Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

UZYEL v. KADISHA

Court of Appeal of California, Second District.
Sep 22, 2010
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CARLOS MURGUIA, District Judge

Plaintiffs, employees of defendant BNSF Railway Company ("BNSF"), bring this putative collective action, alleging that defendants violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to pay plaintiffs for hours they worked while performing "familiarization trips" that BNSF requires for trainmen who transfer from one Grand Seniority District to another.

This matter is before the court on Defendant BNSF's Unopposed Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support (Doc. 194). Defendant BNSF requests that the court dismiss with prejudice certain plaintiffs as a sanction for their failure to (1) timely respond to BNSF's discovery requests; (2) comply with the court's October 21, 2009 Order Granting Defendant's Unopposed Motion to Compel Discovery Responses; and (3) comply with the court's April 20, 2010 Memorandum and Order. Plaintiffs do not oppose this motion. For the following reasons, the court takes defendants' motion under advisement and makes other orders as set out below.

In June 2009, defendant BNSF served discovery requests on plaintiffs. Since that time, the court has twice ordered the following Non-Responding Opt-In Plaintiffs to provide BNSF with sufficient responses to the discovery requests:

Mark C. Allen, Jason Alvarez, Adam D. Ashmore, Gilbert Casarez, Eva Cervantes, Mike Decker, Alan Duran, Steven L. Erickson, Herb L. Factory, James H. Felts, James B. Floyd, Brian H. Fransen, John D. Garside, Donald Godfrey, Douglas Gormann, Mitch L. Haight, Todd Henderson, Justin E. Hoot, Thomas King, Josh Lankford, D.W. Middleton, Carolyn Miller, Wayne Newton, Kyonni Olawumi, Jerry W. Oliver, PK Patel, Brett D. Ridgway, Ernest L. Ritchie, Marques Ross, Mark Schlachter, Joshua Sink, Nicolas M. Smith, Brian D. Steffen, Braden Thornton, Ralph Tolbert, Willie Torres, Derrick Webster, John Arnold, and Jay Pierce.

On August 11, 2010, the court granted BNSF's motion to compel the — depositions of the Non-Responding Opt-In Plaintiffs. (Doc. 192.) The court ordered, the Non-Responding Opt-In Plaintiffs to appear for deposition no later than October 11, 2010 in Overland Park, Kansas. In its Order, the court warned the Non-Responding Opt-In Plaintiffs that "if they do not appear for a deposition in Overland Park, Kansas, then the court may dismiss their claims without further notice." ( Id., at 4.)

The court extended the deadline in light of this motion. (Doc. 195.)

When arranging for the depositions, plaintiffs' counsel stated that none of the Non-Responding Opt-In Plaintiffs live in or near Overland Park, Kansas. He further stated that, despite his best efforts to communicate with the Non-Responding Opt-In Plaintiffs, he has received little if any response from them during the pendency of this action. Because the Non-Responding Opt-In Plaintiffs have failed to provide written responses to the discovery requests, plaintiffs' counsel believes that none of the Non-Responding Opt-In Plaintiffs will travel at their own expense to Overland Park, Kansas for deposition.

The parties seek to avoid the expense and burden of preparing for and travelling to attend thirty-nine depositions in which the deponents, in all likelihood, will not appear. Thus, defendant BNSF filed this motion, and plaintiffs' counsel does not oppose the motion.

Pursuant to Rule 37, this court has a broad choice of remedies and penalties through which it may compel compliance with federal discovery procedures. In addition to an order compelling answers, the court may impose sanctions on uncooperative litigants including dismissal of some or all of plaintiffs' claims. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980). Such sanctions are also authorized based on this court's inherent authority "to manage [its] own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)). When considering dismissal as a sanction, this court evaluates the following factors:

(1) the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant; (2) the amount of interference with the judicial process; (3) the culpability of the litigant; (4) whether the court warned the party in advance that dismissal of the action would be a likely sanction for noncompliance; and (5) the efficacy of lesser sanctions.
Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted); see also Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 920-21 (10th Cir. 1992) (affirming a district court's imposition of an order dismissing the plaintiff's complaint with prejudice as a sanction under Rule 37).

Upon review of these factors, the court finds that dismissal as a sanction is appropriate. The Non-Responding Opt-In Plaintiffs' failure to respond to the discovery requests or comply with the court's orders has, and continues to, significantly prejudice BNSF's ability to defend itself and has created unnecessary delay in the adjudication of this action. Further, these plaintiffs chose to participate in this action when they filed their Consent to Become Party Plaintiff. There is no reason to believe that lesser sanctions would have any effect on them. Despite multiple opportunities to respond and warnings that their case may be dismissed, these plaintiffs have chosen not to participate in the litigation. They have been represented by counsel at all relevant times; there is no reason to believe that they are unaware of the seriousness of their failure to comply with applicable Rules and the court's orders. Even their counsel does not expect them to participate, and he does not oppose this motion.

Nevertheless, because courts generally prefer to evaluate claims on their merits, the court will permit the Non-Responding Opt-In Plaintiffs seven (7) days from the date of this order within which to file a notice to the court that they will participate in this litigation and appear for deposition as ordered by the court. See, e.g., Walker v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 240 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting the court's preference for resolving claims on the merits). The court therefore takes defendants' pending motion to dismiss under advisement. If a Non-Responding Opt-In Plaintiff files a notice with the court, the court will review it and promptly issue a ruling. Any Non-Responding Opt-In Plaintiff that does not file a notice with the court within seven (7) days from the date of this order will be dismissed from this action with prejudice without further notice.

The court finds that this is the proper course of action to ensure that the parties are not prejudiced.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant BNSF's Unopposed Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support (Doc. 194) is taken under advisement.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs Mark C. Allen, Jason Alvarez, Adam D. Ashmore, Gilbert Casarez, Eva Cervantes, Mike Decker, Alan Duran, Steven L. Erickson, Herb L. Factory, James H. Felts, James B. Floyd, Brian H. Fransen, John D. Garside, Donald Godfrey, Douglas Gormann, Mitch L. Haight, Todd Henderson, Justin E. Hoot, Thomas King, Josh Lankford, D.W. Middleton, Carolyn Miller, Wayne Newton, Kyonni Olawumi, Jerry W. Oliver, PK Patel, Brett D. Ridgway, Ernest L. Ritchie, Marques Ross, Mark Schlachter, Joshua Sink, Nicolas M. Smith, Brian D. Steffen, Braden Thornton, Ralph Tolbert, Willie Torres, Derrick Webster, John Arnold, and Jay Pierce have seven (7) days from the date of this order within which to file a notice to the court that they will participate in this litigation and appear for deposition as ordered by the court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if a Non-Responding Opt-In Plaintiff files a notice with the court, the court will review it and promptly issue a ruling. Any Non-Responding Opt-In Plaintiff that does not file a notice with the court within seven (7) days from the date of this order will be dismissed with prejudice from this action without further notice.

Dated this 22nd day of September, 2010 at Kansas City, Kansas.

gh another and distinct breach of trust; but if the breaches of trust are not separate and distinct, the trustee is accountable only for the net gain or chargeable only with the net loss resulting therefrom."

(19) The comments to this section explain that if a trustee incurs a loss and also makes a profit as a result of breaches of trust that are not separate and distinct, the trustee is liable for the net loss calculated by reducing the loss by the amount of the profits. (Rest.3d Trusts, Prudent Investor Rule, § 213, coms., d e, pp. 175 177.) Whether two or more breaches of trust are separate and distinct depends on factors such as:

"(1) Whether the breaches of trust are the result of a single policy, judgment, or set of interrelated decisions;

"(2) The amount of time elapsing between the breaches of trust; and

"(3) Whether, between the breaches of trust, the trustee had become aware of the earlier breach, and particularly of a resulting loss or profit.

"Also properly relevant to the law's treatment of multiple breaches may be such factors as:

"(4) Whether the trustee intended to misappropriate trust property, or intended to commit a breach of trust but not to misappropriate trust property, or had no intention to commit a breach of trust; and

"(5) Whether the profits and losses from the breaches of trust affect different beneficial interests differently in a way that would have inequitable consequences if gains were to be offset against losses." (Rest.3d Trusts, Prudent Investor Rule, § 213, com. f, pp. 178-179.)

Comment f states further that no definite rules can be stated as to the relative weight to be given to the different factors, and that "the distinction upon which these cases turn is justified primarily by concern that allowing profits to be offset against losses may have a tendency to encourage multiple breaches of trust." (Rest.3d Trusts, Prudent Investor Rule, § 213, com. f, p. 179.)

The trial court found that Trust No. 1 initially purchased the Qualcomm stock (then 10,000 shares) from Trust No. 2 in April 1999. The aggregate value of the shares on that date was approximately $2 million. The evidence suggests that the Qualcomm stock then constituted more than one-third of the value of Trust No. 1's assets and that a lack of diversification arose immediately upon Trust No. 1's initial purchase of the stock, although the trial court made no express findings on these issues. If Kadisha breached his duty of prudent investing by failing to diversify the trust's assets upon Trust No. 1's initial purchase of the stock in April 1999, such a breach of trust would be closely related to the failure to diversify the trust's assets in January 2000 and thereafter. This, together with the relatively short period of time from the initial purchase in April 1999 to January 2000, would tend to show that the two breaches of trust were not separate and distinct and that Kadisha's liability should be limited to the net loss, if any, from the investment.

According to Kadisha's accountings, the value of Trust No. 1's assets other than the Qualcomm stock was approximately $3 million as of December 31, 1998, and approximately $4.4 million as of December 31, 1999.

The investment resulted in a net gain during this period, rather than a loss.

Other circumstances, however, suggest that the breach of trust occurring in January 2000 and thereafter was separate and distinct from any prior breach of trust. The trial court found that Kadisha breached his duty of prudent investing not only by failing to diversify the trust's assets, but also by failing to take any measures to protect the principal at any time during a substantial decline in value beginning in January 2000. Despite the dramatic increase in the aggregate value of the shares from approximately $2 million upon Trust No. 1's acquisition of the shares in April 1999 to more than $14 million as of the market closing on January 3, 2000, Kadisha failed to take any measures to protect the principal from price declines. The court found that Kadisha was a skilled investor with the knowledge to employ measures such as a collar, a put option, a stop-loss order, or other measures to protect against a price decline. Kadisha does not contend there was no substantial evidence to support these findings.

We believe that Kadisha's awareness of the dramatic increase in the value of the stock from April 1999 to January 2000 distinguishes his failure to employ any of the means available to him to protect the investment in January 2000 or thereafter from his prior failure to diversify the trust's assets. Considering the factors set forth above, we conclude that the breach of trust occurring in January 2000 and thereafter was separate and distinct from any prior breach of trust so as to justify holding him liable for the depreciation in value of the trust assets resulting from the later breach. In light of our conclusion, we need not decide whether substantial evidence supports the finding of retaliation.

Kadisha also cites In re Pate's Estate (1948) 84 N.Y.S.2d 853, affirmed (N.Y.App.Div. 1950) 276 A.D. 1008 [95 N.Y.S.2d 903], and other cases for the proposition that a trustee's investment decisions cannot be viewed in hindsight. Those cases are distinguishable because the trial court here found that Kadisha breached his duty to invest prudently based on contemporaneous events and information known to him at the time that he failed to protect the investment. Whether the decline in the market value of Qualcomm stock beginning in January 2000 should have caused Kadisha to take measures to protect the value of the trust's investment is a question of fact. The Uzyels' expert, Irwin Goldring, testified that a prudent trustee would have taken some measures to protect the value of the trust's assets in light of the falling market price. Kadisha has not shown that the trial court's finding in this regard was based on hindsight and has not otherwise shown a lack of substantial evidence to support that finding.

Kadisha also contends the award of damages is based on a finding that he had a duty to sell all of the shares on January 5, 2000, and argues that he had no such duty as a matter of law. We believe that this mischaracterizes the trial court's decision. The court did not find that Kadisha had a duty to sell the shares on January 5, 2000, and breached that duty by failing to sell the shares. Instead, the court found that Kadisha's failure to sell the shares on or after that date or take any measures to preserve the investment was a breach of his duty to invest prudently. Kadisha has shown no error in this finding.

7. The Award of Damages Resulting from Kadisha's Use of Trust Funds to Pay for His Legal Defense Includes Excessive Prejudgment Interest

a. Trial Court Decision

The trial court found that Kadisha's taking of $500,000 from the trusts to pay his legal fees and his use of an additional $13,761 from Trust No. 2 for the same purpose were unauthorized and that Kadisha failed to return the $500,000 as ordered by the court. The court rejected Kadisha's argument that language in our prior opinion precluded an award of prejudgment interest on the $500,000 deposited in his attorney's trust account. The court stated that although we had stated in our opinion that "the return of $250,000 [to each trust] shall be deemed accomplished as of this date and the funds shall remain on deposit in the bank account of the trustee's attorney," the Uzyels continued to be deprived of use of the funds and therefore were entitled to prejudgment interest. The court awarded the Uzyels $543,055 on this claim, including $500,000 with interest from February 23, 2000, until September 18, 2000, plus $13,761 with interest from January 13, 2000, until September 18, 2000, and also awarded 10 percent prejudgment interest on the $543,055 from September 19, 2000, until the entry of judgment.

b. The Uzyels Are Not Entitled to Prejudgment Interest at the Legal Rate on the Deposited Funds After August 4, 2000

Kadisha contends our modification of the appealed orders to state that the return of the $500,000 "shall be deemed accomplished as of this date" compels the conclusion that those funds were deemed returned as of August 4, 2000, that the Uzyels are not entitled to prejudgment interest at the legal rate on those funds after that date, and that the only prejudgment interest that they are entitled to on those funds after August 4, 2000, is any interest that was actually earned on the deposited funds.

Contrary to the Uzyels' argument, the failure to move for a new trial on the ground of excessive damages does not preclude the contention on appeal that the award was legally erroneous, as Kadisha contends here. ( Christiansen v. Roddy (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 780, 789 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 72].)

The purpose of the parties' stipulation and our opinion was to provide Kadisha the same security that an undertaking would have provided, by ensuring that the funds would remain on deposit in his attorney's trust account except as authorized by the trial court, while relieving the Uzyels of the need to provide an undertaking. The Uzyels effectively used the deposited funds as an undertaking. We believe that by agreeing that the funds were deemed returned and accepting the benefits of this arrangement, the Uzyels necessarily waived the right to recover prejudgment interest at the legal rate on the deposited funds after August 4, 2000. They are entitled to recover the funds remaining in the attorney's trust account as of the date of entry of judgment, including any interest actually accrued on the deposited funds. The Uzyels also are entitled to prejudgment interest at the legal rate on the entire $500,000 from the date of its deposit, February 23, 2000, until August 4, 2000. Kadisha concedes that they also are entitled to recover the approximately $76,000 withdrawn from the attorney's trust account from March through July 2000. We agree and also conclude that they are entitled to prejudgment interest on the amount of each withdrawal from the date of the withdrawal until the entry of judgment, under Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a) (discussed post).

8. The Uzyels Are Entitled to Prejudgment Interest on the Award of the Disgorgement of Profits Arising from Kadisha's Stock Purchase from Farahnik in May 1991

Kadisha does not challenge the award of $13,761, representing an additional amount paid from Trust No. 2 for attorney fees, plus prejudgment interest on that amount from January 13, 2000, until September 18, 2000.

a. Trial Court Decision

The trial court in its statement of decision awarded the Uzyels prejudgment interest from September 19, 2000, at the rate of 10 percent on the award of $15,818,000 in the disgorgement of profits arising from Kadisha's purchase of Qualcomm stock from Farahnik in May 1991. In denying Kadisha's new trial motion, the court modified the judgment by reducing the award of $15,818,000 to an amount to be determined based on the value of the shares on November 22, 1996, but did not modify the award of prejudgment interest on this claim. The court later reconsidered its ruling on the new trial motion, however, vacating the reduction of the award and denying prejudgment interest.

b. The Order Denying Prejudgment Interest Is Void

After, timely denying the new trial motion and modifying the judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 662 in the order of February 5, 2007, the trial court had no jurisdiction to reconsider and amend its modification of the judgment by denying prejudgment interest or to do so after the expiration of the 60-day period to rule on the new trial motion, for the reasons stated ante. The order of March 7, 2007, purporting to do so was void. The award of prejudgment interest therefore must be restored.

9. The Uzyels Are Entitled to Prejudgment Interest on the Award of Damages Resulting from the Sale of Trust No. 2's Qualcomm Stock in May 1992

The Uzyels do not challenge the award of prejudgment interest on the amount awarded on this claim from September 19, 2000, rather than September 18, 2000, and therefore abandon any claim of error in this regard.

a. Trial Court Decision

The trial court in its statement of decision awarded the Uzyels prejudgment interest at the rate of 10 percent on the $35,389,242 in compensatory damages arising from the sale of Trust No. 2's Qualcomm stock in May 1992. In denying Kadisha's new trial motion, however, the court modified the judgment by denying prejudgment interest on the award. The court later explained that it had denied prejudgment interest in equity so as to avoid "an undue penalty."

b. The Uzyels Are Entitled to Prejudgment Interest on the Award Under Civil Code Section 3287, Subdivision (a)

The Uzyels contend they are entitled to prejudgment interest on the award under Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a) because the amount of damages was "capable of being made certain by calculation" ( ibid.) on September 18, 2000.

(20) Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a) provides that a party is entitled to recover prejudgment interest on an amount awarded as damages from the date that the amount was both (1) due and owing and (2) certain or capable of being made certain by calculation. ( Koyer v. Detroit F. M. Ins. Co. (1937) 9 Cal.2d 336, 345 [ 70 P.2d 927]; Gray v. Bekins (1921) 186 Cal. 389, 399 [ 199 P. 767]; see also Rest.2d Contracts, § 354, subd. (1).) The primary purpose of an award of prejudgment interest is to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of use of money during the period before the entry of judgment, in order to make the plaintiff whole. ( Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 663 [ 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 109, 863 P.2d 179]; Lewis C. Nelson Sons, Inc. v. Clovis Unified School Dist. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 64, 71-72 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 715].)

Damages are certain or capable of being made certain by calculation, or ascertainable, for purposes of Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a) if the defendant actually knows the amount of damages or could compute that amount from information reasonably available to the defendant. ( KGM Harvesting Co. v. Fresh Network (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 376, 391 [ 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 286].) A readily ascertainable market value can satisfy this requirement. ( Cassinos v. Union Oil Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1770, 1789 [ 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 574].) In contrast, damages that must be judicially determined based on conflicting evidence are not ascertainable. ( Lineman v. Schmid (1948) 32 Cal.2d 204, 212 [ 195 P.2d 408]; Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1154, 1172-1173 [ 286 Cal.Rptr. 146].) A legal dispute concerning the defendant's liability or uncertainty concerning the measure of damages does not render damages unascertainable. ( Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 402 [ 197 Cal.Rptr. 843, 673 P.2d 720]; Shell Oil Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1633, 1651 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 580].) On appeal, we independently determine whether damages are ascertainable for purposes of the statute. ( KGM Harvesting Co., supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at pp. 390-391.)

The trial court calculated damages on this claim as the difference between the market value of 600,000 shares of Qualcomm stock at the time of the termination of the trusts (based on their lowest market price between Sept. 14 and 18, 2000) and the value of the proceeds of the sale of 37,500 shares in May 1992 ($801,000) augmented by interest on those proceeds from the date of the sale until September 18, 2000. Both the market value of 600,000 shares at the time of the trusts' termination and the value of the sale proceeds were ascertainable by Kadisha on September 18, 2000. We conclude that the Uzyels are entitled to prejudgment interest on the damages award pursuant to Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a), from September 18, 2000. In light of our conclusion, we need not address their alternative argument that they are entitled to prejudgment interest under Civil Code section 3288.

Prejudgment interest began to accrue on the date that the damages first became certain or capable of being made certain by calculation. (Civ. Code, § 3287, subd. (a) [". . . is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day"].) Prejudgment interest on the damages awarded on this claim therefore began to accrue on September 18, 2000.

We reject Kadisha's argument that discrepancies between the damages awarded by the court and amounts previously stated by the Uzyels in interrogatory responses or requested at trial compel the conclusion that the damages were not ascertainable. A large discrepancy between the amount demanded and the amount awarded indicates that damages were not ascertainable if the discrepancy results from the resolution of factual disputes arising from conflicting evidence or the lack of factual information needed to readily calculate damages. ( Wisper Corp. v. California Commerce Bank (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 948, 961-962 [ 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 141]; Polster, Inc. v. Swing (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 427, 435-436 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 567].) That was not the case here.

Conderback, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 664 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 901], cited by Kadisha, is distinguishable. The calculation of damages accepted by the jury in that case involved the "application of a pricing formula and negotiations between the parties, all in accordance with a prior course of dealing" ( id. at p. 690), apparently requiring the resolution of factual disputes. Moreover, Conderback stated that the invoices and other records provided to the defendant failed to provide sufficient information to enable the defendant to ascertain the exact amount due. ( Id. at pp. 690-691.) Here, in contrast, the amount due could be computed from information reasonably available to Kadisha, as we have stated.

The Uzyels cite no authority and offer no argument in support of awarding prejudgment interest at the rate of 10 percent, as requested in their opening brief on appeal. The proper rate of prejudgment interest awardable under Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a) in these circumstances is 7 percent. (Cal. Const., art. XV, § 1; Continental Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 388, 434 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 779].)

c. Section 16440, Subdivision (a)(3) Does Not Preclude Prejudgment Interest

Kadisha argues that section 16440, subdivision (a) describes the circumstances in which prejudgment interest on a monetary award for breach of trust is, and is not, available. He argues that the inclusion of the words "with interest" in subdivision (a)(1) and (2), contrasted with the absence of those words in subdivision (a)(3), indicates that prejudgment interest is not available under subdivision (a)(3) on an award of damages for lost profits to the trust estate resulting from a breach of trust.

(21) Section 16440, subdivision (a) expressly provides for prejudgment interest on an award of "[a]ny loss or depreciation in value of the trust estate resulting from the breach of trust" or "[a]ny profit made by the trustee through the breach of trust." ( Id., subd. (a)(1) (2).) Subdivision (a)(3), however, authorizes an award of "[a]ny profit that would have accrued to the trust estate if the loss of profit is the result of the breach of trust," with no mention of interest. Section 16442 states that the provisions for a trustee's liability for breach of trust under sections 16440 and 16441 do not preclude any other remedy available under the statutory or common law.

Section 16441, subdivision (a) states that if the trustee is liable for interest pursuant to section 16440, the interest rate is the greater of the legal rate of interest on judgments at the time or the amount of interest actually received. The legal rate of interest on judgments is 10 percent. (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.010, subd. (a).) The legal rate of interest on an obligation before the entry of judgment is 7 percent, unless otherwise specified by statute. (Cal. Const., art. XV, § 1; Continental Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra, 216 Cal.App.3d at p. 434.) Thus, one effect of the express provision for interest on an award authorized by section 16440, subdivision (a)(1) or (2) is to ensure that the prejudgment interest rate on such an award is 10 percent rather than 7 percent. Moreover, subdivision (a)(1) and (2) authorize prejudgment interest on such an award without the need to show that the amount was certain or capable of being made certain by calculation, as would be required under Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a). (22) In light of section 16442, and considering the differences between an award of prejudgment interest under section 16440, subdivision (a) and an award of prejudgment interest under Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a), we conclude that the omission of the words "with interest" in section 16440, subdivision (a)(3) was not intended to, and does not, preclude an award of prejudgment interest under Civil Code section 3287, subdivision (a).

Section 16441 states: "(a) If the trustee is liable for interest pursuant to Section 16440, the trustee is liable for the greater of the following amounts: [¶] (1) The amount of interest that accrues at the legal rate on judgments in effect during the period when the interest accrued, [¶] (2) The amount of interest actually received, [¶] (b) If the trustee has acted reasonably and in good faith under the circumstances as known to the trustee, the court, in its discretion, may excuse the trustee in whole or in part from liability under subdivision (a) if it would be equitable to do so."

10. The Uzyels Are Entitled to Prejudgment Interest on the Award of Damages Resulting from the Failure to Protect the Value of Trust No. 1's Investment in Qualcomm Stock in and After January 2000

a. Trial Court Decision

The trial court in its statement of decision, as modified on November 9, 2007, awarded the Uzyels prejudgment interest at the rate of 10 percent on the $6,930,400 in compensatory damages arising from Kadisha's failure to protect the value of Trust No. 1's investment in Qualcomm stock in and after January 2000. In denying Kadisha's new trial motion, however, the court modified the judgment by denying prejudgment interest on the award. The court later explained that it had denied prejudgment interest in equity so as to avoid "an undue penalty."

b. The Uzyels Are Entitled to Prejudgment Interest on the Award Under Section 16440, Subdivision (a)(1)

The Uzyels contend they are entitled to prejudgment interest on the award under section 16440, subdivision (a)(1). They argue that the damages are for the loss or depreciation in value of the trust estate resulting from a breach of trust, as described in the statute, and that prejudgment interest is mandatory on such an award absent grounds to excuse the trustee from liability, in whole or in part, pursuant to subdivision (b).

(23) Section 16440, subdivision (a)(1) authorizes an award of "[a]ny loss or depreciation in value of the trust estate resulting from the breach of trust, with interest." (Italics added.) The plain statutory language suggests that an award of damages under this provision must include prejudgment interest. The legislative history supports this interpretation. The California Law Revision Commission's report to the Legislature recommending the trust law stated that the proposed law would establish "a uniform rule that the trustee is liable for interest in any case where there is a breach resulting in a loss or depreciation of the trust estate or in profit to the trustee." (Recommendation Proposing the Trust Law (Dec. 1985) 18 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., supra, pp. 560-561.) Moreover, the reference in section 16441 to a trustee's "liab[ility] for interest pursuant to Section 16440" also suggests that section 16440 establishes a trustee's liability for interest and does not merely refer to liability established under some other statute, as Kadisha argues.

We conclude that the award of $6,930,400 in damages arising from Kadisha's failure to protect the value of Trust No. 1's investment in Qualcomm stock in and after January 2000 is an award of damages for the depreciation in value of the trust estate resulting from a breach of trust (§ 16440, subd. (a)(1)) and that the Uzyels are entitled to prejudgment interest on the award at the rate of 10 percent (§ 16441, subd. (a)), from September 18, 2000, pursuant to section 16440, subdivision (a)(1). In light of our conclusion, we need not address the Uzyels' alternative argument that they are entitled to prejudgment interest under Civil Code section 3288.

In our view, prejudgment interest under section 16440, subdivision (a)(1) begins to accrue on the date of the loss or depreciation in value, rather than on the following day. The Uzyels do not challenge the award of prejudgment interest from September 19, 2000, on other amounts awarded in the judgment and therefore abandon any claim of error in this regard as to those other awards.

11. The Parties Have Shown No Error in the Punitive Damages Award

Kadisha contends the award of $5 million in punitive damages will be constitutionally excessive if he successfully obtains the reversal of all of the compensatory damages and monetary awards that he challenges on appeal. We need not address this contention further because its predicate has not occurred, and the compensatory award will far exceed the amount of punitive damages awarded.

The Uzyels contend the award of punitive damages is inadequate as a matter of law under California law because, considering the reprehensibility of Kadisha's conduct, the amount of the compensatory award, and Kadisha's wealth, the $5 million punitive damages award is inadequate to serve the purposes of punishment and deterrence as a matter of law. We disagree.

(24) A plaintiff is never entitled to punitive damages as a matter of right. ( Brewer v. Second Baptist Church (1948) 32 Cal.2d 791, 800-801 [ 197 P.2d 713] ( Brewer).) Whether to award punitive damages if the requirements of Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a) are satisfied and the amount of such an award are questions committed to the trier of fact. ( Brewer, supra, at pp. 800-801; Hannon Engineering, Inc. v. Reim (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 415, 431 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 78].) Accordingly, we conclude that the Uzyels cannot show that the award is legally inadequate.

The Uzyels also argue that any increase in the compensatory award, including prejudgment interest, will require a reversal and redetermination of the award of punitive damages. We likewise disagree with that contention. If the reversal of part of a compensatory award renders the punitive damages excessive, the award of punitive damages should be reversed for a redetermination of punitive damages in light of the reduced compensatory award. ( Ramona Manor Convalescent Hospital v. Care Enterprises (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1120, 1140 [ 225 Cal.Rptr. 120].) The reason for this is to ensure a reasonable relationship between the compensatory award and the amount of punitive damages. ( Ibid.) If an appeal results in an increase in the compensatory award, however, the plaintiff is not entitled to a reversal of the punitive damages award to keep pace with that increase. "The rule that exemplary damages must bear a reasonable relation to actual damages [citations] is designed solely to guard against excessive punitive damages. [Citation.]" ( Brewer, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 802; accord, Torres v. Automobile Club of So. California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 771, 781 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 937 P.2d 290].) Absent a showing of error in the award of punitive damages, we conclude that any increase in the compensatory award as a result of this appeal cannot justify a reversal of the punitive damages award.

12. The Attorney Fee Award Was. Unauthorized

a. Trial Court Decision

The trial court awarded the Uzyels $13,364,530 in attorney fees under section 17211, subdivision (b), which provides for an award of attorney fees and litigation expenses in favor of a beneficiary who contests the trustee's account if the court determines that the trustee's opposition to the contest was "without reasonable cause and in bad faith." Section 17211, subdivision (b) states: "If a beneficiary contests the trustee's account and the court determines that the trustee's opposition to the contest was without reasonable cause and in bad faith, the court may award the contestant the costs of the contestant and other expenses and costs of litigation, including attorney's fees, incurred to contest the account. The amount awarded shall be a charge against the compensation or other interest of the trustee in the trust. The trustee shall be personally liable and on the bond, if any, for any amount that remains unsatisfied."

Section 17211 also provides for an award of attorney fees and litigation expenses in favor of the trustee if the court determines that a beneficiary's contest of the trustee's account was "without reasonable cause and in bad faith." ( Id., subd. (a).)

The trial court concluded that this proceeding involved a contest of an account within the meaning of the statute. The court stated further that Kadisha had reasonable cause to oppose the contest only if a reasonable attorney knowing the facts known to Kadisha at the time of his opposition would have believed that his opposition to each claim was legally tenable.

Kadisha did not challenge this ruling in his appellate briefs. He argued in a letter submitted to this court shortly before oral argument that the trial court had no authority to award attorney fees under section 17211, subdivision (b) because this proceeding did not involve a contest of a trustee's account, citing Soria v. Soria (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 780 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 91] and distinguishing Leader v. Cords (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1588 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 505]. We need not decide whether to exercise our discretion to consider this belated argument because we conclude that the award was unauthorized for another reason. Accordingly, we express no opinion as to whether section 17211 could apply in these circumstances.

The trial court found that at the time he opposed the Uzyels' claims in this litigation, Kadisha knew the pertinent facts relating to his misappropriations of trust funds, his preparation of "fraudulent accountings" to conceal his misappropriations, his failure to administer the trusts in the interests of the beneficiaries, his failure to invest prudently, and other misconduct. The court stated that Kadisha also knew that to prevent the court from discovering his wrongdoings, he would have to commit and suborn perjury. The court concluded that no reasonable attorney knowing those facts would have believed that Kadisha could be exonerated if the facts were presented in a truthful manner. The statement of decision stated: "No reasonable attorney could believe that presenting the facts outlined above in a way that is consistent with the truth could result in Kadisha's exoneration on any legal ground. And no reasonable attorney could have put Kadisha and his witnesses on the stand knowing that they would have to give untrue testimony (as they did) in order to provide a defense. In addition, a reasonable attorney would have known that if the Court did not believe Kadisha or his witnesses, it could disregard all of their testimony (as the Court has done), and that, as a result, Kadisha would have no evidence to support his opposition. In short, no reasonable attorney could have believed that an opposition based on false testimony was legally tenable, [¶] Since no reasonable attorney would have thought Kadisha's opposition legally tenable, the Court finds that Kadisha's opposition was unreasonable."

The trial court also found that Kadisha had opposed the contest in bad faith because he conducted his defense primarily for an improper purpose.

b. Kadisha Had Reasonable Cause to Defend This Litigation

Kadisha contends the Uzyels are not entitled to an award of attorney fees under section 17211, subdivision (b) because his opposition to their claims was not "without reasonable cause." He argues that a trustee's opposition to a beneficiary's contest of an account is "without reasonable cause" only if no reasonable attorney would have opposed the contest. He also argues that he successfully defended several claims seeking, in aggregate, more money than the Uzyels were awarded on their successful claims.

(25) Section 17211, subdivision (b) authorizes an award of attorney fees and litigation expenses in favor of a beneficiary who contests the trustee's account if the trustee's opposition to the contest was "without reasonable cause and in bad faith." (§ 17211, subd. (b).) "Reasonable cause," when used with reference to the prosecution of a claim, ordinarily is synonymous with "probable cause" as used in the malicious prosecution context. ( Kobzoff v. Los Angeles County Harbor/UCLA Medical Center (1998) 19 Cal.4th 851, 857 L80 Cal.Rptr.2d 803, 968 P.2d 514] ( Kobzoff) [construing "reasonable cause" in Code Civ. Proc., § 1038, subd. (a)].)

The same language, "without reasonable cause and in bad faith," is also found in other Probate Code sections providing for an award of attorney fees and litigation expenses in connection with objections to accounts by other fiduciaries. (§§ 2622.5 [guardianship and conservatorship accounts], 11003 [accounts by the personal representative of a decedent's estate].)

"Reasonable cause" may have a different meaning in other contexts where the term has been defined by the Legislature. (See, e.g., former § 21306, subd. (b), amended by Stats. 2000, ch. 17, § 6, and repealed by Stats. 2008, ch. 174, §§ 1, 3.)

"Probable cause" to prosecute an action means an objectively reasonable belief that the action is legally tenable. ( Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 292 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 638, 139 P.3d 30].) There was no probable cause to prosecute an action only if no reasonable attorney would have believed that the action had any merit and any reasonable attorney would have agreed that the action was totally and completely without merit. ( Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 743, fn. 13 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 636, 74 P.3d 737]; Wilson v. Parker, Covert Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 817 [ 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, 50 P.3d 733].) The probable cause determination is objective and is based on the facts known to the malicious prosecution defendant at the time the action was initiated or prosecuted. ( Zamos v. Stroud (2004) 32 Cal.4th 958, 971 [ 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 54, 87 P.3d 802].) Probable cause is a low threshold designed to protect a litigant's right to assert arguable legal claims even if the claims are extremely unlikely to succeed. ( Jarrow Formulas, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 742-743; Wilson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 817.)

In contrast, "bad faith" in this context concerns the trustee's subjective state of mind and cannot be inferred from the absence of probable cause alone. (Cf. Downey Venture v. LMI Ins. Co. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 478, 498-499 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 142] [discussing the "malice" element of malicious prosecution].)

Whether there was probable cause to prosecute an action in light of the facts then known to the malicious prosecution defendant is a legal question for the court to decide. ( Wilson v. Parker, Covert Chidester, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 817; Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 875 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 336, 765 P.2d 498].) Any controversy as to what facts were known to the malicious prosecution defendant at the time the action was initiated presents a question of fact for the trier of fact. ( Sheldon Appel, supra, at p. 881.) If there is no dispute as to what facts were known or if the factual dispute is not material to the probable cause determination, the existence of probable cause is a pure question of law. ( Ibid.)

(26) The question here is the meaning of "reasonable cause" with reference to the defense, rather than the prosecution, of a proceeding. Contrary to the trial court, we believe that reasonable cause in this context does not require an objectively reasonable belief, based on the facts then known to the trustee, that the trustee would be completely exonerated. Instead, we believe that reasonable cause to oppose a contest of an account requires an objectively reasonable belief, based on the facts then known to the trustee, either that the claims are legally or factually unfounded or that the petitioner is not entitled to the requested remedies. Conversely, there would be no reasonable cause to oppose a contest of an account only if all reasonable attorneys would have agreed that the opposition was totally without merit, or, in other words, no reasonable attorney would have believed that the opposition had any merit. As with probable cause, we independently review the trial court's finding on the existence of reasonable cause absent any factual dispute as to Kadisha's knowledge at the time. (Cf. Kobzoff, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 857; but see Guardianship of K.S. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1533 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 78] [applying the abuse of discretion standard to findings under § 2622.5 that objections to an account were without reasonable cause and in bad faith].)

Kadisha successfully opposed several substantial claims in the trial court, including claims for the disgorgement of profits earned on shares that he purchased in August 1988 and September 1989, damages for the misappropriation of trust funds, lost profits resulting from the sale of Trust No. 2's Qualcomm stock in April 1999, and other claims. His successful opposition to those claims shows that he had reasonable cause to oppose them. Moreover, the claims on which Kadisha did not avoid liability presented questions concerning the existence of liability, measure of damages, or amount of disgorgement that were at least arguable. Our review of the award of the disgorgement of profits arising from Kadisha's stock purchase from Farahnik in May 1991, the award of lost profits resulting from the sale of Trust No. 2's Qualcomm stock in May 1992, and the award of lost profits resulting from his failure to protect Trust No. 1's investment in Qualcomm stock in and after January 2000 has revealed substantial questions concerning the existence or amount of liability on those claims. We conclude that Kadisha had reasonable cause to defend against the Uzyels' claims in this proceeding and that they are not entitled to an award of attorney fees under section 17211, subdivision (b).

We express no opinion concerning Kadisha's opposition to the claim for the disgorgement of profits arising from Kadisha's purchase of Trust No. 2's interest in Carson `93. Kadisha does not challenge that award on appeal. The Uzyels did not seek an apportionment of attorney fees, so we need not decide whether apportionment would be appropriate or whether Kadisha's opposition to the claim was "without reasonable cause and in bad faith" (§ 17211, subd. (b)).

In light of our conclusion, we need not address Kadisha's contention that the attorney fee award is excessive or the Uzyels' contention that an award of "expenses and costs of litigation" under section 17211, subdivision (b) can include expenses that are not recoverable as costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5. The Uzyels have shown no error in the award of costs.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed as to (1) the award of the disgorgement of profits arising from Kadisha's stock purchase from Farahnik, with directions to award the Uzyels an amount based on the value of the shares on November 22, 1996, as set forth in the order of February 5, 2007; (2) the award of damages resulting from Kadisha's use of trust funds to pay for his legal defense, with directions to modify the award as stated ante; (3) the denial of prejudgment interest on the award of the disgorgement of profits arising from Kadisha's stock purchase from Farahnik in May 1991, with directions to modify the award by adding prejudgment interest from September 19, 2000, at the rate of 10 percent; (4) the denial of prejudgment interest on the award of damages resulting from the sale of Trust No. 2's Qualcomm stock in May 1992, with directions to modify the award by adding prejudgment interest from September 18, 2000, at the rate of 7 percent; (5) the denial of prejudgment interest on the award of lost profits resulting from the failure to sell Trust No. 1's Qualcomm stock in January 2000, with directions to modify the award by adding prejudgment interest from September 18, 2000, at the rate of 10 percent; and (6) the entitlement to an attorney fee award, with directions to deny a fee award. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects. The order determining the amount of and awarding attorney fees is reversed. Kadisha's appeal from the order awarding costs is dismissed, and the order awarding costs is affirmed. Each party is to bear its own costs on appeal.

Klein, P. J., and Kitching, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied September 22, 2010, and the petition of appellant Neil Kadisha for review by the Supreme Court was denied December 15, 2010, S 187744.