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U.S. v. BELFAST

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Jul 15, 2010
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OPINION ON REHEARING

JAMES T. WORTHEN, Chief Justice.

Real party in interest Roy P. Anderson filed a motion for rehearing, which is overruled. We withdraw our opinion and judgment of January 29, 2010, and substitute the following opinion and corresponding judgment in its place.

In this original habeas proceeding, Relator Jerry Byrom seeks relief from an order signed on June 16, 2009 finding him in contempt for violation of an order signed on December 8, 2008. The respondent is the Honorable Craig A. Fletcher, Judge of the County Court at Law, Cherokee County, Texas. The real parties in interest are Roy P. Anderson and David S. Bouschor II. We grant habeas corpus relief.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Byrom's mother, Ruby Renee Byrom, died on February 5, 2005. Byrom was named in Mrs. Byrom's will as the sole beneficiary and independent executor of her estate. The will was admitted to probate in the County Court at Law, Cherokee County (the "probate court"), and letters testamentary were issued to Byrom. The contempt order challenged here was signed in the probate proceeding as a result of a controversy between Byrom and Anderson, a creditor of Mrs. Byrom's estate.

The Claim

On June 3, 2005, Anderson presented to Byrom and filed in the probate court an unsecured claim against Mrs. Byrom's estate in the sum of $31,992.75, which was based on two orders signed by the Denton County Probate Court. The orders arose out of a guardianship proceeding in which Byrom was appointed temporary guardian of Mrs. Byrom's person and Anderson was appointed temporary guardian of her estate. The first order authorized payment of $5,117.50 in temporary guardian's fees to Anderson and payment of $8,521.50 in attorney's fees to Bouschor for representing Anderson in the guardianship. The second order, signed after Mrs. Byrom's death, authorized payment of $2,748.75 in temporary guardian's fees to Anderson and $15,535.00 in attorney's fees to Bouschor for representing Anderson. Both orders stated that the fees were to be paid from the funds of Mrs. Byrom's estate within thirty days of the date of the order. However, the fees had not been paid at the time Anderson presented and filed his claim in the probate court. On June 9, 2005, Byrom's attorney informed Anderson that Byrom had rejected his claim.

Byrom's Removal as Independent Executor

Approximately two years after Byrom's rejection of the claim, Anderson filed a motion to remove Byrom as independent executor or, alternatively, to require Byrom to post a bond, and to compel an accounting. Anderson alleged that, in trial court cause number 7773, he and Duane Coker, Mrs. Byrom's attorney/guardian ad litem, sued Byrom in his capacity as independent executor "for Authentication of Claims." Anderson further alleged that a final order against Byrom was signed in that cause on April 3, 2007. As grounds for Byrom's removal, Anderson alleged, in part, that Byrom had (1) failed to pay claims in the due course of administration, (2) misapplied property committed to his care, (3) failed to comply with a final order of the court, signed on April 23, 2007, (4) liquidated real property assets of the estate and made disbursements to himself in his individual capacity without payment to creditors of the estate, and (5) failed to file an inventory, appraisement, and list of claims within ninety days after qualification as required by Texas Probate Code sections 250 and 251.

The record reflects that the Denton County Probate Court had awarded $27,551.93 in fees to Coker in the guardianship proceeding.

Neither the April 3 order or the April 23 order is part of the record in this proceeding.

The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Anderson's motion. By order signed on September 10, 2008, the probate court removed Byrom as independent executor, but did not discharge him. The order awarded Anderson $14,034.10 for attorney's fees and expenses incurred in the removal proceeding, and ordered that Byrom pay this amount to Anderson within thirty days of the order. Additionally, the order included a finding that Mrs. Byrom's estate owned an interest in certain Denton County real property, which Byrom had converted to cash in the amount of $622,786.22. The order also directed Byrom to deposit estate property in that amount into the registry of the court with in thirty days of the order. On Byrom's motion, the court signed a reformed order on December 8, 2008, reducing the required deposit to $85,000.00.

Contempt Proceeding

Byrom did not comply with the December 8, 2008 order, and on March 20, 2009, Anderson filed a motion to enforce the order by contempt. He requested that Byrom be confined in jail for a period not to exceed six months for each violation until he deposited $85,000.00 into the court's registry and paid Anderson's fees and expenses incurred in the contempt proceeding. Byrom filed a written response stating that he was no longer the executor of Mrs. Byrom's estate and did not have access to any funds of the estate.

The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Anderson's motion. Byrom testified that he had not complied with the court's order because he did not have $85,000.00, but acknowledged that he had received $622,786.22 as property belonging to the estate. His testimony was conflicting concerning whether he received the money before or after the December 8, 2008 order was signed. Anderson's attorney then proved up $7,058.17 in attorney's fees and expenses incurred in the contempt proceeding.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court held Byrom in civil contempt after finding that he had failed to deposit $85,000.00 in estate funds into the court's registry as required by the December 8, 2008 order. Byrom was ordered to report to the court on July 2 at 9:00 a.m. at which time he would be remanded to the Cherokee County jail if he had not purged himself of the contempt by making the required deposit and paying Anderson's attorney's fees and expenses in the contempt proceeding. Byrom did not purge himself of the contempt and was confined in the Cherokee County jail.

Because we are granting habeas relief, we need not address the trial court's requirement that, to purge himself of the contempt, Byrom must pay Anderson's attorney's fees and expenses in the contempt proceeding in addition to making the required deposit.

Habeas Proceedings

Byrom filed an application for writ of habeas corpus seeking bail, and the trial court signed an order setting his bond at $80,000.00. His attorney filed a bond, and Byrom was released from jail. He then amended his habeas application requesting that the court grant an evidentiary hearing and, after hearing evidence, order him released from confinement. The court conducted the requested hearing on September 2, 2009. Byrom testified that at the time the Denton County property was sold, he did not have notice of any claims he would owe out of the proceeds or any of the fees that he had been ordered to pay. He again insisted that he had none of the funds remaining. He also admitted that the day before he was held in contempt, he signed gift deeds conveying four tracts of land to his daughter. He testified, however, that he did not purchase the property with money from his mother's estate.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied habeas relief, ordered Byrom taken into custody, and set his bond at $95,000.00 cash. Byrom then filed this original habeas proceeding, and also filed a motion for temporary relief, which was denied.

AVAILABILITY OF HABEAS CORPUS

Habeas corpus is available to review a contempt order entered by a lower court confining a contemnor. Ex parte Gordon, 584 S.W.2d 686, 687-88 (Tex. 1979) (orig. proceeding). An original habeas proceeding is a collateral attack on a contempt judgment. Ex parte Rohleder, 424 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Tex. 1967) (orig. proceeding); In re Ragland, 973 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1998, orig. proceeding). Its purpose is not to determine the ultimate guilt or innocence of the relator, but only to ascertain whether the relator has been unlawfully confined. Ex parte Gordon, 584 S.W.2d at 688.

A court will issue a writ of habeas corpus if the order underlying the contempt is void or if the contempt order itself is void. See Ex parte Shaffer, 649 S.W.2d 300, 301-02 (Tex. 1983) (orig. proceeding); Ex parte Gordon, 584 S.W.2d at 688. The relator bears the burden of showing that the contempt order is void and not merely voidable. In re Munks, 263 S.W.3d 270, 272-73 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, orig. proceeding). Until the relator has discharged his burden, the contempt order is presumed valid. In re Parr, 199 S.W.3d 457, 460 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding).

A contempt order is void if it deprives the relator of liberty without due process of law or if it was beyond the power of the court to issue. See In re Coppock, 277 S.W.3d 417, 418 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding). An order of confinement for failure to pay a debt violates the Texas Constitution and therefore is beyond the power of the court to issue. See In re Henry, 154 S.W.3d 594, 596 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding). Consequently, such an order is void. Id.

VALIDITY OF THE CONTEMPT ORDER

In his first issue, Byrom asserts that Anderson and Bouschor have "creatively used the procedures for civil contempt to collect their legal and accounting fees, rather than through well established debt collection procedures." He also makes reference to the attorney's fees awarded to Anderson by the probate court, which are ordered payable out of estate property.

The authority Byrom cites pertains to the prohibition against imprisonment for debt found in article I, section 18 of the Texas Constitution and the prohibition against collection of attorney's fees by contempt. He contends that, in light of the cited authority, the contempt order is void.

Anderson responds that Byrom was held in contempt for failing to deposit $85,000.00 into the registry of the court as ordered on December 8, 2008, and that there is nothing in the record to indicate that the $85,000.00 was for the collection of attorney's fees.

Imprisonment for Debt

As a general rule, a person who willfully disobeys a valid court order is guilty of contempt and subject to imprisonment for a prescribed period until he complies with the order. Ex parte Hall, 854 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding). But the Texas Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall ever be imprisoned for debt." See TEX. CONST., art. I, § 18. This provision establishes that "[i]t is not the policy of the law [in Texas] to enforce the collection of mere civil debts by contempt proceedings." Ex parte Britton, 127 Tex. 85, 90, 92 S.W.2d 224, 227 (1936) (orig. proceeding). An order requiring payment of a debt may be enforced through legal processes like execution or attachment, but not by the imprisonment of the adjudicated debtor. Ex parte Hall, 854 S.W.2d at 658; see also In re Nunu, 960 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (reasoning that because a judgment awarding damages cannot be enforced by contempt, court cannot require payment of expenses incurred as means of purging contempt).

Not every obligation to pay money is a debt within the meaning of article I, section 18. See Ex parte Davis, 101 Tex. 607, 612, 111 S.W. 394, 396 (1908) (orig. proceeding) ("There are many instances in the proceedings of the courts where the performance of an act may be enforced by imprisonment and would not come within the prohibition of the Constitution, although it might involve the payment of money."). For example, an obligation that is a legal duty arising out of the status of the parties is not a debt and therefore may be enforced by contempt. See In re Henry, 154 S.W.3d at 596 (holding that past due child support is not a debt); Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841, 846-17 (Tex. 1979) (orig. proceeding) (holding that former husband was constructive trustee for portion of monthly retirement pay awarded to former wife in divorce decree; therefore obligation to deliver money to former wife was not "debt"). Similarly, criminal fines are not debts, and confinement for failure to pay criminal fines is not prohibited. In re Henry, 154 S.W.3d at 596 n. 1.

Generally, however, an obligation to pay money arising out of a contract is a debt within the meaning of article I, section 18. TEX. CONST., art. I, § 18 interp. commentary. Moreover, "[a]ll causes of action become debts when they are placed in the form of judgments. . . ." Id.; see also Ex parte Hall, 854 S.W.2d at 658. And with few exceptions, none of which are applicable here, attorney's fees are debts and cannot be collected by contempt. See Wallace v. Briggs, 162 Tex. 485, 488-90, 348 S.W.2d 523, 525-26 (1961) (orig. proceeding); Ex parte Dolenz, 893 S.W.2d 677, 680-81 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1995, orig. proceeding).

The Contempt Order

Anderson contends that Byrom was held in contempt and confined for failure to comply with the respondent's December 8, 2008 order by depositing $85,000.00 in the court's registry. He points out that the order Byrom violated was a "court order made mandatory by [Texas Probate Code section] 149C(b). . . ." Because the order Byrom disobeyed was mandatory by statute, Anderson contends that contempt and confinement are permissible.

An order removing an independent executor must direct the disposition of the assets remaining in the name or under the control of the removed executor. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 149C(b) (Vernon Supp. 2009). The order requiring the $85,000 deposit was signed in compliance with this section. However, Anderson has a judgment against Byrom as independent executor of Mrs. Byrom's estate. From our review of the record, it is clear that Anderson sought Byrom's removal as independent executor and filed his motion to enforce the December 8, 2008 order by contempt to assure that property of the estate would be available to satisfy his judgment against Byrom. Because Byrom is the sole beneficiary under the will, there are no other beneficiaries who would benefit from the $85,000.00 deposit. Therefore, it is also clear that the respondent required the deposit for Anderson's benefit.

For example, Byrom's motion to reform the original order removing Byrom as independent executor requested in part that the amount of the deposit, originally set at $622,786.22, be reduced because the previous order "embrace[d] a much broader portion of the Estate of Ruby Renee Byrom than is reasonably necessary to protect any litigant herein." Moreover, Anderson states in his response that the $85,000.00 deposit was required pursuant to section 149C(b) of the Texas Probate Code and refers us to a subsequent order entered by the respondent, which contains the following finding:
"(8) By Order of this Court entered December 8, 2008, JERRY BYROM was ordered to deposit property of the Estate of RUBY RENEE BYROM in the amount of $85,000.00 in the Registry of the Court of Cherokee County, Texas to be used to pay the judgments awarded Plaintiff [Anderson]."

An order requiring a deposit of funds into the court' s registry is not enforceable by contempt if any portion of the funds is for the payment of a debt. See In re Wiese, 1 S.W.3d 246, 251 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1999, orig. proceeding) (contempt order void because portion of funds to be deposited in registry was attorney's fees that were part of turnover order); Ex parte Roan, 887 S.W.2d 462, 465 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, orig. proceeding) (order void where trial court conditioned coercive contempt upon payment of funds into registry and funds were ordered deposited for judgment creditors' benefit). Here, Anderson's judgment is against Byrom in his representative capacity and is based on the fee orders of the Denton County Probate Court. He also has been awarded attorney's fees and expenses incurred in various proceedings in the probate court that are payable from estate property. As we have previously stated, a judgment is a debt and cannot be collected by contempt. Ex parte Hall, 854 S.W.2d at 658. Additionally, the attorney's fees and expenses awarded to Anderson by the probate court are debts. See Wallace v. Briggs, 162 Tex. at 488-90, 348 S.W.2d at 525-26; Ex parte Dolenz, 893 S.W.2d at 680-81. Therefore, the only sums payable to Anderson out of estate property are for debts. Consequently, Byrom has been held in contempt for failure to deposit funds that will be used to pay debts. See Ex parte Roan, 887 S.W.2d at 465. Thus, the contempt order violates the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt and is void. See In re Henry, 154 S.W.3d at 595. Because the contempt order is void, the order illegally restrains Byrom. See In re Wiese, 1 S.W.3d at 251; Ex parte Roan, 887 S.W.2d at 465.

The Buller Cases

Anderson disagrees and calls our attention to the Buller cases. See Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991) (" Buller I"); Ex parte Buller, 834 S.W.2d 622, 623-24 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1992, orig. proceeding) (" Buller II "). He urges that the facts in Buller II and those presented in this case are indistinguishable and concludes that we should deny Byrom's habeas petition.

Buller I is an appeal from a turnover order directing Patricia Buller, independent executrix of her husband's estate, to deliver a specific amount of estate cash to the sheriff for levy in partial satisfaction of a judgment. Buller I, 806 S.W.2d at 224. In reviewing the order, the supreme court stated that once the cash was traced to Buller in her representative capacity, a presumption arose that those assets were in her possession. Id. at 226. The burden then shifted to Buller to account for the assets. Id. The court noted that Buller presented only scant documentation to support her testimony that she no longer had possession of the cash. Id. Ultimately, the court determined that "[c]learly the trial court was within its discretionary authority in disbelieving Mrs. Buller's unsubstantiated claim that [the] cash was spent. . . ." Id. Specifically, the court opined that "simply asserting `I spent it' is unacceptable." Id. at 227. Consequently, the court affirmed the portions of the turn-over order that relate to our analysis in this case. See id.

Despite the supreme court's ruling, Buller refused to comply with the turnover order. As a result, the trial court held her in contempt and confined her. See Buller II, 834 S.W.2d at 624. She sought habeas relief arguing, in part, that her confinement violated the constitutional prohibition of imprisonment for debt. Id. at 626; see also TEX. CONST., art. I, § 18. The Beaumont court of appeals held to the contrary, relying on two cases it described as "compellingly persuasive." Id. at 626-27.

In the first case, the supreme court determined that a husband could be held in contempt and confined for refusing to obey an order to pay into the court's registry his wife's share of certain community property funds. Ex parte Preston, 162 Tex. 379, 381, 347 S.W.2d 938, 939 (1961). Preston argued, in part, that the sum to be paid constituted a debt to his wife and therefore he could not constitutionally be held in contempt and confined for his failure to deposit the funds. Id., 162 Tex. at 382, 347 S.W.2d at 940; see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18. The court observed that the money Preston was ordered to deposit rightfully belonged to his wife under the terms of the divorce decree. Id., 162 Tex. at 384, 347 S.W.2d at 941. Thus, he was not a debtor of his wife, but a constructive trustee holding a portion of the assets awarded to her in the divorce decree. Id. In the court's view, there was "no question . . . about the right of the [trial] court to hold a trustee in contempt of court for willfully refusing to obey an order to pay over funds held in his hands to the one rightfully entitled thereto." Id.

In the second case, the supreme court held that a husband could be held in contempt and confined for refusing to surrender property to his former wife as ordered in the divorce decree. Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d at 846-47. Gorena was committed to jail for contempt for failing to pay his former wife monthly payments of a portion of his military retirement benefits. Id. at 843. In denying habeas relief, the supreme court concluded that Gorena held the unpaid funds as a trustee for his wife. See id. at 846-47. Therefore, he was not being imprisoned for debt. See id.

In short, the supreme court in Preston and Gorena held that the contemnor's refusal to deliver the property of another to its rightful owner as ordered was punishable by contempt and confinement. In applying these two cases, the court stated in Buller II that

[a] trustee or other fiduciary such as a legal representative or independent executrix may constitutionally be fined and jailed for contemptuously refusing to obey an order to turn over funds held in her hands and subject to her right of possession to a proper authority or entity that is lawfully and rightfully entitled to those funds for levy.
Buller II, 834 S.W.2d at 626. It then concluded that Buller, as independent executrix of her husband's estate, had a fiduciary relationship to the estate's creditors. Id. Because of this relationship, the court reasoned, her confinement was not constitutionally prohibited. Id. We do not read Preston and Gorena so broadly.

We first note that Buller was the independent executrix of her husband's estate and consequently "a holder of property of a judgment debtor[.]" See Buller I, 806 S.W.2d at 226. She was not a holder of property belonging to the judgment creditor that had sued her. See id.; see also TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37 (Vernon 2003) (estate of testate decedent vests immediately in devisees, but independent executor has right to possession of estate). Moreover, the holdings in Preston and Gorena do not turn on, and the court does not address, whether the contemnor was a fiduciary by virtue of his holding the property of another. The critical facts were that Preston and Gorena possessed the property of another but refused to deliver it to the rightful owner, despite being ordered to do so. And even if fiduciary duty had been the basis for the court's holdings in those cases, we have been unable to locate any Texas case holding that an independent executor has a fiduciary relationship with estate creditors. Finally, the above quoted language from Buller II is, in substance, a determination that a fiduciary is not subject to the constitutional prohibition of imprisonment for debt. We do not reach the same conclusion from our reading of the cases cited in Buller II and other cases addressing the prohibition of imprisonment for debt. Consequently, for the reasons we have discussed, we respectfully decline to follow Buller II here.

In Buller I, the dissent predicted that "[e]ven as to any estate assets which Buller has not spent, the turnover order will ultimately prove unenforceable. The Texas Bill of Rights prohibits the trial court from enforcing the turnover order by imprisonment, . . . In the present case, enforcement of the turnover order by imprisonment would fall squarely within the constitutional prohibition." Buller I, 806 S.W.2d at 229 (Mauzy, J., dissenting). In Buller II, Justice Burgess noted in his dissent that the trial court's order directed Buller to turn over a specific sum, which was "nothing more than telling her to pay the debt." In his view, Buller was entitled to the guarantee of article I, section 18, and could not be confined for refusing to deliver the funds. Buller II, 834 S.W.2d at 627-28 (Burgess, J., dissenting).

The court also held that the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt does not apply "unless the contemn[o]r demonstrates inability to pay." See Buller II, 834 S.W.2d at 626 (citing Pierce v. Vision Invs., 779 F.2d 302, 309 (5th Cir. 1986) and Ex parte Smyers, 529 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Tex. 1975)). These cases hold that a contempt order is not proper if the contemnor is unable to comply with the order he failed to obey. See Pierce, 779 F.2d at 310; Smyers, 529 S.W.2d at 769-70. According to the dissent in Buller I, the express language of the 1836 Republic of Texas Constitution required inability to pay, but this language has been included in subsequent state constitutions. Buller I, 806 S.W.2d at 229.

DISPOSITION

Because we have held that the contempt order is void and Byrom is illegally restrained, we grant Byrom's petition for writ of habeas corpus and order him discharged. Thus, Byrom's first issue is dispositive, and we need not address his remaining issues. See TEX.R.APP. P. 47.1. All pending motions are overruled as moot.

guous definition of torture that is derived from the definition provided in the CAT. The language of that statute — not an executive branch memorandum — is what controls the definition of the crime. Accordingly, the Torture Memos were, as the district court found, irrelevant to Emmanuel's defense.

VII.

Finally, Emmanuel argues that his 1,164 month sentence is invalid for multiple reasons. We are unpersuaded.

In reviewing the district court's Sentencing Guidelines calculation, we review the findings of fact for clear error and the application of the Sentencing Guidelines to those facts de novo. United States v. Anderson, 326 F.3d 1319, 1326 (11th Cir. 2003). In particular, we review de novo "whether the district court applied the correct sentencing guideline (or subsection of a sentencing guideline) for the defendant's underlying conduct." United States v. Davidson, 360 F.3d 1374, 1376 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). But, where the legal question of whether the district court applied the correct guideline is "fact-bound," we review that legal determination for clear error, because the district court has greater expertise at sentencing, and there is generally limited precedential value in the decision. United States v. White, 335 F.3d 1314, 1318 (11th Cir. 2003). The government bears the burden of proving the applicability of a guideline section that would enhance a defendant's offense level. United States v. Askew, 193 F.3d 1181, 1183 (11th Cir. 1999).

A.

First, Emmanuel says that the district court committed reversible procedural error when it calculated his Sentencing Guidelines range under the 2002 Sentencing Guidelines Manuel. In particular, he claims that the district court erred in using the kidnapping guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1, and the murder cross-reference it authorizes under § 2A4.1(c), because he did not unlawfully detain his victims, the murders did not result from torture, and he was neither charged with nor convicted of kidnapping or murder.

The district court, adopting the PSI over Emmanuel's objection, calculated Emmanuel's guidelines range as follows. Count One, the conspiracy count, involved ten victims; the district court created ten sentencing groups to correspond to those ten victims and then incorporated Emmanuel's convictions on Counts Two through Seven into the applicable victim group. For the sentencing groups for Conteh, Jusu, Turay, Kpadeh, Dulleh, and Kamara, § 2A4.1, which is the guideline for kidnapping, was applied to calculate the appropriate base offense level. For the sentencing groups for Williams and the two unidentified refugees who were shot and killed at the St. Paul River Bridge Checkpoint, § 2A4.1(c)'s cross-reference to the first-degree murder guideline in § 2A1.1 was applied to calculate the appropriate base offense level. These calculations yielded an overall offense level of 43, which directed a Guidelines range of life imprisonment.

Under the Guidelines, a district court arrives at the appropriate offense level through a two-step process. First, the district court must determine which offense guideline section covers the offense of conviction. U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.1(a), 1B1.2(a); United States v. Saavedra, 148 F.3d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 1998). To determine the applicable offense guideline, the court must identify "the offense guideline section in Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) applicable to the offense of conviction." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a). When more than one guideline is referenced in the Statutory Index of the Sentencing Guidelines as being applicable to a violation of a particular statute, then the district court is directed to apply "the guideline section most appropriate for the offense conduct charged in the count of which the defendant was convicted." U.S.S.G. app. A, intro; Davidson, 360 F.3d at 1377.

Second, once the correct offense section has been identified, the district court must then determine the appropriate Guidelines range under that section based on the defendant's actual conduct, which may include conduct that was not an element of the offense of conviction. U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.2(b), 1B1.3; Saavedra, 148 F.3d at 1314. In particular, the court may consider the defendant's relevant conduct — all acts that occurred during the commission of the offense — if that relevant conduct was established by a preponderance of the evidence. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3; Saavedra, 148 F.3d at 1314.

Emmanuel was convicted of torture and conspiracy to commit torture, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2340A. Sentencing Guidelines Appendix A states that the following guidelines may be applied to violations of § 2340A: § 2A1.1, which includes first degree murder; § 2A1.2, which covers second degree murder; § 2A2.1, which includes assault with intent to commit murder and attempted murder; § 2A2.2, which covers aggravated assault; and § 2A4.1, which covers kidnapping. U.S.S.G. app. A. The district court did not err in determining that § 2A4.1 was the most appropriate guideline for the offense conduct of which Emmanuel was convicted.

Count One charged Emmanuel with conspiring to commit torture. Torture requires, as an element, that the defendant have custody or physical control over the victim. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1). Kidnapping is one method of obtaining and maintaining custody or physical control over another. Count One of Emmanuel's indictment alleged that the manner and means of the conspiracy to commit torture included "seiz[ing], imprison[ing] at various locations, and interrogat[ing] persons" about their alleged opposition to Taylor's rule over Liberia. The indictment also alleged that, in furtherance of the conspiracy, victims were seized and taken against their will to locations of detention while being tortured, and then were repeatedly tortured at those locations. Thus, Kpadeh was held at Gbatala Base for months while he was routinely terrorized and tortured, and Dulleh was confined in various locations, including an abandoned outhouse, for nearly a year. This charged seizure and detention of his victims enabled and facilitated Emmanuel's acts of torture, thus the application of the kidnapping guideline, which itself recognizes that kidnapping can occur "during the commission of, or in connection with, another offense," was entirely proper. U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(b)(7). Indeed, the kidnapping guideline is particularly appropriate in cases of torture, such as this case, where there are repeated, severe physical assaults, and the victims are imprisoned in inhumane conditions that exacerbate the physical pain caused by the abuse.

The kidnapping guideline takes into account the gravity of the victim's injuries, whether a dangerous weapon was used, the length of the unlawful detention, and whether the victim was sexually exploited or killed — all of which are circumstances relevant to determining the proper degree of punishment for Emmanuel's crimes, and none of which are considered under the other applicable guidelines for Torture Act convictions. U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(b), (c); United States v. Kuku, 129 F.3d 1435, 1439-40 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining that a guideline section is correctly applied when it covers more circumstances relevant to the conduct for which the jury convicted the defendant than any other guideline section).

We also reject Emmanuel's claim that he did not kidnap any of his victims. On this record, taken in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, the evidence showed that even if Emmanuel's victims were initially detained under lawful circumstances, the extended length and nature of their detention, coupled with the utter lack of access to courts, attorneys, or any information about their arrest, rendered the duration of their imprisonment wholly unlawful. See United States v. Adams, 83 F.3d 1371, 1373-74 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 82, 84 S.Ct. 553, 11 L.Ed.2d 527 (1964)) (explaining that the federal kidnapping statute did not require that the purpose of the kidnapping be illegal). And, in fact, there is absolutely no evidence in this record even suggesting that the seizure of Emmanuel's victims was lawful, or that any of his victims had violated, or were even suspected of violating, Liberian law. Instead, Jusu, Turay, and the other refugees were seized at a checkpoint because they were from Sierra Leone; Kpadeh was seized because he was a member of the non-violent Unity Party and refused to join the ATU; Dulleh, a university student, was arrested in his home, in the middle of the night; and Kamara was never told the reason for his arrest.

Not one of these victims was ever charged with a crime or brought before a court, and not one was given access to a lawyer, even though the Liberian courts were open and operating. The victims were transported to secret and remote locations, including the prison pits at Gbatala Base, the underground prison pits at Klay Junction, a military officer's garage, and an abandoned outhouse. Those are not the places of lawful detention. Indeed, the arrest and detention of the victims in inhumane conditions against their will was certainly an integral part of their torture. And, as the CAT itself provides in Article 2(2), claims of exigency or official justification can never be a defense to torture. The district court did not err in applying the kidnapping guideline in calculating Emmanuel's advisory guidelines range.

Nor did the district court err in applying the murder cross-reference in calculating the range applicable to the victim groups for Williams, Cole, and two other unidentified victims. Once the proper guideline section has been determined — here § 2A4.1 — the defendant's relevant conduct must be considered in evaluating whether any additional cross-references must be applied to calculate his base offense level. Saavedra, 148 F.3d at 1317. Under § 2A4.1(c), if the victim of a kidnapping is killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111, the defendant's base offense level is 43. U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(c) (cross-referencing U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 base offense level for first degree murder). Murder is defined as "the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought" and "every murder . . . committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, . . . kidnapping . . . is murder in the first degree." 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). In other words, 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) is applicable wherever a victim for whom the defendant is being sentenced under U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1 is also murdered. Moreover, the Torture Act itself instructs that "if death results to any person from conduct prohibited by this subsection," that person "shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life." 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a).

In this case, the cross-reference is warranted. The four murders satisfied U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(c) and constituted relevant conduct under § 1B1.3(a), because they all occurred in the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy to commit torture. At the same checkpoint where Jusu, Turay, and other torture victims were kidnapped to be subjected to future torture, Williams and the two unidentified victims were shot after they refused to answer Emmanuel's questions concerning their suspected rebel ties. Those initial killings were used to initiate the terrorization, control, and subjugation of the victims. Emmanuel told the other captured victims that they would be next and the severed heads of the murder victims were prominently displayed atop stakes at the St. Paul River Bridge Checkpoint.

Undoubtedly, an essential part of Emmanuel's and his co-conspirators' scheme to maintain physical control and custody over their victims was to intimidate them with random killings. Cole, for example, was publicly decapitated after he was recaptured following his escape from Gbatala Base; prior to that failed escape, Cole had been detained against his will in inhumane conditions, and had been bound, beaten, and repeatedly abused at the hands of Emmanuel. As with the murders of Williams and the two unidentified victims at the checkpoint, the public and violent murder of Cole as a punishment for his escape served to terrorize and further subjugate Emmanuel's other victims who were imprisoned at Gbatala Base.

Accordingly, Emmanuel's sentence was procedurally reasonable; the district court did not err in calculating his base offense level under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines.

B.

Second, Emmanuel argues that his sentence violates his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to notice and due process, to have a grand jury issue an indictment upon a finding of probable cause, to a trial by a jury, to a conviction only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the offense, and to effectively defend and confront the evidence against him. The basis of these claims appears to be that his sentence rested on the "unproven allegations" of kidnapping and murder, as opposed to his offenses of conviction, torture, and conspiracy to commit torture. Again, we are unconvinced.

The district court correctly treated the Guidelines as advisory in accordance with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). Under an advisory guidelines regime, judicial fact-finding about relevant conduct that supports a sentence within the statutory maximum set forth in the United States Code does not violate the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 233, 125 S.Ct. 738; Chau, 426 F.3d at 1324. Indeed, in evaluating the factors that a court must consider at sentencing, "[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." 18 U.S.C. § 3661; see also United States v. Faust, 456 F.3d 1342, 1348 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that " 18 U.S.C. § 3661 . . . remains intact post- Booker"). Thus, it was within the district court's powers to examine the relevant conduct contained in the PSI — which included multiple acts of kidnapping and murder — in calculating the applicable guidelines range. There was no constitutional violation here.

C.

Third, and finally, Emmanuel contends that his sentence is invalid because the CAT prohibits the district court from sentencing him for acts other than torture; in other words, he says that his sentence is unconstitutional because it goes beyond the bounds of the CAT. This argument falters at its first step because Emmanuel was sentenced only for committing torture. As we explained above, Emmanuel was not sentenced for kidnapping. He was not sentenced for murder. He was sentenced for violating the Torture Act. The Sentencing Guidelines instructed the district court to use the same sentencing range for a violation of the Torture Act as the range applicable to a conviction for kidnapping. Similarly, the murders Emmanuel committed were used by the district court only to assist it in calculating the applicable advisory guidelines range for torture. The abductions, murders, and other characteristics of his crime were simply considered by the district court as relevant conduct used to fashion the appropriate punishment for his atrocities.

Further, nothing in the CAT precludes the sentencing rubric imposed by the Sentencing Guidelines for violations of the Torture Act. Article 4(2) of the CAT only requires that each signatory nation make torture offenses "punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave nature." The United States Code, for its part, provides that "[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence." 18 U.S.C. § 3661. When implementing the CAT, Congress surely had the power to apply the Sentencing Guidelines to violations of the Torture Act, just as they apply to every other violation of the federal criminal code. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989).

The CAT also does not prevent the United States from punishing acts that would constitute torture or attempts to commit torture — both of which undeniably would include kidnappings that occur in furtherance of torture. Indeed, the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 2340A provides that attempts to commit torture are punishable. Put differently, for Emmanuel to successfully inflict severe and repeated beatings, burnings, shockings, and brandings on his victims, he needed to kidnap those victims so as to have them readily at his disposal. Moreover, the conditions in which he forced his kidnapped victims to live — in water- and corpse-filled pits with little or no clothing, and with festering wounds and burns — were themselves torture. Similarly, the murders of Cole, Williams, and the two unidentified refugees were used to facilitate the torture of Emmanuel's other victims. As we have already explained, a central purpose of the murders was to intimidate the other detainees, and thereby deter them from attempting escape or resisting their torture. In short, the kidnappings and murders were punishable under the explicit terms of the CAT, because, at the very least, they amount to attempts to commit torture and acts in furtherance of torture.

VIII.

In sum, we affirm Emmanuel's convictions and sentence in full. The Torture Act's proscriptions against both torture and conspiracy to commit torture are constitutional, and may be applied to extraterritorial conduct. The district court did not plainly err in applying § 924(c) to Emmanuel's extraterritorial conduct, nor in its conduct of this lengthy trial. Finally, Emmanuel's advisory Sentencing Guidelines range was correctly calculated by the district court, and the sentences imposed violate neither the CAT nor the Constitution.

AFFIRMED.