, the parties should address whether Mr. Collins has standing to object and whether or not the objection is moot if the Liquidating Trustee has, by that time, disbursed L3 Communications' dividend. I will also consider any other arguments the parties raise. A copy of this letter as well as Mr. Collins' present motion is being sent to L3 Communications' counsel. The parties will receive a separate notice of the hearing.

The above constitute my findings of fact and conclusions of law under FRBP 7052; they shall not be separately stated.