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ALFONSO v. SKADDEN
Factual and Procedural Background
Michael Skadden and Ana Maria Tarquis Alfonso were married in Houston in 1991. In 1999, Tarquis filed for divorce in Spain, and Skadden filed for divorce in Harris County, Texas, shortly thereafter. Both parties claimed they were not properly served in the other's suit. The Texas trial court granted a default judgment against Tarquis, dividing property, naming both parents managing conservators of their child, and ordering child support. The Spanish court granted sole custody to Tarquis and denied visitation to Skadden, who had not seen the child since 1998, but also ordered child support.
More than four years after the Texas decree, Skadden sought enforcement. Tarquis challenged enforcement, arguing the 1999 Texas judgment was void due to lack of personal jurisdiction (no proper service) and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (Texas was not the child's home state). The district court denied enforcement, finding service by publication improper due to absence of an appointed ad litem or statement of evidence. The court of appeals reversed, holding both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction existed, relying in part on presumptions favorable to the judgment despite missing record parts. This Court granted review and reversed the court of appeals.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a child-custody default judgment entered without proper subject-matter jurisdiction may be collaterally attacked.
- Whether the court of appeals erred in presuming jurisdictional facts despite an underlying record affirmatively showing lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
- Whether personal jurisdiction can be upheld in a collateral attack after a default judgment where service was by publication without proper procedural safeguards.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner (Ana Maria Tarquis Alfonso)
- The 1999 Texas judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction because she was not properly served.
- Texas lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the child was not domiciled in Texas; the child had lived in Texas only 25 days, and Spain was the child’s home state.
- The court of appeals improperly presumed jurisdictional facts in the absence of supporting record evidence.
Respondent (Michael Skadden)
- Argued the default judgment should not be set aside for lack of service after four years, citing precedent involving direct attacks on judgments.
- Asserted Texas had subject-matter jurisdiction, relying on presumptions that missing record parts might support the custody decree’s jurisdictional findings.
- Recognized the Spanish court had not declined jurisdiction, implying Texas jurisdiction was proper under the statutory framework.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| McEwen v. Harrison, 345 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1961) | Default judgments cannot be set aside for lack of service after four years in direct attacks. | The court of appeals relied on this for rejecting collateral attack on personal jurisdiction; the Supreme Court disagreed with its application here. |
| Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2005) | Void judgments may be collaterally attacked if rendered without jurisdiction over the parties. | Supreme Court cited this to support that jurisdictional defects may be raised collaterally. |
| Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. 1990) | Same principle on collateral attack of void judgments. | Reinforced that lack of jurisdiction renders a judgment void and subject to collateral attack. |
| Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1987) | Same principle on jurisdictional voidness and collateral attack. | Supported the principle that jurisdictional defects can be raised collaterally. |
| Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1985) | Same principle on jurisdictional voidness and collateral attack. | Consistent with other precedents cited to support collateral attack on void judgments. |
| Tesco Am., Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., 221 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. 2006) | Accord on jurisdictional principles. | Further supported the principle that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be challenged at any time. |
| White v. White, 179 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1944) | Presumption in favor of judgments does not apply when record affirmatively shows jurisdictional defect. | Key precedent for rejecting presumptions when the record reveals lack of jurisdiction. |
| Bandy v. First State Bank, Overton, Tex., 835 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. 1992) | Affirmed the principle that jurisdictional defects must be affirmatively shown on the record for collateral attack. | Supported the court’s analysis on jurisdictional defects and presumptions. |
| Sec. Trust Co. of Austin v. Lipscomb County, 180 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. 1944) | Same principle on jurisdictional defects and presumptions. | Reinforced the settled rule on jurisdictional defects in collateral attacks. |
| Rolison v. Puckett, 198 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. 1946) | Every reasonable presumption to uphold a judgment will be indulged, but only if not contradicted by the record. | Clarified limits of presumptions in collateral attacks. |
| Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. 2004) | Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised at any time. | Supported the court’s holding that lack of subject-matter jurisdiction invalidated the custody provisions. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the jurisdictional facts presented in the underlying record and found that the record affirmatively demonstrated a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Specifically, Skadden’s own affidavit and testimony established that the child had lived in Texas for only 25 days, while Spain was the child’s home state under the statutory definition. The Texas Family Code required that the child’s home state be Texas or that other specific conditions be met for Texas courts to have jurisdiction, none of which applied here.
The court rejected the court of appeals’ approach of indulging presumptions in favor of jurisdiction when the record itself showed otherwise. It emphasized that while courts must indulge reasonable presumptions supporting judgments under collateral attack, they cannot presume facts that the record clearly contradicts. The Court cited longstanding precedent establishing that a collateral attack must be supported by a record that affirmatively reveals the jurisdictional defect.
Regarding personal jurisdiction, the Court noted conflicting precedent but did not overturn the district court’s finding that service by publication was improper due to lack of an appointed ad litem and statement of evidence, as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 244.
Because subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be challenged at any time, the Court concluded the Texas trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the custody provisions in the 1999 divorce decree and properly refused to enforce that portion of the decree.
Holding and Implications
The Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the enforcement actions for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The direct effect of this decision is that the Texas custody provisions in the 1999 divorce decree are void and unenforceable due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court did not establish new precedent beyond reaffirming established principles regarding collateral attacks on jurisdictional defects and the limits of presumptions in such contexts.
PER CURIAM.
In this collateral attack on a child-custody default judgment, the underlying record affirmatively showed lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the child had lived in Texas for only 25 days. The court of appeals held otherwise, presuming missing parts of the record might support jurisdiction. We agree courts must indulge all reasonable presumptions favorable to a judgment under collateral attack, but disagree that they can indulge a presumption that the record itself shows is untrue. Accordingly, we reverse.
Michael Skadden and Ana Maria Tarquis Alfonso were married in Houston in 1991. In March 1999, Tarquis filed for divorce in Spain, and one month later Skadden (a Houston lawyer affiliated with a Madrid firm) filed for divorce in Harris County. Each claims they were not served in the other's suit, although Skadden appeared by attorney in Spain and Tarquis was served by publication. When Tarquis failed to appear in Texas, the trial court granted default, divided the property, named both parents managing conservators of their only child, entered a standard possession order, and ordered Skadden to pay child support. By contrast, the Spanish court granted sole custody to Tarquis, denied visitation to Skadden on the basis he had no relationship with the child (Skadden admits he has not seen their child since 1998), and also ordered Skadden to pay child support.
Four years and three months after the Texas decree was signed, Skadden sought to enforce it. Tarquis answered and argued the 1999 judgment was void due to lack of personal jurisdiction because she had not been served, and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because Texas was not the child's home state. The district judge — who had heard the 1999 case as an associate judge and recommended the divorce decree — reviewed the 1999 file, heard evidence, and then denied enforcement, finding the absence of an appointed ad litem or statement of evidence rendered service by publication improper. See TEX.R. Civ. P. 244.
Skadden appealed, and the court of appeals reversed, finding both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. Regarding personal jurisdiction, the court held a default could not be set aside for lack of service after four years, pointing to a 1961 opinion involving a direct attack, and dismissing as obiter dicta contrary opinions discussing collateral attacks like this one. 217 S.W.3d at 619 (citing McEwen v. Harrison, 162 Tex. 125, 345 S.W.2d 706, 709-11 (1961)). But see Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2005) (holding void judgment may be collaterally attacked if rendered with "no jurisdiction of the parties"); Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990) (same); Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1987) (same); Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. 1985) (same); accord, Tesco Am., Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., 221 S.W.3d 550, 555-56 (Tex. 2006).
Regarding subject-matter jurisdiction, the court of appeals noted that Skadden swore in an affidavit with his 1999 filing that the couple's child was born in Spain and had always lived there except for a 25-day visit to Texas in 1998. As the custody proceeding was filed before September 1, 1999, it was governed by former section 152.003 of the Texas Family Code, which provided for child-custody jurisdiction in Texas if:
• Texas was the child's home state,
• the child had no home state, but had a significant connection to Texas,
• the child had been abandoned or subjected to mistreatment in Texas, or
• other states had no jurisdiction, or had declined to exercise it.
Act of Apr. 6, 1995, 74th Leg., R. S., ch. 20, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 113, 141-42 (amended 1999) (current version at TEX. FAM. CODE § 152.201). As "home state" was defined as the place where the child had lived with a parent for six consecutive months, id. sec. 152.002(6), Skadden's filing affirmatively established that Spain was his "home state" and Texas was not. None of the other jurisdictional grounds applied; while Skadden argued he never had proper notice or a hearing in Spain, his recognition of those proceedings established that Spanish courts had not declined jurisdiction.
See Act of Apr. 22, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 34, § 2, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 52, 70 ("This Act takes effect September 1, 1999, and applies to a motion or other request for relief made in a child custody proceeding or to enforce a child custody determination that is commenced on or after that date. A motion or other request for relief made in a child custody proceeding or to enforce a child custody determination that was commenced before the effective date of this Act is governed by the law in effect at the time the motion or other request was made, and the former law is continued in effect for that purpose.").
Nevertheless, based on Skadden's assertion that no record of the 1999 divorce hearing was available because the reporter had destroyed her notes, the court of appeals indulged a presumption that evidence at that hearing might have supported the decree's recital that Texas was the child's home state. 217 S.W.3d at 622. After issuance of this opinion, new counsel for Tarquis "begged" the court reporter to look harder, and sure enough the notes were located and a transcript of the hearing filed with the appellate court. That transcript again showed Skadden testifying at the hearing that the child had lived in Texas only 25 days, and included the following exchange with his own attorney:
Q: Between Spain and Texas, on the facts of your case, which is the most appropriate jurisdiction to exercise, to determine custody and support?
A: Well, it would be that of Spain.
In a supplemental opinion, the court of appeals again indulged a presumption, this time that something omitted from the clerk's record might have supported jurisdiction. Id. at 630.
We disagree with the court of appeals that it should have presumed something that the record in the underlying proceeding repeatedly showed was not true. The presumption supporting judgments does not apply when the record affirmatively reveals a jurisdictional defect:
In order for a collateral attack to be successful the record must affirmatively reveal the jurisdictional defect. It seems to be the settled rule that if the record in the cause does not negative the existence of facts authorizing the court to render the judgment, the law conclusively presumes that such facts were established before the court when such judgment was rendered, and evidence dehors the record to the contrary will not be received.White v. White, 142 Tex. 499, 179 S.W.2d 503, 506 (1944) (internal citations omitted); accord, Bandy v. First State Bank, Overton, Tex., 835 S.W.2d 609, 614 (Tex. 1992); Sec. Trust Co. of Austin v. Lipscomb County, 142 Tex. 572, 180 S.W.2d 151, 156 (1944); see also Rolison v. Puckett, 145 Tex. 366, 198 S.W.2d 74, 77 (1946) (holding that on collateral attack "every reasonable presumption to uphold it will be indulged." (emphasis added)). Because Skadden's affidavit and testimony affirmatively revealed a jurisdictional defect, the court of appeals should not have presumed otherwise.
Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, and can be raised at any time. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dallas v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 358 (Tex. 2004). Because the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the custody provisions in the 1999 divorce decree, it properly refused to enforce that portion of the decree here.
Accordingly, we grant Tarquis's petition for review, and without hearing oral argument, TEX. R. APP. P. 59.1, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and render judgment dismissing the enforcement actions for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
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