CLARK v. ANTONIO SHOES

RITA W. GRUBER, Judge.

Alecia Clark brings this pro se appeal from the September 15, 2008 decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission that denied her claim for a lower-back injury, affirming and adopting the administrative law judge's decision. Clark also had appeared pro se at her hearing before the law judge, where the primary issue was whether she had sustained a compensable back injury caused by a specific incident or by gradual onset. Her sole point on appeal is that substantial evidence does not support the Commission's finding that she failed to prove a compensable, specific-incident injury to the right side of her back. She argues, however, that there was evidence she had a "compensable onset injury" caused by her job. We affirm.

The primary issue litigated at Clark's hearing was the compensability of her "low back/SI joint injury caused by repetitive job duties and/or by specific incident on February 13, 2006." Under our workers' compensation statutes, compensable injury means:

(i) An accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body . . . arising out of and in the course of employment and which requires medical services or results in disability or death. An injury is "accidental" only if it is caused by a specific incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence;

(ii) An injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body and arising out of and in the course of employment if it is not caused by a specific incident or is not identifiable by time and place of occurrence, if the injury is:

(b) A back or neck injury which is not caused by a specific incident or which is not identifiable by time and place of occurrence[.]

Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A) (Supp. 2009). Under either subdivision (4)(A)(i) or (ii), the employee has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. The resultant condition for a (4)(A)(ii) claim is compensable "only if the alleged compensable injury is the major cause of the disability or need for treatment." Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 (4)(E) (Supp. 2009).

Clark was thirty-three years old at the time of the hearing and had been employed by San Antonio Shoes for thirteen years. She was a "shoe cutter" in her last job there for six years, carrying bundles of leather, cutting the leather on a machine at her work station, and being paid by the piece. She left work to see Dr. Sharon Meadors because of back pain at the start of the morning shift on February 15, 2005, but did not report a work-related injury to the doctor or to San Antonio Shoes.

Evidence at Clark's hearing included her own testimony as well as that of Lori Dotson, a co-worker on the machine behind hers; Sheila Pennington from personnel at San Antonio Shoes; and Deborah Davis, Clark's physical therapist from March through May 2006. Clark's medical records and a videotape depicting "the process of cutting shoes" were also introduced into evidence. The Commission denied her claim on the following basis, set forth in the adopted findings of the administrative law judge:

In the instant case, the evidence offered by claimant that she was hurt while performing employment services is based on her own testimony. She admits that there was no specific incident or incident of trauma. She speculates that her back problems were related to the twisting and pulling of the beam required in her job as a cutter of shoes because she could not think of any other cause. She claims her symptoms began two weeks earlier and intensified after working a short time on February 13, 2006. However, her testimony is not credible. . . . There is simply no evidence offered to corroborate the claimant's version of events involving the presence of symptoms, complaints, or pain on the job prior to Monday, February 13, 2006. Based on the credible evidence in this case, I find that the claimant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she was hurt while performing employment services.

The claimant must also prove that there is a causal connection between the work-related accident and the injury. Stevenson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 70 Ark. App. 265, 19 S.W.3d 36 (2000). With respect to this proof, the claimant must show that the "major cause" of the injury is the workplace. When making this determination, the claimant does not receive the benefit of the doubt. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-704(c)(4) (Supp. 1995); Glencorp Polymer Products v. Landers, 36 Ark. App. 190, 820 S.W.2d 475 (1991). A claim for workers' compensation benefits must be based on proof. Speculation and conjecture, even if plausible, cannot take the place of proof. Arkansas Department of Correction v. Glover, 35 Ark. App. 32, 812 S.W.2d 692 (1991).

On appeal Clark asserts that the following evidence was in her favor: on and after February 13, 2006, she told each doctor she saw that she was in a lot of pain but did not know what was going on; Dr. Meador and Dr. Mike Hilman prescribed Flexeril for her back pain; Lori Dotson testified that the job was hard on the body; and Clark's physical therapist assessed Clark's lower-back pain and observed that she had muscle spasms. Clark concludes that the repetitive motion of cutting shoes eight hours a day, five days a week, wore her body down.

We will not reverse the Commission's decision unless we are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusions arrived at by the Commission. Cedar Chem. Co. v. Knight, 99 Ark. App. 162, 258 S.W.3d 394 (2007). Furthermore, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings and will affirm if the Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence, i.e., evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Singleton v. City of Pine Bluff, 97 Ark. App. 59, 244 S.W.3d 709 (2006). Substantial evidence exists only if reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion without resort to speculation or conjecture. White Consol. Indus. v. Galloway, 74 Ark. App. 13, 45 S.W.3d 396 (2001). It is within the Commission's province to reconcile conflicting evidence and to determine the true facts. Stone v. Dollar Gen. Stores, 91 Ark. App. 260, 209 S.W.3d 445 (2005).

Here the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commission's findings, is such that reasonable minds could have reached the conclusion of the Commission without resort to speculation or conjecture. The medical records show that Clark told Dr. Meador the back pain began two weeks before the date at issue, when she was bike riding, and Clark did not report her injury as work related. Lori Dotson testified that Clark never complained about back problems until February 13, when she was in tears and said she had "messed up her back over the weekend." There were inconsistencies between what Clark told Dotson and Dr. Meador, and the Commission found that Clark's testimony was not credible. Thus, we must affirm.

Affirmed.

BROWN and BAKER, JJ., agree.