CAMPUZANO v. BD. OF EDUC

Plaintiff Joaquin Campuzano and a coworker, while performing asbestos abatement work, were removing a heavy duct from a ceiling by cutting it with an acetylene torch. They started this work on a scaffold, but Campuzano determined it was dangerous to work that way, and decided instead to set up a ladder adjacent to the scaffold. While Campuzano was standing on the ladder and holding the hoses for the torch, a portion of the duct fell, hitting him and the ladder and knocking him to the ground.

Plaintiffs made a prima facie showing that defendants violated Labor Law § 240 (1), i.e., failed to provide Campuzano with an adequate safety device, and that the violation was a proximate cause of the accident. Thus, plaintiffs made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on their Labor Law § 240 (1) claim ( see Kosavick v Tishman Constr. Corp. of N.Y., 50 AD3d 287; see also Panek v County of Albany, 99 NY2d 452, 458). In opposition, defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether the ladder was an adequate safety device or Campuzano's own acts or omissions were the sole proximate cause of the accident ( see Kosavick, supra; see also Cahill v Triborough Bridge Tunnel Auth., 4 NY3d 35, 40). In particular, there is no evidence controverting Campuzano's assertions that the ladder was a safer method of proceeding with the assigned job; that the scaffold was too small for two employees safely to stand on while performing the work; and that Campuzano was never instructed not to use a ladder in addition to the scaffold. Thus, summary judgment should be granted to plaintiffs on their Labor Law § 240 (1) claim.

Because defendants did not exercise supervisory control over Campuzano's work, the common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 claims must be dismissed ( see Lombardi v Stout, 80 NY2d 290, 295). Given the absence of a violation of an implementing regulation setting forth a specific standard of conduct, plaintiffs' Labor Law § 241 (6) claim must also be dismissed ( see Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494, 501-505).

We have considered the parties' remaining arguments for affirmative relief and find them unavailing.