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ADVANCED BODYCARE v. THIONE
Factual and Procedural Background
Advanced Bodycare and Thione entered a licensing agreement concerning the exclusive marketing and distribution of Thione’s nutritional supplements and testing kits. After Advanced Bodycare received defective testing kits, it alleged that Thione acknowledged a manufacturing defect but failed to provide sufficient replacements, constituting a breach of contract. [1]
The agreement required negotiation followed by non-binding arbitration or mediation before either party could institute legal action. Advanced Bodycare filed suit in Florida state court without first using those procedures; the case was later removed to federal district court. Thione moved for a stay under § 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act, but the district court denied the motion. [2][3]
Thione brought this interlocutory appeal from the denial of the stay. [4][5]
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Federal Arbitration Act permits enforcement of a contractual clause requiring mediation or non-binding arbitration before a party may file suit. [5]
- Whether the court had appellate jurisdiction over the order denying Thione’s requested § 3 stay. [6][7]
- Whether mediation qualifies as “arbitration” under the FAA and whether a clause allowing the aggrieved party to choose between mediation and non-binding arbitration is an agreement to settle by arbitration. [8][9]
Arguments of the Parties
Advanced Bodycare’s Arguments
- The court lacked appellate jurisdiction because § 16(a)(1)(A) permits an appeal only from an order refusing a § 3 stay, and a § 3 stay is available only when the action concerns an issue referable to arbitration. [6]
- Because the contract required mediation or non-binding arbitration, neither of which Advanced Bodycare characterized as enforceable FAA arbitration, the dispute was not referable to arbitration. [6]
Thione’s Position
- Thione sought a stay pending arbitration under § 3 based on the parties’ agreement, which expressly included non-binding arbitration. [3][7]
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| In Re Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. | Untimeliness in removal is procedural rather than jurisdictional. | The court relied on this principle in addressing the untimely removal. [10] |
| Yusefzadeh v. Nelson Mullins Riley Scarborough LLP | A procedural removal defect cannot support sua sponte remand. | The court cited it in concluding that untimely removal did not defeat jurisdiction. [10] |
| Omni Tech Corp. v. MPC Solutions Sales LLC | A non-frivolous claim of an arbitration agreement, combined with denial of a stay, can confer appellate jurisdiction. | The court adopted this approach to reject Advanced Bodycare’s jurisdictional challenge. [7] |
| Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't | A colorable federal claim supports jurisdiction even if ultimately dismissed, unless clearly frivolous or asserted solely to create jurisdiction. | The court analogized Thione’s non-frivolous stay motion to a colorable federal claim. [7] |
| Klay v. All Defendants | Arbitration is a creature of contract, and a § 3 stay is mandatory when a dispute is arbitrable. | The court used these principles in analyzing both jurisdiction and whether the clause required FAA arbitration. [8][11][12] |
| Fisher v. GE Med. Sys. | District-court authority cited as treating mediation agreements as enforceable under the FAA. | The court noted this contrary authority while undertaking close scrutiny of the issue. [12][13] |
| CB Richard Ellis Inc. v. Am. Env. Waste Mgmt. | District-court authority cited as treating mediation agreements as enforceable under the FAA. | The court noted this authority but did not adopt its approach. [12][13] |
| AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp. | One test asks whether the parties submitted a dispute to a third party for a decision. | The court used the concept to distinguish mediation, in which the third party makes no decision, from arbitration. [14][15] |
| Fit Tech v. Bally Total Fitness | Relevant considerations include resemblance to classic arbitration and the presence of an independent adjudicator, legal standards, party submissions, and a decision resolving rights and duties. | The court adopted these “common incidents” as guideposts for identifying FAA arbitration. [14] |
| Salt Lake Tribune Publ'g Co. v. Mgmt. Planning Inc. | Classic arbitration empowers a third party to render a decision settling the dispute. | The court treated binding third-party decision-making as the essential characteristic of classic arbitration. [14] |
| BL Harbert Int'l LLC v. Hercules Steel Co. | The FAA’s purposes require arbitration to function as an alternative to litigation rather than an additional layer of proceedings; it also recognizes judicially created grounds for vacatur. | The court relied on these principles in emphasizing the need for an award and in concluding that compelled mediation could increase litigation costs. [16][17] |
| AIG Baker Sterling Heights LLC v. Am. Multi-Cinema Inc. | The FAA seeks to reduce court congestion and provide a speedier, less costly alternative to litigation. | The court reasoned that compelling unwanted mediation would undermine these statutory purposes. [17] |
| St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. America's Favorite Chicken Co. | Under Georgia contract interpretation, ordinary meaning may guide interpretation where the agreement does not specify otherwise. | The court presumed that “mediation,” lacking specified protocols, meant typical mediation. [18] |
| Ortega Trujillo v. Conover Co. Comms. Inc. | District courts possess inherent discretionary authority to issue stays in appropriate circumstances. | The court distinguished discretionary stays in aid of mediation from mandatory FAA remedies. [19][20] |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first held that it possessed appellate jurisdiction. Thione made a non-frivolous claim that the agreement constituted an agreement to arbitrate, and the district court denied a stay requested under § 3. Whether the stay was meritorious duplicated the merits question and did not eliminate appellate jurisdiction. [7]
On the merits, the court explained that a § 3 stay is mandatory only when the dispute is referable to arbitration. The contract gave the aggrieved party an unconditional choice between mediation and non-binding arbitration. If either option was outside the FAA, the agreement could not be characterized as an agreement to settle by arbitration because a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate without having agreed to do so. [8][11]
The FAA does not define “arbitration.” The court therefore examined the common incidents of classic arbitration, including independent adjudication, application of legal standards, consideration of the parties’ evidence and arguments, and a decision purporting to resolve the parties’ rights and duties. [14]
The court identified the existence of a reviewable award as a controlling feature. FAA arbitration presumes an award that may be confirmed, modified, or vacated by a court. A procedure that produces no award capable of meaningful judicial treatment is not FAA arbitration. [16]
Mediation ordinarily involves a neutral third party facilitating communication and negotiation toward a voluntary settlement; it does not itself adjudicate or resolve the dispute. Because mediation produces no independent award declaring the parties’ rights, it is not arbitration within the FAA. [15][18]
Accordingly, the contractual option to pursue mediation or non-binding arbitration was not an agreement to settle by arbitration enforceable under the FAA. The court expressly left unresolved whether non-binding arbitration alone falls within the FAA. [9]
The court limited its ruling: it did not condemn mediation, hold mediation agreements categorically unenforceable, or prohibit discretionary stays in aid of mediation. It held only that the FAA’s mandatory remedies cannot be used to compel mediation. [19]
Holding and Implications
AFFIRMED. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Thione’s motion for a mandatory § 3 stay pending arbitration. [5][21]
The FAA does not authorize compelling mediation, and a clause allowing the aggrieved party to choose mediation or non-binding arbitration is not enforceable under the FAA as an agreement to settle by arbitration. The ruling does not prevent enforcement under contract or other law, nor does it foreclose discretionary stays to facilitate mediation. [9][19]
KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:
In this interlocutory appeal we must decide whether the Federal Arbitration Act permits enforcement of a contract clause requiring an aggrieved party, prior to filing a lawsuit, to institute mediation or non-binding arbitration. We conclude it does not. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order denying a stay pending arbitration.
I.
Advanced Bodycare International and Thione International Inc. are parties to a licensing agreement. The contract grants Advanced Bodycare exclusive rights to market and distribute Thione's nutritional supplements and a related testing kit, which purports to monitor the amount of free radical cells in the body. Pursuant to the contract, Advanced Bodycare ordered and paid for, and Thione shipped, a certain quantity of supplements and testing kits, which were delivered in September and December, 2004. According to the complaint, Advanced Bodycare discovered that many of the testing kits were defective. It raised the issue with Thione, which, according to the complaint, eventually acknowledged a manufacturing defect and shipped some replacement units in October 2005, but not enough to replace all the defective kits. Thus, Advanced Bodycare alleges Thione is in breach of the contract.
The contract contains a provision specifying the procedures to be followed in the event of a dispute. It provides as follows:
A. The parties recognize that disputes as to certain matters may from time to time arise which relate to either party's rights and/or obligations hereunder. It is the objective of the parties to establish procedures to facilitate the resolution of such disputes in an expedient manner by mutual cooperation and without resort to litigation. To accomplish that objective, the parties agree to follow the procedures set forth below if and when such a dispute arises between the parties.
B. If any dispute arises between the parties relating to the interpretation, breach[,] or performance of this Agreement or the grounds for the termination thereof, and the parties cannot resolve the dispute within thirty (30) days of a written request by either party to the other party, the parties agree to hold a meeting, attended by the Chief Executive Officer or President of each party, to attempt in good faith to negotiate a resolution of the dispute prior to pursuing other available remedies. If within sixty (60) days after such written request, the parties have not succeeded in negotiating a resolution of the dispute, such dispute shall be submitted to non-binding arbitration or mediation with a mutually agreed upon, independent arbitrator or mediator. The arbitration or mediation shall be held in Atlanta, Georgia. Each party shall bear its own costs and legal fees associated with such arbitration or mediation. If no resolution acceptable to both parties is reached through arbitration or mediation, either party may resort to instituting legal action against the other in court and all rights and remedies of the party shall be preserved in such action. This Agreement shall be interpreted in accordance with the laws of the state of Georgia.
Advanced Bodycare filed this suit in Florida state court in December 2006, alleging breach of contract and related state-law claims based on the defective test kits. It did not first seek arbitration or mediation. The complaint was amended and the case was then removed to the district court. After removal, Thione moved to stay the suit pending arbitration pursuant to § 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (FAA). The motion was denied in an order which is the subject of this appeal.
Removal was untimely. However, this is not fatal to the district court's jurisdiction nor to ours, because untimeliness is a "procedural" defect in removal rather than a "jurisdictional" defect, In Re Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 104 F.3d 322, 324 (11th Cir. 1997), and therefore cannot form the basis for a sua sponte remand. Yusefzadeh v. Nelson Mullins Riley Scarborough LLP, 365 F.3d 1244, 1245 (11th Cir. 2004).
II.
Advanced Bodycare argues we lack appellate jurisdiction. It contends there is no appealable order, because the pertinent portion of the FAA's interlocutory appeal provision, 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A), authorizes appeal only of "an order refusing a stay of any action under section 3 [of the FAA]," and a § 3 stay is available only where suit is brought upon an issue "referable to arbitration." 9 U.S.C. § 3. Advanced Bodycare argues this suit is not "referable to arbitration" because mediation and non-binding arbitration are not enforceable under the FAA. In other words, Advanced Bodycare claims that no matter how Thione captioned its stay motion, that motion was not really pursuant to § 3 because the contract does not require "arbitration" within the meaning of the FAA.
This argument merely duplicates the merits, and we reject it. That Thione might not be entitled to a § 3 stay on the merits hardly means it did not request one. It is undisputed that the parties entered an agreement which called for, inter alia, non-binding arbitration. Thus, Thione makes at least a colorable claim that there is an "agreement to arbitrate," 9 U.S.C. § 2, and hence that a § 3 stay is proper. A non-frivolous claim that the parties had an agreement to arbitrate, coupled with an order denying a stay, is sufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction. See Omni Tech Corp. v. MPC Solutions Sales LLC, 432 F.3d 797, 800 (7th Cir. 2005). This approach is also consistent with the treatment of jurisdictional allegations in a complaint. A complaint alleging a colorable federal cause of action confers district court jurisdiction even if the complaint is ultimately dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (failure to state a federal claim does not defeat jurisdiction unless clearly frivolous or made only to allege federal jurisdiction). Because Thione made a non-frivolous motion for a stay pending arbitration and that motion was denied, we have jurisdiction.
III.
On the merits, we must decide if a contract under which disputes "shall be submitted to non-binding arbitration or mediation" is an agreement "to settle by arbitration a controversy," 9 U.S.C. § 2, thereby making the dispute "referable to arbitration," 9 U.S.C. § 3. If so, the district court erred in denying a stay, because when a dispute is arbitrable, entry of a § 3 stay is mandatory. See Klay v. All Defendants, 389 F.3d 1191, 1204 (11th Cir. 2004).
This contract purports to require "mediation or non-binding arbitration." It is apparent that an aggrieved party had the option to initiate whichever procedure it preferred, because the contract contains no conditions requiring that one or the other procedure be invoked in certain circumstances. Although we could not locate any law on this point, we conclude that if either mediation or non-binding arbitration is not FAA "arbitration," this agreement is not enforceable under the FAA. When an aggrieved party has an unconditional right to choose between two or more dispute resolution procedures, and one of them is not FAA arbitration, the contract is not one "to settle by arbitration a controversy." 9 U.S.C. § 2. This is merely an application of the principle that arbitration is a creature of contract; a party may not be compelled to arbitrate if he did not agree to do so. Klay, 389 F.3d at 1201. When an aggrieved party may satisfy his contractual duties under a dispute resolution clause without undertaking arbitration, he has not obligated himself to settle the dispute by arbitration. So if either procedure specified in this contract is not "arbitration" under the FAA, we must affirm the order on appeal.
We come now to the substantive question: is mediation arbitration? When posed this way, the answer may seem obvious. But the FAA does not define its key term, "arbitration," and courts have had a difficult time defining just what types of procedures are enforceable under the statute. Because doubts about arbitrability are resolved in favor of arbitration, see Klay, 389 F.3d at 1201, and because a few district courts have decided on that basis that mediation contracts are enforceable under the FAA, the issue merits close scrutiny.
See Fisher v. GE Med. Sys., 276 F.Supp.2d 891 (M.D.Tenn. 2003); CB Richard Ellis Inc. v. Am. Env. Waste Mgmt., 1998 WL 903495 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.4, 1998).
This circuit has not enunciated a test for resolving whether a particular dispute resolution procedure is FAA "arbitration." One widely-followed opinion asks whether the parties have agreed to submit a dispute to a third party for a decision. AMF Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 621 F.Supp. 456, 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (Weinstein, J.). Other authority considers how closely the procedure chosen resembles "classic arbitration" and whether enforcing it serves the intuited purposes of Congress. Fit Tech v. Bally Total Fitness, 374 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 2004); Salt Lake Tribune Publ'g Co. v. Mgmt. Planning Inc., 390 F.3d 684, 689-90 (10th Cir. 2004). These differing verbal formulations do not constitute a real disagreement, because submitting a dispute to a third party for a binding decision is quintessential "classic arbitration." See Salt Lake Tribune, 390 F.3d at 689 ("classic arbitration" is characterized by "empower[ing] a third party to render a decision settling [the] dispute"). Thus, when there is a dispute about whether any particular dispute resolution method chosen in a contract is FAA arbitration, we will look for the "common incidents" of "classic arbitration," including (i) an independent adjudicator, (ii) who applies substantive legal standards ( i.e. the parties' agreement and background contract law), (iii) considers evidence and argument (however formally or informally) from each party, and (iv) renders a decision that purports to resolve the rights and duties of the parties, typically by awarding damages or equitable relief. See Fit Tech, 374 F.3d at 7. The presence or absence of any one of these circumstances will not always be determinative, and parties have great flexibility under the FAA to select pre-packaged dispute resolution procedures, or to craft their own.
Although we acknowledge that there are few clear rules in delineating the bounds of FAA arbitration, we believe there is one that controls this case. The FAA clearly presumes that arbitration will result in an "award" declaring the rights and duties of the parties. Indeed, much of arbitration law is predicated on the existence of an award: the FAA provides that an award may be confirmed and judgment entered upon it if the parties have so agreed, 9 U.S.C. § 9, or if challenged it may be modified or vacated by the court on grounds established by law. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (statutory grounds for vacatur); 9 U.S.C. § 11 (statutory grounds for modification); BL Harbert Int'l LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 910 (11th Cir. 2006) (judicially-created grounds for vacatur). If a dispute resolution procedure does not produce some type of award that can be meaningfully confirmed, modified, or vacated by a court upon proper motion, it is not arbitration within the scope of the FAA.
The inverse is not true, however. The presence of an award does not by itself make a procedure "arbitration" if the procedures that produce the award bear no resemblance to classic arbitration. The parties could not contract for a binding coin flip, with the winner to receive an award of his choice, and expect the agreement to be enforced under the FAA.
This bright line rule makes sense not only in light of the FAA's statutory structure but its statutory purposes as well. The purpose of the FAA is to "relieve congestion in the courts and to provide parties with an alternative method of dispute resolution that is speedier and less costly than litigation." AIG Baker Sterling Heights LLC v. Am. Multi-Cinema Inc., 508 F.3d 995, 1001 (11th Cir. 2007). But "[t]he laudatory goals of the FAA will be achieved only to the extent that courts ensure arbitration is an alternative to litigation, not an additional layer in a protracted contest." BL Harbert Int'l 441 F.3d at 907. When, as here, a party has contractually preserved all its rights and remedies in court and is unwilling to undertake mediation voluntarily, the FAA's goal of minimizing the time and cost of litigation is ill-served by a prefatory round of motions practice. Unlike submitting a dispute to a private adjudicator, which the FAA contemplates, compelling a party to submit to settlement talks it does not wish to enter and which cannot resolve the dispute of their own force may well increase the time and treasure spent in litigation.
These principles lead clearly to the conclusion that mediation is not within the FAA's scope. Indeed, as a leading dispute resolution scholar explained, "the law of arbitration is in nearly every respect an illogical foundation for enforcement of mediation agreements." Thomas Stipanowich, The Arbitration Penumbra: Arbitration Law and the Rapidly Changing Landscape of Dispute Resolution, 8 Nev. L.J. 427, 446 (2007). Mediation, as that term is commonly understood, is a "method of non-binding dispute resolution involving a neutral third party who tries to help the disputing parties reach a mutually agreeable solution," Black's Law Dictionary 996 (7th ed. 1999), or "a process in which a mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute." Unif. Mediation Act § 2(1). Simply stated, mediation does not resolve a dispute, it merely helps the parties do so. In contrast, the FAA presumes that the arbitration process itself will produce a resolution independent of the parties' acquiescence — an award which declares the parties' rights and which may be confirmed with the force of a judgment. That a typical mediation produces no award is highly probative evidence that an agreement to mediate a dispute is not "an agreement to settle by arbitration a controversy." 9 U.S.C. § 2. Parties to a mediation contract have not "agreed to submit a dispute for decision by a third party," AMF, Inc., 621 F.Supp. at 460, because the third party makes no decision.
Because the contract did not specify any particular arbitration or mediation protocols, our discussion of these procedures is necessarily stylized. Normally labels do not control; indeed, if an agreement specifies in detail a dispute resolution procedure which it calls "mediation" (or anything else) but which is, in substance, FAA "arbitration," substance controls over title. But here, where the agreement provides for "mediation" but provides no further description of the procedures to be employed, our analysis must focus on a typical mediation, because we presume, in the absence of contrary evidence, that the parties used the term in its ordinary sense. See St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. America's Favorite Chicken Co., 198 F.3d 815, 819 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1999) (summarizing Georgia law of contract interpretation).
In short, because the mediation process does not purport to adjudicate or resolve a case in any way, it is not "arbitration" within the meaning of the FAA. Accordingly, FAA remedies, including mandatory stays and motions to compel, are not appropriately invoked to compel mediation. Further, a dispute resolution clause that may be satisfied by arbitration or mediation, at the aggrieved party's option, is not "an agreement to settle by arbitration a controversy" and thus is not enforceable under the FAA either. Because we decide the case on this basis, we reserve for another day whether non-binding arbitration is within the scope of the FAA.
We emphasize the limited nature of our ruling. This opinion should not be read as denigrating mediation — quite the contrary. We encourage parties to make liberal use of it, and we encourage district courts to liberally employ any authority they have under local rules to order mediation sua sponte when doing so may expedite the resolution of a case. Nor do we hold that agreements to mediate are per se unenforceable. They might be specifically enforceable in contract or under other law; that issue is not before us. Finally, we emphasize that we do not hold that stays in aid of mediation are per se impermissible. To the contrary, district courts have inherent, discretionary authority to issue stays in many circumstances, and granting a stay to permit mediation (or to require it) will often be appropriate. We merely hold that the mandatory remedies of the FAA may not be invoked to compel mediation.
See Ortega Trujillo v. Conover Co. Comms. Inc., 221 F.3d 1262, 1264 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
AFFIRMED.
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