BAUERSCHMIDT SONS v. NOVA CAS. CO

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Where, as here, a policy of liability insurance requires that notice of an occurrence be given "as soon as practicable," such notice must be accorded to the carrier within a reasonable period of time ( see Great Canal Realty Corp. v Seneca Ins. Co., Inc., 5 NY3d 742, 743; Security Mut. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v Acker-Fitzsimons Corp., 31 NY2d 436, 441). However, there may be circumstances where the insured's failure to give timely notice is excusable, such as where the insured has a good-faith belief in nonliability ( see Security Mm. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v Acker-Fitzsimons Corp., 31 NY2d at 441). The insured bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the proffered excuse ( see Great Canal Realty Corp. v Seneca Ins. Co., Inc., 5 NY3d at 744). "Ordinarily, the question of whether the insured had a good faith belief in nonliability, and whether that belief was reasonable, presents an issue of fact and not one of law" ( St. James Mech., Inc. v Royal Sunalliance, 44 AD3d 1030, 1031; see Hermitage Ins. Co. v Arming, Inc., 46 AD3d 620, 621; Hudson City School Dist. v Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 241 AD2d 641, 642; Kim v Maker, 226 AD2d 350; G.L.G. Contr. Corp. v Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 215 AD2d 821, 822-823).

Here, the defendant made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law based on the plaintiffs approximately four-month delay in notifying the defendant of the underlying incident ( see Avery Avery, P.C. v American Ins. Co., 51 AD3d 695, 697-698). In opposition, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the delay was reasonably based on a good-faith belief of nonliability ( see St. James Mech., Inc. v Royal Sunalliance, 44 AD3d at 1031). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment.