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VICTOR STANLEY, INC. v. CREATIVE PIPE, INC. (Md. 9-9-2010)

United States District Court, D. Maryland.
Sep 9, 2010
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Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner David Leon, a California prisoner, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the constitutional validity of his convictions arising from a 2002 incident in Sunnyvale, California. Leon was charged with murder, discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle, and assault with a firearm, with gang-related enhancements. At trial, the jury found him guilty of second degree murder and discharging a firearm at an occupied vehicle. The procedural history includes direct appeals and multiple state habeas petitions, culminating in this federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions and denied habeas relief, and the California Supreme Court denied review. This federal court now considers the petition on the merits.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to argue a specific self-defense concept during closing argument.
  2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to give certain jury instructions sua sponte and in refusing requested instructions related to self-defense, defense of property, and justifiable homicide.
  3. Whether the trial court erred in giving certain jury instructions regarding self-defense by an aggressor and contrived self-defense claims.
  4. Whether the application of the second degree felony-murder doctrine and related jury instructions violated due process and equal protection, particularly in light of the merger doctrine and the collateral purpose rule.
  5. Whether the recent California Supreme Court decision in People v. Chun applies retroactively to petitioner’s case.
  6. Whether petitioner’s claim that the felony-murder instruction caused an unconstitutional presumption of malice is valid.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) Standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims requiring deficient performance and prejudice. Applied to analyze petitioner’s claim that counsel failed to argue a self-defense concept during closing argument; court found counsel’s performance reasonable and no prejudice.
Schiro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007) AEDPA standard for federal habeas review of state court factual findings and legal conclusions. Used to explain the high threshold for habeas relief and presumption of correctness of state court findings.
Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) Clarification of “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses under AEDPA. Guided the court’s review of state court decisions under AEDPA.
Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2006) Federal habeas relief for jury instruction errors requires showing the instruction infected the trial to violate due process. Applied to petitioner’s claims of instructional errors; court found no due process violation.
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) Limits federal habeas relief for state law errors in jury instructions unless due process is violated. Supported the standard for evaluating jury instruction claims.
People v. Chun, 45 Cal. 4th 1172 (2009) Clarified the merger doctrine in second degree felony-murder cases, holding assaultive felonies merge with homicide. Discussed in relation to petitioner’s felony-murder conviction; court noted uncertainty about retroactivity.
People v. Bloyd, 43 Cal. 3d 333 (1987) Limits on initial aggressor instructions when defendant is not the original aggressor. Distinguished petitioner’s case from Bloyd in assessing jury instruction claims.
Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263 (1989) Prohibition on conclusive presumptions regarding core elements of a crime. Referenced in petitioner’s argument on felony-murder presumption; court found no conclusive presumption here.
Locket v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) Affirmed constitutional validity of felony-murder statutes. Supported court’s conclusion that felony-murder rule is not constitutionally infirm.
People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522 (1969) Merger doctrine regarding assaultive felonies merging with homicide for felony-murder purposes. Discussed as part of merger doctrine background.
People v. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d 615 (1989) Support for constitutionality of second degree felony-murder rule as substitute for implied malice. Cited in affirming state court’s reasoning on felony-murder instruction.
People v. Robertson, 34 Cal. 4th 156 (2004) Explains second degree felony-murder and merger doctrine. Discussed in context of felony-murder and merger doctrine analysis.
People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441 (1983) Clarifies second degree felony-murder doctrine does not create conclusive presumption of malice. Used to support rejection of petitioner’s claim regarding presumption of malice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a detailed AEDPA-standard review of petitioner’s claims, examining the state court’s adjudication for unreasonableness in law or fact. Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel, the court found that although trial counsel did not explicitly argue the "quickly and harshly" self-defense language, counsel effectively conveyed the concept throughout closing argument, thus failing to show deficient performance or prejudice.

On jury instructions, the court applied the principle that errors in state law instructions do not warrant federal habeas relief unless they infected the trial so as to violate due process. The court upheld the state court’s rejection of petitioner’s claims that the trial court erred by failing to give certain instructions sua sponte or refusing requested instructions, finding the evidence insufficient to support those defenses and no substantial or injurious effect on the verdict. The court also upheld instructions given on self-defense by an aggressor, reasoning that the jury could appropriately apply or disregard instructions based on their factual findings.

Regarding the felony-murder doctrine, the court analyzed the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Chun, which clarified that assaultive felonies merge with homicide and cannot support felony-murder convictions. The court noted that Chun was decided after petitioner’s conviction became final and declined to speculate on its retroactivity, leaving that question to state courts. The court rejected petitioner’s claim that the felony-murder instruction created an unconstitutional presumption of malice, finding no Supreme Court precedent invalidating felony-murder statutes and affirming that the instruction substitutes for implied malice without a conclusive presumption.

Holding and Implications

Partial grant of the habeas petition: The court granted the petition in part, denying claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and jury instruction errors, and reserving determination on the retroactivity of People v. Chun. The petitioner's convictions and sentence were otherwise upheld.

The decision directly affects the petitioner by denying relief on the majority of his claims and clarifies the application of AEDPA standards to claims of instructional error and ineffective assistance. No new federal precedent was established, and the question of retroactivity of Chun remains for state court determination.

Show all summary ...
MEMORANDUM ORDER Re: Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

MARILYN PATEL, District Judge

Petitioner David Leon, a California prisoner incarcerated at the California State Prison in Susanville, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 2254. This matter-wherein Leon challenges the constitutional validity of his convictions-is now before the court for consideration on the merits. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is granted in part.

BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise indicated, all background facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal decision denying petitioner's request for relief. People v. Leon, No. H028370, 2006 WL 2988981 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2006).

On December 26, 2003, petitioner was charged with: 1) the murder of Enrique Hernandez; 2) discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle; and 3) assault with a firearm. The charging document further alleged that petitioner personally and intentionally discharged a firearm during the commission of the offenses in counts one and two, that he personally used a firearm during the commission of the offense in count three, and that he committed all the offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang. On May 28, 2004, the trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss count three. At trial, the following evidence was presented.

I. The prosecution's case

In 2002, eighteen-year-old Hernandez was a member of the Sureno SST gang. Sometime around midnight on November 15, 2002, Hernandez and his girlfriend were driving by a market on Fair Oaks in Sunnyvale in her green Honda Civic when Hernandez yelled "hey, what's up" to petitioner, who was walking outside the market. Hernandez, who had been drinking, jumped out of the car and ran up to petitioner, yelling. A fist fight ensued. Petitioner fell down, got up, and ran away. Hernandez ran after him, whistling for some nearby fellow gang members to join him, and his girlfriend followed in her car. Petitioner, his brother and his neighbor Jesse Bynum, who had joined petitioner, disappeared near a house on America Avenue. Hernandez ran to where petitioner and the others disappeared, and called out for them to come back and fight. Four Sureno gang-member friends joined Hernandez on the street. After Hernandez told his friends what had happened, he returned to his girlfriend's car. She dropped Hernandez off at his friend's apartment complex on Fair Oaks, where he promised to stay, and she then drove home.

Petitioner and his brother hid inside their parents' home on America Avenue. After Hernandez left, petitioner acquired a handgun and returned to the street. The men who were with Hernandez had also left, but soon returned. Upon their return, petitioner fired a shot into the air and ran after the men with his brother and Bynum. After the men scattered, petitioner, his brother and Bynum returned to petitioner's parents' kitchen.

A couple of hours later, around 2:00 a.m. on November 16, 2002, Hernandez called his girlfriend to pick him up. On the way home, Hernandez directed her to drive back to America Avenue and told her to stop in front of a particular house. She passed the house and then made a U-turn. She turned off her headlights and drove slowly down the street and stopped where he told her to stop, next to Bynum's pickup truck. Hernandez got out of the car, leaving the door open, and started punching the window of the truck while yelling that people could not mess with his friends. It was around 2:30 a.m., and a porch light went on in a nearby house. Hernandez's girlfriend asked him to get back in the car.

Meanwhile, petitioner, Bynum and another neighbor were outside a neighbor's house behind some bushes at the fence line. Hernandez's girlfriend saw movement in those bushes and then saw petitioner come around the bushes and jog down the middle of the street toward her car with his hands in his sweatshirt pockets. When Hernandez saw petitioner, he jumped back into the Civic and said "go, babe, go." Hernandez's girlfriend turned on her headlights, put the car in gear, and stepped on the gas. Because it looked as though she might hit petitioner, she took her foot off the gas and the car slowed. Petitioner changed directions and came along the passenger side of the car. When petitioner was outside the passenger window, about three feet from it, there was a loud bang. Hernandez's girlfriend looked back and saw petitioner continue down the street and run across a lawn as she was driving away. Petitioner ran into his parents' house.

Hernandez yelled, "I got shot." He pulled up his shirt and showed his girlfriend that he was bleeding from a hole in his chest. A bullet had entered above his right chest and exited on the left side of his body. He started gasping for air. The two drove back to Hernandez's friend's apartment complex to ask for help. Hernandez died at the hospital that morning.

Later in the morning of November 16, 2002, investigating officers found a bullet hole in the front passenger side door of the Civic, just below the window. The hole went through the door at a rearward and downward angle. Inside the car, officers found a bullet on the floorboard between the front passenger seat and the door, a BB/pellet gun in the front passenger floorboard area and blood stains. Officers found casings for a nine-millimeter pistol on the street just north and south of petitioner's parents' house. Under the couch in the living room of the house, officers found a loaded Star nine-millimeter pistol covered with a washcloth and latex gloves. A criminalist with the Santa Clara County crime laboratory determined that the casings found in the street were fired by the nine-millimeter pistol found inside petitioner's parents' home. The criminalist was not able to determine conclusively whether the same gun fired the bullet found inside the Civic.

Detective Craig Anderson interviewed petitioner around mid-day on November 16, 2002. The interview was tape recorded and the tape was played for the jury. According to the tape, petitioner was walking by the market after midnight when a Mexican male who had been driving by came after him and started a fight. He did not want to fight so he ran home, but the man and a few others ran after him. He went inside, locked the door and went to sleep. The detective told petitioner that petitioner was not being truthful. Petitioner then told the detective that he grabbed a gun, went back outside and shot it once into the air when he saw between six and eight men coming his way. The men scattered. Petitioner's neighbors came out when they heard the shot. Petitioner told them what happened, went back inside and fell asleep on the couch. The detective again told petitioner that petitioner was not being truthful. Petitioner then said that after the police came and went, a truck full of men drove up and down the street. Petitioner and his friends hid in some bushes. Then the Civic from which he was originally attacked drove by with its lights off. A man jumped out of the car and started hitting Bynum's truck with what sounded like BBs, although petitioner did not see a gun. Petitioner ran after the man. When the man saw petitioner, he returned to the Civic without pointing anything at petitioner, and the car sped off. The car swerved a little, but petitioner did not think that the driver was trying to hit him. Petitioner said that he shot at "the bottom half of the door" because he "didn't want to shoot him in the head or nothing like that." He then threw the gun into some bushes and ran back inside his house. Petitioner was arrested at the conclusion of the interview.

II. The defense case

Alma Gonzalez saw Hernandez get out of his girlfriend's car and start fighting with two men who had come out of a different car outside the Fair Oaks market on the night of November 15, 2002. Later, when she and others were at the apartment complex on Fair Oaks, Hernandez said that the guy he had chased on America Avenue had fired a shot, so that they should all be careful.

On the night of November 16, 2002, Cheuritta Cox, who lived next door to the Leon family, heard her dog barking and people yelling outside. She looked out her kitchen window and saw a circle of people in front of her house and a black car with a girl standing on its open-door frame Cox assumed that it was a fight over a girl. She then saw a flash from a gun and heard a gunshot come from petitioner. She called the police. The car left but there were still people outside when she checked later.

Criminalists tested a blood sample taken during Hernandez's autopsy. They determined that he had a blood alcohol level of .09, and he tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. David Medina used to live around the corer from petitioner's parents' America Avenue home, but did not know petitioner. He went to school with Hernandez, who was an SST gang member. When Medina was in school, he was affiliated with the Norteno gang. He is no longer affiliated with that gang even though he still has gang tattoos. To his knowledge, petitioner was not a member of his gang, nor was anybody else who lived on America Avenue. Once, during their freshman year, Hernandez was with at least ten SST gang members when he attacked Medina in the student parking lot.

Omar Guzman also went to school with Medina and Hernandez. He had never seen petitioner before they were both transported to jail in the same patrol car after petitioner's arrest on November 16, 2002. Guzman told petitioner that he was Cesar's younger brother after petitioner told Guzman that he looked like Cesar. Petitioner asked Guzman why he was going to jail. After Guzman told him that it was for assault with a deadly weapon, Guzman asked petitioner why he was going to jail. Petitioner said that it was for murder. Petitioner said that he was walking home from a bar when he was approached by three people who asked if he was a gang member. They kept harassing him, so when he went home he grabbed a pistol and went outside. He saw a truck with its lights off approach his house and somebody inside point a gun at his house. He heard a clicking noise and then fired two shots at the truck. He said that he told the police what happened. Petitioner told the transporting officer that he was afraid that there would be retaliation against his family and asked her to have officers patrol the area.

Travis Cox grew up on America Avenue with petitioner. He considers petitioner to be honest and very respectful. Petitioner never associated with gangs.

Ryan Light went to high school with petitioner and they worked together. He considers petitioner to be honest and does not consider him to be a violent person. Petitioner was not involved in any gang activity that occurred at their high school.

Derrick Stahmer grew up with petitioner on America Avenue. He gave petitioner all of petitioner's tattoos. Petitioner's brother drew the peacock tattoo, and Stahmer testified that he has given the smile-now-cry-later tattoo and the Virgin Mary tattoo to many other people.

Judy Stahmer, Derrick's mother, considers petitioner to be very honest and non-violent. She had never heard of petitioner being involved in gang activity during high school.

Todd Rudy's grandmother has lived on America Avenue for 45 years and he has lived there for six years. He had never seen petitioner be violent in any manner. He has also never had any problems with the occupants of the apartment complex on Fair Oaks.

Stanley Stovall, who worked with petitioner and one of his brothers, has known petitioner's family for most of his life. To his knowledge, no one in the Leon family has ever been involved with gangs. He considers petitioner to be non-violent and honest.

III. Procedural history

On October 14, 2004, the jury found petitioner not guilty of first degree murder, but guilty of second degree murder, Cal. Penal Code § 187, and of discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle, id. § 246. Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life on the murder count, with a consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm use enhancement, and a concurrent term of five years plus 25 years to life on the discharging-a-firearm count.

On April 12, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the California Court of Appeal. On October 20, 2006, the California Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner's judgment on direct appeal, and denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus. See generally Leon, 2006 WL 2988981. The California Supreme Court summarily denied review in both cases on February 7, 2007. On September 20, 2007, petitioner filed another writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. The court denied that petition on March 26, 2008. On August 1, 2007, and March 19, 2008, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and amended petition for writ of habeas corpus, respectively.

LEGAL STANDARD

The court is required to analyze state habeas corpus claims under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). 28 U.S.C. § 2254. AEDPA established a "substantially higher threshold for habeas relief' with the "acknowledged purpose of reducing delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences." Schiro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 475 (2007) (quoting Woodfordv. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)).

Under AEDPA, the court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was: 1) "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or 2) "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Id. § 2254(d).

"Under the `contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). "Under the `unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's decision but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. "[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409.

AEDPA requires federal habeas courts to "presume the correctness of state courts' factual findings" unless the petitioner presents "clear and convincing evidence." Schiro, 550 U.S. at 473-74 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). In other words, "the question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable-a substantially higher threshold." Id. at 473.

The California Supreme Court denied petitioner's claims without opinion and the California Court of Appeal issued the last reasoned state court opinion. The court thus will review the opinion of the Court of Appeal under AEDPA standards. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). For issues where there exists no reasoned opinion by the Court of Appeal, the court will independently review the denial to determine whether the state court's conclusion was objectively unreasonable. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner claims numerous independent errors: 1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel in contravention of constitutional guarantees; 2) due process errors based on the trial court's failure to give certain instructions that were not requested, failure to give certain instructions that were requested, and decision to give certain prejudicial instructions; and 3) due process and equal protection errors based on the trial court's instructions regarding second degree felony-murder, in light of the merger doctrine and the collateral purpose rule. Each is discussed in turn.

I. Ineffective assistance

Petitioner argues that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney failed to argue, during the closing argument, that a person who has been previously threatened or assaulted by another may act more quickly and harshly in self-defense than a person who has not been previously threatened or assaulted. Petitioner concedes that the trial court did in fact give the appropriate jury instruction regarding this concept; instead, he bases his claim on his counsel's failure to mention this concept during the closing argument.

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are examined under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness is whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. In order to prevail on an ineffectiveness of counsel claim, petitioner must establish two prongs. Firstly, he must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687-88. The relevant inquiry is not what defense counsel could have done, but rather whether the choices made by defense counsel were reasonable. Babbittv. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 1159 (1999). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, and a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Secondly, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, i.e., that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.

Petitioner's argument was summarily denied by the state appellate court without opinion. Therefore, the court will examine the denial independently under AEDPA standards. It is undisputed that the following jury instruction was given at trial:

In addition, a person whose life or safety has been previously threatened or assaulted by another, is justified in acting more quickly and taking harsher measures for self protection from an assault by that person, than would a person who had not received threats or had previously been assaulted by the same person.

It is also undisputed that trial counsel failed to recite the quickly and harshly language of the instruction during his closing argument. Counsel, however, gave a thorough argument of the facts of petitioner's case and emphasized the concept conveyed in the jury instruction without actually using the words "quickly and harshly." He repeatedly discussed petitioner's state of mind at the time of the shooting, and how it was affected by the prior events of the evening. Docket No. 23 (Answer), Exh. C (Reporter's Transcript) at 2114. He also paraphrased petitioner's statements during petitioner's interview at the police station: "I was scared out of my ass . . . when I fired the gun, so I shot at the door." Id. at 2118. Counsel even stated that "that whole night, all [petitioner] wanted to do was get out, have his family, his home, be safe from this gangster who's repeatedly coming by." Id. at 2120. These statements demonstrate the emphasis placed by petitioner's trial counsel on the threats and assaults that had occurred prior to the slaying. Although counsel did not cite the instruction or use the magic words "quickly and harshly," he harped on the theme throughout his argument. In light of counsel's reference to the concept embodied in the instruction, his performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Consequently, petitioner's claim is denied.

Even if counsel was somehow deficient in his representation, petitioner was not prejudiced. The jury was aware of the quickly and harshly standard because it had been instructed on the concept by the trial judge. The fact that petitioner's counsel did not explicitly recite this language during his closing argument does not erase the instruction from the minds of the jurors. Counsel's decision to discuss self-defense in a thematic manner instead of parroting the jury instruction language is not prejudicial, and petitioner's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is denied for this additional reason.

II. Jury instructions

The fact that a jury instruction violates state law is not, by itself, a basis for federal habeas corpus relief Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2006) cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1027. "Federal habeas courts therefore do not grant relief, as might a state appellate court, simply because the instruction may have been deficient in comparison to the CALJIC model." Id. (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991)). Rather, the issue before the federal court is "whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process." Id. (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72).

"The burden on the habeas petitioner is `especially heavy' where . . . the alleged error involves the failure to give an instruction." Id. (quoting Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 1992)). However, failure to give an instruction on a theory of the defense will violate due process if the theory is legally sound and evidence in the case makes it applicable. Id. at 904-05. The petitioner must show that "the alleged instruction error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Id. (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). This means that there is a "reasonable probability" that the jury would have arrived at a different verdict had the instruction been given. Id. at 916. A petitioner is not entitled to an instruction embodying a defense theory if the evidence does not support it. Id.

A. Sua sponte instructions

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that a citizen may justifiably kill the perpetrator of a burglary when the nature of the crime is such that it yields a reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury. Specifically, petitioner claims that the following instructions should have been given:

Homicide is justifiable and not unlawful when committed by any person who is resisting an attempt to commit a forcible and atrocious crime.
An auto burglary is a forcible and atrocious crime when the manner of its commission threatens, or is reasonably believed by the petitioner to threaten life or great bodily injury so as to instill a reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury in the petitioner.
An attempted auto burglary is shown when there is evidence to establish each of the following elements: (1) a person attempted to enter an automobile when the doors were locked; and (2) at the time of the attempted entry, the person had the specific intent to commit damage inside of the automobile which would rise to the value of $400 or more.
An attempt to commit a crime consists of two elements, namely a specific intent to commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission.
In determining whether this act was done, it is necessary to distinguish between mere preparation, on the one hand, and the actual commencement of the doing of the criminal deed on the other. Mere preparation, which may consist of planning the offense or of devising, obtaining or arranging the means for its commission, is not sufficient to constitute an attempt where those acts clearly indicate a certain, unambiguous intent to commit that specific crime. These acts must be an immediate step in the present execution of the criminal design, the progress of which would be completed unless interrupted by some circumstance not intended in the original design.
The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an attempted auto burglary which threatened death or great bodily injury did not occur.

Petitioner further contends that the trial court should have instructed the jury, again sua sponte, regarding the affirmative defense found in California Penal Code section 197, subdivision 2, which states:

Homicide is also justifiable when committed by a person in any of the following cases . . . [w]hen committed in defense of habitation, property, or person against someone who manifestly intends to or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony, or against one who manifestly intends and endeavors, in a violent, riotous or tumultuous manner, to enter the habitation of another for the purpose of offering violence to any person therein.

The California Court of Appeal denied petitioner's claims regarding these instructions, reasoning that "there was not substantial evidence supportive of justification based on an attempted auto burglary that threatened death or great bodily injury." Leon, 2006 WL 2988981 at * 11. This conclusion is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, nor is it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.

In California, deadly force may be used in defense of property only when the person threatening the property is committing a forcible or atrocious crime. People v. Ceballos, 12 Cal. 3d 470, 478-79 (1974). A burglary is considered a forcible and atrocious crime only where it threatens death or bodily harm. Id. at 479. The state court's determination-that the evidence does not support a defense theory that petitioner reasonably acted to resist an attempted auto burglary that threatened death or great bodily harm-was not objectively unreasonable because there was no one in or around the neighbor's vehicle at the time Hernandez allegedly attempted to burglarize it. It was also not objectively unreasonable for the state court to find that Hernandez's alleged actions toward petitioner's neighbor's car did not instill a reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury in the petitioner. Indeed, petitioner admits that Hernandez did not know of petitioner's whereabouts when Hernandez was allegedly burglarizing the vehicle. Finally, petitioner's claim that he heard a BB gun is also not sufficient to make the instructions applicable. See Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 577 (9th Cir. 2004) (as amended) ("[f]ailure to instruct on the defense theory of the case is reversible error if the theory is legally sound and evidence in the case makes it applicable."). Hernandez never pointed the BB gun at petitioner and petitioner never saw the BB gun in Hernandez's possession. Moreover, Hernandez did not even know that petitioner was in the vicinity. Nakashima v. Takase does not support petitioner's claim either. 8 Cal. App. 2d 35, 37 (1935). Unlike here, the defendant in Nakashima was present inside his store while it was being burglarized. He was therefore threatened with death or serious bodily harm. Here, petitioner was not in or near the vehicle when it was allegedly being burglarized. Therefore, the failure to give the above instructions did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.

The court is also not convinced by the record that a plausible argument of an attempted burglary could be made, let alone one that threatened, or was reasonably believed to threaten death or serious bodily harm. The Court of Appeal also appears not to have been convinced of an attempted burglary theory since it refers to the conduct as "the asserted attempted burglary." Leon, 2006 WL 2988981 at *3 (emphasis added).

Petitioner also contends that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that "a citizen may use deadly force in order to apprehend a fleeing burglar." Specifically, petitioner argues that the trial court should have given CALJIC No. 5.25 which provides, "Homicide is justifiable and not unlawful when necessarily committed in attempting by lawful ways and means . . . to apprehend any dangerous person who has committed a felony." The California Court of Appeal denied this claim because the instruction was not supported by the evidence. Specifically, it held that this instruction only applies when the underlying felony poses a threat of death or serious bodily injury to others. Leon, 2006 WL 2988981 at *9. As discussed above, it was not objectively unreasonable to find that Hernandez's actions did not constitute a forcible or atrocious crime because there was no threat of death or serious bodily injury to anyone. Therefore, the Court of Appeal's conclusion is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, nor is it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Petitioner's claim is denied.

B. Requested instructions

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by refusing to give a jury instruction regarding the amount of force that may be used in defense of property. At trial, petitioner requested that the court instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 5.43, which provides:

When conditions are present which, under the law, justify a person in using force in defense of property, that person may use that degree and extent of force as would appear to a reasonable person, placed in the same position, and seeing and knowing what the resisting person then sees and knows, to be reasonably necessary to prevent imminent injury threatened to the property. Any use of force beyond that limit is excessive and unjustified, and anyone using excessive force is legally responsible for the consequences thereof.

The California Court of Appeal held that this requested instruction was not supported by the evidence. It noted that "[h]omicide is justifiable when committed by a person defending property when the person threatening the property manifests an intent to commit a forcible and atrocious crime." Leon, 2006 WL 2988981 at *7. It concluded that because Hernandez's attempted burglary did not threaten great bodily harm, petitioner was not justified in using deadly force as a matter of law; therefore, it held that the proposed instruction was not required. Id. The requested instruction was also found unnecessary because use of deadly force is not justified in defense of property. Id.

AEDPA requires federal habeas courts to "presume the correctness of state courts' factual findings" unless the petitioner presents "clear and convincing evidence." Schiro, 550 U.S. at 473-74 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). The California Court of Appeal's determination is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts because the evidence demonstrates that Hernandez was attempting to retreat when he was shot. Petitioner has not made a clear and convincing showing of a lack of retreat, except to argue that the retreat was only a few seconds old. This is not clear and convincing evidence that there was no retreat, and therefore the trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction regarding defense of property. Petitioner's reliance on Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery, 19 Cal. 4th 714 (1998), fails for the same reason. Nor was the state court's decision contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Under California law, deadly force may only be used to defend property to resist a forcible and atrocious crime, and no federal law finds this to be constitutionally impermissible.

Petitioner also contends that the trial court erred by refusing to give his proposed instruction that a BB gun is a dangerous or deadly weapon. Petitioner requested the following instruction:

A pellet gun, such as the weapon in evidence in this case, constitutes a deadly and dangerous weapon as a matter of law. As a deadly and dangerous weapon, a pellet gun is capable of inflicting great bodily injury.

The Court of Appeal denied this claim because the instruction was not supported by the evidence. The court concluded that petitioner could not have thought "he faced an objective risk of imminent harm from a BB/pellet gun." Leon, 2006 WL 2988981 at *9.

The Court of Appeal's decision was not an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. Hernandez never pointed the BB gun at petitioner and petitioner never saw the BB gun in Hernandez's possession. This instruction is not constitutionally necessary simply because petitioner later told an officer that he heard what sounded like BB's or that he believed Hernandez was shooting the BB gun. The state court reasonably concluded that even though petitioner may have heard the sound of BB's, because petitioner never saw the BB gun in Hernandez's possession, he could not have reasonably feared imminent harm from the BB gun. Indeed, petitioner admits that Hernandez did not know of petitioner's whereabouts when Hernandez was allegedly burglarizing the vehicle. For the same reasons, the state court's implicit conclusion-that petitioner's belief regarding possession of the BB gun by Hernandez was not objectively reasonable-was not in itself an objectively unreasonable determination. The state court properly concluded that this instruction was not necessary because the instruction is not supported by the evidence. Likewise, the failure to give the instruction was also not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.

C. Prejudicial instructions

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred by giving two instructions that improperly advised the jury on the theory of self-defense by an aggressor and contrived self defense claims. Pursuant to CALJIC No. 5.54, the trial court instructed the jury that:

The right to self defense is only available to a person who initiated an assault if he has done all the following: (1) He has actually tried in good faith to refuse to continue fighting; (2) He has clearly informed his opponent by either words or conduct that he wants to stop fighting; and (3) He has clearly informed his opponent by either words or conduct that he has stopped fighting. After he has done these three things, he has the right to self defense if his opponent continues to fight.

Pursuant to CALJIC No. 5.55, the trial court instructed the jury that:

The right of self-defense is not available to a person who seeks a quarrel with the intent to create a real or apparent necessity of exercising self-defense.

Petitioner contends that there was no factual basis for either of these instructions because petitioner was not an aggressor as a matter of law, and because petitioner did not engage in a "quarrel" with Hernandez.

An improper jury instruction will only violate due process where the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. The California Court of Appeal held that the instructions were not improper because the facts of the case could support the instructions depending on how the jury interpreted the facts. Leon, 2006 WL 2988981 at *8. The court also held that even if the instructions were improper, they did not prejudice petitioner because "in most cases the giving of an [instruction that is correct in law but irrelevant] is only a technical error which does not constitute ground for reversal." Id. The jury was instructed that not all instructions would be applicable to the facts as they determined them. With respect to CALJIC 5.54, if the jury determined that petitioner was not the aggressor, they would have ignored this instruction. Similarly, with respect to CALJIC 5.55, if the jury determined that petitioner did not commence the conflict in order to use a contrived plea of self defense, they would have ignored this instruction. However, if the jury determined that petitioner was the aggressor or sought to use a contrived plea of self defense, the associated instruction would be relevant. Therefore, petitioner cannot demonstrate any harm from these instructions. Indeed, numerous instructions regarding the defense theory of the case were also given, and the jury could have, if it chose, relied on those instructions. Leon, 2006 WL 2988981 at *7 (listing instructions).

Furthermore, with respect to CALJIC 5.54, it would be reasonable for the jury to conclude that petitioner was an aggressor not entitled to self-defense. Petitioner's argument that he could not be an aggressor as a matter of law is unconvincing. His only support is a reference to People v. Bloyd, 43 Cal. 3d 333 (1987). There, the defendant claimed that he was awakened by a gunshot and went to investigate. Id. at 354. He then emerged from the home in which he was staying, and found the decedent standing at the doorstep, pointing a gun directly at him. Id. According to the defendant, he then attempted to wrestle the gun away when it accidentally discharged and killed the decedent. Id. at 344. The court found that it was unnecessary to give an instruction regarding an initial aggressor acting in self defense because a defendant in that situation could never be the original aggressor: he did not have a weapon, he was confronted outside his own doorstep, and the decedent was pointing a gun directly at him. Id. Bloyd does not stand for the proposition that any person investigating any crime cannot be an aggressor as a matter of law. In contrast to Bloyd, petitioner was armed with a loaded gun whereas Hernandez was not, nor did Hernandez ever point any sort of a gun at petitioner, including a BB gun.

Similarly, with respect to CALJIC 5.55, the trial court's determination was not objectively unreasonable. Petitioner correctly states that "the common sense basis for the rule embodied in No. 5.55 is that a petitioner cannot commence a conflict with someone and then use a contrived plea of self defense in order to retroactively justify what was essentially an unprovoked criminal assault." Docket No. 25 (Traverse) at 22 (citing People v. Conkling, 111 Cal. 616 (1896), People v. Keys, 62 Cal. App. 2d 903 (1944), People v. Garnier, 95 Cal. App. 2d 489 (1950)). However, petitioner cannot demonstrate that CALJIC 5.55 cannot be supported by the facts here. The jury could have reasonably found that petitioner lay-in-wait behind his neighbor's bushes in order to surprise Hernandez, and thereafter himself created a deadly situation while Hernandez was retreating.

In sum, the California Court of Appeal's denial of petitioner's claims regarding these instructions was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.

III. Felony-murder

Petitioner raises a number of issues regarding the state court's application of the second degree felony-murder doctrine. He claims that instructing the jury regarding felony-murder and allowing a second degree felony-murder conviction based upon the felony of discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle is a due process violation. He also claims that the trial court's refusal to apply the collateral purpose rule led to both a due process and an equal protection violation. The California Supreme Court recently addressed the validity of these claims in People v. Chun, 45 Cal. 4th 1172 (2009). Chun was decided after petitioner's conviction became final and after this federal petition had been submitted.

According to Chun, California Penal Code section 187(a) defines murder as "the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought." Id. at 1181. The crime of murder includes malice as an element, defined in section 188, which may be either express or implied. Id. It is implied "when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart." Id. A defendant may also be found guilty of murder under the felony-murder rule. Id. at 1182. The felony-murder rule makes a killing, while committing certain felonies, a murder without the necessity of further examining the defendant's mental state. Id. The rule has two applications: first degree felony-murder and second degree felony-murder. Id. First degree felony-murder is a killing during the course of a felony specified in Section 189, such as rape, burglary or robbery. Id. Second degree felony-murder is "an unlawful killing in the course of the commission of a felony that is inherently dangerous to human life but is not included among the felonies enumerated in section 189. . . ." Id. (citing People v. Robertson, 34 Cal. 4th 156, 164 (2004)).

The "merger doctrine" states that the underlying felony in a second degree felony-murder charge must be an independent crime, and not the killing itself. Id. at 1189. Thus, certain underlying felonies "merge" with the homicide and cannot be used for purposes of felony-murder. Id. For example, because assault with a deadly weapon is usually an integral part of the homicide, it merges and cannot support a charge of second degree felony-murder. Id. (citing People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522 (1969)). Where it is not clear whether the underlying felony should merge with the homicide, the California Supreme Court until last year applied the "collateral purpose rule." Under this rule, the underlying felony would generally merge with the homicide if the purpose of the felony was to injure or assault the victim. The underlying felony would not merge with the homicide if there was an independent purpose to the felony. See People v. Robertson, 34 Cal. 4th 156, 173 (2004) (felony of negligent discharge of a firearm did not merge where the defendant fired into the air to frighten away a group of men); see also People v. Randle, 35 Cal. 4th 987, 1005 (2005) (felony of negligent discharge of a firearm merged where defendant admitted that he shot at the victim).

The California Supreme Court re-evaluated second degree felony-murder and the merger doctrine in Chun, 45 Cal. 4th 1172. The Chun court first found that the second degree felonymurder doctrine was rooted in statutory law and re-affirmed its constitutional validity. Id. at 1183-18 89. The court then examined the continued application of the "merger doctrine" to felonies that are assaultive in nature. Id. at 1197-1202. The court overruled three controlling California Supreme Court cases, People v. Hansen, 9 Cal.4th 300 (1994), Robertson, 34 Cal. 4th 156, and Randle, 35 Cal. 4th 987, and held that "[w]hen the underlying felony is assaultive in nature, such as [discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle and similar crimes], we now conclude that the felony merges with the homicide and cannot be the basis of a felony-murder instruction." Chun, 45 Cal. 4th at 1200. Thus, were petitioner being tried today, the discharging of a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle charge against him would merge into the second degree murder charge against him, and therefore could not form the basis for a second degree murder conviction based on the felonymurder rule.

As a threshold matter, petitioner contends that the second degree felony-murder instruction caused the jury to presume that the element of malice had been proven. Petitioner claims that while the first degree felony-murder rule has been routinely approved of, there is a statutory exception for that rule-California Penal Code section 189 — and it is therefore constitutional. Because there is no such statutory exception for second degree felony-murder, he contends it is invalid. However, petitioner fails to indicate how this long-existing rule is contrary to clearly established federal law. There are no Supreme Court cases specifically disapproving of state felony-murder statutes. Instead, the Supreme Court seems to have shown approval for such felony-murder statutes. See Locket v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 (1978) ("That States have authority to make aiders and abettors equally responsible, as a matter of law, with principals, or to enact felony-murder statutes is beyond constitutional challenge.").

Petitioner references Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265-66 (1989), which prohibits "conclusive presumptions" as to core elements of a crime. There is no conclusive presumption here. The California Court of Appeal correctly rejected this claim, explaining that "[a]lthough the second degree felony-murder doctrine operates as a substitute for implied malice, this does not mean that the doctrine results in a conclusive presumption of malice." Leon, 2006 WL 2988981 at *15 (citing People v. Dillon, 34 Cal.3d. 441, 475 (1983)) (internal quotations omitted). This reasoning, that the second degree felony-murder acts as a substitute for implied malice and is not a conclusive presumption, and has been used to support the constitutionality of California's second degree felonymurder rule on numerous occasions. See People v. Patterson, 49 Cal. 3d 615 (1989); Robertson, 34 Cal. 4th 156. Chun is also in accord. It explained that "although [the rule] derived from the common law, [it] is based on statute." 45 Cal. 4th at 1183. It stated that "[t]he felony-murder rule `acts as a substitute' for conscious-disregard-for-life malice. It simply describes a different form of malice under section 188. `The felony-murder rule imputes the requisite malice for a murder conviction to those who commit a homicide during the perpetration of a felony inherently dangerous to human life.'" Id. at 1181-84 (internal citations omitted). Because this substitution is not a conclusive presumption, the California Court of Appeal's reasoning is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.

In light of Chun, the court requested that the parties provide supplemental briefing on whether it applies retroactively to defendants whose convictions are final. Chun does not specify whether it is retroactively applicable and the court declines to so speculate. "`The retroactivity of a state change of law is a state question and the federal Constitution has no voice upon the subject.'" La Rue v. McCarthy, 833 F.2d 140, 142 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Northrop v. Alexander, 642 F. Supp. 324, 327 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (Lynch, J.)). Therefore, this matter of state law must first be exhausted in state court before the court can determine its compliance with federal law.

Petitioner also claims that he was wrongly convicted under the "already existing, but unspoken, rule that shooting at an occupied vehicle will not support a second degree felony-murder theory." Docket No. 37 (Petitioner's Supp. Brief) at 3. This is not an argument concerning the retroactive application of Chun. Rather, petitioner is arguing that Chun clarified the law as it existed when he was convicted and therefore the jury should not have been instructed on second degree felony-murder. This issue need not be exhausted because petitioner has already presented his felony-murder arguments to the state courts on multiple occasions. See Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 43 (1967) (" Still more state litigation would be both unnecessarily time-consuming and otherwise burdensome. This is not a case in which there is any substantial state interest in ruling once again on petitioner's case. We can conceive of no reason why the State would wish to burden its judicial calendar with a narrow issue the resolution of which is predetermined by established federal principles.").

The jury was instructed that it could convict petitioner of second degree murder on one of two bases: 1) upon a finding of malice; or 2) upon a finding that the killing occurred during the commission of the felony of discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle. If the holding in Chun was a clarification of the merger doctrine as it existed at the time petitioner's conviction became final, then it was improper to give the second instruction because such a felony would merge with the homicide. See Fiore v. White,

Willfulness is equivalent to intentional, purposeful, or deliberate conduct. Buckley v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 306, 323 (4th Cir. 2008). In Goodman, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 523, this Court held that the defendant "willfully destroyed evidence that it knew to be relevant" because its chief executive officer deleted her emails, and the defendant destroyed the officer's computer. Conduct that is in bad faith must be willful, but conduct that is willful need not rise to bad faith actions. See Buckley, 538 F.3d at 323; Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 71 F.3d 148, 156 (4th Cir. 1995); Goodman, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 520. While bad faith requires "destruction for the purpose of depriving the adversary of the evidence," Powell v. Town of Sharpsburg, 591 F. Supp. 2d 814, 820 (E.D.N.C. 2008), for willfulness, it is sufficient that the actor intended to destroy the evidence. See Goodman, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 520; see also United Med. Supply Co., 77 Fed. Cl. at 268 (distinguishing bad faith and willfulness).

Nevertheless, courts often combine their analysis of willfulness and bad faith. E.g., Metro. Opera Ass'n, 212 F.R.D. at 224-25; Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 644; Krumwiede, 2006 WL 1308629, at *9-10. Thus, the following factors supported a finding of intentionality and bad faith in the Fifth Circuit:

[t]he evidence that the defendants knew about the litigation with Rimkus when they deleted the emails; the inconsistencies in the explanations for deleting the emails; the failure to disclose information about personal email accounts that were later revealed as having been used to obtain and disseminate information from Rimkus; and the fact that some of the emails reveal what the defendants had previously denied.
Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 644. And, in the Second Circuit, the following facts lead the district court to the same conclusion: defendants "failed to comply with several court orders"; destroyed evidence; failed to search for and produce documents; and lied about "simple but material factual matters." Metro. Opera Ass'n, 212 F.R.D. at 224-25.

In Krumwiede, 2006 WL 1308629, at *9-10, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found "willful and bad faith spoliation of evidence." Notably, immediately after the defendant in that case sent a preservation letter to Krumwiede's attorney, referring in particular to a laptop in Kruwiede's possession, and again after the court ordered Krumwiede to return the laptop, the laptop "experienced a spike in activity . . . that resulted in the alteration, modification, or destruction of thousands of potentially relevant files and their metadata." Id. at *9. Also, "Krumwiede lied to th[e] Court when he testified that he did not receive notice of the September 15, 2005 order until September 16, 2005," and "continued [to] obstruct[] discovery even after relinquishing control of [the] laptop." Id. at *9-10. The court reached its conclusion based on "the volume and timing of Krumwiede's activities." Id.

Here, the parties disagree about Defendants' level of culpability. Plaintiff characterizes Pappas' behavior as "egregious" and perjurous, and it insists that "Pappas has exhibited a pattern of litigation abuse and a persistent disrespect for the judicial process." Pl.'s Mot. 56, 69. According to Plaintiff, "the record is replete with multiple conscious and affirmative acts by Pappas that led to the deliberate destruction of relevant evidence. Pl.'s Reply 1. Defendants acknowledge wrongdoing but insist that their "culpable state of mind was negligence." Defs.' Opp'n 25. Moreover, according to Defendants, Pappas's September 27, 2007 Rule 37 certification was not false because he was not aware that his production was incomplete. Id. at 9-10. They insist that Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants "manufactured evidence" and removed data instead of producing all ESI are "unfounded." Id. at 14-16. I disagree.

I find the circumstances of this case to be indistinguishable from other cases in which the spoliating party was found to have acted in bad faith. The discussion supra at Sections I.1-I.9 convincingly demonstrates that Pappas, and through him CPI, directly and with the aid of DeRouen and "Federico," set out to delete, destroy, or hide thousands of files containing highly relevant ESI pertaining to Plaintiff's claims. Suffice it also to say that in both Krumwiede, 2006 WL 1308629, at *9-10, and Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 607, 629, 644, as well as in this case, the spoliating parties lied about their ESI production; obstructed the discovery process; and intentionally destroyed evidence when they were aware of the lawsuit. As in Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, Pappas disposed of an entire hard drive, despite his knowledge of the lawsuit, and provided wildly inconsistent explanations of his ESI deletions. Id. at 607, 644. As in Krumwiede, 2006 WL 1308629, at *9-10, "the volume and timing" of Defendants' spoliation is telling: Defendants deleted thousands of files and ran programs to ensure their permanent loss immediately following preservation requests and orders, and immediately before scheduled discovery efforts. And, as in Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, 212 F.R.D. at 224-25, Defendants' destruction of evidence was compounded by their failure to comply with numerous court orders. In sum, Defendants took repeated, deliberate measures to prevent the discovery of relevant ESI, clearly acting in bad faith, and if affidavits, depositions, and in open court, Pappas nonchalantly lied about what he had done.

3. Relevance of Lost Evidence and Resulting Prejudice

The third consideration is the relevance of the lost evidence. In the context of spoliation, lost or destroyed evidence is "relevant" if "a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the lost evidence would have supported the claims or defenses of the party that sought it." Thompson, 219 F.R.D. at 101; see Goodman, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 509 (same). It is not enough for the evidence to have been "sufficiently probative to satisfy Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence," i.e., to have `any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.'" Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 467 (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 401). Moreover, for the court to issue sanctions, the absence of the evidence must be prejudicial to the party alleging spoliation of evidence. Id.; see Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Alcoa, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 335, 346 (M.D. La. 2006) (noting that, in determining whether an adverse inference is warranted, the "`relevance' factor" involves not only relevance but also "whether the non-destroying party has suffered prejudice from the destruction of the evidence"); see also Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 616 (quoting Consol. Aluminum Corp., 244 F.R.D. at 346). Put another way, a finding of "relevance" for purposes of spoliation sanctions is a two-pronged finding of relevance and prejudice.

Spoliation of evidence causes prejudice when, as a result of the spoliation, the party claiming spoliation cannot present "evidence essential to its underlying claim." Krumwiede, 2006 WL 1308629, at *10 (noting that even if the files were only modified and not deleted, "the changes to the file metadata call the authenticity of the files and their content into question and make it impossible for [the defendant] to rely on them"). "Prejudice can range along a continuum from an inability to prove claims or defenses to little or no impact on the presentation of proof." Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 613. Generally, courts find prejudice where a party's ability to present its case or to defend is compromised. E.g., Silvestri, 271 F.3d at 593-94 (significant prejudice resulted when plaintiff's failure to preserve vehicle after accident giving rise to litigation "substantially denied the defendant the ability to defend the claim"). However, at least one court has found that the delayed production of evidence causes prejudice. See Jones, 2010 WL 2106640, at *8-9 (noting that the defendant's one-year delay in producing documents caused prejudice to the plaintiff). The court considers prejudice to the party and "prejudice to the judicial system." Krumwiede, 2006 WL 1308629, at *11.

When the party alleging spoliation shows that the other party acted willfully in failing to preserve evidence, the relevance of that evidence is presumed in the Fourth Circuit. Sampson, 251 F.R.D. at 179; Thompson, 219 F.R.D. at 101. Negligent or even grossly negligent conduct is not sufficient to give rise to the presumption; in the absence of intentional loss or destruction of evidence, the party "must establish that the lost documents were relevant to her case." Sampson, 251 F.R.D. at 179; see Thompson, 219 F.R.D. at 101. Similarly, in the Seventh Circuit, unintentional conduct is insufficient for a presumption of relevance. In re Kmart Corp., 371 B.R. 823, 853-54 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007). However, in the Second Circuit, in the court's discretion, "[r]elevance and prejudice may be presumed when the spoliating party acted in bad faith or in a grossly negligent manner." Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 467 (emphasis added). Also, "[t]he Fifth Circuit has not explicitly addressed whether even bad-faith destruction of evidence allows a court to presume that the destroyed evidence was relevant or its loss prejudicial." Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 617-18. Where there is a presumption, the spoliating party may rebut this presumption by showing "that the innocent party has not been prejudiced by the absence of the missing information." Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 468. If the spoliating party makes such a showing, "the innocent party, of course, may offer evidence to counter that proof." Id. As with the other elements, the lack of a uniform standard regarding the level of culpability required to warrant spoliation sanctions has created uncertainty and added to the concern that institutional and organizational entities have expressed regarding how to conduct themselves in a way that will comply with multiple, inconsistent standards.

This distinction is all the more significant because, as noted, in the Second Circuit, certain conduct is considered gross negligence per se. Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 471. Thus, for example, if a party fails to issue a written litigation hold, the court finds that it is grossly negligent, in which case relevance and prejudice are presumed. Point. Game. Match.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that "Defendants' massive and intentional destruction of emails and documents has substantially prejudiced, to various degrees, its ability to prove all of its claims, both in terms of liability and the extent of damages." Pl.'s Reply 43. According to Plaintiff, Defendants' actions caused prejudice because the ESI that Defendants "irretrievably deleted, destroyed and spoliated . . . contained the very information and `fingerprints' that would establish all or most of the elements of Counts I, II, VII, and VIII." Pl.'s Mot. 76. Although Plaintiff concedes that "many of the known deletions . . . were eventually recovered in whole or in part," id., significant numbers of files were permanently destroyed. On the record before me, the evidence of prejudice to Plaintiff is manifest.

Defendants' willful, bad faith conduct allows this Court to presume relevance and prejudice. Defendants utterly fail to rebut this presumption through their inconsistent and incredible explanations for their destruction of ESI. Moreover, as painstakingly discussed in Sections I.2-I.9, supra, it is obvious that the permanent loss of thousands of relevant files that proved that Defendants improperly accessed and used Plaintiff's proprietary information is prejudicial, because, even if the files were cumulative to some extent, Plaintiff's case against Defendants is weaker when it cannot present the overwhelming quantity of evidence it otherwise would have had to support its case. Defendants themselves cannot seriously believe that their willful misconduct did not cause prejudice, because they acquiesced to the entry of a default judgment on Count I, Plaintiff's core claim, a clear concession that the spoliated documents were relevant to that claim and their destruction caused prejudice. And, lest there be any doubt, Defendants affirmatively stated with regard to the copyright claim: ""[W]e've given up on prejudice. . . . which I think was the appropriate thing to do. We gave up on the issue of relevance. . . ." June 25, 2010 Hr'g Tr. 3:16-22. Thus, the loss of ESI deprived Plaintiff of relevant evidence, and this loss was prejudicial.

C. Sanctions

In determining what sanctions are appropriate, the Court must consider the extent of prejudice, if any, along with the degree of culpability, and, as with the other elements, possible sanctions vary by jurisdiction. See Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 201 (D.S.C. 2009); Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 613-15. The harshest sanctions may apply not only when both severe prejudice and bad faith are present, but also when, for example, culpability is minimally present, if there is a considerable showing of prejudice, or, alternatively, the prejudice is minimal but the culpability is great, as discussed infra. For example, in some, but not all, circuits, conduct that does not rise above ordinary negligence may be sanctioned by dismissal if the resulting prejudice is great. Silvestri, 271 F.3d at 593 (stating that dismissal may be an appropriate sanction for negligent conduct "if the prejudice to the defendant is extraordinary, denying it the ability to adequately defend its case" and dismissing case without concluding whether plaintiff's conduct rose above negligence); see Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 614-15 ("The First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits hold that bad faith is not essential to imposing severe sanctions if there is severe prejudice, although the cases often emphasize the presence of bad faith. In the Third Circuit, the courts balance the degree of fault and prejudice.") (footnotes omitted). Conversely, absence of either intentional conduct or significant prejudice may lessen the potential appropriate sanctions. In the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, for example, courts may not impose severe sanctions absent evidence of bad faith. See Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 614; Managed Care Solutions, Inc. v. Essent Healthcare, Inc., No. 09-60351-CIV, 2010 WL 3368654, at *12-13 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2010). The different approaches among the Circuits regarding the level of culpability that must be shown to warrant imposition of severe sanctions for spoliation is another reason why commentators have expressed such concern about the lack of a consensus standard and the uncertainty it causes.

Sanctions that a federal court may impose for spoliation include assessing attorney's fees and costs, giving the jury an adverse inference instruction, precluding evidence, or imposing the harsh, case-dispositive sanctions of dismissal or judgment by default. Goodman, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 506; In re NTL, Inc. Secs. Litig., 244 F.R.D. at 191. The court may also "treat[] as contempt of court the failure to obey" a court order to provide or permit discovery of ESI evidence. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vii). "While a district court has broad discretion in choosing an appropriate sanction for spoliation, `the applicable sanction should be molded to serve the prophylactic, punitive, and remedial rationales underlying the spoliation doctrine.'" Silvestri, 271 F.3d at 590 (quoting West, 167 F.3d at 779). Put another way, appropriate sanctions should "(1) deter parties from engaging in spoliation; (2) place the risk of an erroneous judgment on the party who wrongfully created the risk; and (3) restore `the prejudiced party to the same position he would have been in absent the wrongful destruction of evidence by the opposing party.'" Thus, the range of available sanctions serve both normative — designed to punish culpable conduct and deter it in others — and compensatory — designed to put the party adversely affected by the spoliation in a position that is as close to what it would have been in had the spoliation not occurred — functions. Because, as noted above, the duty to preserve relevant evidence is owed to the court, it is also appropriate for a court to consider whether the sanctions it imposes will "prevent abuses of the judicial system" and "promote the efficient administration of justice." Jones, 2010 WL 2106640, at *5. The court must "impose the least harsh sanction that can provide an adequate remedy." Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 469; see Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 618.

In this case, Plaintiff has urged this Court to impose the most severe of sanctions, including entry of a default judgment as to all remaining counts — Counts I (copyright infringment), II (unfair competition), VII (Lanham Act violations, namely false advertising and reverse palming off), and VIII (patent violations) — for both liability and damages; assessment of attorney's fees and costs for what likely will amount to most of the litigation costs that Plaintiff has incurred; assessment of a civil fine; and referral of the matter to the United States Attorney for initiation of criminal proceedings against Pappas for "criminal contempt of Court, obstruction of justice, and perjury." Pl.'s Mot. 97, 98, 99. On the record before me, Plaintiff hardly can be blamed for taking such an extreme position. Indeed, as exhaustively inventoried above, Defendants' willful misconduct has had a considerable adverse impact on the Court's pretrial schedule, imposed substantial burden on two judges of this Court and their staffs, and Pappas has essentially thumbed his nose at the Court's efforts to oversee a pretrial process that would facilitate a fair and timely resolution of this case on its merits. Nonetheless, in fashioning spoliation sanctions, Courts must strive to issue orders that generate light, rather than heat, and without ignoring the magnitude of willful misconduct and prejudice, must fashion remedies that strike the appropriate balance between those that are normative and those that are compensatory. With this in mind, I will turn to what sanctions are appropriate in this case. 1. Dismissal or Default Judgment

As this Court noted in Sampson, 251 F.R.D. at 180 n. 11:

Most of the Fourth Circuit cases involving sanctions for spoliation of evidence arise in the context of a defendant asking for dismissal of a plaintiff's claims because of destruction of evidence by the plaintiff. As the Fifth Circuit has noted, "[b]ecause . . . rendering default judgment is equally as harsh a sanction as dismissing the case of a plaintiff with prejudice, we cite cases involving these sanctions interchangeably." Pressey [ v. Patterson, 898 F.2d 1018, 1021 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1990)]. The court here cites cases involving requests for default judgment and for dismissal interchangeably.

Courts may order a default judgment or dismissal to "send a strong message to other litigants, who scheme to abuse the discovery process and lie to the Court, that this behavior will not be tolerated and will be severely sanctioned." Krumwiede, 2006 WL 1308629, at *11. In the Fourth Circuit, to order these harshest sanctions, the court must "`"be able to conclude either (1) that the spoliator's conduct was so egregious as to amount to a forfeiture of his claim, or (2) that the effect of the spoliator's conduct was so prejudicial that it substantially denied the defendant the ability to defend the claim."'" Goodman, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 519 (quoting Sampson, 251 F.R.D. at 180 (quoting Silvestri, 271 F.3d at 593)) (emphasis in Goodman). To conclude that the second prong was met, i.e., that there was sufficient prejudice to warrant dismissal or a default judgment, "the Court must examine the record that remains to determine whether it contain[ed] enough data" for the aggrieved party to build its case or defense, and "the Court must decide whether a lesser sanction than dismissal [or default judgment] would level the playing field." Erie Ins. Exch. v. Davenport Insulation, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 2d 701, 707 (D. Md. 2009); see Sampson, 251 F.R.D. at 180 (stating that second prong requires proof that "plaintiff was highly prejudiced and denied the only means to establish her case.").

Although " Silvestri posits an either/or test," Erie Ins. Exch., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 707, indicating two distinct means of justifying severe sanctions, this Court has not terminated a case where a spoliator acted in bad faith, absent a showing of substantial prejudice. Elsewhere, dispositive or potentially dispositive sanctions are impermissible without bad faith, even if there is considerable prejudice. See Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 614 (In the Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, "the severe sanctions of granting default judgment, striking pleadings, or giving adverse inference instructions may not be imposed unless there is evidence of `bad faith.'"); see also the Appendix to this Memorandum, Order and Recommendation (identifying requirements by jurisdiction). And, in the Fifth Circuit, "[a] severe sanction such as a default judgment or an adverse inference instruction requires bad faith and prejudice." Id. at 642 (emphasis added). The sheer variety of formulae used by various courts to determine whether case-dispositive sanctions are appropriate also contributes to the difficulty that lawyers and clients experience in attempting to evaluate the risks and consequences of failing to preserve evidence.

VSI cites various cases in which the Fourth Circuit has affirmed default or dismissal as a sanction for spoliation, but in many cases the court found irreparable prejudice. See Pl.'s Mot. 53 (citing King v. Am. Power Conversion Corp., 181 Fed. App'x 373, 374 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal as sanction when plaintiff's negligence caused irreparable prejudice); Silvestri, 271 F.3d 583 (same); PVD Plast. Mould Indus., Ltd. v. Polymer Grp., 31 Fed. App'x 210, 211 (4th Cir. 2002) (same)). In other cases, the issue concerned a party's failure to produce discovery (not its failure to preserve ESI) and, in any event, there was substantial prejudice. See Pl.'s Mot. 53 (citing Anderson v. Found. for Advancement, Educ. Emp't of Am. Indians, 155 F.3d 500, 504-05 (4th Cir. 1998) (affirming default judgment "as a last-resort sanction" where defendant in bad faith "stonewalled on discovery from the inception of the lawsuit," failing to comply with court orders to produce documents, and the delayed production caused prejudice because plaintiff's "claim became junior to that of another claimant suing the Foundation"); Zornes v. Specialty Indus., Inc., No. 97-2337, 1998 WL 886997 (4th Cir. Dec. 21, 1998) (affirming dismissal where plaintiffs in bad faith failed to comply with court orders to answer interrogatories, and the delayed production caused "substantial prejudice"). In Zaczek v. Fauquier County, 764 F. Supp. 1071 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd, 16 F.3d 414 (4th Cir. 1993), the district court dismissed a prisoner's case for failure to comply with rules of procedure.
In its own research, which has been considerable, the Court has identified only one case — in a different circuit — that was terminated based solely on a party's bad faith spoliation of evidence. In Miller v. Time-Warner Communications, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 7286, 1999 WL 739528, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1999), the plaintiff tried unsuccessfully to erase handwritten notes on documents produced and then lied about it. Reasoning that the plaintiff's spoliation of evidence was willful and in bad faith and, significantly, she committed "repeated instances of perjury," the court concluded that although there was no prejudice whatsoever, "the only appropriate sanction [was] to dismiss the complaint." Id. It noted that, had the plaintiff not committed perjury, the "lesser sanction of requiring plaintiff to pay all the defendant's attorneys fees incurred as a result of the spoliation might [have] be[en] appropriate." Id. Accordingly, lofty discussions about the truth-seeking purpose of a lawsuit and the need to deter conduct that interferes with it aside, it does not appear that courts have imposed ultimate case-ending sanctions in many cases where there has not also been a showing of extreme prejudice.

2. Adverse Inference and Other Adverse Jury Instructions

In its discretion, the court may order an adverse inference instruction, which informs a jury that it may "draw adverse inferences from . . . the loss of evidence, or the destruction of evidence," by assuming that failure to preserve was because the spoliator was aware that the evidence would have been detrimental. Vodusek, 71 F.3d at 156. Because such a definitive inference is not always warranted, courts have crafted various levels of adverse inference jury instructions: The court may instruct the jury that "certain facts are deemed admitted and must be accepted as true"; impose a mandatory, yet rebuttable, presumption; or "permit[] (but . . . not require) a jury to presume that the lost evidence is both relevant and favorable to the innocent party." Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 470-71; see examples cited in the Appendix to this Memorandum, Order and Recommendation. In this Circuit, to impose an adverse jury instruction, the court "must only find that the spoliator acted willfully in the destruction of evidence." Goodman, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 519 (citing Vodusek, 71 F.3d 148, and noting at footnote 15 that "in the Fourth Circuit, the Vodusek standard detailing the requirements for an adverse jury instruction remains applicable," rather than the oft-cited Zubulake IV standard from the Southern District of New York, because although it "remains insightful," the Zubulake IV standard "could be read to limit the availability of sanctions" in this Circuit); see Sampson, 251 F.R.D. at 181. But see Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 478-79 (stating that an adverse jury instruction was warranted for the grossly negligent, but unintentional, conduct). While negligence or even gross negligence is not sufficient in this Circuit, the conduct need not rise to the level of bad faith. Goodman, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 519. But see Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 617 (stating that "the severe sanctions of . . . giving adverse inference instructions may not be imposed unless there is evidence of `bad faith.'"); see also Faas v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 532 F.3d 633, 644 (7th Cir. 2008) (same); Johnson v. Avco Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1110 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (same); Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 745, 747 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that if spoliation occurs before litigation commences, there must be evidence of bad faith for the court to impose an adverse inference instruction, but if spoliation occurs during litigation, the court may impose an adverse inference instruction "even absent an explicit bad faith finding"). The court must also consider relevance and prejudice. Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 467; see Vodusek, 71 F.3d at 156 ("To draw an adverse inference from the absence, loss or destruction of evidence, it would have to appear that the evidence would have been relevant to an issue at trial and otherwise would naturally have been introduced into evidence."). Once again, the approaches taken by courts vary widely, making predictability difficult for parties who are trying to determine what they must preserve, and what can happen if they do not. 3. Attorney's Fees, Costs, and Fines

Again, the significance of this departure comes to light when it is viewed in the context of the chain reaction spurred by considering certain conduct gross negligence per se. If, for example, a court adopts the position of Pension Committee, 685 F. Supp. 2d at 471, that a failure to institute a written litigation hold is gross negligence per se, and therefore presumes relevance and prejudice, it is inexorably poised to give an adverse jury instruction without further analysis. This approach is not consistent with Fourth Circuit precedent.

Less severe sanctions include costs, attorney's fees, and fines, which not only compensate the prejudiced party but also "punish the offending party for its actions" and "deter the litigant's conduct, sending the message that egregious conduct will not be tolerated." See Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 467, 471; Goodman, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 506. (citations and quotation marks omitted). The court's "inquiry focuses more on the conduct of the spoliating party than on whether documents were lost, and, if so, whether those documents were relevant and resulted in prejudice to the innocent party." Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 467. This Court will award costs or fees in conjunction with a spoliation motion as an alternative to a harsher sanction; if further discovery is necessary due to the spoliation; or in addition to another sanction, in which case the award may be for "reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees," or also for the cost of investigating the spoliator's conduct. Goodman, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 524. Additionally, a few courts have ordered the spoliating party to pay a fine to the clerk of court or a bar association for prolonging litigation and wasting the court's time and resources. E.g., Pinstripe, Inc. v. Manpower, Inc., No. 07-CV-620-GKF-PJC, 2009 WL 2252131, at *4 (N.D. Okla. July 29, 2009); Claredi v. Seebeyond Tech. Corp., No. 4:04CV1304 RWS, 2007 WL 735018, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 8, 2007); Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 81, 111 (D.N.J. 2006); Turnage, 115 F.R.D. at 559. However, as stated supra at page 59, it is unclear whether these unappealed trial court holdings would withstand appellate review, because in similar cases the Fourth and Tenth Circuits have vacated discovery sanctions ordering the payment of money to the Clerk of the Court, deeming them to be criminal contempt sanctions, which are unavailable without the enhanced due process procedure requirements criminal contempt proceedings require. Bradley v. Am. Household, Inc., 378 F.3d 373, 377-79 (4th Cir. 2004); Buffington v. Baltimore Cnty., Md., 913 F.2d 113, 133 (4th Cir. 1990); Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1438, 1442-44 (10th Cir. 1998).

4. Contempt of Court

Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vii) provides that the court may "treat[] as contempt of court the failure to obey" a court order to provide or permit discovery of ESI evidence. Similarly, pursuant to its inherent authority, the court may impose fines or prison sentences for contempt and enforce "the observance of order." United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). Contempt sanctions may be civil or criminal. Buffington, 913 F.2d at 133-34.

When the nature of the relief and the purpose for which the contempt sanction is imposed is remedial and intended to coerce the contemnor into compliance with court orders or to compensate the complainant for losses sustained, the contempt is civil; if, on the other hand, the relief seeks to vindicate the authority of the court by punishing the contemnor and deterring future litigants' misconduct, the contempt is criminal. . . .
If the relief provided is a sentence of imprisonment, it is remedial if "the defendant stands committed unless and until he performs the affirmative act required by the court's order," and is punitive if "the sentence is limited to imprisonment for a definite period." If the relief provided is a fine, it is remedial when it is paid to the complainant, and punitive when it is paid to the court, though a fine that would be payable to the court is also remedial when the defendant can avoid paying the fine simply by performing the affirmative act required by the court's order.
Id. (quoting Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1988) (citations omitted)); see also Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828, (1994) ("The paradigmatic coercive, civil contempt sanction . . . involves confining a contemnor indefinitely until he complies with an affirmative command such as an order `to pay alimony, or to surrender property ordered to be turned over to a receiver, or to make a conveyance.'" (quoting Gompers v. Bucks Cnty. Stove Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911)); Bradley, 378 F.3d at 378 (discussing the "basic difference between civil and criminal contempt sanctions" and quoting Buffington, 913 F.2d at 133).

"Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense," Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968), requiring the procedural protections of notice and a hearing. Bradley, 378 F.3d at 379. Therefore, to treat a party's failure to comply with a court order as criminal contempt, the court must refer the matter to the United States Attorney for prosecution. Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a)(2). If that office declines to accept the case (a highly probable outcome in most instances), then the court must appoint a private prosecutor to bring the criminal contempt case. Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a)(2); Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987) (concluding that federal courts possess inherent authority to initiate "contempt proceedings for disobedience of their orders, authority which necessarily encompasses the ability to appoint a private attorney to prosecute the contempt"); Buffington, 913 F.2d at 132 (vacating order imposing criminal contempt sanctions without required procedural protections; noting that district court, "following the procedure outlined in Young [ 481 U.S. at 801] initially referred the matter to the United States Attorney" and "[a]fter the U.S. Attorney declined to prosecute, the court, citing Young, appointed a private prosecutor," but ultimately improperly imposed fines payable to the clerk of the court as civil contempt sanctions). If brought, the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 444; Bradley, 378 F.3d at 379. Additionally, the defendant is entitled to a jury trial if the sentence will be longer than six months. Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a)(3); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966) ("[S]entences exceeding six months for criminal contempt may not be imposed by federal courts absent a jury trial or waiver thereof."). Recently, another court in the Fourth Circuit referred a case to the United States Attorney for criminal contempt proceedings against a party for spoliation of ESI in a civil case. See SonoMedica, Inc. v. Mohler, No. 1:08-cv-230 (GBL), 2009 WL 2371507, at *1 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2009).

To hold a party in civil contempt, the court must find that four elements have been established by clear and convincing evidence:

"(1) the existence of a valid decree of which the alleged contemnor had actual or constructive knowledge; (2) that the decree was in the movant's `favor'; (3) that the alleged contemnor by its conduct violated the terms of the decree, and had knowledge (at least constructive knowledge) of such violation; and (4) that [the] movant suffered harm as a result."
Id. at *3 (quoting Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 288, 301 (4th Cir. 2000)).

5. Appropriate Sanctions for Defendants a. Default judgment as to liability on copyright claim only

Plaintiff argues that "only the severest forms of sanctions" would be "effective" against Defendants. Pl.'s Mot. 90-91. As Plaintiff sees it, "[i]f this Court finds that Defendants' misconduct was egregious enough to have justified a forfeiture of their defenses, then it need not also determine whether Defendants' misconduct denied VSI the ability to prove all its claims." Pl.'s Reply 5-6. See Erie Ins. Exch., 659 F. Supp. 2d at 707. Defendants contend that here, unlike in the cases in which courts have sanctioned the spoliating party through a default judgment or dismissal, "the lost evidence is not the sole evidence at issue on liability," such that a default judgment on the copyright claim, the unfair competition claim, the alleged Lanham Act violations, and the alleged patent violation, i.e., all remaining counts, is not appropriate. Defs.' Opp'n 45. Moreover, as Defendants see it, a court may impose a default judgment "on only those claims that make a cause of action and not on those to which the defendant possessed a viable legal defense." Defs.' Surreply 3.

As noted, Defendants admit spoliation, relevance, and prejudice, and consent to a default judgment on liability for Count I, the copyright claim. Further, the facts amply demonstrate the intentional, bad faith permanent destruction of a significant quantity of relevant evidence, to the Plaintiff's detriment. Thus, it is clearly appropriate that the spoliation consequences include a judgment finding CPI and Pappas liable on Count I.

Defendants indulge in a little verbal legerdemain in characterizing their position regarding Count I. They acquiesce to the entry of a "consent" judgment, rather than the entry by the Court of a default judgment. While the end result is the same under either characterization, the latter makes it unambiguous that the outcome is as a severe sanction for egregious misconduct; the former implies a form of agreement without the pejorative classification, similar to settling a claim without admitting liability. It would be inappropriate for the Court to indulge Defendants in this face-saving effort. Defendants cannot have their cake and eat it too. They cannot admit to breach of the duty to preserve and acknowledge (or, more accurately, capitulate) on the issues of prejudice and relevance, but attempt to sanitize the result by labeling it something other than what it is — a sanction. Accordingly, the appropriate sanction is the entry of a default judgment as to liability for Count I, copyright infringement, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vi). Because this is a dispositive outcome, I am recommending that Judge Garbis impose it, rather than doing so myself, although there can be no doubt that this result is warranted on this record.

It is far less certain, however, whether Plaintiff has demonstrated that a default judgment as to all the remaining counts alleged against Defendants is required, or that a default judgment as to damages for all counts, including Count I, is warranted. The copyright claim always has been Plaintiff's primary claim, and it is easy to see how the evidence that was destroyed prejudiced Plaintiff's efforts to prove it. The same cannot be said about the remaining counts for unfair competition (Count II), Lanham Act violations, namely false advertising and reverse palming off (Count VII), and patent violations (Count VIII) — for both liability and damages; at least not at this time and on this record. While it may be correct that evidence that would be relevant to prove the copyright claim might also be relevant to proving the others, Plaintiff has not yet made the necessary showing of irreparable or substantial prejudice. Therefore, dispositive sanctions are inappropriate with regard to those counts. See Silvestri, 271 F.3d at 593; Goodman, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 519; Sampson, 251 F.R.D. at 180.

Similarly, with the exception of the remedy of the entry of a permanent injunction as to the copyright claim, which Defendants do not oppose, Defs.' Opp'n 29 Ex. 11, it is not clear that Plaintiff has demonstrated an inability to prove monetary damages for any of the counts alleged. The debate all these years has focused on liability, not damages. While Plaintiff ultimately may be able to make this showing, it has not done so yet. Accordingly, entry of a default judgment as to monetary damages is denied, without prejudice. Rather, it is appropriate for the court to schedule a trial on the issues of liability for Counts II (unfair competition), VII (Lanham Act violations), and VIII (Patent Act violations), and money damages for all counts. Counsel have informed the Court that they do not seek a jury trial on these issues. (June 25, 2010 Hr'g Tr. 5:19 — 6:11.) Accordingly, these issued will be tried to the Court. I recommend that Plaintiff be permitted to proceed, but that if in the future of this litigation Plaintiff is able to demonstrate with greater particularity than it has to date that it cannot meet its burden of proof as to liability for Counts II (unfair competition), VII (Lanham Act violations), and VIII (Patent Act violations), or money damages as to all counts, because of Defendants' spoliation, then the Court should revisit at that time whether additional sanctions, such as the entry of an order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A)(ii) prohibiting Defendants from supporting their defenses to liability on Counts II, VII, and VIII, or money damages; or prohibiting them from opposing Plaintiff's proof of money damages; or finding Defendants liable for the counts other than copyright. b. Permanent injunction on the copyright claim

As for the permanent injunction on the copyright count, which Plaintiff requests and Defendants do not oppose, Defs.' Opp'n 29 Ex. 11, I am recommending that Judge Garbis grant this as a sanction.

c. Attorney's fees, costs, and civil, but not criminal, contempt

As the prevailing party, Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(C) (For failure to comply with a court order to provide or permit discovery, "the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust."). Here, the failure was not substantially justified, and there are no circumstances making such an award unjust. Indeed, Defendants conceded that a fee award would be appropriate when Defense counsel stated that "the Court . . . would determine what would be the appropriate attorneys' fees." (June 25, 2010 Hr'g Tr. 3:16-22.) Thus, spoliation sanctions shall include costs and legal fees allocable to spoliation. Specifically, as Plaintiff requested, the Court shall award attorney's fees and costs, including costs related to uncovering Defendants' discovery abuses; preparing, filing, and arguing all of Plaintiff's ESI motions; and retaining Guidance Software and Andreas Spruill. To that end, Plaintiff shall submit a bill of costs within thirty (30) days of this Memorandum, Order and Recommendation, with Defendants' response, if any, to be submitted within thirty (30) days thereafter.

Plaintiff also has asked the Court to refer this case to the United States Attorney to evaluate whether perjury or other criminal charges should be brought against Pappas. Pl.'s Mot. 98. Such action is unusual and extreme for spoliation cases, but not unheard of. See, e.g., SonoMedica Inc., 2009 WL 2371507. I have given serious thought to doing this, because I have concluded that Pappas, and through him, CPI, engaged in multiple willful acts of destruction of evidence and lied under oath in affidavits, deposition testimony, and before the Court during the hearings it held. Knowing, however, the existing demands on the U.S. Attorney's office to prosecute very serious crimes, as well as their available resources, I do not think it probable that they would agree to initiate a criminal case arising out of a factually-complicated civil case involving an inordinately voluminous record, and concerning highly technical issues that will necessitate expert testimony.

It is true that, if the U.S. Attorney declined to initiate a criminal prosecution against Pappas for contempt of court, this court could appoint a private prosecutor to do so, pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 42(a)(2). See Young, 481 U.S. at 793 (describing process for appointing a private attorney for contempt proceedings). However, commencement of a new proceeding would require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and Pappas would be entitled to a jury trial, involving considerable expenses and time. I seriously question whether this would be the best manner of dealing with Pappas's misconduct. This dispute has been pending for far too long, been far too expensive, and, quite frankly, consumed far too much of this Court's resources to warrant initiating a criminal proceeding that unavoidably will go over the same ground, and likely involve yet another judge.

This is not to say, however, that referral for criminal contempt proceedings is the extent of what this Court can do to address Pappas's egregious behavior. After all, Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(vii) permits the Court to treat "as contempt of court the failure to obey any order except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination." This sanction has the obvious benefit of being warranted on the existing record, without need for initiating new proceedings. As noted, there must exist "`valid decrees of which the alleged contemnor [i.e., Pappas] had actual or constructive knowledge'"; those decrees must have been in Plaintiff's favor; Pappas, by his conduct, must have "`violated the terms of the decree, and had knowledge (at least constructive knowledge) of such violation'"; and VSI must have suffered harm as a result of Pappas's conduct. See SonoMedica, Inc., 2009 WL 2371507, at *3 (quoting Ashcraft, 218 F.3d at 301). As detailed above at Sections I.2-9, I have found that Pappas violated both preservation orders and production orders that this Court issued in Plaintiff's favor, and the above discussion manifestly establishes the factual record to show that he knew of the orders and acted willfully to thwart those orders, thereby causing harm to Plaintiff. Therefore, Pappas's civil contempt is established by clear and convincing evidence.

To summarize briefly, on December 22, 2006, I stated: "[B]oth parties are reminded of their substantive duty to preserve evidence, including electronic evidence, that is relevant to the case." ECF No. 41. On February 1, 2007, I issued a written Preservation Order that stated that the parties had been admonished at the February 1, 2007 hearing of their "substantive duty to preserve evidence potentially relevant to the case, and . . . ordered to do so by the Court." (Feb. 1, 2007 Order 2, ECF No. 56.) The language of the Court's preservation orders was crystal clear. Pappas testified that he understood both orders. (Oct. 29, 2009 Hr'g Tr. 117:18 — 118:2, 139:10 — 140:19.) Even if the language of the first order and the Court's oral order on February 1, 2007 left anything to doubt, the clarity of the February 1, 2007 order is undeniable. Indeed, in Pappas's own words, the Court's February 1, 2007 preservation order "was very clear." ( Id. 139:10 — 140:19.) Pappas deleted thousands of files following these orders. Separate and apart from these preservation orders, civil contempt sanctions are warranted for Defendants' violations of the Court's August 1 and 30, September 21, and October 3, 2007 production orders, which stated clearly that Defendants were to "produce all relevant, non-privileged ESI" to Plaintiff's counsel. (ECF Nos. 131, 145, 149, and 164.) Pappas stated in a sworn affidavit that he produced all such ESI, demonstrating that he had knowledge of the orders, yet his ESI production was not complete.

For such clearly contemptuous behavior, a very serious sanction is required. Accordingly, I order that Pappas's acts of spoliation be treated as contempt of this court, and that as a sanction, he be imprisoned for a period not to exceed two years, unless and until he pays to Plaintiff the attorney's fees and costs that will be awarded after Plaintiff has submitted an itemized accounting of the attorney's fees and costs associated not only with filing this motion, but also with respect to all efforts expended throughout this case to demonstrate the nature and effect of Pappas's spoliation. These costs and fees likely will amount to a significant figure, and that will properly vindicate this Court's ability to enforce its discovery orders. The commencement of Pappas's confinement will be determined at the conclusion of the proceedings to quantify the amount of attorney's fees and costs.

Despite the fact that, if Pappas refuses to pay the attorney's fees and costs ordered by the Court, he will be imprisoned for two years, it is quite clear that this is a civil — not a criminal — contempt sanction, because the relief is compensatory and the sanction will be imposed to coerce Pappas's compliance with this Court's order to pay attorney's fees and costs to Plaintiff; Pappas can avoid imprisonment by promptly paying the fees and costs. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. at 631-32; Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am., 512 U.S. at 828; Bradley, 378 F.3d at 378 (4th Cir. 2004); Buffington, 913 F.2d at 133-34. This result is absolutely essential as a civil contempt sanction because, without it, I am convinced that Pappas will do all that he can to avoid paying any money judgment or award of attorney's fees that is in the form of a civil judgment alone. Without the threat of jail time, Pappas's future conduct would be predicted by his past, and Plaintiff will receive a paper judgment that does not enable it to recover its considerable out-of-pocket losses caused by Pappas's spoliation. To avoid jail time, all that is required of Pappas is to pay Plaintiff the attorney's fees and costs that will be awarded to Plaintiff for prevailing on this motion. Because this sanction is not case-dispositive, I have the authority to order it directly, pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(vii). Should Judge Garbis disagree, I request that he treat this as a recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

A separate Order follows.

ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION 1. ORDER

For the reasons stated in the Memorandum, Order and Recommendation issued this same date, on this 9th day ofSeptember, 2010, it is hereby ORDERED that

(1) Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(C), Defendant shall pay monetary sanctions equivalent to Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs, which will be awarded after further briefing by the parties, and which will include fees and costs associated with all discovery that would not have been untaken but for Defendants' spoliation, as well as the briefings and hearings regarding Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions;
(2) To that end, Plaintiff shall submit a bill of costs within thirty (30) days of the Court's Order, with Defendants' response, if any, to be submitted within thirty (30) days thereafter; and
(3) Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vii), Defendant Pappas's acts of spoliation shall be treated as contempt of this Court, and as a sanction, he shall be imprisoned for a period not to exceed two (2) years, unless and until he pays to Plaintiff the attorney's fees and costs that will be awarded, as provided in Paragraphs (1) and (2) above.

2. RECOMMENDATION

On this 9th day of September, 2010, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that

(1) Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A)(vi), the Court enter a default judgment as to liability on Count I (copyright infringement) only, as a sanction for Defendants' willful spoliation;
(2) Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A), the Court grant Plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief as to Count I (copyright infringement), as a sanction for Defendants' willful spoliation; and
(3) The Court deny without prejudice Plaintiff's motion for default judgment as to liability on the remaining counts and as to damages on all counts.

Any objections to this Order and Recommendation shall be filed within fourteen (14) days.