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U.S. v. RILEY

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Sep 16, 2010
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MEMORANDUM

WILLIAM M. NICKERSON, Senior District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendants MCS Services, Inc., Brian DeFazio, George Ulmer, and Lionel Verrette's Motion to Dismiss. Paper 41. The motion has been fully briefed. Upon review of the pleadings and the applicable case law, the Court determines that no hearing is necessary (Local Rule 105.6) and that the Motion to Dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part as set forth below.

Charles Harding, also named as a Defendant, also participated in this motion, but he was voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiff on July 14, 2010. Paper No. 51.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges the following facts. Plaintiff Océ North America, Inc. (Océ) designs, manufactures, sells, and services high volume production printing systems (PPS) for commercial printing functions. To properly service and maintain Océ systems, it employs Field Engineers throughout the United States. According to Plaintiff, it has also developed proprietary service tool packages for use by the Field Engineers to better service the systems, which include diagnostic software, a parts manual, and a maintenance manual. The service tool packages provide Océ Field Engineers with complete information on how to diagnose and repair problems with Océ PPS.

Plaintiff has developed two different diagnostic software programs. One is the LPMW (Laser Printer Maintenance-W) software, which works with several types of Océ printers, including those that operate using an internal software package known as "Bundle 5" software. The other Océ diagnostic software program is known as "CODI" (COnfiguration and DIagnostics), which works with printers that operate using the more sophisticated "Bundle 7" internal software package. The Bundle 5 and 7 software each consist of several component software programs that work together to make the different functions of the PPS printer operate according to instructions from the user. Plaintiff claims that it developed the Bundle 5 and 7 software and the LPMW and CODI diagnostic software at great cost and expense.

According to Plaintiff, it limits distribution of the service tool packages to its Field Engineers who sign confidentiality agreements, it labels the software in various ways to indicate its confidentiality, and it encrypts the software and sets it to automatically expire after a year. Plaintiff also claims that its PPS printers cannot be properly maintained without its service tool packages.

Defendant MCS is a competitor of Plaintiff in the business of servicing PPS printers manufactured by Plaintiff. MCS also sells used and refurbished Océ PPS printers and toner for use in Océ PPS printers. Defendant George Ulmer is a former employee of Plaintiff who is now working for MCS as a Director of Field Services. The remaining Defendants, Brian Defazio and Lionel Verrette, are President and Manager of National Technical Support, respectively, of MCS.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants obtained the LPMW service tool packages via former Océ employees, including Defendant Ulmer, who copied the LPMW software while working for Plaintiff and provided it to MCS in violation of their terms of employment. After obtaining the LPMW service tool packages, Plaintiff claims that Defendants distributed them to its engineers who are using these copies in their daily work without permission from Plaintiff. Plaintiff also claims that Defendants have taken steps to circumvent the encryption of the LPMW software. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have "down-leveled" a number of PPS printers by removing the Bundle 7 internal software and replacing it with less sophisticated Bundle 5 software so that it can maintain the printers with the LPMW service tool package rather than the CODI package.

Plaintiff entered a License Agreement with MCS to provide MCS with the right for two specifically named engineers to use the CODI service tool package on two designated laptops to service three designated printers owned by Farmers Insurance in California. Plaintiff alleges that MCS violated the terms of that License Agreement by distributing the CODI service tool package to a number of other MCS field engineers and using it on other PPS printers without permission. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that, as with the LPMW diagnostic software tools, Defendants took steps to circumvent the encryption of the CODI diagnostic software tools.

Finally, Plaintiff claims that when it sells PPS printers, the customer can select different degrees of functionality, such as print speed or memory, for different prices. The features and level of functionality is controlled by software contained in a controller unit within the PPS printer. The various features and functionalities may be changed on the controller by the use of an SRA key, which is a computer text file containing an encrypted string of alphanumeric characters along with a description of the features that it authorizes. The key is programmed to work only in a unit with a specific serial number and controller type and will not work in another unit. Should a customer wish to increase the functionality of its PPS printer, it can pay a higher license fee and Plaintiff will provide a new SRA key enabling the additional functions. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants purchased used Océ PPS printers, circumvented the technological measures, and upgraded the functionality of the used printers without paying the license fees for the additional functionality. According to Plaintiff, Defendants then sold the refurbished and upgraded PPS printers on the secondary market.

Plaintiff also alleges facts in its Complaint regarding the improper use of its Technical Support Knowledge Base, and the sale of toner. Those facts are not pertinent to this motion to dismiss, however.

Plaintiff's Complaint raises nine claims for relief: 1) Misappropriation of Trade Secrets; 2) Violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act; 3) Violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act; 4) Copyright Infringement of Software; 5) Breach of License Agreement; 6) Unjust Enrichment; 7) Conversion; 8) Unfair Competition; and 9) Violation of the Lanham Act. Defendants bring this motion to dismiss as to Claim 2 for failure to state a claim under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and as to Claims 5, 6, and 7, arguing that they are preempted by the federal Copyright Act. Defendants also move to strike a portion of claim 8 that it also claims is preempted by the federal Copyright Act.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, . . ., to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S.ct. at 1949 (citingTwombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Detailed factual allegations" are not required, but allegations must be more than "labels and conclusions," or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]" Iqbal, 129 S.ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately," however, "it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563. In considering such a motion, the court is required to accept as true all well-pled allegations in the complaint, and to construe the facts and reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Little v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1 F.3d 255, 256 (4th Cir. 1993)).

III. DISCUSSION A. Count 2: Violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

Defendants' first argument is that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030. Plaintiff cites to two sections of the CFAA that it alleges provide a cause of action against Defendants. The first, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4), provides a federal cause of action against a person who "knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value . . ." The second, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(C) provides a cause of action against a person who "intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage and loss."

Defendants contend that Plaintiff has "failed to allege facts to meet the required element that a defendant's use of [Plaintiff's] software was `without authorization.'" Defs. Memo. at 5. As to Defendant Ulmer, Defendants contend that while he may have misused or misappropriated the information given to him prior to his leaving his employment with Océ by using it in his job with MCS, he was authorized to access the information and so his use was not "without authorization" as defined under the CFAA. As to MCS, Defendants contend that it had a license to use the CODI diagnostic software and so while there may have been a breach of the licensing agreement, here again, its use beyond the licensing agreement was not "without authorization" as defined under the CFAA. Finally, Defendants allege that the remaining Defendants (and MCS) were also not using Plaintiff's software "without authorization" as defined under the CFAA because the ex-employees who gave them the software were authorized and because they did not access Plaintiff's computers.

Defendants raise three cases that are particularly on point. In Orbit One Communications, Inc. v. Numerex Corporation, the defendant alleged that the plaintiffs, three of the defendant's former executives, took the company's electronic proprietary information prior to their departure from the company in order to compete with it. 692 F. Supp. 2d 373, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The Southern District of New York held that because the executives had "unfettered access" to the defendant's computer system while employed by the defendant, their accessing the computer system was not "without

authorization" nor did it "exceed their authorized access in violation of the CFAA." Id. at 385. After analyzing the language of the statute and noting other courts' analysis of the legislative history of the CFAA, the court held that the CFAA specifically prohibits "access of a computer without authorization, not an employee's misuse of information that he or she was entitled to access or obtain." Id.

This Court has taken a similar stance in International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d 479 (D. Md. 2005). In Werner-Masuda, the defendant was a member of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), an international labor organization, and the Secretary-Treasurer of the local Lodge. Id. at 483. As Secretary-Treasurer, the defendant had authorized access to a secure, proprietary website, which was lodged on IAM's server in Maryland from which she could access IAM's confidential membership list. Id. The IAM alleged that the plaintiff used the membership list to attempt to organize a rival union. Id. IAM argued that, because the defendant had signed an agreement that she would not access the website for a purpose "contrary to the policies and procedures of the IAM Constitution," she had accessed the website without authorization or in excess of her authorization. Id. at 498. The Court reasoned that, as a matter of law, however, simply because the plaintiff had breached the agreement by using the information for a contrary purpose, it did not follow that she was not authorized to access the information or that she did so in excess of her authorization in violation of the CFAA. Id. The Court noted that the CFAA does not prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of information or authorized access for unauthorized or illegitimate purposes. Id. at 499. Thus, because she was authorized to access the website and information located there she was not in violation of the CFAA. Id.

The third case raised by Defendants is Role Models America, Inc. v. Jones, 305 F. Supp. 2d 564 (D. Md. 2004). In Role Models, the plaintiff alleged that the principal of its school used proprietary information to complete an Internet-based doctoral program offered by Nova Southeastern University (NSU). Id. at 565. The Court held that because NSU did not itself access the information on the plaintiff's computers, but only received such information from the principal, it did not violate the CFAA. Id. at 566-67. The plaintiff raised the theory that when the principal placed its proprietary information on his personal computer, it became a clone of the plaintiff's computers and thus access to the principal's computer was tantamount to unauthorized access of the plaintiff's computers. Id. at 567. This Court disagreed. Id. First, the Court noted that, even under this theory, the plaintiff did not allege that NSU accessed the plaintiff's computer, but rather that it had simply received information, which is not a violation of the CFAA. Id. Second, the court held that, even if NSU had actively retrieved or "accessed" the information from the principal's computer, rather than passively receiving it from the principal, it was the principal's computer and it was his authorization that was relevant. Id. As the plaintiff did not allege that the principal denied NSU access to his computer, NSU had not committed a violation of the CFAA. Id. The court concluded that "whether [the plaintiff] would have given NSU the same authorization to access its own computers is irrelevant." Id.

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Ulmer accessed any of Plaintiff's computers without authorization while employed by Plaintiff in order to obtain the diagnostic software. In fact, it was part of his job to use Plaintiff's computers and the software on the computers. As in Orbit and Warner-Mesuda, the fact that he copied the software on to his own laptop may have been a violation of his employment agreement, but that does not constitute a violation of the CFAA.

As to MCS and the other Defendants, Plaintiff has not alleged that they accessed any "protected computer" without authorization or in excess of that authorization to obtain Plaintiff's software. Plaintiff correctly cites to Theofel v. Farey-Jones for the proposition that it does not need to own the "protected computer" in order to claim damages for a violation of the CFAA, as "[t]he civil remedy extends to `[a]ny person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section.'" 359 F.3d 1066, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). Theofel does not vitiate, however, the need for the access to the computers to be unauthorized by whoever controlled such access. Here, Plaintiff alleges that its software was accessed on laptops and printers. Nowhere in its Complaint does it allege, however, that the owners of the laptops and printers, or other person with the requisite authority, denied access such that Defendants' access was unauthorized or in excess of its authorization. In fact, most of the laptops and printers alleged to have been accessed belonged to MCS or its employees. Thus, as in Orbit,Warner-Mesuda, and Role Models, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that Defendants' access of the laptops or printers was unauthorized, and there is no CFAA violation regardless if Plaintiff permitted them to use its software.

Plaintiff has argued, and Defendant has not disputed, that "protected computers" covers the laptops and PPS printers at issue here.

Plaintiff argues in its opposition that some of the computers accessed by MCS are owned by its sister company, Océ Financial Services, Inc., and are leased to MCS's customers. As this fact was not alleged in Plaintiff's complaint, it cannot be considered on this motion to dismiss, as the Court only considers facts alleged in the Complaint. See Young v. AT T Mobility, LLC, Civ. No. 09-2292, 2010 WL 2573982, *2 n. 1 (D. Md. 2010). Regardless, such an allegation would not be sufficient to correct the deficiencies in Plaintiff's pleading, because it leaves open the questions of who had the right to prohibit access to those computers and how accessing those computers without authorization would cause damage to Plaintiff as opposed to its sister company.

Defendants' second argument that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a CFAA claim is that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded the $5000 minimum damages required to make a CFAA claim. "A civil action for a violation of [the CFAA] may be brought only if the conduct involves" one of five factors, which includes "loss to one or more persons during any one year period . . . aggregating to at least $5,000 in value." 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (referring to the five factors found at subsection (c)(4)(A)(i)). The CFAA under § 1030(e)(11) defines "loss" as:

any reasonable cost to any victim, including
(i) The cost of responding to an offense,
(ii) Conducting a damage assessment,
(iii) Restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and
(iv) Any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of the interruption of service[.]

Defendants contend, and the Court agrees, that Plaintiff's allegation that it "has suffered impairment to the integrity or availability of its data, programs, systems, and information resulting in losses or damages in excess of $5000 during a one year period" is merely a conclusory statement and thus does not sufficiently plead the $5000 minimum damages requirement to bring suit under the CFAA. See e.g., Civic Center Motors, Ltd. v. Mason Street Import Cars, Ltd., 387 F. Supp. 2d 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing CFAA claim under Rule 12(b)(6) where the plaintiff's loss allegations did not meet any of the four loss categories under § 1030(e)(11); ReMedPar, Inc. v. AllParts Med., LLC, 683 F. Supp. 2d 605 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (same). In its response, Plaintiff does not clarify how the allegations in its Complaint fall under any of the four loss categories as delineated under § 1030(e)(11). It argues, however, that it has expended more than $5000 in connection with its experts' investigation of Defendants' conduct of this matter. While Plaintiff's statement may be true, it has not pleaded these losses and, as already discussed, they may not be considered on this motion to dismiss. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead the $5000 loss requirement and the CFAA claim will be dismissed.

Plaintiff attached a copy of its expert declaration as evidence of the costs spent on investigating Defendants' conduct thus far. As this is a motion to dismiss, however, the question is only whether Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim and not whether it has evidence to support them. Subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, the Court does not consider evidence outside the Complaint on a motion to dismiss.Rush v. American Home Mortgage, Inc., Civ. No. 07-0854, 2009 WL 4728971, *3 (D. Md. 2009). While Defendants insist that Plaintiff's action converts this motion to one for summary judgment, there is no indication that was Plaintiff's intention and the Court declines to interpret Plaintiff's action as such.

Plaintiff has requested that the court allow it to amend the Complaint as to the $5000 loss requirement. The Court acknowledges that Plaintiff's additional allegations as to loss may be sufficient to meet that requirement. Amending the Complaint as to this issue, however, would be futile as Plaintiff has not demonstrated that it can overcome the failure to allege that Defendants' access to the protected computers at issue was unauthorized. Thus, Plaintiff's request is denied.

B. PREEMPTION OF COUNTS 5, 6, 7 BY COPYRIGHT ACT

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims five, breach of license agreement; six, unjust enrichment; and seven, conversion; should be dismissed because they are preempted by federal copyright law. The Copyright Act provides:

All legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyrights . . . are governed exclusively by this title. [After January 1, 1978], no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
17 U.S.C. § 301(a).

To determine whether a state claim is preempted by the Copyright Act, the Court must apply a two-prong test: 1) "the work must be within the scope of the `subject-matter of copyright' as specified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103;" and 2) the state law rights must be equivalent to any exclusive rights within the scope of federal copyright as set out in 17 U.S.C. § 106. U.S. ex rel. Berge v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama, 104 F.3d 1453, 1463 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted). If there is an "extra element that changes the nature of the state law action so that it isqualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim," there is no preemption. Id. (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). Under 17 U.S.C. § 106, "[t]he owner of a copyright has the exclusive right to 1) reproduce the work, 2) prepare derivative works

based on the work, 3) distribute copies of the work, 4) perform the work publicly, and 5) display the work publicly." Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atikinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 659 (4th Cir. 1993).

Plaintiff argues that dismissing claims on the basis of preemption is premature at this stage as Defendants have not yet answered the Amended Complaint and conceded that all the materials covered by the License Agreement are copyrighted or even copyrightable. Thus, they contend that they should be able to plead counts five, six, and seven in the alternative pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff overstates its ability to plead in the alternative, however. This Court has previously granted motions to dismiss claims preempted by the federal Copyright Act. See e.g., Nichols Agency, Inc. v. Enchanted Child Care, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 774, 782-84 (D. Md. 2008) (dismissing breach of contract claim as preempted by federal Copyright Act); Wharton v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 144, 145-46 (D. Md. 1995) (dismissing various state law claims and converting them to a copyright infringement claim due to preemption). As noted by the District of Connecticut, "The relevant question is whether Plaintiffs could bring their claims under copyright law at all, not whether they will nor even whether they will ultimately prevail on their copyright claim." Moser Pilon Nelson Architects, LLC v. HNTB Corp., Civ. No. 05-0422, 2006 WL 2331013, *11 (D. Conn. 2006) (emphasis in original); See also Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d at 658 (holding that failing to meet a jurisdictional prerequisite for bringing a copyright infringement claim "does not affect the broad preemptive scope of § 301"). The protection afforded to Plaintiff at this stage is provided in the standard of proof and in the notice pleading requirement. Patriot Homes, Inc. v. Forest River Housing, Inc. 489 F. Supp. 2d 865, 869 (N.D. Ind. 2007).

1. Count 5: Breach of Contract

Plaintiff claims that MCS violated the License Agreement by copying and distributing the CODI diagnostic software and service tools to MCS Field Engineers other than the two designated and by using it to service and maintain other printers besides those designated in the agreement.

The first question is whether the CODI diagnostic software and service tools at issue within the breach of contract claim are within the scope of the copyright protections. Defendants simply state, without explanation, that the software, which is the subject of the License Agreement, is copyrightable. Plaintiff does not dispute this statement except to respond that Defendants have not conceded that its software and service tools are subject to the Copyright Act. Software is subject to the Copyright Act. See Trandes Corp., 996 F.2d at 659 (holding that computer programs are within the `subject matter' of copyright);M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 434-35 (4th Cir. 1986) (computer programs are copyrightable).

The next issue is whether the breach of contract claim as it relates to the CODI diagnostic software and service tools is equivalent to a federal copyright infringement claim. On its face, Plaintiff's claim falls within the exclusive rights of a copyright owner to reproduce, distribute, and perform their work and is thus preempted by the federal Copyright Act. Plaintiff attempts to distinguish its claim, however, by claiming that the License Agreement created "private law" between the Parties, which it contends creates the "extra element" such that its breach of contract claim is "qualitatively different" from a copyright infringement claim. Plaintiff primarily relies onLowry's Reports v. Legg Mason, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 737 (D. Md. 2003), for this proposition. In Lowry's Reports, a defendant subscribed to a financial report published by the plaintiff and allegedly agreed as part of a subscription agreement not to disseminate the information contained in the reports to others, including associates, branch offices, or affiliates, without consent by the plaintiff. Id. at 756. The court concluded that the agreement contained "unique terms" that, if proved, would "establish[] a private law governing fair use of the copyrighted works inter partes" making "the claim qualitatively different from a simple copyright case, in which there is no `private law' defining what is and is not fair use." Id. at 756-57. UnlikeLowry's Reports, Plaintiff's Complaint contains no allegation that the License Agreement contained a provision whereby Defendants promised not to use the CODI software and service tools beyond the limited scope of the License Agreement. Rather, according to Plaintiff's Complaint, the License Agreement simply granted two MCS technicians permission to have the CODI software and servicing tools on two designated laptops for use in diagnosing problems with three specific printers. In exchange, MCS agreed to pay for that permission.

In order to address this problem, Plaintiff argues that the License Agreement also contains an acknowledgment that the materials licensed are confidential and that MCS will not disclose the confidential information to others outside the two named technicians. As this allegation was not included in Plaintiff's Complaint, however, the Court will not consider it on this motion to dismiss. Because the new allegation appears to create an extra element, however, making the claim qualitatively different from a simple copyright case, and Defendants have not disputed this contention, the Court will grant Plaintiff's request to amend the Complaint to include this allegation. The Court notes, however, that the portion of the License Agreement to which it refers relates only to "Documentation and firmware updates" and it is not clear that it relates to the CODI software itself. Thus, amending the complaint may not have any bearing on Plaintiff's breach of contract claim relating to the misuse of the CODI software.

Although Plaintiff attached the copy of the License Agreement to its Opposition, the Court does not consider it here. Because Plaintiff did not attach the License Agreement to its Complaint nor did Defendant attach it to its Motion to Dismiss, to consider the entire License Agreement in this situation, the Court would have to convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Mezu v. Morgan State University, 264 F. Supp. 2d 292, 295 (D. Md. 2003). Although Defendant advocated for such a conversion, the Court declines to do so. Conversion was not the intent of Plaintiff who operated under the erroneous belief that the License Agreement could be attached and used to allege additional facts not in the Complaint in an opposition to the motion to dismiss. Pl. Opp. at 13 n. 3. Moreover, were the motion to be converted, it would be denied as Defendants failed to demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact as required by Federal Rule 56(c), but instead argued as if it was a motion to dismiss for failing to plead the allegation in its Complaint.

Plaintiff also argues that the requirement in its License Agreement that Defendants pay an annual license fee to use Plaintiff's "Service Document" and "Service Tools" manuals and "firmware updates" provides the "extra element" needed to make its breach of contract claim qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim. Pl. Opp'n at 20. In making this argument, Plaintiff cites to Acorn Structures, Inc. v. Swantz, 846 F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1988) and Madison River Management Co. v. Business Management Software Corp., 387 F. Supp. 2d 521 (M.D.N.C. 2005). In Acorn Structures, the plaintiff provided the defendant with a set of house plans "as a prospective customer of an Acorn house package." 846 F.2d at 926. While the defendant did not have to commit to purchase a house package, the court found implied in the agreement that if the defendant decided to use the plans it would either purchase the plans or purchase his building materials from the plaintiff. Id. The court found that the breach of this implied agreement did not arise out of the subject of copyright and was therefore a separate and distinct cause of action. Id.

Here again, Plaintiff did not include this allegation in its Complaint. As the Court determines that it would not add an extra element to overcome preemption, however, the Court declines to allow Plaintiff to amend its Complaint to add this allegation.

In Madison River, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had used the plaintiff's database in excess of the licenses purchased. 387 F. Supp. 2d at 541. The court found that an express promise to pay for excess use in the Agreement provided the extra element needed to prevent preemption by the Copyright Act. Id.

Here, the provision of the contract to which Plaintiff refers is simply discussing payment for those items for which Defendants are authorized to use the software and materials. It does not discuss payments related to use of the software and materials beyond the limited scope of the License Agreement as inAcorn Structures and Madison River. Thus, the payment provision does not provide the "extra element" making Plaintiff's breach of contract claim qualitatively different than a violation of the Copyright Act — for copying, distributing, and using Plaintiff's copyrightable materials without Plaintiff's permission.

Instead, this case is more like Nichols Agency, Inc. v. Enchanted Child Care, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 774, 776 (D. Md. 2008), in which the breach of contract stemmed from a provision that "[a]fter termination of this agreement, [the defendant] shall have no further right to use, reproduce, distribute, display or modify any Agency Works" without Nichols's consent and agreement to do so. The Court found that such a provision did not provide the kinds of "implicit provisions or private law" as found in Lowry's Reports or Acorn Structures. Id. at 784. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's breach of contract claim as to the CODI software and service tools, but will allow Plaintiff to amend its claim to plead the breach of the confidentiality provision of the License Agreement.

2. Count 6: Unjust Enrichment and Count 7: Conversion

Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim applies to Defendants' alleged "resale of altered Océ PPS and unauthorized use of Océ proprietary diagnostic and maintenance tools." Complaint ¶ 93. The Court understands the proprietary diagnostic and maintenance tools to be software and information, which, as discussed with the breach of contract claim, is subject to the federal Copyright Act. Because Plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment as to the diagnostic and maintenance tools focuses solely on Defendants' unauthorized use, it is no different than a copyright infringement claim. See e.g.,Costar Group Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 714 (D. Md. 2001) (holding that plaintiff's claim of unjust enrichment was preempted by the Copyright Act because it was just "a disguised copyright claim"). Plaintiff seems to concede as much in that its opposition to Defendants' motion regarding the unjust enrichment claim discusses only the resale of the altered PPS printers and not the diagnostic and maintenance tools. Thus, the unjust enrichment claim as to the "proprietary diagnostic and maintenance tools" will be dismissed.

Defendants are less successful in explaining how Plaintiff's claim for unjust enrichment regarding the resale of altered Océ PPS is preempted. They simply make a blanket statement that it involves accessing software on the printers and, therefore, that it is the same as a copyright infringement claim. The PPS printers are more than just software, however, and Defendants do not explain how this difference does not make the unjust enrichment claim qualitatively different than a simple copyright infringement claim. Thus, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim as to the PPS printers will be denied.

Plaintiff's conversion claim relates only to "acts of ownership and dominion over Océ's software that are inconsistent with Océ's rights." Complaint ¶ 98. This allegation is nothing more than a copyright infringement claim and will be dismissed.

C. Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint

Defendants' final argument is that paragraph 103 of claim 8 of the Amended Complaint for unfair competition should be struck under Federal Rule 12(f) because it is immaterial or impertinent. Paragraph 103 of the Amended Complaint alleges that MCS has engaged in unfair competition in its sales of toner and by "misrepresenting to customers that MCS is capable of servicing all functionalities of Océ PPS printers, when in reality its ability to do so is dependent upon pilfered Océ software and misappropriating Océ proprietary tools for PPS servicing." Defendants contend that this last allegation is preempted by federal copyright law since it involves an accusation that Defendants infringed Plaintiff's copyright. Plaintiff does not oppose Defendants' argument except to state that it should be allowed to make the claim in the alternative, which the Court has already discussed. Thus, Defendants' motion to strike the phrase in paragraph 103 relating to the use of Océ software will be granted. The portion of paragraph 103 relating to toner sales, however, will not be stricken.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion will be granted in part and denied in part. A separate order will issue.



ref201 F.3d 214, 218-19 (3d Cir. 1999)). Because the reviewing court must treat all of the incriminating evidence as true and credible, "[t]he burden on a defendant who raises a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is extremely high." United States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 203-04 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 770 (3d Cir. 2000)).

As discussed above, to sustain a conviction of Counts 1-3, mail fraud under § 1341, the prosecution must prove that: (1) there was a scheme to defraud; (2) the defendant acted with the intent to defraud; and (3) the defendant used the mails to further or carry out the scheme. Jimenez, 513 F.3d at 81 (citing Pharis, 298 F.3d at 234). Count 4 required the Government to prove the following five elements: (1) James was an agent of the government of the City of Newark; (2) the City of Newark was a local government, that in a one-year period received federal benefits under the federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance in excess of $10,000; (3) James embezzled, stole, obtained by fraud, or otherwise without authority knowingly converted or intentionally misapplied property; (4) such property belonged to, was in the care, custody, or control of the City of Newark; and (5) the value of such property obtained by his conduct was $5000 or more. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a). Aiding and abetting violations of §§ 1341 and 666 was also charged.

1. James

James challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the "scheme to defraud" element of Counts 1-4. Specifically, James argues that the Government did not prove fraud because: (1) the intimate relationship between James and Riley was not proven; (2) James did not "improperly" favor Riley because Riley was not treated any differently than any other prospective developer; (3) James's only "act" with respect to Riley and the properties was ministerial in nature because he merely signed contracts that were previously reviewed by the Corporate Counsel and approved by the Municipal Council; (4) any omission of their alleged relationship was not material because the existence of any relationship between James and Riley would not have disqualified Riley from acquiring property; and (5) James did not receive any benefit because of the nondisclosure. These allegations will be addressed in turn.

First, Riley conceded at trial that they had an intimate relationship. Further, the Government presented evidence that indicates that Appellants went on multi-day vacations to California and the Dominican Republic, and had frequent interactions of both a personal and business nature. For example, James and Riley attended sporting events together, such as the U.S. Open and boxing matches, and appeared at a Broadway performance together in New York City. Additionally, Johnny Jones ("Jones"), James's close political confidant, personally helped Riley obtain a lease to City-owned office space for TRI even though his position in the Newark Government did not normally involve such minor matters. Indeed, when Riley was not satisfied with the renovations of the office space, she threatened to contact the Mayor regarding the issue. James attended the grand opening of the TRI office and cut the ribbon at the occasion. James also directed his security detail, while on duty, to use his credit card, purchase, and install an air conditioner in the bedroom of Riley's apartment. A member of this same security detail testified that on one occasion James, upon hearing that Riley called, stated he did not want to talk to Riley because she was "dating someone." In light of this evidence presented by the Government, a reasonable jury could have found sufficient evidence to support a finding of an intimate relationship between James and Riley.

Second, James argues that he did not "improperly" favor Riley because Riley was not treated any differently than any other prospective developer. The facts, taken in a light most favorable to the Government, indicate that Riley had a "twenty-four direct connect" to James, and that James was Riley's "`hook' in the City." This relationship resulted in Riley's access to City-owned properties that were otherwise unavailable to most people without development experience. Prospective buyers were supposed to have personal experience in the construction of residential property and the ability to obtain financing for the projects. After the pre-qualification process was abandoned, the applicant was supposed to be surrounded by the right "team" of people who had the experience or financial capacity to deliver what was required under the SWRP. The evidence suggests that Riley had none of the above. Franklin knew that Riley had no experience as a real estate developer and would not have qualified to acquire SWRP properties as the program was initially operated. Further, Riley did not find a developer for the properties until after she was awarded the contracts for the Phase I properties, and thus did not otherwise have a "team" surrounding her when she received the first properties.

Despite this fact, James's Deputy Mayor and Director of DEHD, Alfred Faiella ("Faiella"), brought Riley and her friend to Franklin's office and told him that James wanted Franklin to "help these ladies acquire some property." Riley subsequently received a list of City-owned property available for purchase and in April 2000, Riley sent a letter to James thanking him for "opening doors" and helping her acquire City-owned properties.

James contests the admissibility of this statement. As discussed below, however, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the alleged hearsay statement. See infra Part II.E.

The Government also presented two witnesses who were experienced real estate developers in the Newark area, and were unable to obtain approval for City-owned property. In the case of Wendee Bailey ("Bailey"), because she was unable to obtain City property, she began by renovating, financing, and finding buyers for two of Riley's Phase I properties. In the end, however, Riley sold Bailey the subsequent properties outright without undertaking any renovations of her own. In one instance, Bailey purchased three properties from Riley for $80,000 — properties for which Riley paid a total of $18,000. Consequently, the jury could have reasonably inferred that James treated Riley differently from other developers and improperly favored her.

Third, James argues that his only "act" with respect to the properties was purely ministerial because he merely signed contracts that were previously reviewed by the Corporate Counsel and approved by the Municipal Council. The evidence presented, however, allows for a different conclusion regarding James's control over the SWRP process. The SWRP was considered James' "baby." James met frequently with his Deputy Mayor Faiella, who was also Director of the DEHD, and Faiella occasionally told Franklin that James wanted certain persons to receive particular parcels of SWRP property.

In at least one instance, when Franklin did not follow up on the request by someone "sent" by James, James called Franklin personally and directed him to meet with the applicant again. James also demonstrated his control over the SWRP process by informing friends as to how they could acquire property through the SWRP and indicating he would "take care of their application. In the case of Prentis Thompson ("Thompson"), James showed Thompson a stack of paperwork regarding applications for SWRP properties that James kept in his home. James revealed detailed knowledge about which parcels were available for sale and who had acquired such properties in the past and represented that he was "in charge" of the process.

James called Franklin and told him to meet James at a furniture store in Newark, but Jackie Mattison ("Mattison"), James's former Chief of Staff, met Franklin there in his stead. Mattison told Franklin that he wanted to acquire some property and when Franklin failed to follow-up on Mattison's request, James called Franklin and directed him to meet with Mattison again.

Further, James insured his ability to select eligible people for SWRP properties through his position as a New Jersey State Senator. James and the Municipal Council disagreed as to who had the power to select eligible persons to receive City property under the SWRP. After the Municipal Council prevailed in litigation against the Mayor regarding the issue, James successfully sponsored legislation in 2004, Senate Bill 967, that authorized the Mayor alone to exercise that power.

James was well aware that the City was transferring real estate parcels to Riley. In his official capacity as Mayor, James signed each of the contracts transferring the properties to TRI. Riley maintained calendars and daily "agenda" lists containing innumerable notations regarding her communications with James about the status of her acquisitions of City-owned property from 2001 through 2006. James was also copied on a letter "advising" Riley that certain City-owned properties were being set aside for acquisition by her company.

Additionally, James was able to stop and start the disposition of properties to Riley. In September 2002, Riley sent Franklin a proposal for the purchase of the initial Phase III properties, which was approved by the DEHD and the Municipal Council. After the contracts were signed, but before Riley was able to close on the Phase III properties, James informed Franklin that the City "will not do any more business with Tamika Riley until further notice," and Riley never acquired those properties. In 2004, however, Riley resumed her pursuit of SWRP properties and the Municipal Council authorized the sale of four other properties to Riley. Consequently, the jury could have reasonably concluded that James's relationship to the SWRP was not purely ministerial.

James also argues that any control he may have exercised over the SWRP process was "cured" by the review of each contract conducted by the Newark Corporate Counsel, the City Clerk's office and the Municipal Council. A reasonable jury could have concluded otherwise, however, because James does not contest that he did not disclose his relationship with Riley. As established above, there is sufficient evidence for a jury to have concluded that Appellants had an intimate relationship. The SWRP contracts for properties expressly prohibited an official of Newark to "have any personal interest, direct or indirect, in the Contract." SA 1530. The Government presented two witnesses, Joanne Watson ("Watson"), former head of Newark's Corporate Counsel's office, and Augusto Amador, a Municipal Council member during the time at issue, who stated that Appellants' relationship would have been material to their decision to approve the contracts. Thus, the evidence taken in a light most favorable to the Government suggests that review of the contracts by other City government entities could not have "cured" James's control over the SWRP process because they did not possess the information necessary to properly assess the legitimacy of the contracts.

Fourth, James argues that any omission of their alleged relationship was not material because the existence of any relationship between James and Riley would not have disqualified Riley from acquiring property. A misrepresentation or omission is material when it has a "natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it was addressed." United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 489, 117 S.Ct. 921, 137 L.Ed.2d 107 (1997) (quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770, 108 S.Ct. 1537, 99 L.Ed.2d 839 (1988)). As discussed above, the Government presented two witnesses who approved Riley's contracts — a Municipal Council member and the former head of the Newark Corporate Counsel's Office — and both stated that they would have regarded Riley's intimate relationship with James as material to the decision to approve the property transaction. Watson stated that even if the relationship had been terminated at the time James signed the contracts it would have been material to the Corporate Counsel's decision and thus should have been disclosed. Consequently, a reasonable jury could have found James' omission of his intimate relationship with Riley was material and thus, even if the relationship would not have per se barred Riley from acquiring property, it should have been disclosed.

Fifth, James argues that there can be no extension of criminal liability for a fraud where the defendant did not receive any cognizable benefit because of the non-disclosure. To support a fraud conviction it is "not necessary for the Government to demonstrate that [the defendant] personally benefitted from [the] scheme." United States v. Goldblatt, 813 F.2d at 624. Even if a benefit to the defendant was required, however, a reasonable jury could have concluded that James benefitted through his personal relationship with Riley. By providing a means for Riley to gain income from the City's assets, James was otherwise relieved from expending his own. Thus, a reasonable jury could have concluded that James did receive a cognizable benefit even though he did not accept directly any of the proceeds from Riley's sale of the properties.

2. Riley

Lastly, Riley argues that she did not have the requisite intent to commit § 1341 mail fraud (Counts 1-3) and that the evidence only supported a conclusion that Riley intended to comply with her contractual obligations as she understood them with the advice of counsel. In light of the evidence, however, a reasonable jury could conclude that Riley had the requisite intent to defraud. The SWRP contract specifically states that "[t]he Redeveloper represents and agrees that its purchase of the Property, and its other undertakings pursuant to the Contract, are, and will be used, for the purpose of redevelopment of the Property and not for speculation in land holding." SA 1456 ¶ 17(a). Riley developed two of the four properties from Phase I in accordance with her obligations under the contract. Riley submitted pictures of the two redeveloped parcels to support her application for the Phase II properties, but omitted mention of the two Phase I properties she sold without renovation. Riley sold the Phase II properties without making any improvements. Again, with respect to the Phase III properties, Riley asserted that she planned to redevelop the properties and that she had renovated the properties from Phases I and II. Riley again sold the Phase III properties without undertaking any improvements to the properties. Juries may infer intent from circumstantial evidence. See United States v. D'Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1256 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that in determining sufficiency of the evidence "pieces of evidence must be viewed not in isolation but in conjunction . . . and the jury's verdict may be based on circumstantial evidence" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Thus, a reasonable jury could have concluded that Riley's intent to defraud was demonstrated by her promises to renovate the SWRP properties and her failure to fulfill those commitments for all but two of the properties she received.

Further, for similar reasons, Riley's intent to defraud is not abated by any alleged reliance on her lawyers. Riley's former attorneys testified that they did not "advise her" that her activities violated her contractual obligations. If Riley had discussed the legality of her schemes with her lawyers, and they advised her that her actions were legal, such evidence might have refuted her intent to defraud the City of Newark. See United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating in the context of securities law that "conversations with counsel regarding the legality of his schemes would have been directly relevant in determining the extent of his knowledge and, as a result, his intent"). The testimony indicates, however, that Riley employed the attorneys primarily to help her sell the properties and neither provided counsel regarding her obligations under the SWRP. What the evidence does show, as mentioned above, is that the SWRP applications and contracts were clear that Riley had an obligation to renovate the properties. Riley demonstrated her understanding of this obligation by her misrepresentation to the Municipal Council that she renovated the properties she sold and her promises to undertake such renovations with respect to future properties. Thus, a reasonable jury could have determined that the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate Riley's intent to defraud the City of Newark even if her lawyers did not advise her of the nature of her acts.

In conclusion, a review of the evidence presented at trial leads us to conclude that a rational jury could have found that James defrauded the City of Newark and Riley had the requisite intent to defraud the City. The District Court did not err when it denied a motion for judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence. In proper deference to the jury's verdict, the convictions for Counts 1-4 will be affirmed.

The Government argues that to convict James on Count 4, the jury was not required to find that he acted with the intent to defraud or participated in a scheme to defraud. Rather, the conviction could have been based on a finding that James "misapplied" City property. The Government argues that the evidence proved that James misapplied the SWRP properties by causing them to be transferred to Riley, not for the authorized purpose of renovation, but so she could improperly receive the proceeds of flipping the properties, an unauthorized purpose. Because we find sufficient evidence for the jury to have convicted James on the basis of fraud we need not address this argument.

C. Joinder and Lack of Severance of Riley's Tax Offense Counts

We review de novo whether joinder is proper under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b). See Jimenez, 513 F.3d at 82. We review a district court's denial of a motion to sever under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 for abuse of discretion. See Lore, 430 F.3d at 205.

1. Joinder of the Land Fraud Counts and the Tax Fraud Counts

James asserts that the District Court erred in joining the Land Fraud Counts (Counts 1-5), in which both James and Riley are implicated, with Riley's Tax Fraud Counts (Counts 10-13) under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b). Rule 8(b) states:

We note that on appeal James asserts only that he was prejudiced by joinder of Riley's Tax Fraud Counts (Counts 10-13) and not Riley's Housing Fraud Counts (Counts 6-9). Thus, we will addresses the issue of joinder of Riley's Tax Fraud Counts (Counts 10-13) only.

The indictment or information may charge 2 or more defendants if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses. The defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately. All defendants need not be charged in each count.

Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(b). Under Rule 8(b) there must be a "transactional nexus" between the defendants for the counts to be properly joined. See Jimenez, 513 F.3d at 82-83. Additionally, there is a strong preference to try defendants named in a single indictment together in order to "conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid delays in bringing those accused of crime to trial." Id. at 82 (quoting United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986)).

James argues that Riley's tax offenses were completely separate from the fraud counts and thus were not within the purview of Rule 8(b). Despite James's contention, "[j]oinder of tax and non-tax claims is not unusual." United States v. McGill, 964 F.2d 222, 241 (3d Cir. 1992). "It is appropriate to combine tax charges against one defendant with fraud charges against that same defendant and other co-defendants if the tax evasion charges arise directly out of the common illicit enterprise." United States v. Bibby, 752 F.2d 1116, 1121 (6th Cir. 1985).

In this case, it was Riley's failure to report income earned from the land fraud scheme that led to her Tax Fraud Counts. Because the tax evasion arose directly from the land fraud proceeds, it was in the interest of judicial efficiency to join these claims. See Jimenez, 513 F.3d at 82. Thus, the District Court properly joined the Land fraud Counts and Riley's Tax Fraud Counts under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(b).

2. Motion For Severance

James argues that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for severance because the inclusion of the Tax Fraud Counts prejudiced the jury against him. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits a court to sever counts that have been properly joined under Rule 8(b) "[i]f the joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment . . . appears to prejudice a defendant. . . ." Fed.R.Crim.P. 14. Severance should only be granted "if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence." United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 775 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993)). A defendant must "pinpoint clear and substantial prejudice resulting in an unfair trial." United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 340 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, "[i]t is not enough to show that severance would have increased the defendant's chances of acquittal." Id.

It is not entirely clear from James' brief whether he is appealing the District Court's denial of severance. The Court has chosen to address the issue as if James had raised the discretionary issue properly on appeal.

In this case James has not pinpointed any specific instance of substantial prejudice resulting in an unfair trial. Rather, James merely asserts that the jury was unable to compartmentalize the evidence. Juries, however, "are presumed to follow their instructions." Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 54(M1, 113 S.Ct. 933 (citing Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987)). The District Court specifically instructed the jury that it "must separately consider the evidence against each defendant on each offense charged, and . . . must return a separate verdict for each defendant on each offense." SA 1196:34. These strict instructions are "persuasive evidence that refusals to sever did not prejudice the defendants." Lore, 430 F.3d at 206 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, there was no "serious risk" of "compromising] a specific trial right" by keeping the Land Fraud Counts and the Tax Fraud Counts joined. Urban, 404 F.3d at 775 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The simple fact that the evidence produced at trial was "not germane to all counts against" James, does not entitle James to a separate trial. United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 655 (3d Cir. 1993); accord McGlory, 968 F.2d at 340 ("[T]he mere introduction of other crimes evidence against one defendant does not entitle a co-defendant to a separate trial").

In conclusion, Riley's Tax Fraud Counts were properly joined initially with the Land Fraud Counts because the counts were substantially related as the tax fraud arose from Riley's failure to report her income from the land fraud scheme. Additionally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied James's motion for severance because James did not point to any specific prejudice. Further, any prejudice that might have resulted from the joint trial was easily cured by the District Court's jury instructions.

D. Motion for Mistrial

James argues that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for mistrial. "We review the denial of a motion for a mistrial based on a witness's allegedly prejudicial comments for an abuse of discretion." Lore, 430 F.3d at 207 (citing United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1285 (3d Cir. 1993)). Three factors must be analyzed to determine whether the defendant was prejudiced: "(1) whether [the witness's] remarks were pronounced and persistent, creating a likelihood they would mislead and prejudice the jury; (2) the strength of the other evidence; and (3) curative action taken by the district court." Lore, 430 F.3d at 207 (citing Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1285).

We note that although Riley joined the motion for mistrial in sidebar, she does not appear to appeal the denial.

At issue is the testimonial statement of Basil Franklin, James's Chief of Housing Production for the City of Newark, about a meeting he had with Jackie Mattison ("Mattison"), James's former Chief-of-Staff. Mattison had been convicted of a criminal offense, United States v. Bradley, 173 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999), and was serving a sentence of work release when he met with Franklin. The District Court instructed the Government to direct Franklin not to mention that Mattison had been incarcerated or in a work release program, which would imply that Mattison had been previously convicted of a crime. During the course of the Government's direct examination of Franklin, however, Franklin twice mentioned that Mattison was involved in a work release program. James immediately moved for a mistrial.

The testimony proceeded as follows:

[Prosecutor]: So what happened when you and Jackie Mattison met in the furniture store
[Witness]: He told me that he was on a work release program.
[Prosecutor]: I'll move to strike that. What, if anything, did Jackie Mattison tell you about property?
[James's attorney]: Your honor, may we approach, please?
[The Court]: In a moment, in a moment.
[Prosecutor]: What, if anything, did Jackie Mattison tell you about property?
[Witness]: He told me that he was in the work release program and participate —
[James's attorney]: Judge, may we approach?
[Prosecutor]: May I Lead, your Honor?
[The Court]: Yeah. Just ask him — just with respect to the property, did he have any conversations with you just as to property?
[Witness]: Yeah. He told me that — that-he said —
[Prosecutor]: Did —
[Witness]: He said that he needed —
[The Court]: All right, just a moment.
[Witness]: — an income.
[The Court]: We'll have a break.

SA 211:104-05.

The District Court denied James's motion for a mistrial, but agreed to give a curative instruction at defense counsel's request. The District Court took a ten minute break to allow counsel to speak with James and decide. After the break, defense counsel chose not to ask for an instruction from the court because he did not want to exacerbate any alleged prejudice. The witnesses's testimony resumed, lasting the rest of the day and into the following two days. At the conclusion of the trial, the District Court instructed the jury that James was not being charged with doing anything unlawful with Mattison, nor was he involved in the conduct that placed Mattison on work release.

Addressing the three-factor test to determine prejudice we look to the nature of the statement first. Franklin's improper remarks consisted of two references to a "work release program" in testimony that spanned three days over the course of a five week trial. Thus the remarks cannot be characterized as either pronounced or persistent, nor were they systematic. See United States v. Morena, 547 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding prejudicial misconduct because of the prosecutions "systematic injection of evidence of drug use and dealing" by the defendant); Lore, 430 F.3d at 207 (considering one improper remark by a witness over the course of five days of testimony to not be "pronounced and persistent"); Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1285 (finding that five or six angry outbursts by a witness were neither pronounced nor persistent).

Second, there is no question that the jury did not solely rely upon the fact that Mattison was on work release or that Franklin met with Mattison to convict James. The relevance of the evidence was merely to demonstrate James's control over the SWRP properties. There was a significant amount of evidence presented to prove James's control over the properties and the SWRP process. See discussion supra Part I.A.2; see also Morena, 547 F.3d at 196 (finding that the "other evidence" was insufficient to overcome the prejudice and sustain a conviction because it consisted only of "the testimony of one witness who [had] significant credibility issues and a few items of circumstantial evidence"). In this case, the strength of the other evidence is sufficient to outweigh any possible prejudice Franklin's statements may have inflicted on James.

Finally, the third factor addresses whether curative action taken by the lower court mitigates any potential prejudice. In this case the District Court indicated that it was willing to give immediate curative instructions, but James declined the offer to prevent further attention being drawn to Franklin's statements. At the end of the trial, however, the District Court instructed the jury that "[t]here is no charge in this Indictment that the Defendant Sharpe James did anything unlawful, directly or indirectly, with respect to the sale of any Newark property to Jackie Mattison." These instructions are presumed to have cured any potential prejudice from Franklin's improper remarks. See Lore, 430 F.3d at 207 (finding no prejudice, in part, because although the defendant "declined the district court's offer to issue a specific curative instruction at the time of [the witness's] statement, the court subsequently instructed the jury" in a manner which sought to cure any prejudice).

In conclusion, Franklin's comment that Mattison was on work release did not prejudice James because the statements were not "pronounced and persistent," the strength of the other evidence was sufficient to convict James, and the District Court cured any potential prejudice through its instructions to the jury. Consequently, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied James's request for a mistrial.

E. Alleged Hearsay Statement

James argues that the District Court erred by admitting a hearsay statement during the course of Franklin's testimony. "We review a district court's decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion, although our review is plenary as to the district court's interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence." Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 297 (3d Cir. 2007).

At issue is Franklin's testimony that Alfred Faiella ("Faiella"), the Deputy Mayor and Director of the DEHD, came to his office with Riley and another woman and "smiling and jokingly [said] that the Mayor want[ed Franklin] to help these ladies acquire some property." From this statement Franklin testified that he understood it to mean that "the Mayor want[ed him] to . . . vet her and assist her, if possible, in acquiring property." James objected to Franklin's statement, and argues on appeal that the statement is inadmissible because Faiella was not acting lawfully when he made the comment and thus, was not acting within the scope of his employment.

James does not argue that his own statement to Faiella was inadmissible. We assume, therefore, that James's statement was properly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A), which states that "[a] statement is not hearsay if . . . [t]he statement is offered against a party and is . . . the party's own statement, in either an individual or representative capacity."

The District Court allowed Franklin's testimony as a non-hearsay statement admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D). Rule 801(d)(2)(D) states that "[a] statement is not hearsay if . . . [t]he statement is offered against a party and is . . . a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship." Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). Thus, this rule requires that when making an admission on behalf of the defendant, the declarant be both authorized and acting within the scope of employment.

James's brief mentions Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(C), while discussing the test of agency. Because this rule is not mentioned anywhere else in James's submissions, and the District Court allowed the statement in under 801(d)(2)(D), the Court assumes that the reference to 801(d)(2)(C) was in error.

Faiella was the Deputy Mayor and Director of the DEHD and thus was authorized to direct Franklin as to who should be considered for SWRP properties. Franklin testified that Faiella had the final say on all property allocations and that "everything went through Alfred Faiella." Franklin also indicated that "from time to time [Faiella] would mention that X, Y, or Z person recommended that we try to . . . to vet a person to do the development." Consequently, as Franklin's supervisor, it was within the scope of Faiella's employment to instruct Franklin of his duties regarding SWRP properties. See Marra, 497 F.3d at 297-98 ("[B]eing a direct decision-maker, of course, constitutes strong proof that a statement was made within the scope of employment[.]" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that executives who had authority to make personnel decisions were acting within the scope of their employment when they stated their views on the state of the workforce).

Despite James's assertion, a statement of illegal activity can still be within the scope of employment and can be admissible under 801(d)(2)(D). See Cline v. Roadway Express, Inc., 689 F.2d 481, 488 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that testimony of certain managers' statements indicating that they understood the new policy was designed to replace older workers with younger ones, which was an alleged violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, was admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) as admissions of agents concerning a matter within the scope of their employment). In sum, the District Court did not err in its interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence when it admitted Franklin's testimony of Faiella's statement on the basis that it constituted a non-hearsay utterance of an agent, which is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D).

F. The Government's Summation Remark

James argues that the United States' inappropriate comment during its rebuttal summation "merely capped an avalanche of unfairness" that warrants reversing the conviction. Because James did not seek a mistrial in the District Court challenging the Government's closing remark, this court reviews the District Court's decision not to grant a mistrial sua sponte for plain error. Virgin Islands v. Charleswell, 24 F.3d 571, 576 (3d Cir. 1994). A plain error occurs when the "prosecutor's comments [are] so serious as to `undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a miscarriage of justice.'" United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1126 (3d Cir. 1990). Thus, we may reverse if the prosecutor's comments deprived James of a fair trial.

The prosecutor stated in its rebuttal summation that, "[a]t the end of the day you have a decision to make. Are you going to turn your head away from this type of corruption, say it's business as usual, what can I do? Or are you going to make a statement, say it loud and clear, send a message." SA 1183:193-94.

There is no per se rule against invitations to a jury to "send a message." Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 364 n. 9 (3d Cir. 1999). The type of counsel misconduct that warrants granting a new trial is not generally a single isolated inappropriate comment, but rather repeated conduct that "permeate[s]" the trial. Blanche Rd. Corp. v. Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253, 264 (3d Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 400 (3d Cir. 2003). Although his complaint suggests it occurred, James does not point to specific conduct of a similar nature which allegedly permeates the case. While the Government concedes that the prosecutor's "send a message" comment was improper, there was an immediate and sustained objection that cut off the prosecutor's remarks. Further, the District Court directly addressed the inappropriate nature of the "send a message" comment in its instructions to the jury. The District Court, in its curative jury instruction given the day after the prosecutor's comment, stated that

you must not think of your verdict as sending a message to anyone. Yesterday you heard me sustain an objection to [the prosecutor's] suggestion in summation that you should "send a message" by your verdict.
I sustained the objection because this was an improper comment. You must reach your verdict in this case based solely on the evidence, on the facts as you determine them based on the law as I present it to you now, without concern for public opinion or anything else out-side of this case. That is what the law requires.

SA 1191:14. This jury instruction clearly addressed the improper comment and thus even if there were some risk of prejudice it was cured because "juries are presumed to follow their instructions." Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987). In sum, the prosecutor's statement did not deprive James of a fair trial, and there was no plain error.

III. Conclusion

In conclusion, in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Skilling, we will reverse the Count 5 convictions as to James and Riley. We will affirm the Counts 1-4 convictions as to James and Riley because there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found Appellants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, we affirm the District Court's denial of James's post-trial motions and do not find that the District Court erred in any of the challenged determinations. We will remand for the District Court to perform any re-sentencing necessitated by the Count 5 reversal.