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U.S. v. GALLARDO-GONZALEZ
Factual and Procedural Background
Alberto Gallardo-Gonzalez was charged with possession with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine and reentry by an illegal alien. After the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop, Gallardo-Gonzalez pled guilty to both charges while reserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. This appeal arises from that denial of the suppression motion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the traffic stop of Gallardo-Gonzalez was lawful, specifically whether the officer had probable cause based on observed traffic infractions and applicable North Carolina statutes.
- Whether Gallardo-Gonzalez's consent to search the vehicle was voluntary, permitting the admission of evidence found during the search.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant-Appellant's Arguments
- The traffic stop was unlawful because the officer mistakenly applied North Carolina traffic statutes, particularly arguing that the statute prohibiting covering of registration plates does not apply to temporary tags.
- The stop was unreasonable because the observed lane deviation did not amount to reckless driving and thus did not provide probable cause.
Government-Appellee's Arguments
- The stop was lawful because North Carolina law prohibits covering or partially covering any portion of a registration plate, including temporary plates, as established by N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 20-63(g) and 20-79.1(k).
- The observed lane deviation, even if not reckless, provided probable cause for the traffic stop under state law.
- The defendant voluntarily consented to the search of the vehicle after initially refusing, making the evidence obtained admissible.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 280 (4th Cir. 2007) | Standard of review for denial of suppression motions: factual findings reviewed for clear error; legal conclusions reviewed de novo. | Applied to affirm the district court's factual findings and legal conclusions on the suppression motion. |
| United States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 704 (4th Cir. 2006) | When reviewing a suppression denial, evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government. | Used to frame the review standard favoring the government as the prevailing party. |
| State v. Baublitz, 172 N.C.App. 801, 616 S.E.2d 615, 619 (2005) | Observation of traffic violations can furnish probable cause for a stop. | Supported the finding that the lane deviation provided probable cause for the stop. |
| State v. Barnhill, 166 N.C.App. 228, 601 S.E.2d 215, 217 (2004) | Traffic violations observed by officers justify probable cause for stops. | Reinforced the probable cause determination for stopping the vehicle. |
| United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335-36 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 943 (2009) | Scope and limits of routine traffic stops and when further detention requires consent or reasonable suspicion. | Guided the analysis of the detention length and consent to search. |
| United States v. Meikle, 407 F.3d 670, 672 (4th Cir. 2005) | Assessment of voluntariness of consent under the totality of circumstances. | Applied to uphold the district court’s finding of voluntary consent. |
| Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) | Whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline police requests or terminate the encounter. | Used to assess the voluntariness of the defendant’s consent. |
| United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 877 (4th Cir. 1992) | Standard of review for district court’s factual findings on voluntariness of consent: clear error. | Supported affirming the district court’s findings on voluntariness. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court first evaluated the legality of the traffic stop by examining the observed traffic infractions and the applicable North Carolina statutes. It rejected the defendant's argument that the statute prohibiting covering of registration plates did not apply to temporary tags, citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-79.1(k) which extends the application of the statute to temporary plates. The court also found that the lane deviation, although not reckless, was sufficient to establish probable cause for the stop under state law. The court applied established Fourth Circuit standards reviewing factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.
Regarding the consent to search, the court analyzed the totality of the circumstances, noting that the entire encounter lasted about twenty minutes, the defendant was free to leave at any time, and the officer was deferential. The defendant initially refused consent but later voluntarily consented after being informed of potential consequences. The court found no clear error in the district court’s determination that consent was voluntary.
Holding and Implications
The court AFFIRMED the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. This decision upholds the legality of the traffic stop based on observed traffic violations and the voluntariness of the defendant's consent to search. The direct effect is that the evidence seized during the search remains admissible against Gallardo-Gonzalez. The opinion is unpublished and does not create binding precedent in the Fourth Circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Alberto Gallardo-Gonzalez was charged with possession with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine and reentry by an illegal alien. After the district court denied his motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop, Gallardo-Gonzalez pled guilty to both charges, reserving his right to challenge the propriety of the court's suppression ruling on appeal. We affirm.
This court reviews the factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to suppress for clear error, and the legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 280 (4th Cir. 2007). When evaluating the denial of a suppression motion, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the prevailing party. United States v. Uzenski, 434 F.3d 690, 704 (4th Cir. 2006).
Sergeant Gary Simpson testified that he stopped Gallardo-Gonzalez's minivan after witnessing two traffic infractions. First, information on the vehicle's thirty-day tag was obstructed by a black tag frame, preventing Simpson from reading both the tag's expiration date and its vehicle identification number. Second, Simpson observed the van jerk suddenly to the right, across the fog line, and then move back onto the highway. Gallardo-Gonzalez maintains that the traffic stop was based on Simpson's mistaken understanding of applicable North Carolina statutes and that these mistakes of law rendered the stop unreasonable. We disagree. North Carolina law prohibits the covering or partial covering of any portion of a registration plate, or the figures or letters thereon. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-63(g) (2007). Gallardo-Gonzalez maintains that the statute applies only to permanent tags, and not to temporary plates such as those on his vehicle. This argument is defeated by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-79.1(k) (2007), which states, "The provisions of [§ ] 20-63 . . . shall apply in like manner to temporary registration plates or markers as is applicable to nontemporary plates."
State law also requires drivers to maintain the lane of travel. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-146(d) (2007). Contrary to Gallardo-Gonzalez's contention, the statute does not require that the driver be reckless in order for there to be probable cause to stop the vehicle. Rather, because Gallardo-Gonzalez's traffic violation was "readily observable," there was probable cause for the stop. See State v. Baublitz, 172 N.CApp. 801, 616 S.E.2d 615, 619 (2005) ("observation of defendant's vehicle twice crossing the center line furnished . . . probable cause to stop defendant's vehicle for a violation of . . . § 20-146(a)"); State v. Barnhill, 166 N.C.App. 228, 601 S.E.2d 215, 217 (2004).
A routine traffic stop permits an officer to detain the motorist to request a driver's license and vehicle registration, to run a computer check, and to issue a citation. United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 943, 173 L.Ed.2d 142 (2009). To further detain the driver for questioning requires either the driver's consent or reasonable suspicion on the officer's part that criminal activity is afoot. Id. at 336. In assessing the voluntariness of consent, courts consider the totality of the circumstances to determine "whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not free to decline the officers' request or otherwise terminate the encounter." United States v. Meikle, 407 F.3d 670, 672 (4th Cir. 2005); see Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). A district court's finding that consent was voluntary will be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 877 (4th Cir. 1992).
Here, following the traffic stop, Gallardo-Gonzalez provided Simpson with a license in the name of Kidnay Torres. He sat next to Simpson in the police car while Simpson ran a routine license check. Initial computer checks turned up nothing amiss. Simpson drafted a warning ticket and informed Gallardo-Gonzalez that he was free to go. Gallardo-Gonzalez could have left at any time because the passenger door was not locked; however, he agreed to talk to Simpson for a few minutes.
Simpson asked whether he could search the minivan, and Gallardo-Gonzalez refused. Simpson then asked whether he could run his name through BLOCK, an ICE database. Gallardo-Gonzalez agreed. Simpson requested a K-9 unit and called the BLOCK operator. The K-9 officer promptly arrived, but the dog did not alert when it walked around Gallardo-Gonzalez's vehicle. The BLOCK operator informed Simpson that "Kidnay Torres" was an alias used by Gallardo-Gonzalez and that he had a criminal record, including a conviction for a cocaine offense. When he heard Simpson repeat the name Gallardo-Gonzalez, the defendant slumped over and acknowledged that this was his real name. Simpson informed him that he could be arrested for giving a fictitious name to a law enforcement officer, and again requested consent to search the minivan. This time, Gallardo-Gonzalez agreed to the search. Within minutes, a bag containing two kilograms of cocaine was discovered under the vehicle's passenger seat.
We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding Gallardo-Gonzalez's consent to be voluntary. The entire incident — from the actual stop to the discovery of the cocaine — lasted approximately twenty minutes. Gallardo-Gonzalez was free to leave rather than stay and engage in a discussion with Simpson. As the district court found, Simpson was deferential when dealing with Gallardo-Gonzalez.
We therefore affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the material before us and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED.
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