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IN RE NM HOLDINGS CO. LLC

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Sep 30, 2010
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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

E. WEBBER JR., District Judge

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant J. Douglas Cassity's Motion to Strike [doc. #286], Defendant J. Douglas Cassity's Motion for Entry of a Protective Order [doc. #335], Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses of Defendant Katherine P. Scannell [doc. #316], and Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses of Defendants Lennie J. Cappleman, Tony B. Lumpkin, III, Randall J. Singer, and George Wise, III [doc. #268].

I. DEFENDANT CASSITY'S MOTION TO STRIKE

In his Motion to Strike, Defendant J. Douglas Cassity ("Cassity") argues that certain — ultimately, most — of Plaintiffs' allegations in their Complaint should be stricken pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f) because they contain "derogatory, scandalous, and repulsive language," because Plaintiffs' lengthy allegations fail to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)'s "short and plain statement" pleading requirement, because Plaintiffs' fraud claims are not pled with particularity as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b), and because Plaintiffs' allegation regarding Cassity's prior criminal conviction is irrelevant to the present matter.

A district court has "liberal discretion" with respect to granting motions to strike under Rule 12(f), but the Eighth Circuit has recognized that "striking a party's pleadings is an extreme measure," and that therefore such motions "are viewed with disfavor and are infrequently granted." Standbury Law Firm v. I.R.S., 221 F.3d 1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted). With respect to Cassity's argument that Plaintiffs' allegations both contain irrelevant and inflammatory allegations, and that they fail to plead fraud with particularity as required by Rule 9(b), the Court finds that these arguments are best addressed in connection with his Motion to Dismiss. As for the allegation concerning Cassity's criminal record, Plaintiffs have made a colorable argument that this is relevant in the present litigation, and in any event Cassity fails to demonstrate how he would be prejudiced by its continued inclusion in Plaintiffs' pleadings. See Sobba v. Elmen, 462 F. Supp. 2d 944, 946 (E.D. Ark. 2006) (in order for a motion to strike to be granted with respect to certain allegations, a plaintiff must demonstrate that "their presence in the pleading throughout the proceeding will be prejudicial") (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, Cassity's Motion to Strike will be denied.

II. DEFENDANT CASSITY'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

In this Motion, Cassity asks the Court to enter a protective order prohibiting Plaintiff Donna J. Garrett, Special Deputy Receiver in the related Texas receivership proceedings, from obtaining and serving subpoenas in that action concerning his American Express credit card records. This Court has recognized, however, that its authority over discovery matters does not extend to other proceedings or to materials obtained in connection with them, and the Court therefore has no power to grant the relief requested. See Schoenbaum v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 2008 WL 4790332, at *2 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (quoting Kirshner v. Uniden Corp. of America, 842 F.2d 1074, 1081 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[A] district court's power to control discovery does not extend to material discovered in a separate action, notwithstanding the fact that the parties are identical.")). If the Court were to grant Cassity's Motion, it would in effect be attempting to over-rule the receivership court's determination with respect to the issuance of subpoenas in that proceeding, and the Court is unaware of any authority recognizing a district court's power to issue such an order. As such, Cassity's Motion will be denied.

In response to Cassity's Motion, Plaintiffs assert that they should be awarded their costs in responding to the Motion, based on the lack of authority for his position and his alleged failure to meet and confer with them prior to filing it. The Court is satisfied, however, that Cassity's Motion was filed in good faith, and that he will in the future strictly comply with Rule 26(c)(1)'s meet and confer requirement. The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs' request will be denied.

III. PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS TO STRIKE

In their Motions to Strike, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants Katherine Scannell ("Scannell"), Lennie Cappleman ("Cappleman"), Tony Lumpkin ("Lumpkin"), Randall Singer ("Singer"), and George Wise ("Wise") have raised affirmative defenses implicating the conduct of state regulators that should be stricken because they are insufficient as a matter of law.

In this litigation, Plaintiffs assert claims on behalf of National Prearranged Services, Inc. ("NPS"), Lincoln Memorial Life Insurance Company ("Lincoln"), and Memorial Service Life Insurance Company ("Memorial"). Scannell is former general counsel for all of these entities, and Cappleman, Lumpkin, Singer and Wise all served as officers or directors for Lincoln or Memorial; Wise was also employed as an actuarial consultant to Lincoln and Memorial during the time period relevant to Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs allege that these Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for, among other things, breach of fiduciary duty, and each of these Defendants has responded with an affirmative defense asserting that he or she relied on information obtained from state regulators in taking the actions alleged to be unlawful.

Scannell, in response to Plaintiffs' Motion, filed a Notice with the Court [doc. #354] indicating her intention to withdraw her Fifteenth Affirmative Defense, and as such, Plaintiffs' Motion is moot to the extent it concerns that defense. Because Plaintiffs concede that the remaining affirmative defenses they contend should be stricken from her Answer only potentially involve reliance on regulatory conduct, the Court concludes that their Motion concerning Scannell will be denied. Cappleman, Singer, Lumpkin, and Wise, however, contend that their affirmative defenses, premised on reliance on regulators, should not be dismissed, because courts have in certain instances permitted such defenses to go forward.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f) provides that "the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense. . . ." A motion to strike on these grounds should be denied if "the insufficiency of the defense is not clearly apparent, or if it raises factual issues that should be determined on a hearing on the merits." Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 578 F. Supp. 1286, 1295 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (internal citation omitted).

The vast weight of authority holds that regulators owe no duty to corporate officers or directors, and that such corporate actors therefore should not be permitted to assert affirmative defenses based on regulators' actions. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Co. v. Renda, 692 F. Supp. 128, 135-36 (D. Kan. 1988) (listing authorities for the proposition that the "regulatory activities of a government agency do not give rise to a duty to discover and report possible fraud or wrongdoing to a bank or its officers, directors, shareholders, creditors, or depositors"); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gibson, 829 F. Supp. 1103, 1106 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (collecting cases in which courts prohibited directors and officers from raising comparative or contributory negligence affirmative defenses based on the conduct of government regulators); see also State of North Dakota v. Merchants Nat'l Bank Trust Co., 634 F.2d 368, 379 n. 20 (8th Cir. 1980) (noting, in dicta, several cases in which courts from other circuits had concluded that a government agency's statutory obligation to conduct regular examinations of national banks does not give rise to a cause of action against the agency for damages caused by its negligent performance of those duties). As the Western District of Missouri recognized in Gibson, this conclusion can be based not only on the absence of a duty owed to the subjects of government regulation, but also on public policy, in that allowing directors or officers to evade liability on this basis could undermine industry stability and public confidence in government regulation. 829 F. Supp. at 1107.

These Defendants concede that most authorities are contrary to their position, but they do identify one case in which the court concluded that regulators assumed a duty to an entity's officers and directors by acting outside their normal regulatory function and participating in the actual operations of the target entity. See In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., 445 F. Supp. 723, 731-734 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). The court recognized, however, that the regulators' conduct was alleged to be "grossly arbitrary and capricious," and that the allegations presented therefore might present the "extraordinary case" in which government regulators could be found to have assumed and breached a duty by acting outside the ordinary boundaries of their authority. Id. at 734; see also id. at 733 (suggesting that liability would lie only where the regulator's conduct amounts to "a trap . . . calculated to lure the officers, directors and supervisory committee into a complete disregard of their duties") (internal quotations and citation omitted).

The situation presented in Franklin, however, is plainly different from the one in this case. In Franklin, the court denied the FDIC's motion to dismiss counterclaims asserted against it by the insurers of a failed bank. See id. at 726. As Plaintiffs persuasively argue, this case is entirely different because here it is the directors and officers of the entity themselves, and not a relatively innocent insurer, attempting to avoid liability based on a duty owed by government regulators. Cf. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Renda, 692 F. Supp. 128, 136 (D. Kan. 1988) ("The defendants are the alleged defrauders of the failed institutions; to allow them to counterclaim and defend against the FDIC and the FSLIC by alleging that the agencies failed to discover and report the defendants' fraud to the institutions would be absurd."). Furthermore, all of the above-cited cases discussing whether the regulators owed a duty to the regulated entity all involved situations in which the plaintiffs were the regulators, and the defendant officers and directors sought to assert the negligence of the plaintiffs as an affirmative defense. Here, in contrast, the regulators are not parties to this litigation, and it therefore appears to the Court that even if these Defendants could establish that Plaintiffs' alleged losses arose out of breaches of duties owed by third parties, it would be entirely irrelevant to the question of their liability to Plaintiffs.

The Court therefore concludes that Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike with respect to Cappleman, Lumpkin, Singer, and Wise will be granted. Plaintiffs have met their burden of demonstrating that these Defendants' affirmative defenses based on reliance on regulatory approval are legally insufficient, and accordingly these defenses will be stricken from Defendants' Answers.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant J. Douglas Cassity's Motion to Strike [doc. #286] is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant J. Douglas Cassity's Motion for Protective Order [doc. #335] is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses of Defendant Katherine P. Scannell [doc. #316] is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses of Defendants Lennie J. Cappleman, Tony B. Lumpkin, III, Randall J. Singer, and George Wise, III [doc. #268] is GRANTED.

Dated this 30th Day of September, 2010.

however, itself has an exception:

The sole actor rule is an exception to the adverse interest exception. . . . The sole actor rule comes into play where the wrongdoer is, in essence, the corporation (the "sole actor"). Indeed, it has its roots in cases where the agent and the principal are literally the same person (literally a "sole actor") and thus information obtained by a person in his role as an agent is treated as also being obtained in his role as principal, even if his activities as agent are contrary to his interests as a principal. Therefore, where the wrongdoer acts contrary to the interests of the corporation, under the adverse interest exception the wrongdoer's conduct would not ordinarily be imputed to the corporation. But where the wrongdoer is a sole actor, the adverse interest exception is not applied and his wrongdoing is nevertheless imputed to the corporation.
MCA Fin. Corp., 687 N.W.2d at 860. Thus, for example, "where a sole shareholder loots the corporation of its assets[,] the adverse interest exception will not apply." Id.

We pause to note Gold's argument that a court cannot undertake the imputation analysis without first applying Michigan's wrongful-conduct rule, which "precludes a plaintiff from recovering on a claim that is based on the plaintiffs own wrongdoing." Id. at 853. In other words, Gold claims that the only actions that can be imputed to a corporation are those that are deemed wrongful by this common law rule. He then proceeds to argue that the wrongful-conduct rule does not apply to bar Venture's recovery because, among other things, Winget's conduct was not "prohibited or almost entirely prohibited under a penal or criminal statute." See Orzel v. Scott Drug Co., 449 Mich. 550, 537 N.W.2d 208, 214 (1995) (holding that a plaintiffs claim that a pharmacy negligently supplied him with a controlled substance was barred because the harm was caused, at least in part, by the plaintiffs illegal conduct).

This argument is contradicted by the caselaw cited above that explicitly acknowledges that courts can impute a corporate agent's knowledge in addition to an agent's wrongful conduct. And the only case cited by Gold to support his argument regarding the proper order of analysis, MCA Financial, is distinguishable. In that case, the Michigan Court of Appeals first held that the wrongful-conduct rule applied to the actions of individual officers of the corporation. Next, the court went on to hold that the wrongful conduct of these officers would be imputed to the entire corporation, thus barring the corporation from recovering on its claims against its former auditor. MCA Fin. Corp., 687 N.W.2d at 857-61.

To argue, however, that MCA Financial stands for the proposition that imputation can occur only if the wrongful-conduct rule applies is inaccurate. Indeed, the Michigan Supreme Court has applied the imputation rule without undertaking a wrongful-conduct analysis. In National Turners Building Loan Ass'n v. Schreitmueller, 288 Mich. 580, 285 N.W. 497 (1939), which appears to be the earliest Michigan case applying the sole-actor rule, the Court held that a corporate agent's knowledge should be imputed to the corporation where the agent issued a fraudulent stock certificate to an investor. The corporation thus could not seek to cancel the stock certificate because "[i]f a corporation is so lax as to trust the whole of a transaction to one officer, it should suffer the consequences of his misfeasance as an officer." Id. at 499. Importantly, the Court under-took the imputation analysis, see id. at 499-500, without any mention of the wrongful-conduct rule, which was solidly in place in Michigan at the time of the Court's decision. See, e.g., Garwols v. Bankers Trust Co., 251 Mich. 420, 232 N.W. 239, 240-42 (1930); McDonald v. Hall, 193 Mich. 50, 159 N.W. 358, 362 (1916). Gold's argument that imputation can occur only where the wrongful-conduct rule applies is thus without merit.

Returning now to the imputation analysis, we note that Gold alleges that Winget used his power as CEO to cause Venture to enter into the related-party transactions. This allegation meets the threshold requirement for the imputation rule. But Gold also alleges that Winget's transactions were "solely in his own interest and entirely against the interests of Venture," which implicates the adverse-interest exception. Deloitte responds by arguing that Winget was clearly the sole actor because he was the CEO and sole shareholder of Venture. See In re Mediators, Inc., 105 F.3d 822, 827 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Where, as here, a sole shareholder is alleged to have stripped the corporation of assets, the adverse interest exception to the presumption of knowledge cannot apply."), cited in MCA Fin. Corp., 687 N.W.2d at 860 n. 28.

And Gold does not seriously dispute that Winget was the sole actor through this point in the imputation analysis. Indeed, at oral argument, Gold's counsel conceded that the sole-actor rule would be applicable but for the "innocent-decisionmaker exception" to the sole-actor rule. This exception was most clearly articulated in In re Sharp International Corp., 278 B.R. 28, 39 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 2002), where the court declined to apply the sole-actor rule to impute the knowledge of Sharp's CEO in perpetrating a fraud to the corporation because the complaint alleged "the presence of a person with the ability to bring an end to the fraudulent activity at issue." Id. That is, there was "an innocent 13% shareholder who served on Sharp's board of directors, served as a consultant to Sharp, regularly visited Sharp's offices, and regularly received and reviewed financial statements," and who "could or would have prevented the fraud had he known about it." Id. at 37, 39. These allegations were deemed sufficient to defeat the applicability of the sole-actor exception.

Here, Gold contends that Venture's creditors and the Fairness Committee were innocent decision-makers because they had the authority to stop Winget from entering into the related-party transactions. He argues that given the presence of these innocent parties, Winget cannot be considered to be Venture's sole actor, meaning that Winget's knowledge should not be imputed to Venture so as to bar any recovery by Venture.

We first note that no Michigan court has thus far adopted the innocent-decision-maker exception. See MCA Fin. Corp., 687 N.W.2d at 861 (stating that the court "need not consider whether to apply the Sharp exception to the sole actor rule"). Nonetheless, as explained below, Gold still fails to state a claim for relief even if the Michigan courts would apply the innocent-decision-maker exception in the imputation context.

3. Alleged reliance by the Fairness Committee

The relevant allegations in the first amended complaint regarding Venture's Fairness Committee are as follows:

312. Section 4.12 of [the NBD loan indenture agreement] . . . required the formation of a "Fairness Committee" to review related party transactions. The Indentures required at least one member of the Fairness Committee to be independent of Venture and its principals, which independent member effectively wielded veto power over related party transactions.
. . .
320. Not only would timely and proper disclosure of these transactions have caused NBD, the noteholders and indenture trustees to force Winget to cease the unfair related party transactions, but . . . such disclosures would have caused the independent member of the Fairness Committee to act to avoid or at the very least reduce the corporate injury suffered by Venture as a result of Winget's improper related party transactions.
321. As required under certain of its indentures and loan agreements . . ., Venture maintained a Fairness Committee, which had a sole and independent member, Maurice Williams, who was empowered to evaluate and approve or disapprove of any related party transactions undertaken by Winget. Because Venture was required to retain an independent member of the Fairness Committee, Mr. Williams . . . could not be terminated at the whim of Winget without placing Venture in default under various agreements. In this capacity, Mr. Williams possessed greater corporate power than an officer or director of Venture, because he had the unilateral and absolute authority to prevent Winget from undertaking or continuing any unfair related party transactions. On information and belief, Mr. Williams was innocent of Winget's misconduct . . ., and was able to prevent it had the misconduct been known.
322. Deloitte was fully aware of the existence and powers of the Fairness Committee. Deloitte obtained minutes of the meetings of the Fairness Committee, knew of Mr. Williams' identity and role, and was fully able to communicate with Mr. Williams about the related party transactions it was auditing.

Even assuming (without deciding) that these allegations are enough to state a claim that Williams was an innocent decision-maker who could prevent Winget's knowledge from being imputed to Venture, the allegations are insufficient in a critical way: They contain no statement that Williams actually relied on Deloitte's audits in choosing not to act. Even more fundamental, there is no allegation that Williams ever saw the audits.

The amended complaint does allege that properly conducted audits "would have caused the independent member of the Fairness Committee to act," but this statement is, at most, a mere "formulaic recitation" of the causation element of a professional-negligence claim and is not sufficient to state a claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation omitted) (holding that the plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim for relief because it contained conclusory allegations that were not entitled to the assumption of truth). An allegation that Williams in fact saw and relied on the audits would be the "further factual enhancement" that is needed to support this "naked assertion." See id. (citation omitted). In sum, Gold's amended complaint can hardly "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" if it does not even allege that Williams saw the audits. See id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

This deficiency is especially glaring in comparison to the explicit statements regarding creditor reliance. The amended complaint, for example, alleged that Deloitte "issued certain opinions directly to NBD Bank and to the noteholders," that "Venture was obligated to supply audited financial statements to the noteholders," and that Deloitte "directly reported" to Venture's creditors. In addition, the amended complaint alleged that Deloitte specifically represented to the creditors "that it was not aware of any violation of applicable covenants, including covenants prohibiting Venture from making distributions to Winget." Most importantly, the amended complaint alleged that "the note-holders relied upon Deloitte's representations in determining whether Venture was in compliance with the covenants set forth in the indenture." These specific allegations of creditor reliance are in sharp contrast to the allegations regarding the Fairness Committee.

Particularly striking is the fact that Gold amended his complaint to add specific examples of creditor reliance. In Gold's original complaint, there were no allegations of reliance on the audits by anyone. Deloitte subsequently filed a motion to dismiss Gold's original complaint, arguing that because the complaint did not (and could not) allege that Venture itself relied on the audits, Gold had failed to state a claim. Presumably in response to this contention, Gold amended his complaint to add allegations of reliance. These new allegations, however, related only to reliance by Venture creditors, not by Williams as the sole member of the Fairness Committee.

Williams, in other words, might or might not be considered an innocent decision-maker within Venture for the purpose of overcoming the sole-actor rule. But without any allegations that Williams relied on Deloitte's audits, Gold has failed to satisfy the causation element for a professional-negligence claim even if Williams were so considered.

4. Alleged reliance by creditors

Gold's final argument related to Count I is that the amended complaint alleges reliance on the audits by Venture's creditors. According to Gold, this reliance would establish causation. He also claims that the creditors acted as innocent decision-makers, thus keeping Winget's knowledge from being imputed to Venture. In analyzing this third-party reliance argument, we must bear in mind Gold's role as the trustee in bankruptcy for Venture. The key point is that "a bankruptcy trustee has no standing generally to sue third parties on behalf of the estate's creditors, but may only assert claims held by the bankrupt corporation itself." Shearson Lehman Button, Inc. v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1991). Gold, in other words, represents Venture, not Venture's creditors.

The Fifth Circuit directly faced the issue of third-party reliance in FDIC v. Ernst Young, 967 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1992). In that case, Western Savings Association was in a precarious financial condition because its sole shareholder, Jarrett Woods, had entered into "unsafe and unsound" ventures. Id. at 168. As a result, federal regulators required Western to undergo an outside review of its financial condition. Ernst Young (EY) subsequently certified that Western was in a strong financial condition when, in fact, it was insolvent. The FDIC was the assignee of Western after the latter's assets were placed in the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Resolution Fund. As assignee, the FDIC sued EY, alleging professional negligence.

After noting that reliance is a necessary element for such a claim, the court stated that the issue before it was "whether either Woods or Western relied upon [EY's] audit to cause injury to Western." Id. at 170. The court held that, under the imputation rule, Woods's knowledge was imputable to Western, so neither could have relied on the audit. Id. at 171.

The court then rejected the FDIC's alleged cause of action based on the argument that third parties had relied on the audits:

The FDIC argues that even if neither Woods nor Western relied upon the audit, [EY's] alleged negligence caused the losses because had the audits been accurate, someone, such as Western's creditors or government regulators, would have "rescued" Western. This argument is flawed because it is not an appropriate argument for Western, or its assignee, to make. Western cannot claim it should recover from EY for not being rescued by a third party for something Western was already aware of and chose to ignore. Neither can Western's assignee make the claim. The FDIC in its own capacity or Western's creditors might be able to make this claim, but the FDIC brought this suit only on Western's behalf.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that [EY] negligently audited Western's books, we do not hold that EY can never be held liable for its negligence. Either Western's creditors or the FDIC on its own behalf may have a cause of action against EY. Moreover, we are not holding that an auditor is never liable to a corporation when a corporation's employee or agent acts fraudulently on the corporation's behalf. We limit our holding narrowly to the facts of this case under Texas law — i.e. the FDIC, as assignee of a corporation with a dominating sole owner, sues an auditor for negligently performing an audit upon which neither the owner nor the corporation relied.
Id. at 171-72; see also Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v. Coopers Lybrand, LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting an argument that the corporation's creditors or underwriter could have acted as innocent insiders and could have rescued the company from the fraudulent transaction, reasoning that such third-party reliance is "legally irrelevant" to a claim by the trustee in bankruptcy).

The argument that Gold makes in the present case is essentially the same as that made by EY. Perhaps Venture's creditors could have prevented Winget from continuing to enter into related-party transactions had they known about them. But this is not an appropriate claim for Gold (who stands in the shoes of Venture) to make. As Deloitte points out, Gold is attempting to combine reliance by the creditors with the harm suffered by Venture to establish a claim brought by Venture against Deloitte. We conclude that the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Ernst Young is sound, and hold that third-party reliance of this type is insufficient to establish causation in a professional-negligence action.

In sum, Gold's amended complaint does not allege reliance by Venture or by Venture's Fairness Committee. And the alleged reliance by Venture's creditors cannot support a claim brought by Gold on behalf of Venture. The district court thus did not err in dismissing Count I of Gold's amended complaint for failure to state a claim.

C. Count II: Aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary duty

Turning now to Count II, Gold alleged that by "knowingly failing to disclose" the nature of the related-party transactions and by improperly issuing un-qualified opinions, Deloitte aided and abetted Winget in his breach of his fiduciary duty owed to Venture. The district court held that this claim was covered by the residual three-year statute of limitations for tort claims contained in Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. `§ 600.5805(10), which states that "[t]he period of limitations is 3 years after the time of the death or injury for all other actions to recover damages for the death of a person, or for injury to a person or property." It further concluded that the claim accrued when Venture filed for bankruptcy on March 28, 2003. Because Gold did not file suit against Deloitte until March 31, 2006, the claim was held to be time-barred. In so holding, the court reasoned that the statute of limitations for professional-negligence actions did not apply because the type of interest harmed in such an action was different:

[I]n Gold's claim that Deloitte aided and abetted Winget's breach . . ., the interest harmed was Venture's interest in Winget's performance of his fiduciary duties. . . . Gold is not claiming that it was harmed due to Deloitte violating some duty it owed to Venture itself, which would be required for a negligence or malpractice claim.

Gold contends that this conclusion is erroneous. He argues instead that the two-year statute of limitations in Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5805(6), which applies to "an action charging malpractice," governs Count II. Although the statute of limitations period is shorter for a malpractice claim, the action would not accrue until Deloitte "discontinue[d] serving [Venture] in a professional . . . capacity." See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.5838(1). Gold contends that because Deloitte did not discontinue its service to Venture until May 4, 2004 (at the earliest), his aiding-and-abetting claim is not time-barred. He reasons that the aiding-and-abetting claim "sounds in malpractice regardless of the label attached to the claim," and that "Deloitte's duty to not aid and abet Winget[] . . . [is] the subject of the aiding and abetting claim. Winget's breaches of his duties are not the source of Deloitte's liability."

Deloitte, on the other hand, contends that the district court was correct in its application of the three-year statute of limitations to Count II. It reasons that the elements of an aiding-and-abetting claim "go well beyond" the elements of a professional-negligence claim, making the two claims separate and distinct.

In Michigan, "[t]he type of interest allegedly harmed is the focal point in determining which limitation period controls." Aldred v. O'Hara-Bruce, 184 Mich.App. 488, 458 N.W.2d 671, 672 (1990); see id. at 673 (holding that the plaintiffs claim was one of attorney malpractice, not breach of contract, because "damages flowed not from defendant's failure to represent their son, but from her failure to do so adequately"). There are at least two potential interests that could have been harmed if Deloitte aided and abetted Winget. First, Venture had an interest in having Deloitte adequately perform the audits. Venture had a second interest in having Winget properly perform his fiduciary duty by not looting the company. The interest that was ultimately harmed by Deloitte's alleged aiding and abetting was the interest that Venture had in having Winget properly perform his fiduciary duties. This is different from the interest harmed in a professional-negligence claim — the interest that a client has in receiving adequate performance by the outside professional.

Moreover, the nature of an aiding-and-abetting claim is different. See Tenneco Inc. v. Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co., 281 Mich. App. 429, 761 N.W.2d 846, 864 (2008) ("The true nature of a plaintiff's claim must be examined to determine the applicable statute of limitations."). In an aiding-and-abetting claim, the defendant is helping someone else commit the. primary wrong. This is fundamentally different from a malpractice claim, in which the primary wrong is committed by the defendant itself.

The elements of the cause of action are also different. In order to establish a claim of aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary duty, Gold would need to prove that (1) Winget breached his duty to Venture, (2) Deloitte knew that Winget's conduct constituted a breach of his duty to Venture, and (3) Deloitte gave "substantial assistance or encouragement" to Winget "so to conduct himself." See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b), cited in Carson Fischer, PLC v. Standard Fed. Bank, Nos. 248125, 248167, 2005 WL 292343, at *6 (Mich.Ct.App. 2005), reversed on other grounds by 475 Mich. 851, 713 N.W.2d 265 (2006).

The differences between an aiding-and-abetting claim and a professional-negligence claim are thus substantial. For the former cause of action, there is no requirement that Deloitte owed any duty to Venture. But Gold would need to establish that Deloitte provided substantial assistance or encouragement to Winget in breaching the latter's fiduciary duty to the company. Most importantly, an aiding-and-abetting claim requires proof that Deloitte acted knowingly, whereas a professional-negligence claim requires proof of only negligent behavior. Given the differences in the interests harmed, as well as the differences in the nature and elements of these two types of claims, the district court did not err in holding that the residual statute of limitations applied to Gold's aiding-and-abetting claim.

Gold has also failed to cite a single case where a Michigan court has applied the professional-negligence statute of limitations to an aiding-and-abetting claim. The primary case cited by Gold on this issue, Alken-Ziegler, Inc. v. George Bearup, Smith, Haughey, Rice Roegge, P.C., No. 264513, 2006 WL 572571 (Mich.Ct.App. 2006), is easily distinguishable. The corporate plaintiff in Alken-Ziegler filed suit against its former attorneys, arguing that they committed malpractice by failing to appeal an order and committed breach of contract where the contract provided that the attorneys would appeal. Id. at *1. The court first concluded that the corporation's malpractice claim was time-barred. Id. at *2. Although the corporation then argued that its breach-of-contract claim was distinct from its malpractice claim, and thus subject to a separate statute of limitations, the court disagreed:

[C]laims against attorneys brought on the basis of inadequate representation sound in tort and are governed by the malpractice statute of limitations, even though a plaintiff may assert that the attorney's actions breached a contract. Attorneys may be held liable under a contract theory, but only when it is shown that the attorney breached a special agreement rather than a general agreement to provide requisite skill or adequate legal services. A special agreement is a contract to perform a specific act, as opposed to a general agreement to exercise appropriate legal skill in providing representation in a lawsuit.
Id. at *3 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Alken-Ziegler does not support Gold's argument. The primary thrust behind the court's opinion in Alkerir-Ziegler was that both of the corporation's claims were based on allegations of inadequate representation. Id. Both were deemed similar enough to fall within the malpractice statute of limitations. Here, Gold's aiding-and-abetting claim is not based on an allegation that Deloitte breached its duty to Venture, but rather that Winget breached his duty to Venture and that Deloitte knowingly provided substantial assistance to help him do so. Gold's claim of aiding and abetting is therefore significantly different from his claim of professional negligence, thus warranting the application of a different statute of limitations.

III. CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of district court.