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HCP LAGUNA CREEK CA V.SUNRISE SENIOR LIVING MGMT
BARNES, Presiding Judge.
Daniel Oliver appeals from the trial court's order revoking his probation and suspended sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.
Although suspended and probated sentences are similar, OCGA § 42-8-39 clearly distinguishes the two, specifying that an order suspending a defendant's sentence does "not have the effect of placing the defendant on probation." See also Williams v. State, 191 Ga. App. 217, 217-218 (1) ( 381 SE2d 399) (1989) (describing the difference between probated and suspended sentences). An order revoking a suspended sentence, therefore, is not equivalent to a probation revocation. And the discretionary appeal requirement in OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (5) applies explicitly to orders revoking probation; it does not mention suspended sentences. An order revoking a suspended sentence is directly appealable. See White v. State, 233 Ga. App. 873, 875 ( 505 SE2d 228) (1998) (noting that OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (5) "on its face applies only to `orders revoking probation'"). Therefore, Oliver was not required to follow the discretionary appeal procedure to challenge the revocation of his suspended sentence and his challenge to the revocation of his probation is subject to appellate review under OCGA § 5-6-34 (d).
The record shows that Oliver pled guilty in January 2008 to possessing cocaine. The trial court sentenced him to seven years incarceration, but suspended the first three years upon entry into and completion of a drug treatment program, and probated the remaining four years. A few months later, the State moved to revoke Oliver's probation, arguing that he had committed several new criminal offenses in February 2008 and had not finished the drug treatment program. It also moved to enforce the suspended portion of Oliver's sentence based on his failure to complete the program. Following a hearing, the trial court found that Oliver had violated the terms of his suspended sentence and probation as alleged by the State. It thus revoked the suspended and probated portions of the sentence and ordered him to serve seven years in prison.
1. Oliver first argues that the trial court erred in finding that he had violated the terms of his suspended sentence. As noted above, the trial court agreed to suspend the first three years of Oliver's sentence if he entered into and completed a residential drug treatment program. Oliver entered the required program on January 18, 2008, two days after he pled guilty. Approximately three weeks later, however, he was arrested for the new criminal offenses and discharged from the program. The program manager testified that because of Oliver's arrest, "he did not successfully complete the program" and was placed in "non-compliant status."
On appeal, Oliver argues that he was doing well in the program before his arrest and was eligible to return for further treatment upon his release from prison. He thus claims that the trial court erred in finding that he did not complete the program. This Court, however, will not interfere with a trial court's decision revoking a suspended or probated sentence absent a manifest abuse of discretion. See Griffin v. State, 302 Ga. App. 807, 808 ( 692 SE2d 7) (2010). A preponderance of the evidence showed that Oliver was discharged from the program because he was arrested, failed to complete its requirements, and was placed in "non-compliant" status. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Oliver violated the terms of his suspended sentence. See OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (b) (court may revoke suspended sentence if preponderance of the evidence establishes the alleged violation).
2. Oliver further claims that the trial court erred in revoking his entire four-year probationary period. The evidence at the revocation hearing showed that on February 7, 2008, Oliver had a physical altercation with his fiancee at her apartment. According to the fiancee, Oliver entered her bedroom early that morning, held her down on the bed, ripped her shirt, and grabbed her breast. She managed to push him away and told him to leave. Oliver responded by taking her car keys from her purse. Although the fiancee tried to stop him from leaving with her keys, he hit her in the face and left the apartment, heading for her car. The fiancee outside to prevent him from taking the car, but Oliver avoided her and drove away. The fiancee reported the incident to police, and Oliver was arrested five days later while driving her car.
The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Oliver had committed theft by taking a motor vehicle and misdemeanor battery against his fiancee. Given the evidence presented, the court did not err in reaching these findings. See OCGA §§ 16-8-2 (defining theft by taking); 16-5-23 (a) (defining simple battery); see also Griffin, supra (" `[I]f admissible evidence is presented in support of the allegations regarding revocation of probation, this court will affirm.'"). Moreover, motor vehicle theft is a felony offense that subjects the offender to a maximum of ten years imprisonment. See OCGA § 16-8-12 (a) (5) (A). Oliver concedes on appeal that the trial court was authorized to revoke his entire probationary period based on commission of this felony. See OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (d). He argues, however, that the court should not have imposed such punishment here.
We disagree. Oliver contends that a complete revocation was "unduly harsh" because he was doing well in treatment before his arrest and was dedicated to changing his life. He also characterizes the altercation with his fiancee as an unfortunate "domestic incident" and asserts that he merely wanted to borrow her car. But the trial court rejected Oliver's explanations, as it was authorized to do, and found him guilty of a new felony offense. See Dugger v. State, 260 Ga. App. 843, 847 (3) ( 581 SE2d 655) (2003) (trial court decides the credibility of witnesses at a probation revocation hearing). Under these circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion in revoking all of his probation. See OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (d).
Judgment affirmed. Senior Appellate Judge G. Alan Blackburn and Senior Appellate Judge William LeRoy McMurray, Jr., concur.
BARNES, Presiding Judge.
DECIDED AUGUST 31, 2010.
iii. Counts II, XV XVI (Injunctive Relief
The Court grants summary judgment in favor of Sunrise as to Counts II, XV and XVI because the HCP Plaintiffs cannot show that they will likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must show that: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 575 F.3d 342, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 365, 374 (2008)).
In Count II, the HCP Plaintiffs request that the Court issue an injunction to: (1) prevent Sunrise from making further unauthorized withdrawals and expenditures from the Portfolio Facilities' accounts; (2) require Sunrise to vacate the Portfolio Facilities; (3) require Sunrise to transfer the Portfolio Facilities pursuant to §§ 10.01 and 13.02 of the MA; (4) require Sunrise to grant HCP access to the Portfolio Facilities' account books and records; (5) require Sunrise to vacate the Camarillo Facility; and (6) require Sunrise to transfer the Camarillo Facility pursuant to §§ 10.01 and 13.02 of the MA. (Compl. ¶ 135.) In Count XV, the HCP Plaintiffs allege that Sunrise (1) realized undisclosed profits and other income and (2) made improper expenditures from the Facilities' accounts. (Compl. ¶¶ 191-193.) The HCP Plaintiffs seek an injunction to adjust the accounts in accordance with the MA. (Compl. ¶ 195.) Similarly, Count XVI sets forth allegations suggesting that Sunrise received and retained funds in violation of its fiduciary duties, including: (1) funds obtained through undisclosed and improper charges, fees, and allocations; (2) funds obtained from the unauthorized provision of ancillary activities at the Facilities by third-party ancillary service providers; and (3) funds obtained by withholding amounts due to the Facilities under the MA. (Compl. ¶ 198.) The HCP Plaintiffs seek an injunction requiring Sunrise and its affiliates to hold these funds in a constructive trust for the HCP Plaintiff's benefit. (Compl. ¶ 204.) A grant of the HCP Plaintiffs' requests on these Counts depends on whether Sunrise breached the MAs and OAs, which, as discussed above, it has not because no reasonable trier of fact could find that Sunrise violated the aforementioned provisions. Because the HCP Plaintiffs cannot show that they would likely succeed on the merits for the reasons discussed above, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Sunrise as to Counts II, XV and XVI.
iv. Count I (Declaratory Judgment)
The Court grants summary judgment in favor of Sunrise because declaratory relief is improper where Sunrise did not breach the MAs and OAs, and was improperly terminated from the Camarillo Facility, such that the HCP Plaintiffs cannot be released from the MAs and obtain further access to the Facilities' records beyond what Sunrise has provided. Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), a federal court "may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Declaratory relief is awarded if the relief sought (1) will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue, and (2) will terminate and afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity and controversy giving rise to the proceeding. Dourous v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co., 508 F. Supp. 2d 479, 482 (E.D. Va. 2007) (internal citation omitted).
Here, the HCP Plaintiffs request a judicial declaration that: (1) Sunrise breached the MA and OA through the commission of various monetary and non-monetary defaults; (2) the HCP Plaintiffs may terminate the MAs; (3) HRA properly terminated Sunrise as manager of the Camarillo Facility under § 12.06 of the Camarillo MA for failure to obtain proper Medicare certification; and (4) that Sunrise grant the HCP Plaintiff's independent auditors access to the Facilities' account book and records. (Compl. ¶¶ 130-133.) The Court denies the HCP Plaintiffs' first request because as discussed, no reasonable trier of fact could find that Sunrise violated the MAs and OAs alleged by the HCP Plaintiffs. The Court also denies the HCP Plaintiffs' second request for the same reasons. Because the Court finds that Sunrise did not breach the MAs or OAs, the HCP Plaintiffs may not invoke its right to terminate the MAs or OAs. The Court further denies the request that HRA be permitted to terminate Sunrise from the Camarillo Facility because Medicare certification is not a license to operate an assisted living facility. As discussed, nothing in the MAs requires Sunrise to obtain or maintain Medicare certification at the Camarillo Facility. Finally, the Court denies the HCP Plaintiffs' request that Sunrise grant the HCP Plaintiffs' independent auditors access to the Facilities' account book and records. Sunrise has successfully introduced evidence that contradicts any dispute of material fact that it violated the MAs and OAs. Because the Court finds that Sunrise did not breach the MAs and OAs, declaratory relief is improper. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Sunrise as to Count II.
B. Sunrise's Counterclaim
i. Count I (Breach of Contract)
The Court grants summary judgment in favor of the HCP Plaintiffs as to Count I because no reasonable trier of fact could find that the HCP Plaintiffs' alleged violations of the MAs and OAs caused actual damage to Sunrise. At dispute is whether the HCP Plaintiffs' alleged obstruction of Sunrise's ability to effectively manage the Facilities caused financial harm to Sunrise. As stated in the MAs, "the budget as proposed, shall be considered by [HRA] and, in consultation between [HRA] and [Sunrise], the budget for the Facilit[ies] for the ensuing fiscal year will be prepared by [Sunrise] with the final contents of the budget to be determined mutually by [Sunrise] and [HRA]. . . ." (Mgmt. Agmt. § 7.01.) Sunrise must also prepare a Repairs and Equipment Estimate of the Facilities' expenditures and submit it along with the Annual Operating Budget. (Mgmt. Agmt. § 11.02(d).) Aside from these requirements, Sunrise has "complete and full control and discretion in the operation, direction, management and supervision of the Facilit[ies]. . . ." (Mgmt. Agmt. § 2.01.) As party to the MAs, HRA "agrees to comply with all of the applicable provisions of [the MA] and to perform all obligation[s]" set forth therein. (Mgmt. Agmt. § 10.03.)
Sunrise asserts that the HCP Plaintiffs engaged in various bad faith conduct in an effort to force Sunrise to restructure the Facilities' MAs. Specifically, the HCP Plaintiffs refused to approve budgets and engage in meaningful negotiation with Sunrise regarding the budgets. (Am. Countercl. and Third-Party Compl. ¶ 36.) According to Sunrise, the HCP Plaintiffs also obstructed capital expenditures at the Facilities by refusing to advance sufficient funds to Sunrise. (Am. Countercl. and Third-Party Compl. ¶¶ 41 43.) Sunrise further insists that the HCP Plaintiffs made bad faith demands by requesting: (1) information regarding the Facilities' licensing;, (2) all reports filed by the Facilities with any agency in connection with any legal requirement; (3) marketing and financial data; and (4) proof that the prices Sunrise paid for services are reasonable and competitively priced. (Am. Countercl. and Third-Party Compl. ¶ 45.)
While Sunrise has sufficiently shown that no disputed material fact exists concerning the HCP Plaintiffs' failure to perform under the MAs, it has not shown that the alleged breach caused actual damage. Sunrise claims that its share of the Facilities revenue was depressed due to the HCP Plaintiffs' bad faith conduct. (Am. Countercl. and Third-Party Compl. ¶¶ 43-44.) Specifically, Sunrise claims that it suffered a loss of $191,000 due to HCP's alleged failure to approve capital expenditures. (Def.'s Opp'n Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. 29.) Sunrise also points to a diminution in the value of its stock. These statements alone, however, do not show how Sunrise suffered actual damage when its corporate representative, Mr. Eugene Weil, indicated that Sunrise's parent company "suffered the harm." (Nickelsburg Decl. Ex. 93 at 96:20-99:5; Am. Counterclaim and Third-Party Comp. ¶¶ 43-44; Def.'s Opp'n Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. 27.) Sunrise provides no evidence to suggest that a trickle down effect caused financial damage to its ability to manage the Facilities. Rather, Sunrise recognizes that corporate entities are separate and distinct, suggesting that it does not bear the damage suffered by its parent company; and Sunrise offers no facts that would allow the Court to pierce the corporate veil to find the necessary damages. (Def.'s Opp'n Summ. J. 26-28. Because Sunrise fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact with respect to damages, it thereby fails to satisfy all elements for a breach of contract claim. As such, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the HCP Plaintiffs on Count I of the Counterclaim. ii. Count III (Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations
The Court grants summary judgment in favor of the HCP Plaintiffs because no reasonable trier of fact could find that the HCP Plaintiffs intentionally interfered with HRA's obligations to Sunrise under the MA. The elements of tortious interference with contractual relations include: (1) a valid contractual relationship or business expectancy; (2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the interferor; (3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy; and (4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship or expectancy has been disrupted. Chaves v. Johnson, 335 S.E.2d 97, 102 (Va. 1985) (citation omitted).
Sunrise alleges that the HCP Plaintiffs conspired with HRA to cause HRA to breach its contractual obligations to Sunrise. (Am. Countercl. and Third-Party Compl. ¶ 63.) Sunrise argues that the HCP Plaintiffs had a plan to threaten Sunrise with terminating the MA if the latter refused to restructure the MAs. (Def.'s Opp'n Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. 29-30; Keyes Decl. Exs. 9 11.) However, it is unclear from the record how HCP intentionally induced or caused a breach or termination of the relationship between Sunrise and HRA. (Keyes Decl. Ex. 100 at 80:7-81:15 94:5-96:21.) Moreover, while Sunrise asserts that
its share of the Facilities revenue has been depressed, it is unclear under what theory and how Sunrise, rather than its parent company, is actually damaged. (Am. Countercl. and Third-Party Compl. ¶¶ 43-44; Nickelsburg Decl. Ex. 93 at 96:4-99:5; Def.'s Opp'n Pls.' Mot. Summ. J. 25-28.) Consequently, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the HCP Plaintiffs.
iii. Counts IV V (Conspiracy to Harm Business and Reputation
The Court grants summary judgment in favor of the HCP Plaintiffs as to Sunrise's conspiracy claims because no reasonable trier of fact could find the HCP Plaintiffs willfully and maliciously injured Sunrise's business or reputation. A common law conspiracy consists of "two or more persons combined to accomplish, by some concerted action, some criminal or unlawful purpose or some lawful purpose by a criminal or unlawful means." Commercial Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Bellsouth Servs., Inc., 453 S.E.2d 261, 267 (Va. 1995). The damage caused by the acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy is the foundation of a civil claim of conspiracy. Id (citations omitted). Similarly, Virginia law provides that any person who attempts to procure the participation of others in an attempt to willfully and maliciously injure another in his reputation, trade, business or profession can be liable for statutory conspiracy. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-499. A plaintiff proceeding under this statute must prove his case by clear and convincing evidence. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-500. Instead of actual malice, the statute "merely requires[s] proof legal malice, i.e., that . . . acted intentionally, purposely, and without lawful justification." Commercial Bus. Sys., Inc., 453 S.E.2d at 267.
From the record, it is unclear how the HCP Plaintiffs willfully and maliciously injured Sunrise's business or reputation by attempting to get Sunrise to alter its contractual relationship with HCP before and after the CNL-HCP merger. It is also unclear how HCP joined forces with HRA to drive Sunrise out of business. The mere fact that HCP wishes to have Sunrise lease rather than manage the Facilities, without more, does not amount to unlawful intent, where Sunrise acknowledges that the parties engaged in discussions at length regarding possible restructuring of the MAs. (Am. Countercl. and Third-Party Compl. ¶ 15.) Sunrise concedes it agreed to the discussions and reached a tentative agreement with HCP, whereby HCP would buy out a limited number of the MAs and the structure of the remaining MAs would change. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Summ. J. ¶ 5.) The parties' failure to come to an agreement is not clear and convincing evidence that HCP conspired with HRA to harm Sunrise. (Am. Countercl. and Third-Party Compl. ¶¶ 21 22.)
Additionally, Sunrise's contention that HCP audited Sunrise's books and records in an attempt to pressure it into renegotiating the MAs is weakened by the fact that HCP's conduct was within its rights under the MAs. (Am. Countercl. and Third-Party Compl. ¶¶ 18 19.) As owner of numerous senior living facilities worth millions, it is reasonable that HCP consider changes to its contractual relationship with various parties, let alone Sunrise, so as to increase its revenues. HCP stands to benefit financially from Sunrise's successful management of the Facilities, which could only be strengthened by HCP's support and cooperation. Thus, Sunrise's conspiracy claims suffer from a defect similar to its other claims — absence of evidence showing Sunrise suffered damage — which in this instance concerns financial loss or harm to business reputation. (Am. Countercl. and Third-Party Compl. ¶¶ 43-44.) The Court, therefore, grants summary judgment in favor of the HCP Plaintiffs as to Counts IV and V.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Sunrise as to Counts I — XVI of the HCP Plaintiffs' Complaint. As to Sunrise's Counterclaim, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of the HCP Plaintiffs as to Counts I, III — V.
The Clerk is directed to forward a copy of the Memorandum Opinion to counsel.
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