GWIAZDOWSKI v. THE INS. CO. OF PEN., No. CV 08-5008868 (Sep. 1, 2010)

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] ROBERT A. MARTIN, J.

The present action arises out of an uninsured motorist claim filed by the plaintiff, Carol Gwiazdowski, against the defendant. The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, pursuant to the insurance policy the plaintiff had with the defendant. On February 3, 2010, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, awarding the plaintiff $10,262.37 in medical bills, but finding the plaintiff 50% comparatively negligent. The plaintiff filed a motion to open and modify the judgment on March 12, 2010, claiming that the first $5,000 awarded to the plaintiff for medical bills should be attributed to the plaintiffs medical payment coverage, on which there is no reduction for comparative negligence.

"The principles that govern motions to open or set aside a civil judgment are well established. Within four months of the date of the original judgment, Practice Book [§ 17-4] vests discretion in the trial court to determine whether there is a good and compelling reason for its modification or vacation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chapman Lumber, Inc. v. Tager, 288 Conn. 69, 94, 952 A.2d 1 (2008). "Because opening a judgment is a matter of discretion, the trial court [is] not required to open the judgment to consider a claim not previously raised. The exercise of equitable authority is vested in the discretion of the trial court . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 94-95. "While such a motion should not be readily granted nor without strong reasons, it ought to be when there appears cause for which the court acting reasonably would feel bound in duty so to do." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Steve Viglione Sheet Metal Co. v. Sakonchick, 190 Conn. 707, 710-11, 462 A.2d 1037 (1983). "The court has the inherent power to open, correct, modify or vacate a judgment, and it exercises that discretion in the interest of justice." Kores v. Calo, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 06 5000359 (August 27, 2009, Gallagher, J.). CT Page 21239

In the present case, the plaintiffs complaint alleged that the plaintiff "had a contract for automobile insurance with the [d]efendant under the provisions of an insurance policy designated as policy number 682 86 37, which . . . includes coverage for uninsured . . . motorist benefits," and that "all premiums due on said policy had been paid by the [p]laintiff and said policy was in full force and effect." The plaintiffs complaint further alleges that the plaintiffs injuries are the "legal responsibility of the [d]efendant pursuant to the terms of said contract of insurance with the [p]laintiff and in accordance with Connecticut General Statutes § 38a-336." The plaintiffs prayer for relief sought "[flair, just and reasonable compensatory damages" and "[s]uch other relief as this [court] deems just and equitable." As a result, the court construes the plaintiffs complaint as alleging damages pursuant to the entirety of the insurance policy the plaintiff had with the defendant. Furthermore, damages awarded to the plaintiff pursuant to the medical payments coverage section constitute "benefits under the policy that are owed directly to [her], regardless of fault, under the terms of the policy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Alexander v. W.F. Shuck Petroleum Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 08 5010050 (August 3, 2009, Tanzer, J.) ( 48 Conn. L. Rptr. 365, 369). Therefore, in the interest of justice, the court finds that the plaintiff has sufficiently advanced a good and compelling reason to open and modify the judgment to attribute the first $5,000 of the plaintiff's award to the medical payments coverage section of the plaintiff's insurance policy.

The defendant first counters that the plaintiffs motion to modify and open the judgment should be denied because the insurance policy provides that "[n]o one will be entitled to receive duplicate payments for the same elements of loss under" the medical payments coverage section and the uninsured motorists coverage section of the insurance policy. The defendant argues that the jury awarded damages for the plaintiffs medical expenses under the uninsured motorist section of the plaintiffs insurance policy, and therefore, the plaintiff is precluded from seeking payment for the same medical expenses under the medical payments coverage section of the plaintiff's insurance policy.

Our appellate courts have noted that "[a]n insured may not recover double payment of damages under overlapping insurance coverage;" (internal quotation marks omitted) Buell v. American Universal Ins. Co., 224 Conn. 766, 775, 621 A.2d 262 (1993); and that "the CT Page 21240 purpose of [uninsured] motorist insurance is to place the insured in the same position as, but no better position than, the insured would have been had the [uninsured] tortfeasor been fully insured." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fahey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 49 Conn.App. 306, 309, 714 A.2d 686 (1998). In the present case, the court first notes that the jury interrogatories did not specify an award for damages under the uninsured motorist section of the plaintiffs insurance policy. Instead, the jury interrogatories solely asked whether "the medical treatment and bills incurred . . . [were] medically necessary as a result of the subject motor vehicle accident." Furthermore, the plaintiff does not seek to recover a double payment of damages under her coverage. Instead, the plaintiff seeks to attribute a portion of the awarded payment amount to the medical payments coverage section of the insurance policy, and the remainder of that same amount to the uninsured motorist coverage section of the insurance policy. Moreover, attributing a portion of the plaintiffs award to the medical payments coverage section will not place the plaintiff in a better position than she would have been had the uninsured tortfeasor been fully insured. As a result, the court finds the plaintiff is not seeking duplicate payments under the insurance policy, and therefore, the defendant's argument to deny the plaintiffs motion on this ground is unpersuasive.

The defendant further counters that the plaintiffs motion to modify and open the judgment should be denied pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. The defendant claims that in the present case, the plaintiff made a claim under the insurance contract for uninsured motorist benefits, and therefore, the plaintiff is not able to make a claim for medical payments benefits under the same contract now that judgment has been rendered. As discussed herein, however, the court construes the complaint to include a claim for damages under the entire insurance policy, not solely the uninsured motorist coverage section of that policy.

Moreover, "[t]he doctrine of res judicata holds that an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of causes of action and of facts or issues thereby litigated as to the parties and their privies in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction . . . If the same cause of action is again sued on, the judgment is a bar with respect to any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or might have been made." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Massey v. Branford, CT Page 21241 119 Conn.App. 453, 464-65, 988 A.2d 370, cert. denied, 295 Conn. 913, 990 A.2d 345 (2010). In the present case, the plaintiff filed a motion to open and modify the judgment. The plaintiff is not suing again on the same cause of action. As a result, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to the present case, and the defendant's argument to deny the plaintiff's motion on this ground is unpersuasive. Therefore, the court finds that the plaintiff has established the existence of a good and compelling reason to open and modify the judgment, and the defendant's objections do not preclude granting the plaintiffs motion.

Based on the foregoing, the court hereby grants the plaintiffs motion to open the judgment which may be modified to reflect no reduction for comparative negligence on the first $5,000.00 awarded to the plaintiff for her medical bills.

CT Page 21242