STATE v. HUGHES

PER CURIAM:

Bridget Marie Hughes appeals the district court's March 16, 2007 judgment and sentence. We affirm.

Hughes asserts that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress. This court reviews the district court's ruling on a motion to suppress for correctness. See State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 11, 103 P.3d 699. In search and seizure cases, no deference is granted to the district court regarding the application of the law to the underlying facts. See State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, ¶ 8, 147 P.3d 425. An appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent in the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 1158.

Hughes asserts that the police encounter escalated to a level-two stop when the police officer asked her group whether they were carrying any weapons and that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify a level-two stop. However, this court need not reach this issue, because even if the stop did escalate to a level-two stop, the record indicates that the police officer had reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity.

A level-two stop must be supported by reasonable suspicion or it will be found to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2005 UT App 55, ¶ 18, 998 P.2d 274. Reasonable suspicion arises from specific and articulable facts and the rational inferences drawn from those facts. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). This court reviews the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there was an objective basis for suspecting criminal activity. See State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160, ¶ 8, 47 P.3d 932. We also grant deference to an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions. See id. In conducting a reasonable suspicion analysis, officers may draw on their own experience and specialized training. See State v. Singleton, 2005 UT App 464, ¶ 5, 128 P.3d 28. Factors such as the area in which the activity is observed, and any evasive behavior are legitimate components in a reasonable suspicion analysis. See id. ¶ 9.

Here, the record demonstrates that the police officer was patrolling an area known for criminal activity when he noticed a group of young looking individuals who appeared to be violating the imposed curfew. The officer also observed a hand-to-hand exchange between two members of the trio. Based on the officer's specialized training, experience, and the totality of the circumstances, the officer reasonably suspected that the group may be violating its curfew and may also be engaged in a drug transaction. Moreover, once the trio began to walk away from the officer, upon noticing him, the officer's suspicions were further heightened that the trio may be engaged in unlawful activity.

During the encounter, the officer sought to insure his safety and asked Hughes and her companions if they were carrying weapons. Hughes responded by producing a wooden bat. Hughes's companion consented to a frisk, which revealed an additional weapon and illicit drugs. Given the totality of circumstances, the officer reasonably suspected that other members of the trio may also possess additional weapons. Thus, the officer was justified to inquire as to whether Hughes would consent to a frisk for additional weapons. It is undisputed that Hughes consented to a frisk, wherein she volunteered that she was also carrying illicit drugs.

Even assuming that Hughes's encounter with the police escalated to a level-two encounter, we cannot say that it violated the Fourth Amendment as the record demonstrates that the officer had reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court erred in denying Hughes's motion to suppress.

Affirmed.